

Interface

A journal for and about social movements

VOL 5.2: FIVE YEARS OF INTERFACE JOURNAL



Interface volume 5 issue 2

Tenth issue celebration

***Interface:* a journal for and about social movements**

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Artwork

Front cover:

Marios Lolos has been a photojournalist for almost 25 years and has been the chair of the Union of Greek Photojournalists for the last 8 years.

Ο Μάριος Λωλος εργάζεται ως φωτορεπόρτερ εδώ και περίπου 25 χρόνια και είναι Πρόεδρος της Ένωσης Φωτορεπόρτε Ελλάδας τα τελευταία 8 χρόνια.

Inside cover:

Rydell lives in Aberdeen, Scotland, despite being born over in the USA. She draws in her free time and is a college student — though she accepts commissions and occasionally makes money from her art. Growing up in a very liberal and open environment, she is interested in feminism and religious teachings, as well as being an avid supporter and member of the LGBTQ community. The image in this issue was inspired by the rawness and impact of the feelings which fuel protests. You can contact her at skinnyrydell AT gmail.com.

About *Interface*

Interface: a journal for and about social movements is a peer-reviewed journal of practitioner research produced by movement participants and engaged academics. *Interface* is globally organised in a series of different regional collectives, and is produced as a multilingual journal. Peer-reviewed articles have been subject to double-blind review by one researcher and one movement practitioner.

The views expressed in any contributions to *Interface: a journal for and about social movements* are those of the authors and contributors, and do not necessarily represent those of *Interface*, the editors, the editorial collective, or the organizations to which the authors are affiliated. *Interface* is committed to the free exchange of ideas in the best tradition of intellectual and activist inquiry.

The *Interface* website is based at the National University of Ireland Maynooth.

NO NOS VANOS
NOS ECHAN



INTERFACE

Interface tenth issue

Interface editorial spokescouncil (contributions from Lesley Wood, Peter Waterman, Sara Motta, Alice Mattoni, Mandisi Majavu, Elizabeth Humphrys, Cristina Flesher Fominaya and Laurence Cox)

As we celebrate our fifth year anniversary, we make a departure from our existing practice to publish our first ever non-themed journal. Interestingly, despite every CFP stating that we always are open to non-themed contributions, we frequently receive questions about this so we thought a general issue might help highlight the issue once and for all: *we are always open to contributions on any social movement related subject even if we issue themed calls for papers.*

Normally, our editorials are jointly written by the editors who have taken the lead on designing the theme of the issue and writing the original call for papers. They are somewhat unusual for journal editorials in that they attempt to be a sort of state of the art on the theme under discussion in the issue, from the perspectives of the editors coordinating the issue. They often involve intense debate, dialogues and compromises between a diverse range of positions before finally coalescing in what we hope are more or less coherent position papers. They take a lot of work and we hope they are in themselves important contributions (the fact that they do get cited and reprinted gives us some basis for this hope).

This issue, however, we are doing something completely different in that we are simply individually reflecting on our experience with the journal since its inception, and offering those reflections in a very loosely edited fashion for any of our readers who might be interested in knowing more about how the Interface project began and where we would like it to go from here. For those of you who simply want to get on to what is in store for you in this issue, you can skip the trip down memory lane, and jump straight to the section titled "In this issue".

And now for something completely different:

How did *Interface* start, and what did we think we were up to?

Cristina¹: The *Interface* project was born out of a proposal launched during an annual conference in Manchester that brings together academics and activists.

¹ This is adapted from a chapter co-authored with Laurence Cox and published as Cristina Flesher Fominaya y Laurence Cox "El Proyecto Interface: una reflexión sobre los movimientos sociales y el conocimiento". Alberto Arribas Lozano, Nayra García-González, Aurora Álvarez Veinguer y Antonio Ortega Santos (eds.) *Tentativas, Contagios, Desbordes. Territorios del Pensamiento*. Granada: Editorial Universidad de Granada, 2012, Pp. 171-185.

The Alternative Futures and Popular Protest conference has been organized for many years by Colin Barker and Mike Tyldesley and creates an environment where academic texts are subject to criticism by activists and where activist presentations are also subject to theoretical and analytical criticism by academics. Within this exchange of ideas and perspectives, the resulting production of knowledge seems to somehow to go beyond the boundaries of the different groups that make up the participants and become greater than the sum of its parts.

The proposal for the journal, therefore, was born out of the positive experience that many of the founders of the journal had had in this particular conference. At that time (2007) we had the sense that many social movement journals didn't really offer a lot of information that was of value for the social movements that were being analyzed. In some cases it seemed the journals were controlled by a nucleus of academic gatekeepers with a particular theoretical line who were perhaps not that open to new ideas coming from younger researchers who were also activists within the movements that they were studying.

On the other hand, we recognized that oftentimes movements produce a lot of knowledge but that it can be self-referential and not in dialogue with either other movements and groups, or with academic and theoretical work. In the context of a global movement of movements in which many activists had one foot in the academy and vice versa, the *Interface* project can be understood as a small part of a much wider process of the development of participant-action research by academic activists at that time.

Essentially we wanted to create a journal that would be open to a diverse range of perspectives, that wouldn't have a predetermined editorial line, that would be relevant for social movements, and that could offer a diverse and high-quality content. Above all we wanted to establish a bridge and a dialogue both between social movements in the academy and between different groups within social movements and the academy.

So we needed to work out an organizational model that would reflect our goals. After a lengthy period of debate and reflection we decided to organize ourselves in a decentralized and regional manner in which each editorial group would be quite autonomous in its own internal functioning but would have as a reference point the virtual editorial collective, and would have the obligation of following certain norms collectively developed in the editorial collective and to respect the decisions that were made there. Because of the great diversity of relationships between social movements and intellectual production in different regions of the world, we wanted a model that would allow sufficient flexibility for editors in particular regions to decide what worked best at their particular context.

Because we wanted to be truly accessible to people anywhere in the world we took for granted from the beginning that we would follow a true open access model of publishing in which no money of any kind would be exchanged on either end of the production process. The fact that we have been able to produce five years of issues of up to 500 pages each issue following this open access

model proves that it can be done. Of course, what this means is that a tremendous amount of work has gone into the journal, unpaid volunteer labor from the editors and the many collaborators who have helped us produce the journal over the past five years.

We follow a Creative Commons licensing model where contributors are free to republish their work, although we do ask that they credit the original publication in *Interface*. We feel that open access is a crucial way of realizing the vision of a truly global journal. If we have not yet managed to be truly global in terms of production, at least we can feel sure that in terms of who is able to read us, anyone with access to the internet can. We realize that an online only journal excludes people who do not have access to the internet, but the open access model means that any collective or person who can and wants to make hard copies of the journal available to individuals or groups is free to do so.

One of the key innovations of the journal was our modification of the process of peer review, in which all the peer-reviewed contributions would be reviewed by an activist and by an academic. This was crucial to us to avoid *Interface* simply becoming another social movement journal and also to maintain our focus on meeting needs of movements and maintaining to some degree a practical and useful orientation. In practice, so many of our reviewers are both activists and academics that we often end up asking them to evaluate a particular contribution from the perspective of one orientation or the other.

We felt peer review was important to maintain a high quality standard of articles, and to enable contributors to reach their full potential by benefiting from input from a number of sources, but on the other hand we realized that not everyone is interested in reading or producing an "academic" text and therefore it was important to us to also include a range of formats for contributions such as interviews, strategy texts, event analyses, etc. We try to be reflexive about the incorporation of different forms of contribution from movements around the world, and we are trying to imagine and integrate new forms of collaboration.

As an online open access journal that tries to reach whoever wants to read us we do run into some limitations of a technical nature. For some of us, it has long been a hope to incorporate more visual and artistic forms of contribution, but we are limited by the size of the PDF files that we can create – beyond a certain limit people around the world would not be able to download the issues without a very high-speed broadband connection. As technology advances this may be more possible in the future, or perhaps we will come up with a solution that will enable us to have articles with embedded video and so on.

Taking our vision and converting it into an actual working collective and journal was a long and arduous process. We worked for over a year and a half without producing anything at all, simply developing an organizational model that would work for the founders of the journal. It was a very lengthy process of dialogue and debate before we settled on a model that we all felt comfortable with and felt would work in practice. We never expected the journal to have the kind of response that we got. The diversity of contributions, the number of

readers around the world, and the many wonderful people who have wanted to collaborate with us has exceeded our wildest expectations.

The organizational challenges that we face are really the classic ones related to any kind of collective horizontal project: too few people actively participating, the challenges of trying to work in a participatory way, the difficulties of incorporating new people to an established working culture, the problems with some regional collectives that were unable to really get off the ground, and balancing the pressures of our own individual work and activism and finding time for the journal.

The other classic challenge is that when we incorporate new editors, sometimes people want to re-open debates and decisions that we have already discussed at great length and closed and we really don't want to start the whole debate up again! Going over the same ground again and again can be a cause for burnout. But of course this is the classic problem for horizontal groups when they enter into a period of growth and we need to strike a balance between being true to our original vision and in the decisions we've already taken, and incorporating new perspectives, new ideas, new proposals and new ways of working which is not always easy. We have, however, on the whole been incredibly lucky in finding people to work with who have enriched and developed the project.

Liz: I have been involved in *Interface* since its inception, hearing about it at a conference in Manchester that I attended. At that point I was studying a graduate certificate and was presenting a paper on a social movement I had been involved in. I considered myself an activist. I definitely did not think of myself as an academic. I was reading a lot of academic critiques on the 'gap' or disconnect between activist and academic knowledge, and the Interface project seemed to me an attempt to tackle this in a small way. I didn't know anybody else involved, but was impressed by people's openness and desire to see the project realized. Within three days I went from being isolated in Australia with a few thoughts on the problems of social movement scholarship, to someone engaged in a project to attempt to address some of those concerns. While others had been thinking about the possibility of *Interface* for a while, for me it was a whirlwind introduction.

Laurence: I think *Interface* mostly came out of the experience of a group of activists who felt they needed a wider canvas to think about the movements they were in (and so had taken on extra roles as researchers) and were disappointed both by the quality of much academic movements research and the barriers of form preventing people writing genuinely engaged research on movements within the academy. There were animated discussions around this at the Manchester Alternative Futures and Popular Protest (AFPP) conference in the mid-2000s. As I recall it the background experience of working together with people from different movements and political backgrounds in the alterglobalist movement of movements was a really important "learning moment" that made

it possible for us to work together - as of course AFPP's cross-discipline, non-sectarian and activist / academic atmosphere.

I think we thought we were pursuing the same theoretical explorations that had brought us there - needing to reach beyond our own movements, national contexts and political traditions and beyond given disciplinary constraints and the depoliticisation of scholarship, without for those reasons either giving up on serious intellectual work or on our own struggles. We had the phrase "learning from each other's struggles" which didn't make it into the journal's title but could have done. I also want to say that we were right in this - the global political shift of the late 2000s drew on much of the "movement of movements" learning while also showing that we had not reached an endpoint in terms of thinking about what we were up to (a point which some of the more celebratory writing of earlier years rather missed). And what a difference a recession and three movement waves (anti-austerity, Arab world, Occupy) make in terms of scholarship - now disciplines which drew in their skirts from discussions of movements in the mid-2000s are falling over themselves to capture the lucrative high ground of commentary on Real Politics (by which they mean the actions of states and economic elites)...

Alice: I began to be involved in *Interface* as a translator from English to Italian, immediately after the first issue of the journal was published. The *Interface* project fascinated me from the very beginning since it was open to many activist and scholarly traditions. Also, I really like its attempt to be a multilingual publication, to be engaged towards a truly open access policy, and of course to aim at fostering a dialogue between social movement scholars and social movement activists. It is now many years since I have translated into Italian the first call for action for *Interface* and I found myself doing many things for the journal: from developing the new website to acting as a guest co-editor for a couple of issues, apart from taking care of the usual editorial process in the context of the Western European editorial collective. Being engaged in so many activities allowed me to appreciate the many faces of an open access editorial enterprise such as *Interface*. How difficult it is at times to work with so many diverse people across the world, but how rewarding, also, when constructive dialogue between different editors develops and, of course, when a new issue is published online.

Sara: I remember a group of activist-scholars, some familiar faces and some new faces, sitting round a wooden table in a pub in Manchester discussing the possibilities of beginning a new type of journal. Our journal hoped to bridge borders of knowledge, place and practices to facilitate processes of systematisation, reflection and strategic development of social movement struggles (including those within the university space).

It was also a way to develop our disruptive practices in, against and beyond the marketised university and its suffocation of the possibilities of alternative

emancipatory horizons and imaginaries. It has thus also been a journey of self/other discovery and of learning to produce myself differently to that of the logics, rationalities and ways of being a scholar of commodified regimes of knowledge.

This journey has often been one of taking chances and leaps of faith without knowing whether the hunches, relationships or practices would actually work. Yet I think that what marks out our collective practice is the courage to commit again and again to such a politics of hope, invention and creativity and the tenderness and care through which we hold each other through the difficult moments in our lives as scholars, carers, activists, workers.

What has happened since with the journal?

Liz: I'm not sure I ever worried that *Interface* would not happen, or would not release issues, but I was concerned that the process of doing this would be quite fraught given the enormity of working across the globe and through different networks and language groups. Part of what made the project exciting, the different people and the attempt to organize through decentralized processes, also worried me in terms of simply *getting it done*. I was pleased a few years in at how relatively easy it had been to locate good work and get it out, as well as to work across boundaries and differences of various kinds. *Interface* is not without its weak spots and challenges by any estimation, like any project of its ilk, but I feel the journal is at a point where these can be tackled in an effort to build from our solid base.

Lesley: The engagement of the Canada/US region has grown from year to year as we build our networks and attract an increasing volume of submissions. In 2010, there was a discussion of David Harvey's work, that included the first focused attention on movement dynamics in the US and Canada in the journal. From there, the journal has touched on the movement for medical marijuana, police repression, anti-Olympics organizing, working class organizing, bike culture, US feminism and populism, participatory budgeting in NYC, childcare services in Quebec, Occupy Wall Street, animal rights, anti-colonial, and environmental movements. The current issue expands our engagement with US based movements in particular, looking at Occupy Wall Street, counter-recruitment organizing, movements of the blind, and anti-fascist movements. Not including the book reviews.

Overall, I'm delighted with the way that the themes touch on key questions within organizing. My sense is also that they are gradually accumulating into a theoretical approach, one that brings Marxist, New Social Movement and Political Process/Social Movement theory together into the same space. I'm curious whether others have seen similar convergences playing out. That said, there may be less theoretically driven pieces than there were in the first two years.

Peter: The process has seemed to me - in connection with 'my' themed issue - to have been a little bit magical. This because of my anxiety that we wouldn't get to the church on time and then the relief, and the amazement, that the improvisation worked. Further, related to the above, the surprisingly relaxed and friendly relationships between a group with quite radically different ages, political orientations, nationalities, genders (I don't know about sexualities or preferred wines). I can only assume that this has to do with the spirit of the times. It is certainly different from the spirit of my various previous times and publication efforts!

Alice: The journal broadened its audiences as the years passed by and, also, it became more popular amongst scholars in social movement studies. I saw the journal growing issue after issue, both in terms of readership and authorship, expanding also its global reach. Although there is still much work to do and it is of course difficult to broaden the editorial collective, including new editors and passing by the knowledge about the editorial processes and how things work within *Interface*. It is a slow process, sometimes in contrast with the need to have things done rather quickly when it comes to respect the deadlines for publication etc. So *Interface* is also a good place from which to learn the challenges that being a horizontal organization implies, along with the challenges of transferring knowledge within horizontal organizations.

Laurence: We have certainly found that we were asking the right questions in many areas. So we have seen contributors coming from activism and academia, from a very wide range of movements indeed, from many different corners of the globe, and using very different political and disciplinary languages. I think we made the right choice in terms of theming issues so that a reader of any given issue (other than this one of course) encounters a series of pieces tackling a particular theme within movements, or a particular kind of movement - and these change from issue to issue, showing that we are interested in a wide range of movements and themes.

At the same time I think we have also seen how difficult real dialogue is (which of course underlines its necessity). Many researchers submit pieces which seem aimed only at others in the academy, while many activists return the favour by not writing for *Interface* - a balance which we have to keep on working hard at, commissioning pieces from voices we feel need to be heard. Formats are often determinedly conventional despite all the possibilities offered by online publication. Very few writers seem really able to speak to peers who stand outside of their theoretical / disciplinary / political / intellectual language, or whose main point of reference is to a different kind of movement or a different part of the world. Even non-native speakers often prefer to write in English, and our readership is considerably more Northern-heavy than we had hoped.

This might sound like the voice of disappointment, but in my view it reflects the scale of the real problems (both external ones which movements seek to

overcome in society and their own internal ones) and we do our best to tackle them, with our very limited resources, I think we are managing to construct a diverse space for *readers* - who will find writing spanning all these divides and more, and can certainly hear a very diverse range of voices in *Interface*. Our challenge is now more to find a way of constructing real conversations between those different voices directly, not only in the minds of the readers.

When we started, in the final years of the boom, we could draw on the long experience of the alterglobalist movement of movements in enabling and encouraging diversity along many different axes. As for other movement institutions, this has been really helpful in working with the new movement upsurge around the world since 2008. Bringing in new voices with very different agendas, this experience underlines how important it is to keep on developing conversations, building alliances and "learning from each other's struggles".

In the narrower world of academia, social movements have of course become the focus of many people's attention. There is much cynical appropriation - for annual disciplinary conferences, edited collections or special issues of mainstream journals etc. - which involves little real engagement with movements but rather their use to boost a particular group's cultural capital. Much the same, of course, is true for many journalists and other writers who have no particular relationship to movements but find movement issues, or esthetics, offer a way to attract readers. It was ever thus!

More interestingly, the existing field of social movements research has become much more open to dialogue with movements in many ways, while engaged researchers who previously dedicated themselves to the relentless chronicling of structural injustice are now at times exploring the question of what collective agency can put things right. It is now far easier than it was when we started - at least in some countries and some disciplines - to carry out "movement-relevant research", engage practically with movements, and have a day job in academia. To the extent that other academics feel the same way (and thus help to hold researchers accountable in this sense), this is no bad thing.

Sara: The collective has in many ways come into its own, which is reflected in the depth and breadth of thematics and contributions. Individually, I feel that our voices have developed as editors, scholar-activists and facilitators of collectivity. Importantly this has also enabled the flourishing of our abilities to facilitate the voices of others through thematic choice, experimentation in format and form and editorial maturity. We have cultivated a generosity of spirit and practice of recognition of each other. This means that there is acceptance of our changing and differing cycles of engagement and commitment and attempts to navigate these differences.

For me personally the freedom to be able to go with my intuition about which thematics are important, relevant and meaningful for the development, generalisability and sustainability of movements has been fundamental in my own process of self-liberation and healing from the wounds of colonial

patriarchal capitalism . For many years I felt silenced and invisible; so to enter into a space (and virtual at that!) with friends and people whom I have never met in person and to be accepted and valued has been transformative.

There are thus many mirrors in the multiple stories and *travesías* of our collective practices of producing knowledge for and about movements. These practices also enable us to produce ourselves and our relationships differently to that of capitalist logics and rationalities.

Cristina: The journal has grown beyond our wildest dreams and it is a real kick to look at the clustr map

(<http://www3.clustrmaps.com/counter/maps.php?url=http://www.interfacejournal.net>) and see that we have readers in places I have trouble locating on a map (geography is not my strong suit) and think that a bunch of us sitting around a table in Manchester made that happen. I think that is what keeps me going through the times I have wanted to throw in the towel. For me the journal has opened many doors, from people wanting to talk to me about it at conferences and encounters, to being invited to talk about the journal at a wonderful conference/exchange in Granada in 2010, to putting me in touch with the many interesting contributors to the journal with whom it has been my real pleasure to work. I have also developed some excellent relationships with co-editors on the journal that have transcended issues related to the journal.

Where to next with the project?

Mandisi: I joined *Interface* in 2011. As Book Reviews Editor, I would like to see the journal publishing more reviews of books authored by grassroots activists than we are currently doing. Similarly, I would like to see more reviews of books on women's movements and movements from the South in general. That said, the diversity of contributions that the journal has published in the past is impressive.

Alice: Something that I think would be valuable for *Interface* and its editorial collectives would be to organize an *Interface* conference that would render possible the meeting between activists and academics, but also between *Interface* and other open publishing projects on social movements, that are flourishing in recent years. We already had a couple of meetings before/after the Council for European Studies Conference - Boston 2012 and Amsterdam 2013 - but I was thinking about a more structured and ad-hoc conference event with the active participation of many *Interface* members. I think that such an event would be a nice next step for *Interface*. Although one big challenge would be to find out the funding in order to have travel/accommodation grants for those who would be self-funded.

Liz: Diversity is a key concern of *Interface* – diversity in terms of people, voices, experiences, movements, languages and geographies. For me, this is something we need to work on further. We need to find ways of working with people and regions under-represented in the *Interface* project, as well as areas of social movement activity and analysis we have not covered well. We need more involvement from people and networks in South East Asia, as well as from the United States. We know from our active editors and group in Western Europe that activity begets activity (and excellent journal articles!), and so I'm hopeful that small steps we have taken in places will blossom with further focus by the journal's Editorial Spokescouncil members.

Lesley: My hopes for my next steps in terms of the journal is first and foremost to build the capacity of the journal to handle the increasing volume of work. I worry that our/my turnaround isn't good enough. Another ongoing challenge is the question of how to plug people into the project that allows them to be fully engaged in the process. We have a list of wonderful people willing to help, but reviewing articles isn't really enough to keep them engaged and interested. I'd also like us to build our relationships to people in other regions. I'd also like to continue to build our collective process as a journal. It's quite lovely that it works so well informally – but it can result in too much work in a few hands.

Laurence: I think our main goal for the next five years (if that isn't too grandiose a scale to be thinking on) should actually be to consolidate what we are doing or trying to do already. Our ideas are good, we know how to turn them into reality, but it takes time and energy, and we are all very much engaged in our movements and / or as researchers (which is as it should be). This shows up in how much internal learning we have done when we have to try and articulate it for new participants - as well as in how much of a challenge it is to actually include new people, simply because we are all so stretched. At the same time, those of us who are involved are usually under great pressure simply to hold our end of things up. I think if we can manage, slowly and sustainably, to include new people to help us do better what we are already trying to do, and hold open the space for "learning from each other's struggles" which we aim to be, then we are doing something very useful!

Sara: Our collective practice has emerged and consolidated. The next steps are ensuring our longer term sustainability. Here continual collective reflection on our practices, processes and possibilities seems important. In particular, it is crucial to facilitate the continual participation of current members of the Editorial Board collective and enable the inclusion of other voices, experiences and perspectives.

Multiplicity and its fostering in practice, thought and theory also strikes me as a key thematic both in terms of multiple contents, analyses, perspectives and

experiences of movement struggles and practices but also in terms of the form through which we produce knowledge for and about movements.

I would thus like to help foster more multiplicity in form, or as Gloria Anzaldúa describes, speak in multiple tongues, including image, art, poetry, audio, visuals. I also think that finding ways and methodologies to support author experimentation with collective processes of writing and producing movement-relevant knowledges is an exciting prospect.

I hope that in this way we can continue to contribute to making our dreams of transformation and liberation in our lives, communities and world possible.

Cristina: One thing we have never had is money. On the whole, I think this is a good thing, because a) it shows that it is possible to produce a high quality journal outside of the logic of any sort of monetary exchange, and b) it would have introduced yet another element that would need to be negotiated and thought through and frankly we never really felt the effort would be worth it. Getting each issue out is enough work as it is! Having said that, there are a few things we would like to be able to do better and which would be greatly facilitated by some sort of face to face encounter between editors, along the lines of Alice's suggestion above. Many people can't believe that in fact many of us have never laid eyes on each other, but it is true. Translation is another dream we never managed to realize, simply because good translations are hard work and deserve to be remunerated, and we never have any money. So, if we ever get around to putting up a contribution button on the webpage, and your great Aunt Fanny leaves you a large inheritance, feel free to contribute to fund a face to face *Interface* editorial encounter or earmark it for the translation of your favourite *Interface* article into the language of your choice!

On a separate note, it is clear that the nature of academic publishing is changing with the inexorable move to online and "open-access" publications. *Interface* has been one of a tradition of truly open access journals that are committed to high quality publication of sympathetically edited work from a range of contributors. I hope that in a modest way we have shown that this model of journal is sustainable, at least for a while, and hope others will be inspired to provide other outlets for high quality work beyond the confines of the current academic/editorial marketplace.

In this issue:

Although this issue of *Interface* has no specific theme, the topics authors have chosen to write on certainly reflect the struggles going on across the world today as well as key questions researchers and activists face.

Thus understanding the new movements is a key concern. Anna Szolucha's article explores the messy complexity of Occupy in the SF Bay area and Ireland. She argues that the practice of real democracy is not the incarnation of an ideal but is rather best understood as a changing and incomplete construction, and

that it is from the complexities of these temporalities that the potential for real change comes. José Antonio Cerrillo Vidal takes up the question of what led to the strength of the November 14th 2012 general strike in Spain. He argues that innovative alliances between the 15-M movement and labour struggles and the true grassroots and inclusive nature of the support for the strike, as well as its unique trans-European dimension, are its most distinctive features. Panagiotis Sotiris investigates the December 2008 revolt of the Greek youth from the perspective of Greek intellectuals and social theorists, arguing that these actors refused to acknowledge the revolt's potential as a highly original form of collective action, opting to treat it as a case of social deviance, anomie, and evidence of a deficient political culture.

Another set of concerns relates to movement alliance-building and networking processes. Giuseppe Caruso's article explores the unique approach of the World Social Forum in terms of its identity, its vision and its methodology: we are inviting responses to this article for next issue. In similarly dialogical vein, activists and researchers from across Europe who took part in the Transnational Institute symposium "Social movements and the European crisis" reflect on the state of the struggle, on solidarity and on how movements can win. Yavuz Yıldırım's piece discusses the current situation of the European Social Forum and in particular the 2010 Istanbul ESF, where tensions between "horizontals" and "verticals" played a major role. Despite the ESF's current crisis, the author argues that contemporary movements show the continuing need and potential for movements of this kind.

A number of articles discuss the political implications of different organising strategies. Amy Lane's research on early disability rights organizing in the US shows how in 1959, the National Federation of the Blind (NFB) adapted race based civil rights strategies and to attempt to enact civil rights legislation for the blind, challenging the institutional authority of professional services for the blind. Patricia Aljama and Joan Pujol explore the dynamics of institutionalization of LGBT politics in Catalonia, to examine the legal and institutional achievements but also the political costs of institutionalization, including cooptation, the de-radicalization of a politics of transformation based on sexuality, and a lack of recognition of the diversity and complexity of the LGBT collective. Eric Turner provides an overview of the 5 Star Movement in Italy comparing it to similar cases of comedians-turned-politicians, media figures as social movement leaders and populism in Italy. The article also analyzes the reasons for the recent 5 Star Movement success in the last Italian political elections.

Cost and risk are important parts of many movements' experience. Franz Seifert explores how the tactic of destroying fields of GM crops was diffused from France to Spain and Germany, noting the importance of national factors in explaining the failure of diffusion to Spain and the moderate results in Germany. The article argues that high-cost tactics in particular face particular challenges in diffusion from one country to the next. Connor T. Jerzak examines the roles of the Ultras (organised football fans), in Egyptian politics and argues

that they have become a significant popular force against authoritarianism. Based on years of participant observation of militant anti-fascist movements in the United States, Stanislav Vysotsky shows how the perception of threat within a counter-cultural space justifies the tactical choices of anti-fascist activists.

By contrast, a series of articles explore where social movements are situated in terms of wider political discourses. Raphael Schlembach's article on the German "autonomous nationalists" explores the paradox of far-right mobilisation using DIY attitudes, horizontal organisation and counter-cultural style more typical of the alterglobalisation movement and raise questions as to how far we can assume that such orientations are always and automatically progressive. In similar vein, Mi Park explores far-right discourses in the global North which use themes of cultural diversity, environmental protection and local autonomy to ground anti-immigration positions. She argues for the need for progressive critiques of globalisation to go beyond a privileged eco-localism.

Christian Fuchs draws on an analysis of public video announcements posted by Anonymous activists on the Internet to explore the ideological underpinnings or "political worldviews" of the Anonymous movement and specifically the role that socialism and liberalism play in it, arguing that the two coexist in a sometimes contradictory fashion. Using Gramsci, Emily Brisette explores the relationship between neoliberalism and the contemporary movement against military recruitment in the US, finding that the counter-recruitment movement is constrained by, reproduces, and in some instances challenges the reigning neoliberal common sense.

Two articles explore the particular challenges movements face organising in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Grzegorz Piotrowski's article on the alterglobalisation movement in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary discusses how the region's previous history has led to a smaller movement and one less comfortable with leftist arguments. The movement's subcultural and anarchist tone has in turn had a significant effect on subsequent movements, while the peripheral situation of CEE led to complex interactions with western movement representatives. Yulia Lukashina's article uses social media sources to explore how the Russian "snow revolution" protests of 2011-13 tried to develop collective action frames, noting both the difficulties in articulating positive frames and the power of the spectre of a return to the USSR.

The articles section closes with two pieces on movement outcomes and legacies. Through her examination of the US civil rights movement in Clarksdale, Mississippi, Françoise Hamlin critically interrogates movement legacies and histories, raising questions about the nature and extent of change, and the implications for contemporary black freedom struggles in the USA. Thinking through their work with activists in Nova Scotia, Max Haiven and Alex Khasnabish reflect on how we measure and imagine "success" and "failure" in social movement research, especially research that strives to work in solidarity with the social movements in question.

Book reviews

This issue sees book reviews of the new edition of Sheila Rowbotham, Lynne Segal and Hilary Wainwright's *Beyond the Fragments: Feminism and the Making of Socialism* (Laurence Cox); Setsu Shigematsu's *Scream from the Shadows: the Women's Liberation Movement in Japan* (Julia Schuster); Chris Crass' *Towards Collective Liberation: Anti-racist Organizing, Feminist Praxis and Movement Building Strategy* (Lesley Wood); Lesley Wood's *Direct action, Deliberation and Diffusion: Collective Action after the WTO Protests in Seattle* (Neil Sutherland); Alice Mattoni's *Media Practices and Protest Politics: How Precarious Workers Mobilise* (Mark Bergfeld); Paulo Gerbaudo's *Tweets and the Streets: Social Media and Contemporary Activism* (Maite Tapia); Symon Hill's *Digital Revolutions: Activism in the Internet Age* (Deborah Eade); and RD Smith's *Higher Hopes: a Black Man's Guide to College* (Mandisi Majavu).

New editors

This issue we welcome four (!) new editors. In Central and Eastern Europe Jiří Navrátil, Asia Rutkowska and Anna Szolucha have kindly agreed to join us and in Southeast Asia Sarah Raymundo. We look forward to working with them and to deepening our connections with movements and researchers in those regions.

Upcoming issues

Our next issue (vol 6 no 1, May 2014) will be on the pedagogical practices of social movements (extended deadline for contributions 1 December 2013). The subsequent issue (vol 6 no 2, November 2014) will be on movement internationalism(s); a call for papers is in this issue (deadline for contributions 1 May 2014). As always, contributions on relevant topics outside the special theme for that issue are welcome.

About the authors

The authors are all editors of *Interface* and can be contacted via <http://www.interfacejournal.net/submissions/editorial-contact/>.

Call for papers: Movement internationalism(s)

Issue 6/2 (November 2014), deadline May 1 2014

**Theme editors: Cristina Flesher Fominaya,
Peter Waterman, Laurence Cox**

The November 2014 issue of the open-access, online, copyleft academic/activist journal *Interface: a Journal for and about Social Movements* (<http://www.interfacejournal.net/>) invites contributions on the theme of *Movement internationalism(s)* as well as general submissions.

Internationalism, originally used to refer to relationships between states, has come in much movement practice to mean relationships of solidarity between people and peoples across or despite national boundaries, inter-state conflicts and economic competition.

Social movement internationalisms have had many different flavours: since the late 18th and early 19th centuries we have seen liberal cosmopolitanism, radical-democratic internationalism, internationalisms linking anti-colonial and national liberation struggles, often overlapping. In the later 19th and early 20th century we have seen often more tightly-defined trade union, socialist and anarchist internationalisms; Pan-African and Third-Worldist internationalisms; and some paradoxical right-wing internationalisms. In more recent decades a "new internationalism" often associated with links between movements rather than parties, playing a role in the alterglobalisation movement and the 2003 anti-war movement as well as the latest movement wave.

Internationalisms do not always take this formal shape. We are equally interested in the global plebeian networks of the kind discussed by Linebaugh and Rediker in *The Many-Headed Hydra* or come to that contemporary grassroots labour networking; "transnational advocacy networks" campaigning around specific themes; processes of international solidarity, often in support of specific revolutionary movements such as the Zapatistas; and state-sponsored internationalisms such as that of the Venezuelan state's *Bolivarismo*.

For this special themed section of *Interface* 6/2 we are interested in articles by researchers and activists, as well as material in other formats such as "action notes" on particular organising methods, activist biographies, book reviews, conversational roundtables, analyses of movement events etc. written in such a way as to be of interest or use to people *outside* the specific internationalism in question – contributing to *Interface's* goal of "learning from each other's struggles". Contributions might address such questions as:

- The practical challenges of international social movement organising;
- The different political implications of how movements frame international, global, transnational or other ways of organising;
- How do relationships of solidarity cope with the often vast differences in resources, power and experience between their participants, including differences between organisations in the North and the South and between NGOs and popular movements?
- The relationship between international movement organising and other actors such as the international state order or global capitalism;
- The present-day tension between local struggles and their representation in international movement or left circuits;
- The role of migrants and minority groups in international organising and its contribution or otherwise to redressing *national* ethnic injustices;
- Other questions relevant to the special issue theme.

As in every issue, we are also very happy to receive contributions that reflect on other questions for social movement research and practice that fit within the journal's mission statement (<http://www.interfacejournal.net/who-we-are/mission-statement/>).

Submissions should contribute to the journal's mission as a tool to help our movements learn from each other's struggles, by developing analyses from specific movement processes and experiences that can be translated into a form useful for other movements.

In this context, we welcome contributions by movement participants and academics who are developing movement-relevant theory and research. Our goal is to include material that can be used in a range of ways by movements — in terms of its content, its language, its purpose and its form. We thus seek work in a range of different formats, such as conventional (refereed) articles, review essays, facilitated discussions and interviews, action notes, teaching notes, key documents and analysis, book reviews — and beyond. Both activist and academic peers review research contributions, and other material is sympathetically edited by peers. The editorial process generally is geared towards assisting authors to find ways of expressing their understanding, so that we all can be heard across geographical, social and political distances.

We can accept material in Afrikaans, Arabic, Catalan, Czech, Danish, English, French, German, Hebrew, Italian, Maltese, Norwegian, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Slovak, Spanish, Swedish and Zulu. Please see our editorial contacts page (<http://www.interfacejournal.net/submissions/editorial-contact/>) for details of who to submit to.

Deadline and contact details

The deadline for initial submissions to this issue, to be published November 1, 2014, is May 1, 2014. For details of how to submit to Interface, please see the "Guidelines for contributors" on our website. All manuscripts, whether on the special theme or other topics, should be sent to the appropriate regional editor, listed on our contacts page. Submission templates are available online via the guidelines page and should always be used to ensure correct formatting.

No stable ground: living real democracy in Occupy

Anna Szolucha

Abstract

This paper examines Occupy in order to explore the incredibly complex and temporarily situated realities of living and researching real democracy in this movement. It is a story that highlights just how much was going on within the movement and that democracy – as practised in many aspects of Occupy – was not an ideal form of society. Instead, it was a real democracy, characterised by a degree of messiness and uncertainty that is common to the realities of all political action. It is worth preserving this complex picture because it has very real consequences for the ways in which we may think about our political engagement and strive for radical social change.

This article is meant as a response to all those Occupy participants and observers who found themselves feeling cynical and disillusioned by the movement. I do not aim to defend or idealise Occupy but I do want to give a taste of the complexity and multidimensionality of this movement situation. It is very easy (perhaps even too easy) to claim that some things were done wrong and some were not accomplished at all. To do so in a constructive way is an important part of the movement's reflection process, but being cynical about the movement while not appreciating that it had its own complex dynamic can hardly bring us to some place better. Even if one claims that Occupy failed to achieve its goals, one has to admit that it nevertheless succeeded in showing that it is always possible to significantly disrupt the business-as-usual reality and practise a different form of self-government. And if nothing else, its strength lies in reaffirming to a new generation that such a possibility is always real and mobilising our appetites for more and better.

The analysis is based on more than five months of “militant ethnographic” and participatory action research within the Occupy movement in Dublin but the article draws most heavily on semi-structured interviews with twenty six participants in various Occupies in the San Francisco Bay Area as well as with five members of Occupy Dame Street in Dublin and eight from Occupy Cork in Ireland.

In early summer 2012, I arrived in Oakland with my pocket recorder and a set of spare batteries. I wanted to check where the people from Occupy were at, participate in whatever actions I could, hear some of their stories, share mine, and depart with a well-intentioned but still pretty obscure promise that we will all benefit from the experience. As a perpetual immigrant, I could not offer anything more than that.

Back in Ireland, months flew by while I was trying to code the interviews and decipher pages filled with miniature worm-like zigzags. One evening as I was turning a loose page in my Oakland notebook, an emphatic arrow with the word research next to it stood out. It was pointing to a little note that said: "City Hall and amphitheatre in front." That was it. I went back to my photos from Oakland. It turned out that when I had been scanning them, I mechanically skipped over ones with no "action" in them. I glanced over the photos of an empty Oscar Grant Plaza where Occupy Oakland used to have its main encampment. Now displaying them on a computer screen, I smiled at the sight of the unpretentious amphitheatre at the foot of the magnificent construction of City Hall. The structure of the amphitheatre looks relatively new and consists of four levels of concrete benches that encircle a light blue and greyish dais of six half-round steps. The terrazzo features Lake Merritt, City Hall and the Jack London oak tree as its central images. This was the place where numerous Occupy Oakland assemblies were held and it is the exact spot where on the night of 26th October 2011 Occupy Oakland reached an agreement to hold a general strike a week after. The action on 2nd November 2011 was the first general strike in Oakland and the entire United States since 1946.

What was so special about the amphitheatre? Perhaps, as one of the occupiers told me, his voice raising and becoming subdued from excitement: "It was like it was made for it!" I started remembering that I had talked about this peculiar structure with other people in Oakland and how they were laughingly encouraging me to "research" the history of that place. At the time, I did not make much of these suggestions although I did think that it was a great stroke of ironic luck to have the amphitheatre in such a symbolic place. Much the same way as it was ironic to be able to stage a five-month occupation in the spacious Central Bank plaza, located amidst an otherwise crowded and densely interlaced Temple Bar area in Dublin.

We know for certain that the Central Bank plaza was not meant to be a place for airing public grievances and sustained civil disobedience. The "big bank" was finished in 1980. It is a suspended structure which means that it was literally built from the top down, because each floor was assembled at the ground level and then hoisted up, with the top floor going up first to be suspended from two tall concrete towers that constitute the core of the construction (Anon 2010). Originally, the plaza did not have a fence around the grand stairs leading to the entrance of the building but the sole function of the inviting benches and granite pavement with fan-shaped patterns was only to balance the sharp and austere curvature of the great building.

Was the amphitheatre in front of Oakland City Hall made for public assemblies of self-governing communities? I knew that tracing the original intentions of planners and investors might prove an utterly futile exercise but I decided to try anyway. And I am glad that I did – however briefly – because there is an illuminating story behind it. When the City Hall at 14th Street and Broadway (Oakland's fifth city hall) was built in 1914, it was the tallest building west of the Mississippi and considered to be cutting edge – built in Beaux Arts-style, setting new trends by combining traditional civic roles with a high rise office building. It had 14 floors and accommodated a city jail, police and fire stations and even a hospital (Ward 2011). The plans to renovate the plaza began in the 1960s and by 1984 the intention was to make it into a symbolic civic and ceremonial centre. It was proposed that one of the objectives of the square should be “a performance space with both stage and audience areas, holding rallies and demonstrations, formal City Hall arrivals and departures” (California City Hall Redesign Committee 1984, p.8). As the design efforts were shaping up in the 1980s, nobody foresaw that they would be brought to an abrupt halt.

The Loma Prieta earthquake that struck Oakland and the San Francisco Bay Area in October 1989 left City Hall severely damaged. From the outside it might not have seem like much – only the clock tower hovering over the massive structure suffered the most. But had the shaking continued, it was only a matter of seconds before it would have collapsed. The structural core of the building was also severely damaged. The amount of resources needed to fix it was immense and the city needed to decide what to do with the evacuated building.

Thanks to money from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Oakland Redevelopment Agency and local bond issue, the building was completely restored (Anon 1997). As part of the \$85 million deal, the building received a significant earthquake retrofitting. The new base isolation system required that 90 steel structural columns be cut off from the concrete foundation of the building, lifted up, placed upon a platform made of concrete and steel, which in turn rests on 113 steel-encased rubber bearings bolted to the foundation. That essentially means that the building itself is not attached to its foundation so that in the case of an earthquake, it can move from 18-20 inches laterally (Burt 2009). The building is rootless, so to speak; it does not have a stable foundation.

In 1994 a decision was made to rename City Hall Plaza “Frank H. Ogawa Plaza” after a Japanese-American Oakland City Councilman who served for 28 years and died of lung cancer (Obituary Mercury News Wire Services 1994). A year after, in 1995 Oakland City Council voted to spend \$102 million of the city and city's redevelopment agency's money on a project to restore downtown. This anti-blight push to counteract the results of the earthquake and the 1980s' recession identified the local stores and artists as potential losers of the new project (DeVecchio 1995b). Who was to gain from it? Well, it was going to provide space for hundreds of City workers and boost property values in the abandoned urban core. In the mid-1990s, the local media also unashamedly declared that the redevelopment project will help the plaza in front of City Hall

to “become the public ground it was meant to be” and even assist in “reaffirm[ing] the democratic tradition of the civic plaza” (DelVecchio 1995a).

When completed in 1998, the project – together with its restoration of Frank Ogawa Plaza – was to encourage street life (DelVecchio 1995a; DelVecchio 1995c). Most likely, the city advisers did not even imagine the kind of street life that Occupy Oakland brought to this place in October 2011. The movement renamed the square “Oscar Grant Plaza” after a black man shot dead by a BART police officer on 1st January 2009 and in recognition of the struggle for justice for Oscar Grant that has been going on since then.

At the press conference a day after the (first) eviction of the Occupy encampment carried out for variously defined “safety reasons,” Mayor Quan said that the city agencies were trying to “restore the park as a free speech area” (Anon 2011). Oscar Grant Plaza was to remain a place for democratic and free debate only on the condition that there will be no tents, tarps and sleeping bags! In other words, in a building unattached to its foundation, we were told that the plaza could only function as a democratic and public space if the very activity of democratic conversation and radical protest – now suspended – remains an abstract possibility; a possibility that stays unrealised.

Some may claim that the protest could have been more successful or continued if the participants had not insisted on the occupation as their main strategy, or could have ensured the safety of all. In other words, maybe Occupy would have been allowed to stay or come back if it could be guaranteed that there would be no injuries, knife-pulling, drug dealing, sexual harassment and homelessness (sic!). If the city officials were pressed further for their ideal notions of exercising the right to free speech, we would soon discover that the City's idea of protest does not amount to much that could really bear its name.

While occupying and trying to practise real democracy in the here and now, we cannot eliminate the possibility that it will be a messy and challenging endeavour with its own inconsistencies, deformations and problems. But this is exactly why it is called *real* democracy. If we were to get rid of all messiness, we would be left with an empty egg shell that might be perfectly round and smooth but has not a trace of a potential for life in it. Democracy, in the end, is about the idea that no idea for governing ourselves is good enough to last for ever. No idea can be that universal. Funnily enough, it seems that sometimes we need a quake to realise that the ground under our ways of governing is not that stable after all.

This paper examines Occupy in order to explore the incredibly complex and temporarily situated realities of living and researching real democracy in this movement. It is an example of a militant research(er) trying to “feed back in” and speak to all those Occupy participants and observers who found themselves feeling cynical and disillusioned by the movement. I do not aim to defend or idealise Occupy but I do want to give a taste of the complexity and multidimensionality of this movement situation. It is very easy (perhaps even too easy) to claim that some things were done wrong and some were not accomplished at all. To do so in a constructive way is an important part of the

movement's reflection process, but being cynical about the movement while not appreciating that it had its own complex dynamic can hardly bring us to a better place. Even if one claims that Occupy failed to achieve its goals, one has to admit that it nevertheless succeeded in showing that it is always possible to significantly disrupt the business-as-usual reality and practise a different form of self-government. And if nothing else, its strength lies in firstly, reaffirming to a new generation that such a possibility is always real and, secondly, in mobilising our appetites for more and better.

Below is a story that highlights just how much was going on within the movement and that democracy – as practised in many aspects of Occupy – was not an ideal form of society. It was a real democracy characterised by a degree of messiness and uncertainty that is connected to the realities of all political action. I write this text because I think that in all our efforts to create ideally egalitarian, purely anarchist or exclusively vegan spaces, however important they are, we tend to forget that the real potential of social movements always lurks in their inconsistencies and indeterminations – or in the fact that when radical social change happens, it never already has a stable ground to rely on but seems to be a result of a particular plurality. Preserving this complex picture has very real consequences for ways in which we may think about our political engagement and strive for radical social change.

The analysis is based on more than five months of “militant ethnographic” and participatory action research within the Occupy movement in Dublin but the article draws most heavily on semi-structured interviews with twenty six participants in various Occupies in the San Francisco Bay Area as well as with five members of Occupy Dame Street in Dublin and eight from Occupy Cork in Ireland.¹

Real, ideal or prefigured?

In Occupy, we practised the ideal or prefigured version of direct democracy. Prefigurative politics denotes a politics that is based on horizontal, autonomous and leaderless forms of self-organising and struggle. Its aim is to prefigure the world we want to live in in the here and now of the ways in which social movements and autonomous groups govern themselves and organise actions. The term is relatively new as it was first used in reference to some of the movements of the 1960s and its meaning is appealing to many strands of anti-authoritarian organising. Recently, most of the activity that was happening under the Occupy banner could be summed up as prefigurative politics:

the public assemblies, the consensus decision making, the collective spaces in the camps, and the diverse forms of collaborative self-management constitute a set of concrete alternative practices that serve as powerful symbolic yet embodied

1 For more analysis on Occupy in Ireland, see for example Szolucha 2013.

contrasts between an inclusive, grassroots, and participatory democracy as it ought to be and the current configuration of a representative "democratic" system that serves the interests of the 1%. (Juris 2012, p.272)

We, the New York City General Assembly, [...] urge you to assert your power. Exercise your right to peaceably assemble; occupy public space; create a process to address the problems we face, and generate solutions accessible to everyone. (NYC General Assembly 2011)

True, the scene in Liberty Plaza may seem messy and chaotic but it's also a laboratory of possibility, creating a diversity of ideas, expression and art. (Gupta 2011)

Through its emphasis on practice, experimentation and direct action in such spaces of experience as the Occupy encampments and the movement as a whole, prefigurative politics makes meaningful social change palpable to all participants. This is visible in the politicising effects that Occupy had. The camps were structured and operated in ways that could prefigure communities in which people would like to live in the future. The direct democratic ways of making decisions may provide some clues as to how to facilitate more democratic ways of self-governance. It is as Maeckelbergh put it that in prefigurative politics, "the struggle and the goal, the real and the ideal, become one in the present. Prefiguration is a practice through which movement actors create a conflation of their ends with their means. It is an enactment of the ultimate values of an ideal society within the very means of struggle for that society" (2009, p.67)

I remain sympathetic to such an understanding of prefiguration and think that it is a helpful category to describe parts of movement practice. However, I am still concerned to reinforce an insight that is not necessarily at odds with prefiguration but may be significantly lacking from the picture of social movement struggles. Namely, it seems that a way forward from prefigurative politics is either constantly perfecting already known practices or trying to approach an absent ideal of those practices i.e. preparing a "viable alternative" that can one day substitute for the current arrangements. As important as they are, they cannot by themselves, however, prompt a new social movement or start a period of political upheaval. Like Occupy, most political "moments of excess" (The Free Association 2011) seem to burst out of nowhere and their rationale and genealogy are always supplied in reality after – not prior – to the event. Does that mean that we should resign all efforts to understand situations when fundamental breaks happen? I think not. Can we then predict them? I do not know that but I think that there is a way to learn something about them that we cannot simply learn by following the theoretical framework and narrative of prefigurative politics.

When Occupy happened, we tended to call *real* the ideal or prefigured version of direct democracy that we were practising. Paradoxically, however, by conflating the real and the ideal in the present, the concept of prefiguration to a large extent loses what is real about it. It glosses over many of the inescapably

temporal processes that are at play simultaneously with prefiguration. These processes are embedded in relationally structured interactions of people from different social groups, cyclical time of embodied engagement, burnout and rest, the temporal time of spaces of experience, the push and pull dynamics of autonomous organising, the mechanisms of creating divisions, and finally times of critical self-reflection of all those involved. All of them engage people's memories, senses, bodies and make demands on their intuition. By rescuing some of these experiences of living real democracy, we can reveal many of the issues of the "day after" any political moment of excess or social change on a grand scale.

My aim in trying to highlight this aspect of Occupy is not to provide a list of "issues where we need to start next time there is a revolution." Instead of supplying the ground for a political action in the future, it may actually serve better to think about it in terms of doing away with any ground – assuming the inevitability that all future experiences of living real democracy will be singular and although they may bear some similarities to the issues that I will outline below, the answers that we find would have to be developed in their particular circumstances and time.

By focusing on living temporalities of Occupy, I attempt to present a more complex and fuller picture of the local lives of the movement. They involve processes that are social, temporarily situated and usually non-linear in nature. By concentrating on this aspect of a movement, one can achieve two things. Firstly, the real of political action is brought back to the equation. All people's lived experiences are affirmed and valued as opposed to only those that fit a particular theoretical framework or narrative. Secondly, my contention is that the complexity and inconsistencies of those temporalities is the field where all potential for real social change comes from. Unexpected situations arise where people's creativity has to be mobilised on the spot. Different viewpoints, facts and beliefs mingle in a way that is much more productive in responding to social challenges than any one political doctrine. In the current political and economic system, this mixing up of political outlooks and situations is precisely what there may be a need for:

I think that personally, it's a disservice to Occupy to say that Occupy is x, y and z and this is how it's run. That's people being just exactly as deeply embedded in like archaic or inflexible as our current system of government is. Like isn't that what we are fighting against? Then why would you stagnate something that has the potential to be so fluid and evolve to really fit the needs of specific situations? I'm very irritated by people that are like 'this isn't Occupy!' and I think that in some senses, their feelings are valid but I think we need to have a sense of flexibility as a 'movement' because I'm sorry, things change all the time. We can't be static especially if you're trying, you know, to ostensibly bring down capitalism. (interview, 19 June 2012 A1)

There are obviously two immediate temporalities that are engaged below: one is that of an unfolding action and the other marks the time of critical self-reflection and story-sharing in settings where I was the person with the recorder. As such, they reveal a wonderful panoply of the ways in which we construct and relate to our realities. There are moments of euphoria, hope, confusion, disappointment, quite a bit of strong language, self-critique, acts of taking sides and making excuses, articulations of burnout, sharing of rumours, explanations of contradictions, blurring of the line between conviction that something is possible and the fact that it actually happened. All of them are important because they shape people's actions in very real ways and contribute to the potential of social movements.

In what follows, I will try to outline a few aspects of living real democracy in the Occupy movement. First, I would like to highlight some of the issues connected to social problems as well as to interactions of people from different social/political groups within Occupy. Subsequently, there will be a short description of the temporality of physical engagement and burnout. I will then move on to briefly discuss the non-permanent character of the encampments. Before concluding with a reflection on the nature of radical political engagement, I will outline some of the controversies around the issues of autonomous actions and divisions within the movement.

Living real democracy in Occupy

Living real democracy in Occupy was challenging. Doing it as a participant-researcher was even more so. I have always been interested in the subjective realities of people's political engagement. What influences them? How do they respond in a challenging environment? I wanted to know what we can learn from our experiences of activism that will help us bring about real social change. Soon I realised that I would not be able to do that without talking about issues that are difficult, sensitive or in other ways, less convenient for the movement. In places where I return to such issues, this is not to rehash old tensions but to reaffirm our own imperfections, complexities of our life-worlds and necessary inconsistencies of our actions as valuable experiences that help us learn about how real change happens. And since it never happens as an automatic implementation of an ideal plan, why not accept these complexities as an inevitable part of our struggles and learn from them?

Social problems and social/political groups in Occupy

When Occupy opened up democratic spaces where everybody could have their voice heard, it revealed a lot of the things that are the results of the political and economic system that we live in but had been repressed or in other ways pushed to the margins of society. This was especially apparent with regard to homelessness and mental health issues. All of these issues informed the ways in which the occupations unfolded.

Some participants claimed that they made Occupy dangerous places (to some groups). But they also make Occupy a deeply informative experience. It immediately made everybody aware that their individual ideas of what "society" was were perhaps not as accurate as they thought. And a grand social change will have to include everyone. Different camps had their own rules as to what they did with threatening or aggressive behaviour. Occupy Dame Street usually called the police to intervene – something that many of the participants always felt uneasy about. Occupy Oakland, on the other hand, did not allow the police into the camp. Hence, the participants realised that figuring out how to deal with people who were "difficult" without the help of a network of social programmes, state enforcement agencies, NGOs, charities or sheer day-to-day ignorance would be hard. But it would also be worthwhile if the break of the state system is to be achieved (interview, 28 June 2012 B).

On the one hand, the encampments did provide a number of services that catered towards the homeless people such as the kitchen, medical tents etc. These were obviously not adequate and not enough, but as one occupier from San Francisco told me it is still more than the government is willing to do for these people and simply "we have hearts and we have rules and here we are and what the fuck are we supposed to do?" (interview, 22 June 2012). The same person shared an anecdote with me where there was a woman who was stabbed (not in relation to Occupy) while the camp was still in operation. Instead of an emergency room, however, she asked to be brought to Justin Herman Plaza (where the encampment was) as she knew that they had a first aid centre there. So all sorts of people in need were gravitating towards Occupy because this is where many of them were finding community and a degree of safety.

On the other hand, there was an ongoing friction between the homeless and other people pushed to the margins of society (such as alcoholics, persons with mental health issues etc.) and activist or more middle-class participants. One part of this tension was the debate about who is deserving and undeserving of the social position they found themselves in (Herring and Glück 2011). Another aspect is that any encampment like that was bound to attract all kinds of "opportunists" - trying to sell drugs for example. Furthermore, in Oakland,

[t]here were rumours about different things that I didn't see, you know, like somebody pulled a knife on somebody [...] So there was lots of tensions a lot of people couldn't handle, you know. It was pretty rough. I think for some homeless people it might have been intense but it was like maybe like a step up cause there was food and there was like community [...]. The positive outweigh the negative for some people [...] I would say that the dynamic was, the first day was maybe 90% - and I'm not sure that this is the best dichotomy but I think there is something to it – there was like 90% activists, 10% homeless and by the end of the two weeks it's more like 80% homeless, 20% [activists]. (Interview, 27 June 2012 A)

It would be problematic to ascribe the declining feeling of safety to some real threat from the homeless or other disadvantaged groups. But the tensions were there in spite of the fact that it was the centre of Oakland and drug dealing and violent interactions were happening in the plaza before there was an Occupy (interview, 24 June 2012 B), so it would be unrealistic to expect they would stop once the camp was there.

It cannot be ignored that the radically inclusive ethos of Occupy presented real problems for some participants because of the roles that they played. In Occupy Oakland, there was apparently a big man who was mentally ill and notoriously pulled knives on people, but he also became a very committed and influential occupier. He was symbolic in that he exemplified a real transformation through which people become politically engaged and respected members of a community despite our various life situations and struggles. It was a great story when everything was good and well but when the participants from the security committee had to come in to disarm him, they felt like the seriousness of the situation had been trivialised (interview, 18 June 2012). Other participants came to similar conclusions in terms of the limits of their ability to self-govern. Despite their horizontalist persuasions, they rejected the conviction that Occupy was a model that could meet people's needs better than the state can. Importantly, however, they also believed that some of these needs could be probably adequately addressed by directed campaigns and focused direct actions (interview, 19 June 2012 A).

Other campaigns such as Occupy the Farm that was reclaiming the Gill Tract in Berkeley to grow food and meet the needs of the local community, would downplay the needs of the homeless people – and quite consciously so. As two of the participants told me, their aim was not to create a tent city similar to one in Oscar Grant Plaza but to farm the land they were occupying. In order to make that statement, they would take down their tents every morning. This, unfortunately, created tensions within the group and left some people feeling disempowered (interview, 19 June 2012 A1).

There was also uncertainty as to what to do with people and groups who were coming in with their own political agendas. Sometimes a single person would appear and would have some sort of a plan or a blueprint and be trying to persuade others to get behind an idea or a platform that so far included only that one person. Such encounters, however, were relatively rare and singular (interview, 27 June 2012 A). In Dublin, visits of radical political parties or other groups had the ability to generate widespread paranoia as people feared that the movement could be hijacked by any one established political entity. In some activist circles, there was also a tendency to perceive Occupy with a degree of cynical dismissal due to the kind of people that got involved in it later on. After a few months in Occupy Dame Street, people of the Freeman on the Land persuasion gained considerable currency. They were central in many actions organised during that time but their ideas were also somewhat problematic when contrasted with the collective ethos of decision-making or safer spaces policy that the occupation adopted (interview, 7 May 2012).

There was also just the scary and hilarious randomness of what you get in places that are radically open to all. Several times while co-facilitating a GA and as a person with an Anglo-Saxon but not distinctly Irish accent, I was told to effectively shut up and “let the Irish speak.” Another member of the facilitation working group in Dublin was attacked with a plastic sword while simultaneously being made an offer he could not refuse, when one participant put forward a proposal that he will cut the facilitator's head off. But the US occupations were no less engrossing:

Occupy SF is kind of cool actually cause [...] it was just like wild homeless people that started it and there wasn't activists involved at the beginning so they were really feeling their way through it. So they would go through each agenda item but they couldn't figure out how to make decisions generally and it was just wildly people doing the direct response signal back and forth and everyone freaking out at one another and no decisions were being made. And then there's the lady from Barcelona and she's like: 'I'm from the history of collective decision-making and listen to me!' [...] And half of the people were like 'listen to her' and the other people were like 'forget about the Spanish lady' [laughs] (interview, 29 June 2012)

[I]t's like a junky down the square and suddenly you are fed and had a place where you could speak up and you wander around a GA drunk off your ass yelling like 'Michael Jackson' and just crazy ass shit, you know. That comes out. Every other person that nobody would listen to or like all that old form boom boom leftists who never had an audience for their hardcore Trotskyist fucking sermon so then they come to the fore. So like everyone was like – all the New Age shit – they come to the fore. So the GA cannot handle that, you know, especially when all expectations are placed within that vessel. [...] So people still have to learn what the GA can be or should be. [...] [W]e just have to put some means and procedural stuff in order to keep all the fruit loops and the bullshit communist party like solidarity statements and rubber stamps – like keep that in the wings. And there are a couple of simple rules out there that can [help do that]. Cause no matter what's people's intentions and what the greater political context unless you keep that shit at bay, there are only so many times that people are gonna come back to a four hour meeting on a cold concrete to listen to a total bullshit from a Stalinist. And for me, that's like once, you know. I had a lifetime of that shit. (interview, 25 June 2012 B)

Burnout

Many of the participants of Occupy experienced it as a moment of very intense involvement. Not surprisingly, most of them could not sustain that level of engagement and felt that they burnt out. There were three main factors that were often pointed to as responsible for this. The first was the limited numbers of people who were committed to do the work. In each case, a lot of it depended on just a few individuals who would be consistent in their involvement and determined to see their plans through (interview, 20 June 2012 A). The

constantly shifting participation did not prove conducive to promoting attitudes of responsibility and accountability to the group.

Another factor was that a lot of the participants had other significant work or family responsibilities. When being a part of Occupy was put on top of these, it simply was not sustainable. In some cases, what helped avoid burnout was limiting one's involvement to fewer roles or helping the camp develop rota systems that enabled people to contribute at a level that was not that overwhelming (interview, 4 May 2012). In other instances, however, the feeling of burnout coincided with withering enthusiasm and declining participation in general (interview, 19 June 2012 B). It was not very likely that people who left for these reasons would come back once they felt more rested because the issue was only partially bodily and mental exhaustion.

The third and most prominent factor that contributed to burnout was the sheer roughness and challenges of the situation in which a group of people occupies 24/7 a space in the middle of a city centre – sometimes throughout the winter season. One participant of Occupy Dame Street even said that it was like a war zone – because of a feeling of being constantly under threat (interview, 24 April 2012). Or as another occupier from Dublin explained it, it was

[a] very challenging physical environment in which we had no electricity, no hot water, no, you know, it's lashing rain, it's windy, there is no computer. People are worried about their shelter, about their food, their safety. People are getting robbed, people are getting physically attacked on a nightly basis, people would come and throw rocks onto the tents [...]. People would come and urinate onto people's tents, like passing strangers. You know what I mean? You're dealing with that kind of environment. You're trying to maintain life on a city street. Very quickly that sort of absorbed all energy and time of the people who were camping there. So in that sense it was just a feature of the nature of the physical environment. (interview 4 May 2012)

It should come as no surprise then that when the encampments were no longer in place many of the participants expressed their relief that there was not as much activity for some time (interview, 29 June 2012). The experience of the Occupy encampment also made people aware of the amount of hard work that had to be put into it in order to make it work. While still recovering from the first wave of Occupy Oakland, one participant confessed that when there were plans for January 28th action of taking over the Kaiser Convention Center (dubbed the Move-In Day), she thought:

well, there might be an occupation but I kind of hope it doesn't work because I don't feel totally ready to start doing something and let my life being taken over by this, you know. Or I hope that it just lasts a weekend. And then I hope that they shut it down. You know what – it's just so much work. (interview, 18 June 2012)

Camps as non-permanent spaces

One of the hardest things to imagine when you start an occupation is how it is going to end or even that it is going to end, eventually (O'Dwyer 2011). Part of the reason for this is the initial enthusiasm and a firm belief that once – what at the time seems like the most difficult part – we got all the people together to form an encampment, we are onto a winner. However, in Occupy Dame Street as well as Oakland, it took just a few weeks for the participants to realise that it is a hard task (and one that requires conscious efforts) to sustain that initial enthusiasm and engagement.

Furthermore, after these first few weeks there was already more talk about switching to direct actions and issue campaigns instead of treating the camp as the only manifestation of the movement. For some participants, Occupy camps were to serve the purpose of developing political leadership, a degree of “political sophistication” and helping people experience alternative ways of living and making decisions. The encampments had to empower everybody in a process of mutual learning. They could not be permanent if their goal was to encourage people to go on and lead in their own communities (interview, 28 June 2012 B).

Nevertheless, there were also people who remained deeply committed to the task of withholding the plazas. Once attempts at reoccupying proved unsuccessful, this overemphasis on the centrality of the camps turned out to be harmful to the movement. When the camps were gone, it left the participants with no particular issue or anchor from which to take the struggle to the next level (interview, 26 June 2012). Similarly, in cases where participants got rid of their camps themselves, there was a feeling that they “didn't have the juice to come back” (interview, 19 June 2012 A).

Often the question of preserving the camp or letting it go encompasses a number of issues. One of them are interpersonal and political since any occupation that lasts more than a few days may face the challenges of long-term organising when all political differences and agendas start coming to the fore (interview, 24 June 2012 B). Another issue is less apparent but has to do with the ethos of radical openness and the question of what to do when the camp loses its ability to live up to it.

With regard to the first issue, the encampments that are dragging on for months such as Occupy Dame Street take the problem of interpersonal and political differences to a wholly new level. After four months or so of Occupy in Dublin, the mix of people who remained active and their political persuasions were different than at the start when most of the principles were agreed. The broader context was that there were many hurt feelings and new antagonisms were created because of interpersonal conflicts within Occupy. There were also only a handful of people who kept the camp going and nobody new was joining in at that stage. Several of the structures were still in place but some of the participants wanted to change a few directions that the occupation took at the start – especially in regard to its non-engagement with unions and political

parties. This created a situation in which some people who were involved in the occupation at the beginning wanted it discontinued, while those still participating, thought it should be carried on. If at the beginning, the participants knew that this was going to happen and had time for this debate, it might have been helpful to agree in what circumstances we would finish the physical occupation (interview, 7 May 2012) instead of letting it continue and further deepen the divisions. Even if that was accomplished, though, there is no guarantee that that decision would be followed through.

As for openness, it was one of the main factors that influenced people's opinions about whether the camp should be closed down. In some cases such as Occupy the Farm, the concern was that the occupation may turn into an "Occupy wildlife preserve" where people outside of a fencing put up by the police were observing those on the inside. "As opposed to what we had before which was the occupation was holding the space open for anyone to come and go" (interview, 19 June 2012 A2). Eventually, the participants decided to end the occupation themselves. The argument that the camp was no longer a radically open space and hence should be disbanded was also used in reference to Occupy Dame Street but it was made by the people who were no longer central to the occupation at that stage (interview, 7 May 2012) so there was not any move to terminate the encampment and it was eventually evicted by the police.

Autonomous actions

At the core of the notion of autonomous action is the conviction that decentralised self-organising is more efficient and conducive to human freedom and creativity than organising that is led by a central body. Autonomous activities and the related practice of diversity of tactics are also vessels through which the complexity of the movement and the variety of actors involved are reflected. Strategically, autonomous actions translate into and support a multitude of struggles. There does not have to be a unanimous agreement on what issues are most important and which ways of organising are best. The point is to try out many because nobody knows which of them or what particular combination is going to strike a chord in the general population (interview, 7 May 2012).

In practice, however, autonomous action presents a real quandary for the place of the consensus process. One of the roles of the GAs in Occupy was to debate and agree on the actions that would be undertaken under its banner. This should ensure that people exercise democratic control over what is happening in the name of Occupy and that there is at least a degree of accountability for whatever action is taken. The argument goes that without that decision-making centre, there would be very little cohesiveness in the movement. It would also make it more difficult for new people to join in if all the work was done in committees and did not have to go through a broader approval process (interview, 24 June 2012 A). On the one hand, it may be important that not just any action can claim to be Occupy. On the other hand, this can limit the role of

the GA to providing a mere rubber stamp for an action (interview, 23 June 2012). But then what does it really mean that something was endorsed by or called Occupy and is it that important what it is called? As one member of the facilitation and environmental justice committees pointed out:

So it's all kind of murky. [...] What does it mean when Occupy Oakland actually endorses something [...]? It means that roughly 100 people [the quorum] were in that place and got convinced to endorse it. And we've endorsed [...] some stuff that we know nothing about. (20 June 2012 A)

Moreover, if a group plans an autonomous action, it is likely that it is going to happen whether it is or it is not called Occupy. This is also a position that Occupy Oakland seemed to reach after a few debates about the proposals to adopt some sort of non-violence policy against the rule of thumb embracing diversity of tactics. Even if any of these proposals were passed, that would not stop anybody from organising autonomous actions and engaging in property destruction i.e. a behaviour contrary to the agreed policy. This simply is not one of the things that could be resolved by making a collective decision about it (interview, 29 June 2012).

It would, however, be inaccurate (as many have done) to perceive this tension between autonomous action and collective decision-making as a tension between two groups of people who prefer opposite modes of action or have different political inclinations. This tension is structural rather than merely ideological or personal. It is more than just "talkers versus doers." In fact, there are many temporal factors that influence people's decisions to take one side in this ongoing debate rather than the other. One participant who helped organise a number of actions in Occupy Oakland, for example, has always supported the philosophy and practice of diversity of tactics. When the proposal to adopt a non-violence policy in Occupy came up, however, he voted against diversity of tactics because he disagreed with the particular interpretation that was used and was disappointed by how the recent autonomous actions went down. They seemed to be organised as if diversity of tactics was synonymous with the everything goes attitude whereas for him, it should really be an attempt to find some sort of unity while recognising each other's differences (interview, 27 June 2012 A). Similarly, even the people who in Occupy Oakland were called insurrectionists and often chose not to attend the GAs, still recognised the importance of some sort of a central decision-making and deliberation body for the movement. Creating an indoor space where GAs could take place was one of the motivations behind the Move-In Day in January 2012 – an action that the "insurrectionist crowd" was key in organising (interview, 24 June 2012 A2).

Divisions

The topic of divisions within the Occupy movement is so rich that it would merit a separate paper. There were differences between people who were involved in

the camps from the beginning and those that joined later on. Tensions emerged between the campers and the people who were active participants but slept off site. There were all sorts of frictions between persons who wandered off the camps to start their own campaigns and those who stayed in Occupy. In Ireland, the issue of nationalism and the various manifestations of republicanism regularly came to the fore. There was fear of being hijacked by a political party or the weak and corrupted trade unions on the one hand, and the old leftist mantra that they had to be central in any revolutionary struggle on the other. The lines of divisions were multiple, crisscrossing or overlapping and sometimes constantly changing.

Within any movement, various divisions reflect its internal diversity of interests and outlooks. They are far more than just that, however. They are unfolding processes that make problematic any stark and rationalistic judgements about "who is with and against whom" like in the following fragment about the insurrectionists in Occupy Oakland:

After these non-violence debates went away, so did they [the insurrectionists]. Even though I do not wholly agree with them tactically, strategically a lot of the times, *it's been like a kind of a vacuum beyond bodies*. [...] It's like that radical, anarchist, political analysis like wasn't there. Like I mean it was there cause a lot of us were anarchists but it could have been more of it there in those General Assemblies so that those younger people [...] would be mingling with them and talking to them, hearing the arguments, deciding for themselves like 'yeah, that's right, this black bloc over here right in the smoking section is like pretty smart, right?' (interview, 24 June 2012 A2)

In the above, even though this member of the labour solidarity committee disagreed with the people using the black bloc tactic, he thought that their participation was an important part of the movement. Their presence brought developmental benefits for the younger activists and their political analysis constituted a vital radical part of the movement that helped make it what it was.

Couldn't the same effect be achieved through the use of the internet? Since the Arab Spring the mainstream discourse has hailed the new opportunities for organising and communication brought about by the social media. It is true that the Occupy movement used the internet extensively and creatively to extend its reach and help people stay in touch with the movement. Most occupations had their webpages, Facebook profiles, Twitter and livestream accounts. Participants created innumerable mailing lists and online forums that all mirrored to some extent the horizontal ways of organising within the movement (Juris 2008). What cannot be overlooked, however, is that the debates that took place on the internet were the most heated and negative. These debates had the ability to heighten divisions rather than strive for resolution. The online mode of these discussions also made some participants worried about the things that were being exposed about the movement and who they were exposed to. The worst part of it was that any such argument could feed many others, if a

sentence or phrase was taken out of context and tweeted out with the aim of sparking the next controversy (interview, 24 June 2012 A). Therefore, the internet is far from a benevolent tool and a mode of non-face-to-face discussion can be quite problematic in movement contexts.

There were, however, certain circumstances when many divisions were put aside. The most obvious of those were when the police cracked down on the encampments. At the GA after the camp in Dublin was evicted, everybody came out – even the people who were most embittered by their experience on Dame Street and left the camp a long time ago. After the first eviction of Occupy Oakland, three thousand people gathered in front of City Hall and decided to have a general strike. In other instances such as Occupy the Farm, very clear ideological differences were disregarded when there was a lot of physical work that needed to be done (interview, 19 June 2012 A). Furthermore, the beginning stages of all occupations also tended to welcome differences rather than treat them as a cause for concern or suspicion.

Conclusion, or what we can learn for our future political engagement

Political struggle is a never ending endeavour. The roles that people play in it are varied and constantly shifting. A one-time window-smasher becomes an old codger and a patient one who advises younger participants how to avoid arrest. In periods of intense engagement, participants become more involved, only to fall back on their earlier identities and roles once these periods are over. New activists throw themselves into work for radical social change, get burnt out and leave with bitterness or swallow the pill of immediate dissatisfaction, recognise the monstrosity of work that needs to be done and get committed to their struggle for the long haul. All of these are entirely normal processes that testify to the cyclical, protracted and sometimes unexpected ways in which social change happens.

When understood in this way, political engagement encourages attitudes that are humble and steer away from overstating one's influence and centrality. As one member of the anti-foreclosure group in Oakland pointed out, in movements that would mean opening oneself up to the dictates of reality. And reality of Occupy is that it might be just one of the more formative moments of the war of position rather than manoeuvre (interview, 25 June 2012 B). However, the truth is that there is no objective benchmark that one can use to prove or disprove that conclusion. If radical social change happens through constant perfecting of our known forms of self-governance, palpable experiences of alternative social systems as well as "discontinuous invention of a new form" (interview, 24 June 2012 B), then all judgements about the reality of the movement are temporarily situated and prone to change in the future.

What is the formula for bringing about radical social change based on this understanding of the nature of political engagement? I think it is already visible in the recent movements such as Occupy and in some of the activities of the

Anonymous, in that they are not primarily driven by the quest to institutionalise some already worked-out, more democratic system of governance (or even one in the making, for that matter). Instead, they are protesting against the limits imposed on their political imagination (Graeber 2011) and hence, enacting the distance between the current arrangements on the one hand, and ways of living that are beyond the coordinates of what we now perceive as possible on the other. This is why the participants do not know yet what ideas for a better society they might have had, had they not lived in the current system. Thanks to the experience of living real democracy, however, they may be much more aware that what they lost by the imposition of neoliberalism and liberal representative democracy was not some benign and problem-free unity of all people but rather an ephemeral, peculiar, ever-changing and inconsistent plurality that has not and will never go away.

Here I also need to clarify that the messiness and complexity that I talk about does not designate merely the positive plurality of outlooks and interests as they co-exist in real society, but also the all-important fact that this plurality (with all its claims of what is real) is revealed at the points when social construction fails. When I talk about plurality, I do not mean a sum total of people's "true selves," but rather all the inconsistencies that only come out in these moments of destruction of one social system and a creation of another. Messiness is not simply diversity with all its problematic connotations of persistent and self-identical identities. It is not there to be known and presented as the "truth" that gives shape to an ideal construction. Messiness is what is uncovered when there is a sudden crack in the dominant order – when I ask myself: "what just happened?"

Why is this understanding important? I think that it helps acknowledge that there is a structural failure at the heart of all systems of governance. The city hall is always already cut off from its foundations and rests on an unstable ground. But it is hard to remember that that is the case if the dominant attitude of the day is business as usual, so that structural and inherent failure may remain a purely abstract idea.

In those rare instances that it does not, the collapse of the dominant structures creates a production that is never finished and it may even be substituted midway by another process. In the place of truth – e.g. as a representational form of democracy and neoliberal economy² – is just a construction produced in temporary and contingent ways. And that is frightening – both that this is something that goes for what truth is, and also that all progressive struggles may one day amount to just that and nothing more.

What Occupy and some other movements of the day did was that they ostentatiously rejected a lot of content that would give their message and demands a semblance of cohesiveness and super-consistency. To be sure, they did say what they thought – capitalism and traditional forms of representative

2 Or a new system of self-governance that is more democratic and responsive to the real needs of the population than the old one, for that matter.

democracy were delegitimised. We wanted *real* democracy. What was it and how was it supposed to work? Well, we had our best go at it by prefiguring it in the ways of practising consensus, for example. That was not entirely “it” and as of today, we still remain (more or less) faithful subjects under the aegis of representative democracy.

The encampments, however, made something else plain clear – we saw it as thoroughly unfair that the powers that be could draw a line between what constitutes a legitimate and illegitimate form of protest. The issue is not about whether we would be allowed to go back to the plazas with tents and sleeping bags or would these items be prohibited. The question about illegitimate forms of protest is also one about transcending the rules of the day. An ethical social structure would in some way incorporate a recognition that one day the time will come when it will have to give in. People will call on its limits and demand that their political imagination be liberated and engaged in a new production. How do we keep space for that open at all times, or is it even sane to ask this question? I guess, if nothing else, there is no harm in mobilising the appetite for trying to answer it.

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About the author

Anna Szolucha is currently a PhD student in the Department of Sociology, at the National University of Ireland in Maynooth. She completed her MA Hons. in International Relations at the University of St Andrews, Scotland. Anna has a keen interest, both personally and professionally, in social movements that use direct action and direct democracy. She has conducted her research in this area in Poland, Ireland and the USA. She has been involved in a number of movements in several countries, most recently in Occupy. Anna has published about autonomy in anarchist organising and participatory action approaches to research. She has also written many movement-relevant texts that were published in non-academic outlets. Anna is a journal participant of *Interface* – an international journal for and about social movements. Her postgraduate research is funded through the Doctoral Teaching Scholarship from NUI Maynooth. She can be contacted at annaszolucha AT gmail.com

From general strike to social strike: movement alliances and innovative actions in the November 2012 Spanish general strike¹

José Antonio Cerrillo Vidal

On November 14th 2012, six southern European countries (Spain, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Malta and Cyprus) were summoned to the first coordinated and multinational general strike of the 21st century, with solidarity actions organized across the rest of the EU. But how successful was this first attempt? In this note I would like to draw attention to the Spanish wing of this historic event, since movements of other countries can learn some important lessons about the possibilities of the strike as a form of protest in our times.

I think most people will agree that globalization has weakened labour and strengthened capital. The opening of China, India, Southeast Asian and former Warsaw Pact countries to foreign investment has allowed multinational corporations to take advantage of differences in wages and labor protection legislation across the world. This has driven governments to an endless competition to reduce the costs of labor force as a way to prevent the loss of jobs across borders and attract investment: facilities to fire employees, tax cuts for companies, new forms of temporary hiring and all the well known prescriptions of the neoliberal agenda (Castells, 2000: 77-354; Harvey, 2007).

Thus, workers, and the unions that still aim to represent them, have been forced to adopt a defensive position, accepting in many cases the reduction of their rights and wages as a lesser evil. In these circumstances, going to strike has become increasingly difficult for more and more people: the reduced wages hindering the loss even of one pay day, precarious workers' fear of losing their jobs, the menaces of bosses, the possibility of the company taking the factory to a cheaper and less conflictual place... going on strike is not an easy choice for millions of workers.

Despite the large amount of research that has attempted to warn them of those problems in recent decades, most unions have failed to react to this change of scene. And without the much needed adaptation to the new reality of global capitalism, the loss of the unions' power has been progressive but unavoidable (Recio, 1997). In Spain, this process has been even worse due to the loss of most of the country's industrial base in the 1980s, the lack of a strong advanced services sector and the importance of low added value sectors (agriculture, construction, tourism, etc.) in the national economy. Not by chance, Spain

¹ I would like to thank Laurence Cox and Cristina Flesher Fominaya for their useful comments and suggestions, which have helped improve the text considerably.

presents the highest rates of temporary² employment and unemployment³, and one of the lowest rates of unionization (Visser, 2006) in the EU-15, even before the current crisis broke out.

Nevertheless Spain has a strong tradition of organizing general strikes. The first one was called as early as 1855 (Manzanera, 2005), with the revolutionary general strikes of 1917 and 1934 being the most important of our history (Romero Salvadó, 1996; Vega García, 2000). Since the end of General Franco's Dictatorship, the country has seen nine general strikes, plus three other half-day strikes and several others at regional level, especially in the Basque Country (García Calavia, 2008; Jodar, 2006). However, the September 2010 strike, called against the neoliberal turn from then ruling government of the Socialist Party, showed how much power have the unions lost since the previous one, in 2002.




Figure 1: Participation in general strikes in Spain since 1985

² Eurostat, Employees with a contract of limited duration (annual average), <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00073&plugin=1> (last visited May 7, 2013).

³ Eurostat, Harmonised unemployment rate by sex, <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=teilm020&tableSelection=1&plugin=1> (last visited May 7, 2013).

DATE	Strike participation (government estimation)	Strike participation (unions' estimation)	Electricity consumption decrease
20/06/1985	7.50	30	
14/12/1988	50	90	36.34
28/05/1992	34.60	80	
27/01/1994	30	90	34.20
20/06/2002	16	84	20.50
29/09/2010	7.50	70	14.10
29/03/2012	16.71	77	16.10
14/11/2012		76.70	12.70

Table 1: Participation in general strikes in Spain since 1985⁴

Blank spaces indicate that data are not available.

Source: <http://www.20minutos.es/graficos/las-huelgas-generales-de-la-democracia-12/0/>

But in 2012 things have changed notably. Despite rising unemployment and the deterioration of the living and working conditions caused by the huge economical crisis the country is suffering, the overall impression is that the two general strikes called that year (on March 29th and the mentioned November 14th) have achieved far more success. Are the unions reversing their declining trajectories? No. Are the loss of rights and the worsening of living conditions motivating more Spaniards to going on strike? Partly. Is it the fact that there is a conservative and not a social democrat party governing the country? To some extent. The true cause of the relatively greater success of the 2012 strikes is the involvement of the M-15 Movement.

This is not the place to delve into the main features and evolution of the Spanish M-15 Movement⁵. Suffice to say, the eruption of the "Indignants" the past 2011 has completely shocked the political life in Spain. The last two years have seen the spontaneous birth of a lot of new collectives in different spheres, inspired by the energy, grassroots spirit, democratic claims and the rejection of the establishment of the M-15 Movement. Such is the case of the "Marea" ("Tide") movements, collectives of both state employees and users in defense of public

⁴ : The difficulty of measuring the real impact of a general strike is well known. The three indicators presented in the Table and the Figure 1 (strike participation estimated both by unions and by government and the decrease in electricity consumption compared to the average of a normal day) are certainly questionable. However, I think they are useful to illustrate the progressive loss of support to general strikes in Spain in the last three decades and the relative improvement of the last two compared with the 2010 strike.

⁵ Actually, there isn't a clear agreement about what exactly the M-15 Movement is, or who can be included inside. In my view it is more a methodology of organization and mobilization than a movement itself. I've talked about this in another text (Cerrillo Vidal, 2011).

services threatened by government cuts, using a different color each one (white for the health system⁶, green for education⁷, yellow for public libraries⁸ and so on). Another example is the Platform of those Affected by Mortgages⁹, where many people who have their houses foreclosed by banks (or are close to it) are organizing themselves to find solutions to the eviction problem at both the individual (providing legal assistance, trying to block evictions) and the social level. Or the "iaioflautas"¹⁰, a collective of elderly people who are leading many actions with high media impact, mainly occupations of bank offices and public administrations. Many other groups are pushing for alternatives in economics¹¹, against cuts to the science budgets¹², conducting citizen audits of public debt¹³, and many others¹⁴. Even the institutional left has been forced to follow some of those initiatives, neither born nor controlled by any party or union, and indeed transcends them.

In the first stages of the Movement, there were significant resistances to any form of coordination with the unions, which were seen by many participants as part of the establishment that was being challenged¹⁵. But once key collectives of the M-15 decided to support the general strike summoned by the unions¹⁶, the contribution of the movement has not been limited to helping in the organization in traditional ways (picketing, spreading propaganda, etc.). Beyond that, the M-15 Movement started a debate about the possibilities of the strike in the 21st century and formulated many innovative proposals to ensure everybody could take part in the protest independently of their particular conditions. The collective blog Madrilonia, one of the key sites in the spreading of discourse and strategies for the M-15, posted a very interesting article regarding the March

⁶ <http://mareablancasalud.blogspot.com.es/> (last visited May 7, 2013).

⁷ <http://mareaverdemadrid.blogspot.com.es/> (last visited May 7, 2013).

⁸ <http://www.biblogtecarios.es/biblogtecarios/marea-amarilla> (last visited May 7, 2013).

⁹ <http://afectadosporlahipoteca.com/> (last visited May 7, 2013).

¹⁰ <http://www.iaioflautas.org/> (last visited May 7, 2013).

¹¹ <http://econonuestra.org/> (last visited May 7, 2013).

¹² <http://cienciaconfuturo.com/> (last visited May 7, 2013).

¹³ <http://www.auditoria15m.org/> (last visited May 7, 2013).

¹⁴ For other interesting examples check Gutiérrez (2013).

¹⁵ Actually, there was a long history of mistrust between unions and social movements in Spain, especially in the bigger cities of the country (Flesher Fominaya, 2007). As Aguilar Fernández & Fernández Guibaja (2010) show for instance, one of the main reasons of the failure of the movement for decent housing (a direct antecedent of the M-15, which conducted some important demonstrations in 2006-7, when the housing bubble was about to explode) was its inability to establish broad alliances between autonomous collectives and more established organizations, such as the bigger unions and left parties.

¹⁶ Nevertheless, the M-15 and the collectives that identify themselves with it preferred most of the time to take distances from the main unions (CCOO and UGT), proposing separate actions. For instance, they went to the alternative demonstrations summoned by smaller unions like CGT, CNT, USO or SAT rather than to the bigger ones summoned by the two big unions.

29th strike (Madrilonia.org, 2012), asking for an "inclusive strike" where the unemployed, students, precarious workers and every social subject could be a part of it. And this would be possible only if the movement was able to create new kinds of actions that engage those who can't go to strike in the classic sense of the expression.

As a movement that works as a distributed network, many people took up the challenge and almost immediately lots of ideas began to flow. The slogan "Take the Strike"¹⁷ was popularized quickly, and has been used to name a collective web¹⁸ that distributes useful information to anyone interested in participating in the protest. Proposed by consumer associations¹⁹, the idea of a consumption strike gained a lot of support, since it allows the participation of everyone: perhaps you can't miss your work, but you can always stop yourself from buying. From the feminist sections of the Movement, a care strike was proposed as well²⁰, as a form of making visible the unpaid domestic and care work that is still mainly done by women, especially in a country like Spain with a poorly developed welfare state (Duran, 1997: 94-113, 2000, 2002; Navarro, 2009). A few days before the November 14th strike, the "Precarious Office" (another very active collective) came up with the idea of giving orange ties to everyone who support the strike but are not able to follow it, so they can express their backing to the protest²¹. Joining the international initiative Theatre Uncut (a project born in London in 2010 to denounce public spending cuts through theater²²), several theater groups across the country held critical readings, parades and free performances in the streets (Henríquez, 2012). Road blocks, cyber attacks to official webpages, boycotts to the companies that pressure their employees not to go on strike, and so on: dozens of suggestive ideas. And all in a single year, in a single country.

Are we witnessing a change of paradigm? I think so. The struggle centered in the workplace, and especially those made by the unions, have remained anchored for too long in the Fordist imaginary and methods, particularly in Western Europe, where the labor movement was more important and had more strength in the past²³. But the labor movement no longer commands the struggle for

¹⁷ This was a reference to "Take the Square", the main slogan of the M-15 Movement since its birth in 2011.

¹⁸ <http://tomalahuelga.net/> (last visited May 7, 2013).

¹⁹ <http://www.facua.org/es/noticia.php?Id=7174> (last visited May 7, 2013).

²⁰ <http://madrid.tomalaplaza.net/2012/11/09/el-14n-huelga-general-huelga-de-cuidados/> (last visited May 7, 2013).

²¹ <http://www.oficinaprecaria.net/2012/11/14-n-huelga-general-huelga-precaria.html> (last visited May 7, 2013).

²² <http://www.theatreuncut.com/> (last visited May 7, 2013).

²³ Anyway, there have been some attempts to test new forms of labor protests adapted to the precarious work era. Among these we can quote the unemployment movement that had some strength mainly in France, and to a lesser degree in Italy and Germany (Giugni, 2008; Thé, 2000); the movement against temporary work agencies in Spain (Cerrillo Vidal, 2009), and so

justice. The new social movements in the 70s and 80s, the social forums and the counter-globalization movement in the 90s and the first decade of the 21st. century, and now the Indignants/ Occupy movements have been displacing it from the center of the battle for democracy. Now wide coalitions of movements united under identities that are more inclusive, but respectful of diversity ("the citizenship", "the 99%"), have taken over. The labor movement is necessary, but not sufficient²⁴.

Thus, as our repertoires²⁵ have been changing in the last decades, it was only a question of time until the work oriented struggles end up doing so as well, going beyond the scope of work to expand the protest in a multidimensional combination of actions. So, it seems that in the near future the idea of a "social strike" will prevail over the old "general strike".

After all, the main goal of the general strike was always to show the unity and strength of the working class and to visualize the social conflict by the interruption of normality. And that was what happened in November 14th in Spain, not only in the massive demonstrations or the few riots that erupted that day. There has been a lot of debate around the real following of the strike using traditional tools like electricity consumption²⁶. It doesn't matter at all. The real success of the strike was in seeing all those innovative actions progressively implemented and, of course, the transnational character of the protest. Don't miss the real point: the road to the future has already been opened.

on. But these efforts were scattered, poorly coordinated or synthesized and in many cases had little social impact. For most people, the work-centered protest remain linked to the classical methods of the labor movement, and thus, progressively unavailable in the new conditions of the deregulated labor market. See also Flesher Fominaya (2007, 2010) and Katsiaficas (1997).

²⁴ As Angel Calle (2007: 11) has pointed out, each movement has left a "democratic footprint" on the general struggle for justice. The "material critique" of the labor movement introduced the social rights and the need of redistributive measures. The "expressive critique" of the new social movements appeals to our everyday practices, languages and identities. The counter-globalization/social forums movement brought the claim for a radical democracy culture and the need for a repertoire that takes care both at the local and the global scales. I think the present Indignants/ Occupy movements seems to have incorporated this entire heritage in a more coherent and unified frame, but it's very soon to assert that have been successful in doing so. Time will tell.

²⁵ In the classic sense proposed by Charles Tilly (2006): a complete set of actions and tools of organization and protest.

²⁶ See for instance <http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/huelga-general/20121114/54354475464/huelga-general-caida-consumo-electricidad.html> (last visited May 13, 2013).

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About the author

José Antonio Cerrillo Vidal is a sociologist, Research Technician in the Institute for Advanced Social Research (IESA/CSIC) and Assistant Professor in the University of Córdoba. He is a member of the Council for European Studies' European Social Movements Research Network and an ATTAC Spain activist. He can be contacted at: jacerrillo AT iesa.csic.es

Reading revolt as deviance: Greek intellectuals and the December 2008 revolt of Greek youth

Panagiotis Sotiris

Abstract

The December 2008 revolt of Greek youth was one of the most important recent examples of mass mobilization in advanced capitalist social formations, exemplifying rising social tensions and youth disenchantment with dominant neoliberal policies. However, an important segment of Greek intellectuals and social theorists refused to acknowledge its potential as a highly original form of collective action. Instead of trying to analyze it in terms of the underlying social dynamics that created the conditions of its possibility as a form of social and political protest and movement, they opted to treat it as a case of social deviance, anomie, and evidence of a deficient political culture. This attitude is the result of mainstream Greek intellectuals' attachment to projects of capitalist modernization and their ideological displacement in the context of a crisis of political strategy with repercussions for social theory.

Keywords:

Greek riots; intellectuals; social theory; social movements; contentious politics.

Introduction

The December 2008 explosion of the Greek youth was one of the most important recent examples of social mobilization, both in terms of its magnitude and of the repertoire of practices it included. However, it was analysed by a large segment of mainstream Greek intellectuals and social theorists in terms of deviance, a persistent culture of violence, lack of civility and evidence of a deficient political culture. Contrary to this position, we are going to offer an alternative interpretation of the December revolt as a highly original form of collective action that can be thought of both in terms of social movement, more particularly a youth movement, and of a protest sequence of insurrectionary character. Consequently, we are going to treat the reactions of these intellectuals and theorists as symptomatic of the inability of mainstream social and political theorists to come in terms with the social and political causes of social explosions of such magnitude. In its turn, this lack of comprehension is going to be interpreted as evidence of a theoretical crisis, which is an aspect of a crisis of hegemony in a conjuncture of economic crisis and rising social tensions and class conflicts.

In terms of methodology, we base our analysis of the reaction of Greek intellectuals to the December 2008 events on a sample of articles and texts that appeared mainly in the Greek press during and after the events. The articles

appeared in some of the major Greek newspapers, were written by academics, journalists and writers who have a constant presence in the public sphere and are generally recognized as public intellectuals.

The theoretical framework upon which we base our analysis and explanation of the role of intellectuals and their relation to social and political strategies, is influenced by Antonio Gramsci's writings on hegemony and the role of intellectuals (Gramsci 1971; Gramsci 1977) and Poulantzas' emphasis on the role of the state and state-enrolled intellectuals in the production of knowledge, the articulation of ideological discourse and the encoding of strategies (Poulantzas 2000). According to our reading of Gramsci the concept of hegemony does not refer simply to the combination of coercion and consent, but to the very complexity of the articulation of power in capitalist societies in all its forms, and is based upon Gramsci's definition of the State as 'the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules' (Gramsci 1971: 244; Gramsci 1977: 1765). Intellectuals play a strategic role in the articulation of hegemony, in the elaboration of political strategies, in the development of discourses and forms of 'common sense': 'every relation of "hegemony" is a pedagogical relation' (Gramsci 1977: 1331). Consequently, analyzing the role of intellectuals in a particular conjuncture requires analyzing the broader balance of forces in society, the strategies of social forces, and the possibility of a hegemonic crisis.

In contrast to the analysis offered by mainstream intellectuals, our own approach is based upon a Marxist interpretation of the dynamics and contradictions of capitalist accumulation and the constant efficacy of social and political antagonism, especially in a period marked by the crisis of neoliberal capitalism (Konigs (ed.) 2010; Duménil and Lévy 2011; Lapavistas *et al.* 2012), upon social movement theory (Melucci 1989; Della Porta and Diani 1999; Tilly 2004) and recent developments on the theoretical understanding of insurrectionary collective action (Seferiades and Johnston (eds.) 2012).

Greek intellectuals and their reaction to the December 2008 revolt

In this section, we attempt an overview and classification of the reactions of mainstream Greek intellectuals to the December 2008 revolt. By 'mainstream' we refer to theorists situated in political positions closer to the political centre, something that in the Greek political landscape of the 2000s could be translated to those with opinions closer to the two main power parties in Greece, the more conservative centre-right New Democracy and the social-democratic centre-left PASOK, and also to openly neoliberal tendencies. In addition, we include theorists situated in what one could describe as the 'modernizing' Left. When we refer to the 'modernizing' Left, we describe a current that represents the right wing of the Greek post-communist Left, a current that in the 1990s and parts of the 2000s was mainly associated with Synapismos (the larger constituent part of the SYRIZA coalition) and currently mainly with the party of the Democratic

Left but also the broader Centre-Left. However, the classification of theorists we use as examples is based on the different discursive modalities employed in the reactions against the December 2008 and not necessarily on the political positioning of each intellectual.¹

More specifically we have focused mainly on articles that have appeared in major Greek newspapers, such as *To Vima* and *Ta Nea*, two newspapers traditionally associated with the Centre-Left and in particular PASOK, *Kathimerini* which is the leading 'serious' Centre-Right newspaper, *Eleutherotupia*, *Avgi* and *Epohi*, as more left-leaning newspapers. Particularly for intellectuals and commentators coming from the 'modernizing' Left, we have also used articles reproduced in the website www.ananeotiki.gr.

December 2008 as social delinquency

The first reaction of some intellectuals was to discredit the December revolt as a movement, in line with the neoconservative attitude to treat social movements as sporadic irrational reactions to neoliberal orthodoxy. This was the position taken by historians Stathis Kalyvas, a US based professor, formerly associated with the right-wing Konstantinos G. Karamanlis Institute, and Nicos Marantzidis, a professor in the University of Macedonia. Kalyvas and Marantzidis, apart from being the main representatives of a 'revisionist' historical school of the Greek Civil War (that insists on treating 'red violence' as an important aspect of the Civil War and denies the socially emancipatory character of the Left guerrillas' struggle) have been the most obstinate supporters of the view that whatever happened in December 2008 was not a social movement. According to them it was not a mass movement, it was not an insurrection of the Greek youth, it had no central idea or demand and was not a result of social tensions aggravated by the international economic crisis (Kalyvas and Marantzidis 2008; Kalyvas 2009a; Kalyvas 2009b). There were no underlying social problems; only a culture of violence and disrespect for authority (Kalyvas 2008). Kalyvas exhibits the same reluctance to seek social and political causal mechanisms for political violence in his book on civil war violence, which also includes his reading of the Greek Civil War (Kalyvas 2006).

The only explanations they offer are the failure of necessary reforms, because of the resistance of organized minorities, ineffective policing, and a general incapacity to deal with a culture of violence (Kalyvas 2009, Marantzidis 2009a). For them this culture of violence is a heritage or a by-product of the 'Metapolitefsi'² political culture, which treats the demands of any social group as a noble right, justifies all forms of social mobilization, including violence against authority (Kalyvas 2008a), and treats the smooth functioning of institutions as

¹ For a more extensive statistical approach to the reactions of intellectuals to the December revolt see Costopoulos 2010.

² We use the Greek term that refers to the period that followed the 1974 fall of the dictatorship and the full establishment of parliamentary democracy. Especially its first phase (1974-1981) was characterized by social and political radicalization.

anomaly (Marantzidis 2009). Marantzidis goes even further, insisting that Greece is the last country in Europe where a 'popular democracy' ideology still prevails in the form of a left-wing populism that leads the forces of the anti-systemic Left (for Marantzidis the 'fundamentalist' Left) to support political violence, whether they admit it or not (Marantzidis 2009b; Marantzidis 2010; Marantzidis 2010a). Similar is the position of Manos Matsaganis (2009), a university professor and representative of the modernizing centre-Left, who cites as possible causes of violent protests the indifference of the Greek population towards terrorist groups, the support for totalitarian regimes in the name of their anti-imperialism and a general lack of civility. Both centre-right and centre-left commentators have seen not a movement but only violent 'hooded youths' (Someritis 2008) and violent anarchists (Papangelis 2008), and have lamented the lack of goals of values (Papangelis 2009), and the malfunctioning of the institutions (Konidaris 2008).

December 2008 as negative discourse and political nihilism

The criticism of the hegemony of anarchist violent practices and of a 'negative' political discourse has been a basic tenet of some mainstream theorists, neoliberal, neoconservative, but also from the non-radical 'modernizing' Left. These commentators have considered the widespread anti-authoritarian position of the movement as evidence of a more general crisis of politics (Papadimitropoulos 2009). They have insisted on the individualistic character of most insurrectionary practices during the December movement, stressing the danger that the new political identity that emerged during the December rebellion will enhance, despite its anarchist and leftist rhetoric, an egocentric imaginary in line with neoliberal ideology (Papatheodorou 2009, 2009a). Others attribute violence to the fact that the 'prevailing values in the society are those of distrust, lack of solidarity, indifference to common interest issues, and contempt of the law' (Zeri 2009).

A similar line of reasoning stressed the element of nihilism in the violence that erupted during the movement. In an open letter, seven university professors (with left or centre-left orientations), lamented the culture of nihilism, resentment and envy exemplified in anarchist violence and demanded zero tolerance for all forms of violence and abuse (Georgiadou *et al.* 2008). The same accusation of nihilism, attributed to the excessive rationalism of the Age of Enlightenment, is the main point of Stelios Ramfos (2008), a well-known intellectual who has championed the alignment of Orthodox Christianity and capitalist modernization.

Others, such as Haridimos Tsoukas, a neoliberal professor, have attributed this nihilism to a general climate of political and moral crisis (Tsoukas 2008). For Thanos Veremis, a professor that played an important role in the implementation of the 2007-2007 neoliberal university reforms by the New Democracy government, the problem was the inability to deal with a period of crisis (Veremis 2008). Centre-left commentators have offered a similar argument that insists on the sense of impunity that fuelled the most violent forms of protest (Gousetis 2008). For George Pagoulatos, a professor and

representative of the neoliberal version of Greek social-democracy, this should be attributed to a widespread culture of permissiveness that leads to forms of social anomie (Pagoulatos 2008). In its more eloquent version this criticism from centre-Left commentators does not deny that there are political references in the discourse and the imagery of the December explosion, but considers them a political mythology and aesthetics originating in the post-1968 radicalism that has nothing to do with today's political exigencies (Kanellis 2009). This tendency to treat the movement as inherently politically pathogenic led some well-known novelists to treat forms of protest, such as the interruption of theatrical performances, as an attack on the freedom of expression (Doxiadis *et al.* 2008). Even theorists with a critical Marxist background such as Constantinos Tsoukalas (2008) did not avoid referring to the demonstrations as blind explosions without political and ideological content.

December 2008 as crisis of civil society and its institutions

Nicos Mouzelis (2008a, 2009), a well known sociologist coming from the centre-Left, has insisted on the lack of adjustment to the exigencies of postmodern societies that led to widespread feelings of youth insecurity and attributes the characteristics of the mobilization to an underdevelopment of civil society. Although he refers to rising inequalities and new forms of pauperization (Mouzelis 2008), he attributes the same importance to the disorganization of the police force due to the political clientelism of the New Democracy government. One can discern in such interventions a combination between an earlier Marxist emphasis on social inequalities and the emphasis on institutions as facilitators of social rationalization associated with more mainstream post-Weberian and post-functionalist social theorizing. However, the unease at dealing with the movement and its dynamics is made more evident by his reference to an underdevelopment of civil society despite the fact that in December 2008 we witnessed a flourishing of grassroots initiatives.

The same tendency to underestimate the importance of social inequalities and class polarizations is evident in other interventions by intellectuals of the 'modernizing' Left. For Giannis Voulgaris (2008), a university professor and regular columnist, December 2008 exemplified a crisis of authority regarding social and political institutions with youths facing the collapse of the compromise between generations and the inability of family protection to help them cope with the difficulties of working life. For Pantelis Mpasiakos (2008), a philosophy professor, the danger is the undermining of the institutions of post-1974 democracy, for him the main achievement of the Metapolefsi period, a point also taken by Giannis Papatheodorou (2008) who treats the turn towards state authoritarianism as the result of the decay of democracy. Others simply lament the 'crisis of values' of the Greek family (Chrysostomidis 2008), in the same line as more conservative writers. For Nicos Alivizatos (2009) the eruption of violence during the December movement is the result neither of the economic crisis nor of worsening prospects for youths, but of the lack of credibility of the political system and of the crisis of education and the inability of the educational apparatus to adjust itself to the changing environment. For Alexis Kalokerinos

the movement was the result of a crisis of institutions, especially education, that create 'structural distortions' (Kalokerinos 2009: 24).

Attempts at coming in terms with the dynamics of the movement

It would be unfair to suggest that there have not been attempts to understand the dynamics of the movement. An enduring radicalism, along with a tradition of radical critical perspectives that is still vibrant in parts of the Greek academy, have produced valuable and inspired readings of the movement on the part of left-wing intellectuals. The Contentious Politics Circle, a network of academics and researchers based in Panteion University, has attempted a very interesting reading of the events of December 2008, organizing an important conference in December 2009.³ There have been interventions in the public debate, right from the beginning, stressing the need to come in terms with the causes of the explosion and to express solidarity with struggling youths (Seferiades 2008; Kouvelakis 2008; Psimitis 2009; Serdedakis 2009; Sevastakis 2009; Douzinas 2009a.; Vergopoulos 2010). Theoretical reviews such as *Synchrone Themata*, *Theseis*, and *Αληθεία* have been the venue for theoretical interventions in the debate and the same goes for the pages of the daily and weekly newspapers of the Left such as *Avgi*, *Epohi*, *Prin*.

The social and political dynamics mainstream intellectuals failed to see

The limits of thinking in terms of deviance and anomie

Events such as the December movement 'test the interpretative ability and the analytical clear-sightedness of political and social scientists' (Douzinas 2009: 107). However, there has been a significant lack of comprehension of this movement. One could expect that social unrest of this extent, duration and magnitude would have been treated as a social phenomenon demanding explanation and search for underlying social conflicts and societal trends, and would have been considered a challenge for social and political theory. On the contrary, one can discern a quick turn from the descriptive towards the prescriptive, with a strong sense of ideological bias. By this, we do not suggest that a neutral reaction to the December revolt would have been possible. What we see is that kind of ideological bias that obstructs the analysis of social phenomena and leads to a certain form of 'begging the question'. All these references to violent insurrectionary practices being the symptom of inadequately functioning institutions, lack of values, endemic political violence, crisis of political representation are not the result of actually examining the dynamics (and contradictions) of the movement, but of mainly preconceived opinions.

Treating social movements and political contention as forms of deviance and anomie has a long history in social theory and Greek mainstream intellectuals

³ See <http://contentiouspoliticscircle.blogspot.com>. See also Seferiades 2009.

are following a rather long tradition. Beginning with LeBon (2002) there has always been a temptation to treat the behavior of the 'crowd' as evidence of the political pathology of the subordinate masses. In the long tradition of sociological positivism, from Durkheim to Parsons and Merton, social unrest has always been treated as evidence of social pathology and dysfunction, despite the attempt to incorporate rebellion into the paradigm (Durkheim 2004; Thompson (ed.) 2004; Parsons 1991; Merton 1938). In the positivist tradition consensus has always been seen as a more natural societal condition than conflict and contention (Taylor, Walton and Young 1973).

In the Greek case what emerges is a treatment of the December movement as mainly deviance, both in the 'narrow' sense of activist delinquency and in the 'broad' sense of Greek youth (and Greek society) moving away from the ideal types expected in a fully modernized (or even post-modern) society. The revolt is not treated as a movement that social institutions must try to cope with, listen to its demands, enter in dialogue and negotiation with, but as something pathogenic, as 'a chain of irrational or openly anomic practices' (Sevastakis 2009: 304) and as 'the condensation of chronic degeneration of the networks and subsystems of Greek life' (Sevastakis 2010: 288). This can explain why almost all of the intellectuals discussed above finally opt for some form of disciplinary attitude. By 'disciplinary', we do not refer mainly to repressive measures, but to a more general emphasis on the need to adjust Greek society to certain social and political norms that would lead to the completion of a project of modernization.

December 2008 as social movement and insurrectionary collective action

The particular aspects of the December 2008 revolt reveal both its originality as a particular contentious sequence and the degree of its misapprehension by mainstream theorists. Contrary to viewing it just as 'rioting' and 'violent protest', we insist that the December 2008 events combine elements both of what can be termed a social movement, and more particularly a youth movement, and of a particular form of insurrectionary collective action.

Regarding the characterization of December 2008 as a social movement, not a blind social explosion, we can follow Michalis Psimitis who has shown (Psimitis 2009; Psimitis 2011) how the emergence of a cohesive collective identity, the establishment of active relationships, the emotional investment, the anti-systemic confrontational attitude and the refusal to negotiate, provide ample evidence of the emergence of a social movement. For Psimitis in December 2008, 'the movement was built as a hybrid collective actors that joined different groups of excluded young people', it produced 'a meaningful course of actions', and 'creative interactions between different groups of young people [...] [that] constructed a new common identity (Psimitis 2011: 131).

In the same line of reasoning, we can say that we were dealing with a form of collective action that involved solidarity, engagement in conflict and breaking the limits of compatibility of a system, in line with Alberto Melucci's definition

of a social movement (Melucci 1989: 29-30; Melucci 1996). We could discern in the December movement the 'informal networks based on [...] shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilize about [...] conflictual issues, through [...] the frequent use of various forms of protest' suggested by Della Porta and Diani as characteristics of a social movement (Della Porta and Diani 1999: 16). Finally we could witness the synthesis of a 'sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on target authorities; [...] employment [...] [of] forms of political action [...] participants' concerted public representations of [...] worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment on the part of themselves' suggested by Charles Tilly (Tilly 2004: 3-4).

However, as mentioned above, December 2008 cannot be theorized simply as a youth movement. We must also come in terms with the diffuse, multifarious, heterogeneous and complex repertoire of practices witnessed during December 2008 and particularly how they moved beyond the traditional contours of protest both in terms of violence but also of disruptive practices. Instead of describing these practices simply as 'rioting', we can follow Seraphim Seferiades and Loukia Kotronaki in describing them as 'insurrectionary collective action' (Seferiades 2009; Kotronaki and Seferiades 2012). According to Kotronaki and Seferiades (2012: 159-160) insurrectionary collective action is characterized by geographic and social diffusion of riotous practice, by the combination of violent protest with non-violent disruptive practices such as occupations and it induces a polarization within the political system.

All these are evident in the particular dimensions of the December 2008 protests. First, the degree of mobilization was unique in modern Greek history and there are very few examples of such unrest in recent European history. A few examples can attest: mass demonstrations have taken place not only in Athens, but in almost every city and town in Greece, for the whole stretch of time up to (and including) New Year's Eve; towns that had not experienced a mass rally in years saw clashes with the police; in hundreds of high schools some form of strike or another kept on for two weeks; the majority of university campuses was occupied up until the beginning of Christmas holidays; tens of police stations all over Greece became the target of student rallies, which often ended in rock-throwing; tens of local radio stations were briefly occupied in order for messages of solidarity to be broadcast; the studios of the National Television Company were likewise briefly occupied in prime time; Town Halls and other municipal facilities were occupied and housed mass assemblies; theatrical shows, including a première at the National Theatre, were interrupted by protesting drama students; more than 180 bank branches were attacked, many of them totally destroyed, hundreds of stores, ATMs and traffic lights were smashed, with the total cost of damages estimated to have exceeded 1.5 billion euros (Sotiris 2010).

An important aspect of the originality of December 2008 was that for the first time it was not just the student movement, but also the whole *youth movement* that dominated the social scene. The December movement united high school students and youths from vocational training centres, university students and young workers, middle-class youths and youths facing social exclusion, Greeks

and immigrants. The participation of immigrant youths was massive, marking a widespread demand for active political participation, but it took place in the general context of anger against social and political elites and not in the name of a particular identity (Kalyvas A. 2010). It was neither a classical student movement nor an explosion of disenfranchised socially excluded youth, like the 2005 *banlieue* riots in France (Wihtol de Wenden 2006; Murray 2006). Both the deterioration of employment prospects and the restructuring of the educational system provided the material basis for this unity. The movement accelerated the re-articulation of a collective identity in the Greek youth that comprises struggle, solidarity, hostility towards authority and the traditional political scene, and an anti-systemic demand for radical change in all aspects of social life. The movement was based on various forms of coordination, often informal, and self-organization (Kotronaki 2009), and used the Internet and new communication technologies extensively, following the pattern observed in other recent youth movements (Tsimitakis 2009; Biddix and Park 2008). The appeal of the movement was not limited to students alone, or to left-wing or anarchist militants. It also attracted various segments of the workforce, who found a way to express their discontent, including young workers and unemployed youths, teachers and professors, people working in precarious posts of intellectual labour. It also acted as a catalyst and accelerator for all forms of social and political activism, the best example being the movement of solidarity with Konstantina Kuneva, a Bulgarian janitor who was attacked and nearly died because of her union activity against precarious labour.

Instead of viewing the violent character of many of the protests as evidence of irrationality and lack of coherence, we must try to discern its particular logic. This tendency of treating collective violence as simply irrational and pathogenic runs contrary to much of current critical social theorizing that insists on trying to discern the particular logic of collective violence (Tilly 2003) and considers an analytical mistake to treat political violence, in all its forms, as another form of common criminal violence (Ruggiero 2006). Even the mass destruction of banks and retail stores in the centre of Athens on December 8th was directed mainly against symbols of economic power, and even youths that opted for more 'peaceful' ways to demonstrate experienced rioting as a necessary aspect of a collective effort to 'make themselves heard'. Therefore, it is possible to treat violence not as deviance and anomie, but as integral aspect of a repertoire of protest (Kotronaki 2009; Papanikolopoulos 2009). Moreover, treating the violent aspects of youth protest as a form of social deviance or delinquency would simply reproduce the neoconservative and neoliberal trend towards a disciplinary, punitive and penal treatment of social problems (Wacquant 1999; 2008).

The political dynamic of the December 2008 protests, in contrast to other movements that tended to focus on concrete policy changes, represented a more profound demand for radical social change. The rage expressed by youths against what they called the 'policies that kill our dreams' and the popularity of slogans such as 'down with the government of murderers' provides evidence of its anti-systemic orientation. The texts and declarations coming from the movement, exemplify this. See for example the following extract from the

declaration of the coordination of Student Assemblies: “The revolt of the youth is an expression of social anger against the politics that murder life, education and work, against the government that attacks the youth and at the same time is handing 28 billion euros to the banks” (Solomon and Palmieri (eds.) 2011: 236).

However, treating the social explosion of December 2008 as the expression of a post-proletarian ‘precariat’ (Xydakis 2008), or as the rising of the ‘Multitude’ (Gavrilidis 2009) following Negri’s theorization (Hardt and Negri 2000) can be misleading. Concerns about working conditions, job insecurity, and privatization of social goods, demands for better public education and more stable and decent jobs combined with a deep distrust of the political establishment, make this movement much less a ‘nomadic multitude’ and much more an advance viewing of a potential counter-hegemonic bloc of the subordinate classes.

The importance of the social and political dynamics of the December 2008 revolt was made obvious less than two years afterwards when Greece entered the prolonged cycle of protest and unrest that followed the beginning of the austerity programs. From the general strikes of 2010, 2011 and 2012, many of which also included violent confrontations with the police to impressive collective experiences of self-organization, horizontal coordination and mass protest such as the 2011 movement of the squares (Sotiris 2011a), one can see in many instances the importance not only of the collective experiences of protest during 2008, but also some of the networks of activism and coordination that were first seen in 2008.

A condensation of social tensions and systemic contradictions

One cannot explain the intensity and extent of the revolt without reference to the social tensions and systemic contradictions related to dominant policies of neoliberalism and capitalist restructuring. We are not suggesting that the December 2008 events are the simple result of the general social and economic trends. At the same time, we cannot theorize the events of December 2008 without taking into account these trends, without thinking about “social currents coursing beneath them and which carried them far beyond their singular precipitant, the killing of a 15-year-old student by the police” (Johnston and Seferiades 2012, 150). In the section that follows, we first look at these trends and then turn to police violence as a condensation and metonymy for all forms of discontent, in order to explain why the murder of a 15-year-old youth could trigger such a sequence of contentious practices. The importance of a broader set of systemic contradictions, having to do with employment prospects, workplace conditions, the crisis of education, is also evident in the discourses coming from the movement itself.

The first declaration of the Occupation of the Athens University of Economics and Finance, mainly by anarchist activists, exemplified this: “This particular state murder was the end of the line concerning the everyday violence and terror which are being suffered increasingly by big parts of the society, through the massive dismissals, the economic penury, the police power, the psychological

terror that is being delivered by the news of 8” (Assembly of the Occupation of the university of economics and business 2008). The Occupation of the headquarters of the General Confederation of Labour (GSEE) mainly by militants in radical trade union initiatives exemplified this articulation of workplace grievances with the protests against police violence. As one of the declarations coming from this Occupation stated: “We, manual workers, employees, jobless, temporary workers, local or immigrants, are not passive TV viewers. Since the murder of Alexandros Grigoropoulos on Saturday night we participate in the demonstrations, the clashes with the police, the occupations on the centre or the neighborhoods” (General Assembly of Insurgent Workers 2008). The declaration of the ‘Popular Assembly’ of the occupation of the Agios Dimitrios Town Hall insisted that part of the reasons for the revolt was the “everyday violence we face at work, at schools, in the fight for survival” (Occupation of the Agios Dimitrios Town Hall 2008). The first communiqué of the Occupation of Athens Law School also epitomized this conception.

The same government that implement politics of austerity for workers and at the same time offers 28 billion euros as bail-out for the banks, the same government that uses police as an answer to social inequality that it is creating, is the same government that following the policies of the PASOK governments, is drafting within the European Union framework anti-terrorist legislation against movements and militants, the murders and kidnaps immigrants in police stations, that arrests protesters that represses and penalizes workers’ struggles. It uses the judicial system to issue decisions that consider strikes illegal, that puts militants behind bars and that justify police violence and brutality. It is investing in fear and is intensifying the attack on all fronts (privatizations, pension reform, education, health, social rights). These are the policies that armed the hands of policemen and murdered a fifteen-year-old student (quoted in Solomon and Palmieri (eds.) 2011, 235-236).

Deterioration of employment prospects and the emergence of a common youth identity

Despite high growth rates from the mid 1990s up to 2007 (INE GSEE – ADEDY 2008), Greece has experienced high rates of youth unemployment and underemployment. According to Eurostat estimates the unemployment rate of young people (15-24) in Greece in 2008 was at 22.1% with the EU-27 average being at 15.4% and by the end of 2009 it had reached 27.5% with the EU-27 being at 20.3% (Eurostat 2009; Eurostat 2010). This was the beginning of an extreme rise of unemployment and especially youth unemployment. By 2013 unemployment had reached 27% and youth unemployment 64%. According to Karamesini (2009: 21) six years after graduation one out of three Higher Education graduates, two out of three secondary education graduates and one out of three compulsory education graduates have not found some form of stable employment. Those who manage to enter the labour market have to put up with low wages, part-time posts, working ‘off the books’, harassment by employers. Better qualifications do not necessarily lead to better employment

prospects. In the 20-24 and 25-29 age groups unemployment rates are higher among those with better educational qualifications, such as university degrees (Karamesini 2009: 21), following a trend observed across Southern Europe where leavers from upper secondary education and even higher education have at least equal unemployment rates with the least qualified (Gangl *et al.* 2003: 282). A large survey of the employment prospects of Greek university graduates (Karamesini 2008) has shown that many of them face flexible work forms and / or are obliged to accept positions different from their formal qualifications. A picture emerges of a 'unity in difference' (Karamesini 2009: 21) of Greek youth.

Despite the differences in educational level and social status between the different segments of youth (especially between those that leave school at the end of compulsory or secondary education, opting for vocational training and early entry into the workforce at manual or lower clerical posts, and those continuing to Higher Education), they all face the deterioration of employment prospects. Worsening of work conditions, higher unemployment and lower earnings for youths have been a constant feature of European social reality from the 1980s and 1990s. Young employees have a stronger presence in sectors with high employee turnover, temporary posts and part time jobs (Lefresne 2003) and youth is at the epicentre of the expansion of precarious forms of labour (Castel 2006). Whether we choose to see precariousness as the paradigmatic form of labour under capitalism (Neilson and Rossiter 2009) or not, it is obvious that young people are indeed facing a continuous deterioration of employment prospects.

Therefore, this deterioration of employment prospects for all segments of the Greek youth was surely one of the reasons for the reproduction of a rather unitary identity for youths in Greece. In their turn, these elements of a common collective youth identity in Greece have played an important role in the mobilization of all segments of youth in the December 2008 protests and the dynamic of these protests.

Education as social battleground

From the 1990s reforms have aimed at increasing access at post-secondary education and at the same time making sure that university degrees do not lead to guaranteed work prospects, bringing higher education closer to business interests and disciplining the student movement, in line with the so-called 'Bologna Process' (Katsikas and Sotiris 2003). This has led to successive waves of student unrest. In the 2000s the combination of a highly competitive system of entry exams for higher education –that requires tremendous amounts of studying and many extra hours of expensive tutorial courses– with the prospect of obtaining a university degree that will not lead to secure employment has produced a widespread feeling of growing insecurity as regards young people's prospects.

University reform is an aspect of a broader process of capitalist restructuring. Commodification and entrepreneurialization of higher education (Ovetz 1996; Slaughter and Lelslie 1997; Harvie 2000; edu-factory collective 2006) are

important aspects, but equally important are changes in the role of education in social reproduction. Educational reforms tend to 'internalize' the changes in the labour market and the capitalist labour process within the educational apparatus. This internalization and pre-inscription of the realities of capitalist production, this subsumption of education under the imperatives of capitalist accumulation, is not limited to changes in university funding. It takes the form of changes not only in the relative value of university degrees but to the very notion of the degree, leading to new fragmentations, educational hierarchies, processes of individualization that respond to the new realities of the workplace. It can also account for the emphasis on training instead of education, for the changes in curricula, for the emergence of an entrepreneurial culture in higher education, for the ideological projection of individualistic 'investment' in one's qualifications. In addition, it can explain why youths in the educational apparatus have a stronger than before perception of the realities and difficulties of the workplace. As experienced during the French student movement against the CPE (Contract of First Employment) in 2006 (Budgen 2011) or in recent Italian student movements (Bascetta and Vecchi 2011), students tend more easily to associate with the labour movement, to think in terms of common demands, to create forms of solidarity. New forms of linkages between higher education and capitalist production and the labour market, along with increased insecurity regarding employment prospects in a conjuncture marked by increased unemployed and precariousness (Calella 2011), can explain why student movements express both an increased apprehension of the struggles in the workplace and greater readiness to articulate broader demands. Recent student movements have not been just a reaction to the devaluation of degrees but are a part of greater social mobilization against the neoliberal 'restructuring of the totality of capital – labour relations' (Kouvelakis 2007: 279).

What emerges is a deeper contradiction facing modern capitalism because of the effort from the part of the forces of capital to have a more skilled labour force but with fewer rights, more productive but also more insecure, over-qualified and at the same time underpaid. The gulf between aspiration and reality and the fact that these segments of the workforce, (both as active and as future workers), not only are in a position to grasp this contradiction, but also have the communicative skills to transform their discontent into social demand, has given a new quality to the wave of student and more generally youth unrest in Europe in the second half of the 2000s. That is why, although the majority of the youths participating in the December movement were high school and university students, the grievances at the base of their discontent had also to do with the developments within capitalist production.

Regarding the Greek case we should note the importance of the impressive 2006-2007 movement by university students and professors against a wave of reforms that included changes in the status of university degrees that would de-link them from professional qualifications, harsher disciplinary measures, intensified study schedules, and an attempt to overturn the explicit constitutional ban on private universities (Dritsas and Kalampokas 2011). This movement produced a generation of student activists that were to play an important role during December 2008 (Lountos 2012).

Capitalist crisis and social tensions

The economic crisis was surely a contributing factor to a general feeling of discontent, marking the first stages of the whole sequence that led to the 'Greek debt crisis' and the austerity package enforced by the European Union, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In 2008 the Greek economy was already sliding into recession (Bank of Greece 2009) in sharp contrast to high growth rates and intense capitalist restructuring attested from the mid-1990s. Households were facing stagnant wages, job insecurity and rising indebtedness, compounded by a policy of strict fiscal austerity. Rising social inequality became an integral aspect of the Greek social landscape (Kouvelakis 2008). All these accentuated feelings of growing insecurity and a widespread sense that things were going to get worse in the next months. A few months after the December revolt a special Eurobarometer survey captured aspects of this social climate of dissatisfaction with the current situation and negative expectations for the future (*Eurostat* 2010a: 43-57). The evolution of the Greek economy after 2010 showed that 2008 was the beginning of a much deeper economic crisis that by 2013 had reached proportions that can only be compared to major warfare or the Great Depression of the 1930s, with a prolonged recession, a tremendous increase in unemployment and massive loss of income for the majority of society (INE-GSEE 2013).

Legitimization crisis

On the political level, rising social discontent was condensed in a wider sense of legitimization crisis of the Greek State and dominant policies (Bratsis 2009). The apprehension of widespread political corruption and direct links between business and the political system intensified these tendencies, and the same goes for the inability of the Greek State to deal with emergencies such as the devastating forest fires of 2007. Despite the fact that this did not take the form of an open 'systemic' political crisis, it surely contributed to the extent of the anger and protest in the streets of Athens in December 2008. The humiliating defeat of New Democracy in the 2009 general election also exemplified the extent of the discontent. The depth of the political crisis was made even more evident in subsequent years and especially the May 2012 election, the most impressive expression of dissatisfaction with the political system in recent Greek history (Mavris 2012).

Police violence in perspective

Police violence should not be seen as simply a contributing factor to the revolt of the Greek youth; it acted as a metonymy for the systemic social violence of capitalist restructuring and neoliberalism and as a catalyst for the expression of various forms of social and political discontent. Therefore, even though structural tendencies such as the ones discussed above were surely contributing factors to the eruption of process, it was such a display of police violence that acted as the critical event that not only triggered a whole sequence of

contentious practices but also offered a specific and clearly defined reason to act and protest.

An extreme case of police aggression, such as the murder, in cold blood, of 15-year-old Alexis Grigoropoulos, was perceived as the 'tip of the iceberg' of all forms of authoritarianism, aggression, social inequality, as the condensation of all forms of grievances, especially since police violence has also been an integral aspect of the turn towards the neoliberal security state (Belantis 2006; Kouvélakis 2010). The fact that Alexis Grigoropoulos was a high school student, from a middle-class family living in the suburbs, that he was out on a Saturday night with friends, in an Athens neighbourhood traditionally associated with youth culture and student radicalism, that was killed without provocation by a police officer, meant that all sections of Greek youth could identify with him and see its death as a totally unjustified display of state-imposed systemic violence. That is why from the beginning mourning and anger were mixed and fuelled the radicalization of protest, something that can account for the impressive rapid diffusion of the protests, including violent protests and the mass participation of all sections of the youth.

Therefore, a tendency to focus on the inability of the police to deal with youth protest or on the rituals of youth collective delinquency misses the point. Moreover, it is not enough to link hostility to the police with the historic association of police forces in Greece with state authoritarianism and constant persecution of left-wing and communist militants. By saying this we do not want to underestimate the fact that at the same time all sorts of militant and radical groups, collectivities and networks could immediately treat protests against this murder as a protest against all forms of attacks against youth and society. This was based upon the long tradition of political radicalism associated with youth movements in Greece, from the long-history of politicized student movements and the student Left to the anarchist and autonomous groups that never ceased to have a strong presence, along with forms of trade union militancy, the existence of experienced activist networks and strong traditions of defiance against the security forces including traditions of street clashes with riot police (Sotiris 2011; Kanellopoulos 2012; Lountos 2012). All these factors can explain the rapid diffusion of insurrectionary practices, from the immediate start of street clashes by radical left and anarchist militants during the night of the murder, to the mass presence of youth, union, left-wing and anarchist militants in the demonstrations the following day, to the impressive entrance of high school students into the stage and tremendous mass violence of the manifestations on Monday, 8 December 2008 (Kotronaki and Seferiades 2012).

Beyond a simple '*trahison des clercs*': explaining the inability of mainstream intellectuals to understand the movement

Simply observing the inability of mainstream theorists to grasp the significance of the December 2008 explosion is not enough. It is a symptom of underlying ideological displacements. In what follows we will focus on three aspects, the support given historically to projects of modernization from Greek intellectuals,

the gradual identification of the demand for 'modernization' with the neoliberal restructuring of Greek economy and society, and the current ideological crisis of mainstream social theory in Greece as part a broader tendency towards hegemonic instability after the exhaustion of the neoliberal paradigm.

Greek intellectuals and projects of modernization

The association of Greek intellectuals with projects of capitalist modernization has been particularly important. Modernization has been a key word in the evolution of Greek political culture in the past 4 decades. Political representatives from the entire political spectrum, the Right, the Centre (and later the socialist centre-Left) and even the Communist Left have formulated their respective political agendas as projects for the modernization of Greek Society. In the theoretical plane, it was the theorization of tendencies of underdevelopment and / or distorted development in Greek society (Tsoukalas 1977, 1983, 1986; Mouzelis 1978, 1986) that offered the necessary justification for the need for modernization. Moreover, from the 1960s to the 1980s, a basic tenet of the Greek Left has been the inability of the Greek bourgeoisie, because of its backward character and its dependence on foreign imperialism, to lead the process of modernization of Greek society. It was up to the people's movement to lead the way of both social modernization and of social emancipation. This earlier version of the demand for modernization (and development) facilitated a certain duality from the part of intellectuals in the 1970s and 1980s. On the one hand it helped proponents of such a position to be in touch with a climate of social and political radicalization, exemplified in the demand for 'change' articulated in socialist terms. On the other hand, it facilitated their role as 'organic intellectuals' of the state. It allowed them to make more articulate and sophisticated a historical transition already in motion, namely the transition of Greece to an advanced capitalist economy, to a European-style parliamentary democracy, to the establishment of welfare state institutions, and to the end of the 'state of exception' that was established after the Civil War (1946-1949).

Modernization as a break with the aspirations of the subordinate classes

The 1980s and early 1990s marked a turning point for Greek intellectuals and their commitment to projects of modernization. The gradual right-wing turn of PASOK towards political realism, the austerity program of 1985, and the beginning of the distancing between social demands and government measures evolved into a growing conflict between the social aspirations of the lower classes and projects of modernization. The project of modernization started to incorporate elements of the emerging neoliberal policy consensus (privatization, retreat of the state, market accountability of public institutions). The change of the conjuncture also changed the connotations of the appeal to modernization. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the appeal to modernization was combined with elements of a radical-popular ideology that included anti-imperialism, an

emphasis on struggle and resistance, high valuing of collective goods and the public sector.

After the mid-1980s, we witnessed a turn towards a new set of values that included individualism, consumerism, and high valuing of wealth (Voulgaris 2008: 337). However, large segments of the subordinate classes remained faithful to aspects of the 'Metapolitefsi' ideology. Consequently, the appeals of public intellectuals towards the necessary modernization of Greek society started to incorporate a rupture with the ideological, social and political practices of the subordinate classes. It was then that the accusation of populism became commonplace in political and theoretical interventions, referring to the attitudes and practices by the working class and large segments of traditional petty bourgeois strata that insisted on secure employment, income redistribution, state intervention in the economy. For the first time the main enemy of the modernizing project is not the bourgeoisie or imperialism but the subordinate classes themselves. The 1989 collapse of 'actually existing socialism' acted as a catalyst for this process of political and theoretical transformation.

Nikiforos Diamantouros (1994) epitomized this position in a text that became a reference point for many writers. Diamantouros reformulated the cultural dualism thesis that had been commonplace in the discussion of Greek political culture. While adhering to the description of two cultures, one originating in the experience of Ottoman rule and the other in the encounter with European Enlightenment, he suggested that the post-1974 form of the more traditional or backward political culture was what he defined as the 'underdog' political culture. This culture comprised a 'levelling egalitarianism [...] a compensatory sense of justice [...] a profound diffidence towards capitalism and the market operation' (Diamantouros 1994: 38). It is obvious that we are dealing here with a semantic and ideological shift, where instead of referring to pre-modern traditionalism the problem is located in the anti-capitalist political and social reflexes of the subordinate classes and their endorsement of political projects of social justice, redistribution and social protection.

The momentum of the demand for modernization was not only theoretical but also political. Costas Simitis, a self-proclaimed modernizer in PASOK, and himself a theorist of the need for 'modernization' (Simitis 1989, 1992, 1992a, 1995), was the winner of the succession race that followed the resignation, due to health problems, of Prime Minister A. Papandreou in 1995. It was at that time that the appeal to 'modernization', in the sense of complying with capitalist norms expressed in the process of European integration, became dominant in the public discourse (Sakellariopoulou and Sotiris 2004). The participation of intellectuals and social theorists in the development of specific policy initiatives, the new research landscape and the growing importance of programs funded by the European Union, and the need to ideologically legitimize 'reforms' (the new catchword for apologists of capitalist modernization), all these facilitated the emergence of a new consensus among Greek mainstream intellectuals in the 1990s and 2000s, regardless of their political denomination.

In this consensus, modernization meant the identification of democracy with parliamentary procedure, the distrust of radical social movements, viewing as

essentially conservative all demands that were in contrast to neoliberal economic orthodoxy, and the acceptance of the market as a vector of social rationality. The fact that most of these intellectuals opposed the nationalist trend of the 1990s and the subsequent short-lived attempt of the Greek Orthodox Church for a more openly political intervention, was self-proclaimed as element of the their progressive position, despite their alignment with the prevailing policy consensus. However, the demand for modernization, although dominant in the public sphere and discourse, especially when coupled with the appeal to Europeanization, was never fully hegemonic in the collective self representation of the lower classes, leading to dualisms and contradictions in Greek political culture (Voulgaris 2008a).

If we want to understand why mainstream theorists had such a difficulty in dealing with December 2008 as a social movement, we must pay particular attention to the theoretical and ideological displacements surrounding the demand for modernization. The identification of modernization with neoliberal orthodoxy led to a very particular reaction towards social movements that opposed neoliberalism and processes of capitalist restructuring. This reaction was not simply hostile – this would follow a trend observed in most advanced capitalist social formations. The crucial point was that social movements were considered as inherently parochial and backward, representing interests and practices that can impede progress. This is in sharp contrast even to the positivist tradition that reluctantly left room for the ‘functional rebel’ (Durkheim) or ‘rebellion’ (Parsons, Merton) or openly admitted the importance of conflict (Dahrendorf). This inability to treat social resistances as forms of social conflict, requiring theoretical comprehension, leads to this theoretical impasse. Treating social contention and conflict as obstacles to an inescapable road to progress, leaves no room for analysis, assessment of dynamics and search for underlying causal mechanisms.

From the mid 1990s onwards student, worker and peasant movements have been treated as examples of a parochial mentality. This was particularly evident during the continuous cycle of student and university unrest in 2006-2007. At that crucial moment and despite the fact that students were facing police aggression, the majority of the intellectuals discussed above opted to offer their support to the government – even though most of them did not have affiliations to the then ruling New Democracy Party – in the name of the necessary modernization and reform of universities (Lazarides 2008). It was then that the repertoire of treating youth movements as forms of deviance and delinquency became the norm of mainstream theorists.

Crisis of hegemony and the impasse of mainstream intellectuals

However, treating the reaction of mainstream Greek intellectuals towards the December movement simply as the result of their support for projects of capitalist modernization is not enough. We must also look at the ideological and political conjuncture. This inability to comprehend a social movement and to perceive it not as a form of deviance but as an actual movement is an expression of deeper ideological displacements and contradictions. These contradictions

signal the exhaustion of the hegemonic potential of the dominant discourse on modernization and 'reform' in a period of rising social tensions and conflicts and consequently hegemonic instability.

In the second half of the 2000s, after the end of the artificial euphoria orchestrated around the Olympic Games, Greek society witnessed rising social inequalities, tensions, and confrontations. The impressive student and teacher movements of the 2006-2007, the confrontation around the reform of the pension system in 2007, and the rise of a new wave of trade union activism, especially in sectors where job precariousness was predominant, were manifestations of these tensions and the same goes for the rise of left-wing formations, especially in the 2007 general election. Greece was becoming a more unequal and socially polarized country. In 2007, the 'at risk of poverty' rate was at 20%, higher than the EU average, the top 20% of the population (in terms of disposable income) received 6 times as much of the total income of the bottom 20%, and the Gini coefficient of income inequality distribution was at 34 higher than the EU-27 average at 31 (*Eurostat* 2010a). There was the gradual exhaustion of what one might describe as the Greek developmental paradigm. This was based upon capitalist restructuring, cheap labour, constant flow of EU funds and the growth of sectors that are very sensitive to the tendencies of the general economic conjuncture, such as tourism, shipping and construction and experienced, without ever successfully solving a problem of competitiveness that was accentuated by the monetary and financial architecture of the Eurozone.

The growing distrust by large segments of the electorate of the political establishment reflected a more general inability of the neoliberal project to be hegemonic in the positive sense of actually gaining active consent from the subordinate classes. This meant that the political scene was becoming more alienated from the working class and large segments of the 'middle class', leading to a political cycle where the party that came to power gained more from the discontent against the policies of its predecessor than from the positive appeal of its program. At the same time, no alternative strategy has emerged in order to deal with growing social tensions and inequalities. On the contrary, both at the national and at EU level a 'fuite en avant' tactic of even more aggressive neoliberal reforms became dominant. This entrenchment of the political system and the economic elites also had ideological repercussions in the form of a return to an authoritarian and conservative emphasis on 'security' and 'law and order'. The erosion of the hegemonic and integrating ability of the State in most advanced capitalist social formations vis-à-vis the subordinate classes can explain the rise of the 'Security State', which aims at disarming the subordinates from any possibility to comprehend the reasons for their discontent and at directing their anger against stigmatized minorities (Kouvelakis 2010).

The full manifestation of the economic crisis did not change this systemic entrenchment around a policy of even more aggressive neoliberal policy despite the obvious failure of neoliberal market orthodoxy. This situation can be described as a strategic impasse from the part of the political and economic

elites. It was obvious, that more social tensions and even social explosions lay ahead, exemplified in the 2010-2012 sequence of protest and contention. However, what we have been witnessing an almost complete inability of the political system to think of an alternative other than successive 'shock and awe' waves of reforms, by means of draconian EU-ECB-IMF packages, aiming at complete demoralization of the subordinate classes, a bet far from safe as the persistence of mass movements and explosive social and political dynamics protests since 2010 has shown. On the contrary mass protest and social political contention brought Greece close to what Gramsci described as an 'organic crisis' and 'crisis of hegemony' (Gramsci 1971: 210-11; Kouvelakis 2011: 24-27). Therefore, the inability of mainstream intellectuals to comprehend the dynamics of the December 2008 movement is not simply a theoretical deficiency, but exactly an aspect of a tendency towards a crisis of hegemony.

To explain this inability we can turn to Poulantzas' insistence that the State 'both through apparatuses specialized in the qualification and training of labour power [...] and through the totality of its apparatuses (bourgeois and petty-bourgeois political parties, the parliamentary system, cultural apparatuses, the press and media)' (Poulantzas 2000: 60), plays an instrumental role in the division between manual and intellectual labour, knowledge production and in the articulation of hegemonic discourses. Following Gramsci, Poulantzas insists that this process requires a distinctive corps of 'state-enrolled intellectuals [that] are formally distinct from the bourgeoisie but play a role in organizing its hegemony' (Poulantzas 2000: 61). Consequently, a crisis of strategy or a crisis in the ability of the State to produce hegemonic discourses, can also take the form of this inability of 'organic intellectuals' to actually produce knowledge of the conjuncture. It is not that they have not been not aware of the possibility of social explosions. They are unable to treat them as social phenomena that require comprehension, because this would also mean articulating possible policy changes and class compromises, something precluded in advance in the dominant discourse. Thus, this whole conception of these movements as dangerous obstructions and forms of deviance, which entail the danger of generalized anomie and a complete breakdown of order, a conception that necessarily implies that the only way to deal with them is through disciplinary practices and technologies. Therefore, the ideological displacement of mainstream Greek intellectuals is also an aspect of a more general crisis of capitalist strategy (and consequently 'pro-systemic' social theory) in a period of hegemonic instability.

Instead of viewing the December 2008 movement as the symptom of an incomplete political modernization, or as a backward, corporatist reaction to progress, we must describe it as the eruption of all the conflicts and violence associated with capitalist modernization. As Stathis Kouvelakis (2008) has observed, contrary to the tendency of Western media to depict the December 2008 riots as evidence of Greece's incomplete transition to modernity, we must see them as the result of the advanced stage of neoliberal reforms in Greece.

Conclusion

The December 2008 explosion of Greek youth presents a very important challenge for radical social theory. It belongs to a cycle of protest and discontent against dominant neoliberal policies, which is far from over. On a more general socio-theoretical level one is obliged to treat it as a highly original *event* (Galanopoulos *et al.* 2008; Douzinas 2009; Vergetis 2010). The inability of mainstream Greek intellectuals and social theorists to comprehend its dynamics and their insistence on treating it as some form of deviance can only be explained through their historical attachment to projects of capitalist modernization and a more general pattern of a crisis of dominant strategy with repercussions in mainstream social theory. Radical social theory must answer this challenge, and attempt to come in terms with the theoretical and political exigencies of such movements.

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About the author

Panagiotis Sotiris teaches social theory, social and and political philosophy at the Department of Sociology of the University of the Aegean in Mytilene, Lesbos. His publications include *Communism and Philosophy. The theoretical adventure of Louis Althusser* (in Greek) (Ellinika Grammata; Athens). His research interests include Marxist theory, contemporary philosophy, radical social theory, social movements, and the theory of imperialism. He has been active in social movements for more than 25 years first as a student, then in private education unions and now as an adjunct lecturer. He can be contacted at psot AT soc.aegean.gr

Towards a new universality: the World Social Forum's cosmopolitan vision¹

Giuseppe Caruso

Editors' note:

We invite responses to this article for a special discussion in the upcoming (May 2014) issue of Interface. Please contact Laurence Cox (laurence.cox AT nuim.ie) if you are interested in contributing.

Introduction

The World Social Forum (WSF) is presently the world's largest and most diverse transnational activist network. Its global events in Brazil, India, Kenya, Mali, Pakistan, Venezuela and Senegal and its regional, national and local ones have attracted hundreds of thousands of participants and thousands of organisations and social movements. The WSF is a complex structure of loosely articulated networks and organisations aiming at individually and collectively pursuing transformative actions towards a more just and equal world. It aims at inspiring broad coalitions capable of advancing global transformation. To fulfil this goal WSF's participants seek to create spaces of dialogue in which actors with different outlooks on society and the future can share their visions and design collaborative practices.

The WSF's methodology privileges mediation but does not eschew compromise, it privileges transformation but does not avoid contingent strategic thought. This paper argues that the WSF's most innovative contribution to global transformations is the articulation of emancipatory discourses and practices (both prefigurative and strategic) recursively engaging its identity, vision and methodology. Such cultural politics of transformation is illustrated in this paper through the WSF's cosmopolitan project based on emancipatory identities, relational knowledges and practices of liberation.

The WSF is the brainchild of two Brazilian activists, Chico Whitaker and Oded Grajev, who during the year 2000 networked globally to canvas support to establish a counter-event to the World Economic Forum. The WEF meets annually since 1971 in the ski resort of Davos, Switzerland, and gathers the world most successful CEOs and most influential finance ministers, academics, and top militaries. Its meetings focus on subjects as varied as economic development and market penetration, democracy and governance, profit and sustainability. The WSF, instead, would aim at establishing a cultural and

¹ This contribution draws on and revises the argument in Caruso 2013.

political counter-hegemony by stressing the importance of social issues over economic dynamics in conceptualising desirable futures.

After a successful first edition gathering 15,000 participants, the WSF grew into mammoth events with tens of thousands of participants. Alongside its yearly global events, turned biannual since 2007, the WSF gave life to a proliferation of regional, national and local events across the planet. In 2010, 55 networked events took place all around the globe (Massiah 2011). While originally linked to the WEF, the WSF has increasingly emancipated itself from defensive positions and become more assertive in facilitating activist convergences and, at the same time, both imagine and practice a better world. To fulfil its expanding mission, it has developed an increasingly complex organisational framework. In the first semester of 2001 a Charter of Principles was drafted and approved by an appointed International Council: the Charter defined the contours of the open space and its vision; the International Council, gathering over a hundred organisations and networks, would facilitate the further development of the WSF, the organisation of its events and their methodology and the expansion of the WSF movement. Later the IC was complemented by five thematic commissions dealing with strategy, methodology, resources, communication and expansion. Recently a Liaison Commission was set up to facilitate the work of the IC and to support to the local organising committees of its global events. A global Secretariat in San Paulo supports the work of all commissions, working groups and organising committees.

Currently, the IC has around 200 members² including global social movements, La Via Campesina and the International Trade Union Confederation together counting a membership of around four hundred million, global NGOs, like Greenpeace and Action Aid, feminist networks like the Articulacion Feminista Marcosur and the World March of Women and networks of research-activists like the Network Institute for Global Democratization (NIGD) of which this writer is member.

As a member of NIGD I have participated since 2009 to the meetings of the IC and contributed to the work of its Communication, Strategy and Methodology Commissions³. This paper is based on the engaged participant observation in the IC and does not pretend to be representative of the whole WSF, which would be at odds with WSF's values that inspire it stressing the situatedness of knowledge and the limitations of the presumption of representativeness. However, my work with and research on the IC is complemented by an engagement with the WSF dating since 2002. Since then I contributed to the work of a global network of activists called Red de Resistencia Global (Global

² http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/main.php?id_menu=3_2_1&cd_language=1

³ Regular reports and reflections of my participation in the IC meetings are published on <http://giuseppecaruso.wordpress.com> and in several other media networks such like Ciranda, E-Joussour, Pambazuka and others and organisational websites including the main WSF website.

Resistance Network) started in the Intercontinental Youth Camp in 2003, I participated as a volunteer in the organisation of the WSF held in India in 2004 and I was involved in the communication process for the Bamako forum in 2006 to which I contributed, at a distance, as member of the IC Communication Commission.

This paper is divided into three sections. The first discusses the identity of the WSF which is articulated in complex structures made of local, national and transnational networks and organisations set in horizontal and hierarchical arrangements with each other and with International Council, International Secretariat and local Organising Committees. The second section discusses the vision of the WSF as enshrined in its Charter of Principles. Those principles inspire a potentially emancipatory cosmopolitan project aiming at replacing the domination of one cultural and social system founded on exploitative conceptions of human relations and the environment with a negotiated one built on mutual recognition and symbolic and material emancipation of all individuals and groups. The third section discusses the transformative methodology elaborated to pursue these goals.

In a tellingly circular movement, the themes discussed in each section resonate with each other illustrating a three-way recursive relationship between identity, vision and methodology. Such dynamic is underpinned by closely intertwined analytical approaches and normative postures that challenge instrumental relations between actors of change and their objectives. Moreover, ambitious methodological formulations within the WSF about how to engage existence and transformation challenge the assumptions that underpin the relations between what is, how it can be known and how it can be transformed and present them as function of each other. Engaged research, like the transformative ethnography that informs this piece, shares these premises and it is consistent with WSF's cosmopolitan vision and methodology (Juris and Khasnabish, forthcoming; Caruso, forthcoming; Eschle and Maiaguashca, 2007; Wilson, 2007). The transformative ethnographer is committed to the impossibility of the extraction of absolute (ontological) knowledge from the lives of actors and she aims at establishing relationships in which the knowledge of all those involved is engaged and transformed. In the context of the WSF, the transformative ethnographer aims at contributing to the articulation of its visions and methodologies, both while "in the field" and through the written accounts that might spark further reflection, engagement and transformation.

Nature and identity of the World Social Forum

This paper dialogues with a widening and deepening debate on the WSF. This conversation takes advantage of the contributions of activists and scholars from a wide range of disciplines such as anthropology, social movement studies, sociology, political sciences, geography, international relations to mention just a few, in a truly trans-disciplinary engagement consistent with the WSF's values. The WSF has been conceptualised as a public sphere (Conway and Singh 2009;

Doerr, 2007; Yla-Anttila, 2005; Glasius, 2005; Smith, 2004; Hardt, 2002), a network (Byrd and Jasny, 2010; Juris, 2008; Della Porta et al., 2006; Escobar, 2004; Waterman, 2004), an open space (Whitaker 2005, Sparke et al., 2005), a utopian space (Tormey, 2005), a space of intentionality (Juris, 2008b), an embryonic global social movement or a party *in fieri* (Teivainen, 2007; Chase-Dunn and Reese, 2007; Marcuse, 2005; Patomaki and Teivainen, 2004), a “resistance relay” (Funke, 2008) or a contact zone (Conway, 2011; Santos, 2005). The differentiation of the debate illustrates both scholarly interest and relevance of the WSF as instance of transformation and as actor of social theorization.

Such growing literature engages issues related to the geographic reach of the forum, its unique local and thematic instantiation, its increasingly complex institutional architecture, the multiplication of its organisational settings, and the articulation between them and the situated instantiations of its vision and methodology. Though so highly differentiated, the discussions on the WSF share matters of concern about a theorization that is consistent with and inspired by the WSF’s values and methodology and is able to contribute to its development and the achievement of its vision (Juris, 2008b; Doerr 2008; Eschle and Maiaguascha 2006 and 2007; Willis and Roskos 2007; Wilson 2007; Vargas 2003). Common concerns in this literature are the extent to which the WSF can a) be inclusive; b) develop emancipatory knowledge practices; and c) contribute to an emancipated future devoid of exploitation, oppression and marginalisation.

These debates reflect and are reflected by dialogues taking place in the WSF and like those often conflate analytical and normative constructs, actual and projected identities, present and future. Highlighting the constitutive interaction between normative, cultural and ideological dimensions of the WSF, the social structures that underpin it and the dynamics it expresses, problematizes the tensions between aspirations and practices (vision and methods), between identity and vision (being and becoming) and between identity and practices (being and doing) and considers them as a complex creative field of forces rather than bounded oppositions such as actor/space, public-sphere/network, deliberative/agonistic, strategic/prefigurative (Eschle and Maiaguashca, 2006; Smith, Kharides et al. 2008). Multiple constitutive tensions are indeed at play in the WSF IC (and in all WSF spaces I was involved in) and apparent polarizations are often caused by linguistic terms that, attempting to define complex dynamics, simplify them along binary cleavages.

According to its Charter, the WSF is an “open meeting place” where “groups and movements of civil society that are opposed to neoliberalism and to domination of the world by capital (WSF, 2001)” can articulate strategic alliances. Inclusive and extolling the creative role of differences, the WSF is a “place for reflective thinking, democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free exchange of experiences and interlinking for effective action (WSF, 2001).” Participants in the WSF discuss action oriented proposals without central direction. The WSF is a “context that, in a decentralized fashion, interrelates organizations and

movements engaged in concrete action at levels from the local to the international" (WSF, 2001).

Whereas successful in providing the WSF with the inclusiveness to make it the referent of a wide section of global progressive activists, the assumed inherent or perceived contingent limitations of the "open space" are highlighted, theoretically and ideologically, by activists who envisage the WSF as a political actor which directs actions against strategic targets on the basis of a coherent theory of society. Over the years the debate has arguably described or created a cleavage between the advocates of the "open space" and those of an institutionalised organisational structure (Santos, 2005; Teivainen, 2004, 2007; Adamovsky, 2005; De Angelis, 2005; Dowling 2005; Sullivan, 2005; Juris 2008; Smith, Karides et al., 2008; Whitaker, 2005).

The case for an unstructured WSF is made on the comparative advantage of networks centred on information and knowledge exchange to foster social innovation (Castells, 2001). However, assuming (as in the Charter of Principles) the horizontality, openness and inclusiveness of networks overlooks the role of social and power imbalances in knowledge relations and prevents the possibility of their exposure, engagement and transformation. Consider this: one of the conditions of inclusion in knowledge networks is access to the shared linguistic code. In the case of the 2004 Indian WSF, for instance, English was the shared linguistic protocol of the organisational process; this caused the exclusion of those who expressed themselves in other Indian languages (not to mention other foreign languages) reproducing in the WSF the divide between the English speaking middle class and the vast majority of workers and peasants. The ignorance of the code was not a technical lack but it involved social dynamics of subordination.

Cultural protocols are as different as linguistic codes. In the WSF idioms of protest and cosmologies of the oppressed represent a variety of perspectives on the future and their unequal relations often generate oppressive communications informed by unaware ethnocentrism and other forms of embodied cultural domination. When not exposed and engaged they generate disappointment and reproduce dynamics of marginalisation. Illustration of this is the case of Muslim activists whose inclusion in the Indian WSF was less successful than desirable due to the uncritical secularism of the organisational setting which prevented the engagement of issues of religious marginalisation (Caruso, 2004; Khan, 2004).

The normative tensions between designed vs. emergent organisation, directed social change vs. self- transformation, political actor vs. public sphere and others, affect the perception of both the nature of the WSF and its vision and methodology. They also have profound theoretical, political and practical implications. The ambiguities of each term of the binaries considered challenge both theoretical reductionism and political instrumentalism and invites inclusive methodologies of transformation as discussed later. Moreover, dichotomous and adversarial approaches to the WSF's identity and to the

representation of its struggle are not representative of the vastly more complex debate in the WSF and in its IC. In the case of the actor/network debate, for instance, networks and public spheres (of which the “open space” would be a declination) while potentially open, inclusive, efficient and fast adapting to changing environments are also seen to obliterate social structures and the cultural domination that often informs dialogue and instrumental deliberations taking place in those spaces. At the other end of the spectrum theorists and advocates highlight how less flexible and less inclusive, political counter-hegemonies can be more successful in defeating strong adversaries like those that WSF activists face in their daily struggles and activities.

Further, networks operate at different scales from the local to the global and they balance autonomy and horizontality through self-organisation of heterogeneous entities and full autonomy of their components (Escobar, 2004; Waterman, 2004b). On the other hand, the paradoxes of informal organisational structures have been highlighted. Hierarchy in autonomous networks rather than absent is determined by the density of informal relations. With reference to the WSF, Teivainen, both a university professor and founding member of the IC, suggests that this ambiguity generates opaque organisational structures devoid of democratic legitimization (Teivainen, 2004; 2007). The case for a deliberate and conscious organisation of the WSF is grounded on the observation that an informal and hierarchical structure is emerging giving life to a potentially authoritarian leadership and that this can only be made visible through an accountable and transparent organisational architecture.

Sparked by these observations a trajectory of organisational development started with the institution of the International Council and the International Secretariat, progressed with the development of local Organising Committees with the creation of five commissions of the International Council and was complemented by the Liaison Group created to facilitate, in close collaboration with the International Secretariat, the work of the International Council. Polarization of the debate notwithstanding, multiple cultural, ideological and organisational arrangements are articulated in the WSF in ways that are not accounted for by binary representations.

Networks of activists share communicative infrastructures, *commissions* mobilise resources and design WSF's methodology, ad-hoc *organisations* are established to coordinate and direct the efforts to hold global and local events, *executive leaderships* undertake organisational coordination, a *moral leadership* is widely acknowledged by WSF activists, *coalitions* and *alliances* are created around specific issues to carry out the political decisions taken in the deliberative spaces of the WSF and insurgent, utopian, open, intentional, feminist, liberated *spaces* are created and recreated. Dynamics of exclusion based on class, caste, gender, sexuality, ethnicity and generation (among others) are at play in the WSF; their denial makes them impervious to transformation. Moreover, power/knowledge imbalances have often been approached in instrumental ways that have generated less transformation than expected and alienated past and potential partners. For instance, at the IC meeting in Dakar

in November 2010, a participant commented that social movements in Europe were operating outside a WSF which they considered marred by hegemonic strategies led by the old sectarian Left. Both unequal social dynamics and the instrumental manipulation of differences in the WSF seem to be the target of much reflexive thinking. Highlighting and engaging such dynamics could have crucial implications on activists' and commentators' projections of the WSF's vision and its methodology. To these I turn in the next two sections of the paper.

Towards a new universality? The vision of the WSF

The most recent avatar of the WSF's vision aims at inspiring the elaboration of "a new universality" aiming at "rebuilding relations between humans, the environment and living beings on the basis of justice, solidarity and diversity, by giving precedence to groups and social categories which have suffered most from the dominant hegemonic model during the last five centuries, that they may have a voice. The people involved are in particular workers, peasants, diasporas, migrants, women, 'native/autochthonous' peoples, peoples struggling for independence and groups struggling for economic, social and cultural rights and for gender equality" (WSF, 2011). This convergence would not be designed by a small leadership but democratically negotiated by those who "have suffered most from the dominant hegemonic model". The process to articulate this vision has gained momentum since the 2008 global crisis and it has catalysed converging imaginations of another world beyond neoliberal capitalism (WSF, 2011). To be sure, the new universality is not an alternative to the WSF vision as expressed in the Charter. It is, rather an actualization of that vision that does not pretend priority or exclusiveness over others.

At the core of neoliberalism is a social epistemology centred on the belief that world society consists of individuals. Individuals are free by nature and are only constrained by limitations they voluntarily accept and they are rational actors and perform best in regimes of multiple choices such as free markets. Free markets are the best tool to allocate scarce resources; scarcity induces competition, the necessary amoral good which in turn (via the Invisible Hand) delivers the most cherished outcome: efficiency and innovation. The expansion of markets caused the destruction of other cultures and the forceful imposition of a civilization whose universality was imposed by decree and force (Dussel, 2002; Mignolo, 2000; Quijano, 2000).

These conceptions are the foundations of the vision advocated by the WSF's activists who stress how social and epistemological exclusion are tied together in a regime where technical, scientific and rational expertise define the rules of social and cultural interaction between societies and with the environment (Escobar, 1995; Kennedy, 2005). In other words, the political and institutional power of expert knowledge conflates the normative and analytical dimensions of neoliberal epistemology. Such dynamic is at the core of the process of naturalisation of neoliberal knowledge (Bourdieu, 2001). In other words, neoliberal ideology attempts to ontologise the outcome of a representational

(epistemological) process⁴. Activists in the WSF at times reproduce such ideological conflation of epistemology and ontology on the basis of an assumed expert knowledge (Pleyers, 2010). Consider for instance the case presented above about the assumed ontological openness of the open space. Engagement in the WSF, based on personal, cultural, social and political negotiations, aims to (applying Calhoun's words from a different but congruent context) "challenge not only nationalist pressures to conform, but also technocratic insistence on the application of expertise, as though such expertise (or the science that might lie behind it) embodies perfect, unchanging, and disinterested solutions to problems" (Calhoun, 2002:165). Against the politics of naturalisation and depoliticisation of neoliberalism, WSF activists claim a renewed role for politics in defining values and setting agendas for global change (Teivainen, 2007).

The values of the WSF as articulated in its Charter attempt to connect the macro-level (globalisation) with the micro-level (individual injustice) and to sketch the overall vision of "another world". The cornerstones of the WSF's vision are "difference", the "open space", and "non-violence" (WSF, 2001). What would, then, the "other world" look like on the basis of the WSF's values? An event note for the 2003 Asian Social Forum explained that "participants (...) have a commitment to democratic values, plurality and peace". A South American IC member stressed "the affirmation, amplification and construction of rights in the global arena. (...) widening democratic, subjective and symbolic horizons – for the recovery of a utopian perspective" (Vargas, 2004). The Indian WSF stressed that "the path to sustainable development and social and economic justice does not lie in neoliberal globalisation but in alternative models for people-centred and self-reliant progress" (WSF, 2003). Sustainable development, social and economic justice, people-centred and self-reliant progress are the pillars of the WSF vision. Again in the words of Indian activists, the WSF would contribute to herald "a plural, just, responsible and shared world which accords equal dignity and rights to all its people" (WSF, 2003).

The vision for a better world advocated by the WSF is a constellation of connected goals. Ideas are linked to each other as the movements that foster them. Networks of individuals, relations and imaginations constitute the WSF's contribution to an emergent cosmopolitan vision. Some suggest though that the WSF's vision is best understood in terms of multiple cleavages (Santos, 2005). In fact, contingent polarisations of discourses in and on the WSF are escalation of potentially creative conflicts and their very existence is often projection of simplifying analyses onto actual conflicts. In this sense, framing binary political options and, overtly or covertly, eliciting head counts, could be understood as part of a political struggle to foster particular interests rather than transformation of those conflicts (Bush and Folger, 2005).

⁴ A flawed process as it is built on the following three inconsistent steps: 1. the separation of ontological and epistemological truth domains; 2. the privileging of the former while 3. pretending to transform the latter into the former.

Recent developments around the “new universality” raise important question on a growing awareness by the WSF’s activists of the emergent nature of their vision⁵. The WSF’s vision is taking shape as outcome of the elaboration of global imaginations at all levels from the local to the global which in turn produce global solidarities (Eschle and Maiaguashca, 2007; Calhoun, 2002). Justice, freedom, equality, self- and collective realisation, recognition and respect of cultural differences, and radical democracy are, at the same time, among the methodologies and objectives of this new political subject. The WSF could contribute to the development of political tools to enhance communication, interaction, intelligibility, recognition and conflict transformation the relevance of which could extend beyond its immediate reach and contribute to develop aware emancipatory cosmopolitan visions (Mignolo, 2000; Beck, 2006; Pieterse, 2006). Such emancipatory cosmopolitan vision is positioned beyond benevolent recognition and humanitarian offers of hospitality by the noble powerful and beyond aprioristic universalism (often of Greek or Enlightenment origin) and it advocates critical and dialogic negotiation of difference (Eschle and Maiaguashca, 2007). Moreover, this emancipatory cosmopolitan vision constitutes a path beyond the radical opposition of universalism (a la Nussbaum) and pluralism (a la Kymlicka) (Hollinger, 2001). In the sense discussed so far, the WSF could contribute to the construction of a cosmopolitan global society and to the constitution of a collective subject and a shared “new universality” *while* in the process of articulating deliberative and transformative solidarities rather than *a priori*. Decision-making practices as those taking place in the institutional and organisational settings of the WSF are about forming global solidarities, not only about steering them (Eschle and Maiaguashca 2007; Calhoun, 2002). In the WSF and in the “other world” it advocates, solidarity is built through political discourse and practice rather than reproduced by inherited status and power relations or being a by-product of industrial production or market interactions; “the engagement of people with each other in public is itself a form of social solidarity” (Calhoun, 2002:162). I turn now to the methodology experimented in the WSF towards the realisation of its vision and the construction of a new global solidarity.

The WSF’s emancipatory pedagogy

How is the WSF going to catalyse the global transformations necessary to achieve its vision? Whereas few advocate vanguardism *tout-court* (Callinicos 2004), many are aware of the exclusive nature of both hegemonic processes, including those that assume organisational horizontality and inclusiveness, and of purely discursive and processual approaches that eschew any decision

⁵ Consider the following: “The blueprint of ‘another world’ is emerging, not just from the interactions in the WSF, but through debates, discussions, and most importantly struggles across the world. The WSF is only providing the opportunity to enrich these debates, to bring in a larger number of perspectives – some contending, some complementary.” (Sengupta and Purkayastha 2007)

making beyond absolute consensus. The majority of WSF activists aims at articulating a methodology of transformative activism centred on a conception of knowledge as relational and pursued through an emancipatory pedagogy built on awareness of both social dynamics of exclusion and emancipation and their ambiguous nature.

A cleavage seems to have developed in the WSF among those who believe that the vision of the WSF can only be fulfilled through its direct engagement in political activism and those who highlight the need for it to remain an open space of alliance building (Pleyers 2010; Santos 2005). This debate is not only related to political practices but it is influenced by specific understanding of the nature of the world, human communities and individuals. These understandings influence ideas on how knowledge about the world, existence and their transformations is acquired and, further, they inform processes of personal transformation and social change (Eschle and Maiaguashca, 2007). The variety of positions expressed by activists in the WSF about knowledge, being and change are often simplified (in ways and for reasons detailed below) along the spectrum of political methodologies that range from political to deliberative action.

According to some the two positions are incommensurable. However, these positions are vigorously negotiated and the result is often suggestive of potential transformations of the same assumptions on which the opposition is built. Illustration of this, among many others, is the statement of a member of the Strategy Commission of the WSF IC according to whom the opposition between advocates of the WSF as movement and advocates of the WSF as space have been surpassed by the growing recognition that the WSF is a “space for the organisation of actions”⁶. The mediation process, of this and other apparently incommensurable oppositions between WSF activists, could be truly transformative if informed by innovative knowledge relationships elaborated in a pedagogical processes that design collaborative visions beyond the enslaving epistemology of neoliberalism, suggest WSF activists. An organiser of the WSF held in Belem in January 2009 stated, at the WSF IC meeting held in Rabat in May 2009, that while advances are made in developing strategies to implement in practice the WSF pedagogical vision, further energy should be applied to the crucial task of developing “its pedagogy of liberation”. However, the actual implementation of the emancipatory pedagogy left still a lot to be desired both in the IC meetings whose methodology of engagement among members did not allow the inclusion of all participants and during the events where fully emancipatory and transformative engagements between activists were penalised by organisational settings that privileged verbal expression over other forms of communication and by the failure of even those basic arrangements due to recurring logistical issues.

⁶ Personal notes of the IC meeting, Dakar November 2010.

In the IC meeting that took place in Mexico in May 2010, during a seminar on the methodology of the WSF, a long and complex engagement took place between participants on issues regarding the methodology of the seminar itself, on the understanding of time and its management and on the nature of the communication between participants. Some participants challenged the relatively obsolete, and perhaps contradictory with the WSF values and aspirations, methodology of the meetings in which only a few members had the chance to speak and for only few minutes during the day-long seminar. Small breakout groups were suggested, and an ongoing renegotiation of the priorities of the meeting that kept into consideration the shifting feelings of the participants and their main interests and objectives vis-a-vis a rigid agenda set in advance by the facilitators of the meeting and never updated during the meeting itself. In a plenary two days after, the session on WSF communication was introduced by dance and songs in an attempt to explore alternative forms of exchange.

Pedagogical suggestions, informed by reciprocal responsibility, aim at inspiring dynamics of mutual emancipation of those involved in the knowledge relation, and are central to the original inspiration of the WSF (Eschle and Maiaguashca, 2006; Whitaker 2005; Giroux 2001; hooks 1994; Freire 1970). The WSF aims at contributing to elaborate a "strategy for pedagogical interventions attempting to deal with complexity and uncertainty in a responsible way. This strategy tries to avoid normalising subjectivities and does not propose consensual outcomes for dialogue, which can be seen as an innovative aspect for pedagogical processes, but which by no means offers a universal or 'ultimate' solution for all educational challenges" (Andreotti, 2005; see also Teivainen, 2003).

WSF pedagogies directly engage, therefore, the assumptions on which the oppositions between epistemology and ontology, theory and practice, acting and thinking, being and becoming are constructed by challenging the dominant normalisation of subjectivities and naturalisation of ideology fostered by neoliberal pedagogy. The WSF's pedagogical potentialities are expressed through the uniqueness of its political project and its fluid shape based on the daily multi-logic construction of a vision for another world. The radical pedagogy that informs the WSF according to its initiators, critics and many of its supporters is the corner stone on which is built its most coordinated, innovative and potentially transformative and emancipatory challenge to neoliberalism. How is the emancipatory pedagogy of the WSF articulated?

The unifying methodology of the WSF is non-violence in all dimensions of human existence, physical, psychological, emotional to oppose the logic of war and the epistemology of violence of patriarchal neoliberalism. Non-violence can bring about social change through individual transformation expressed in political action. Moreover, it challenges the ethical and moral foundations of political systems based on oppression and exploitation. Nonviolence is central to the process of *conscientization* (Freire, 1970) of the learning individual struggling for liberation. This approach is reflected in the conviction that radical change is a long process which needs a profound and continued commitment to

transformation rather than contingent strategies which tend to replicate the epistemology of violence that they wish to replace (Whitaker, 2005). This slow process engages the roots of the issues at stake; not only the political governance of neoliberalism and the social structures on which it is predicated, but also its moral and epistemological assumptions.

In order to develop tools to pursue its vision, the WSF's activists understand their political practice in terms of recursive and shared learning processes in which all actors value their own and each other's knowledge. This approach to the struggle against neoliberalism is contested and critics accuse the WSF to be a "talking shop" and express doubts on the real alternative offered by it to capitalism on ideological, organisational, and political grounds. Responses to those criticisms stress that a revolution in understanding politics and social change could be developed within the WSF. In this sense "The other world we are trying to build has to be built first in each of us and in our organisations. We are what we do not what we think, so our world will be the outcome of what we do not what we say" (Grajev in Whitaker, 2003). Self-education is the methodology that defines the movement and is understood as outcome of the multiple networked interactions of ideals and aspirations of those who converge within the WSF space (Whitaker, 2005).

Slowness and the rejection of strategic shortcuts are a political and lifestyle commitment against the speed of unreflexive neoliberalism and the postponement of the transformation of human relations to "after the revolution". At the same time, however, slowness is object of endless frustration among activists who face the real or perceived urgency imposed by the tragic consequences of exploitation and inequality. At the IC meeting in Montreal, for instance, when participants were taking stock of the crisis of the global left vis-a-vis the ongoing global crisis, emotional calls were made by some activists to the need to forcefully respond to the human and social devastation caused by neoliberalism and its latest crisis. I do not have the space here to delve in detail on the issues related to the conditions in which appeals to urgency turn against themselves by slowing down political processes as potential allies find that such uncritical calls in the name of immediate necessity can be construed as hegemonic and instrumental.

The WSF's potentialities for the future rest in its ability to contribute to develop viable and inclusive alternatives to neoliberalism that challenge its cultural logic and politics. The WSF could contribute to develop a political culture grounded in openness, multiplicity, radical democracy and emancipatory knowledge. Such relational and contested knowledge would challenge the deliberate silencing of alternatives by the ideologically constructed "natural knowledge" of neoliberalism (the "natural laws" of the market, for instance), and replace it with intentional operations to put in evidence current denied alternatives (Juris, 2008; Santos, 2005).

The WSF's methodology can be the context in which the negation of the hegemonic neoliberal epistemology becomes transformed into the construction

of a cosmopolitan environment where social change is function of mutual recognition, engagement, conscious learning and transformation. In turn, the activism constructed in relation with the culture of politics here described can contribute to the creation of a cosmopolitan world inhabited by individuals engaged in recursive processes of emancipation and constructed on the values of conviviality, equality and justice. The following document, produced by the WSF International Secretariat, illustrates what discussed so far:

*To imagine that another world is possible is a creative act to make it possible. The WSF releases contradictions and makes them operate, catalyzing, liberating creative energies. (...) The WSF intends to be a space to facilitate pulling together and strengthening an international coalition of the most diverse social movements and organizations, adhering to the principle of respect for differences, autonomy of ideas, and forms of struggle. (...) It's an initiative of the emerging planetary civil society. (...) It's a movement of ideas that feeds on human diversity and possibilities, opposing the "single way of thinking". (...) The WSF is a living laboratory for world citizenship [italics in original]*⁷.

The WSF's transformative pedagogy works at the borders, where differences touch (Mignolo, 2000); it involves both symbolic aspects and practices (Eschle and Maiaguashca, 2007); it is motivated by the necessity to complement a perceived incompleteness felt by the actors involved in the process; it is often facilitated by formal and informal mediators; it may best express its creativity within intentional frameworks; it entails conflicts and power dynamics. Intentional transformative processes are predicated on the awareness of those involved of implications and consequences of political and pre-political reasons (structural, symbolic and affective) and are informed by processes of personal, cultural and social mediation (Goodwin et. al, 2001; Melucci, 1996).

An illustration of the complexities evoked and of the contextual legitimacy of the calls for intentional organisational structures of mediation was provided by the case of the translation system deployed in the Mumbai WSF. From the practical point of view it was a failure, the nature of which can be summarised in a paradox: the translation process between translators and organisers did not work and generated a communication breakdown that escalated to extreme displays of distress by some translators (in one occasion pieces of furniture were thrown out of an office window to protest against working conditions). The organisers limited their considerations on the nature of the incidents to the following: "[they] were resentful because they were not given a stipend whereas all the people who worked at the technical aspects of the translation system were paid"⁸. Translators and media activists involved denounced manipulation, deception and exploitation exerted by the organisers.

⁷ 2003 Unpublished.

⁸ Mumbai IOC, 28-29 February, 2004, personal notes.

An early misunderstanding was generated in the encounter between “translators” and “organizers” around the status of Babels/Nomad (the groups/project that provided the WSF with translation in several regional and global events). Considered by the “organizers” as service providers, the “translators” thought of their role as political and fully integrated in the organizational process. The situation of stress, the certainty of a low performance due to technical shortcomings, the frustration arising from the impossibility to address the problems, due to irreconcilable differences, lack of time and resources, caused the configuration of a confrontation that often bordered intolerance and racism and degenerated beyond repair.

Transformative mediation could have proactively engaged these conflicts when they emerged if an appropriate institutional framework had been set in place. Once more, the perceptions of those involved, especially of the WSF facilitators (local organising committees and International Council as well), on the nature of conflicts and their possible transformation or inevitable tendency to escalate unless managed and stifled, are central in defining the overall institutional mood about conflicts and their transformation and its structure.

Processes of transformative negotiations have taken place in the decade of WSF history. Interesting outcomes are illustrated by the negotiations regarding some aspects of the methodology of the Dakar event. One object of contention referred to the relationship between assemblies of convergence organised by the participants aimed at coordinating actions after February 2011 and the Social Movement Assembly (SMA). The SMA is a convergence of social movements with an important role in WSF’s history which gathers advocates for a more institutionalised and politically active WSF. Its demands to conclude the WSF events have generated concerns in many who believe that such prominence would communicate a skewed image of the WSF as many could mistakenly associate the final declaration issued by the SMA with a declaration issued by the whole WSF.

During the Dakar IC meeting in November 2010, it was agreed that all assemblies have the same importance and that the SMA will be “neither exclusive nor conclusive”⁹. A member of the Strategy Commission further remarked that “the space/movement debate is by now an empty debate as it is clear that the WSF is a space of convergence aimed at organising actions”¹⁰. Both these formulations show viable ways to mediate apparently incommensurable positions.

It is true too that mediations stall and conflicts escalate in unbridgeable polarisations, but divisive outcomes are not inevitable. Rather, they may be produced by hegemonic practices as those exposed by the German activist with reference to the European chapter of the WSF. The outcome of those negotiations, though, would be considerably different if the underlying

⁹ Methodology Commission report to the plenary, personal notes.

¹⁰ Personal notes.

sentiment of some or even most of the parties involved is that oppositions necessarily clash and remain incommensurable or if, instead, the shared mood is towards the possibility of transformation and therefore towards configuring institutional arrangements that favours such transformation within the WSF space as envisioned in its Charter.

Conclusion

The WSF aims at contributing to the formulation of an emancipatory cosmopolitan vision which challenges neoliberal ideology and institutions. The WSF's activists advocate for cooperation against competition, community values against radical individualism, human relationships over consumerism and solidarity over the survival of the fittest with in mind a convivial and peaceful world. These values and objectives have inspired an institutional structure that aims to respond to external challenges and internal aspirations, attempting to facilitate a global alliance building which takes advantage of the experience of decades of social struggles across the planet. Crucial towards the construction of such alliance against neoliberalism is self-education through a radical transformative pedagogy that extols the value of different knowledge and is aware of the differences of cultures, subjectivities, worldviews and aspirations that constitute the foundations of its activism. Transformative pedagogy and differences negotiation are complemented by formal and informal, conscious and unconscious, practices of cultural, linguistic and conflict mediation.

I made a case here that issues of organisational structure, vision and methodology of transformation are linked in a recursively constitutive dynamics. I claimed that to respond to the challenges presented by its epistemology of differences and the conflicts that spark at their cultural, social, personal and political intersections the WSF has been striving to articulate an institutional and organisational architecture that both responds to the challenges of a continuously changing (internal and external) environment and is faithful to its values and vision as enshrined (constitutionalized) in its Charter of Principles. Moreover, I argued that further proactive engagement of differences and conflicts through an intentional institutional arrangement within the WSF could contribute to facilitate an adaptive, flexible and responsive institutional and organisational architecture and to spell out and develop its emancipatory cosmopolitan vision towards "A New Universality".

The WSF has burst into the world scene with a goal of inspiring profound and lasting global transformations. Criticisms, even scepticism, have surrounded its history since its inception and internal conflicts have fragmented its membership and alienated partners and potential allies. Some have suggested that its innovative thrust has been exhausted and that it is time for global activists to develop new forms of engagement which are both more focused and more wide-ranging. Scholarly and activist debates have explored each detail of its organisational structure, its cultural and social base, its vision, its methodologies and have questioned its viability and legitimacy. These

discussions and conflicts, some of which I reported here, show both possibilities for mediation and for escalation and fracture. These dynamics influence, in turn, normative and analytical considerations on the WSF and guide its organisational learning and development. Expectations and hope might have generated excessive investment in the WSF and projections of what it could realistically help activists to achieve. It has, however, contributed to develop the widest collective engagement to date on issues of equality, justice and practices of transformation. In this sense the WSF has contributed to ground scholarly debates on emancipatory cosmopolitanism while contributing to develop visions of a better world. In its open space the encounter of activists and committed researchers has contributed to mediate the radical separation of theory and practice. For this alone the WSF contribution would be invaluable.

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About the author

Giuseppe Caruso's research focuses on the role of transnational activist networks in global transformations. He is interested in conflict, leadership and learning in transnational social movement organisations and in the cultural politics of transnational activist networks. He also studies activist engagements with different and conflicting cosmopolitan projects, paradigms of social development and regimes of globalisation and global governance. In the past he wrote on the global Right to the City movement; on free and open software activism; on philanthropy and activist networks and, earlier, on traditional healers and social transformation among the Shipibo-Conibo of the Peruvian Amazon. He can be contacted at [giu.caruso AT gmail.com](mailto:giu.caruso@gmail.com)

Social movements and the European crisis: activist and researcher reflections

**Heleen Schols, Garan Hobbelink, Cristina Flesher Fominaya,
Sat Trejo, Marianne Maeckelbergh, Markos Vogiatzoglou,
Ewout van den Berg, Laurence Cox**

Overview

On June 28, the Transnational Institute Amsterdam hosted a symposium with activists from a range of movements and researchers from the three main European networks of social movement research (Council for European Studies, European Sociological Association, European Consortium for Political Research). The goal was to share experiences from participants' different standpoints, map out the current situation of movement organising in Europe, and identify strategic implications in a way that can be usefully shared with activists across Europe.

The participants were Jille Belisario, Coffi Badou-Bonsou, Brid Brennan, Ewa Charkiewicz, Daniel Chavez, Laurence Cox, Nicole Doerr, Cristina Flesher Fominaya, Garan Hobbelink, Kees Hudig, Satoko Kishimoto, Maria Kousis, Caroline Lindo, Marianne Maeckelbergh, Jerome Roos, Heleen Schols, Orsan Senalp, Seongcheol, Benjamin Tejerina, Markos Vogiatzoglou, Peter Waterman, Andrea Teti, Sat Trejo, Ewout van den Berg, Sol Trumbo Vila, Hilary Wainwright and Angela Wigger.

The symposium discussed three key questions:

- 1. Where are movements at? New and old elements, strengths and weaknesses (introduced by Benjamin Tejerina)*
- 2. How can movements help each other? Networking across differences, solidarity, building a European movement? (introduced by Marianne Maeckelbergh)*
- 3. How can movements win? Movement strategy in the crisis (introduced by Laurence Cox)*

Following the event we asked participants to write up their reflections arising out of the discussion to be jointly published by the TNI, Red Pepper and Interface. Below are the results!

Reflections on the symposium

Scholars and activists: making the most of different perspectives

Heleen Schols

Choosing the easy way

In late June 2013, I participated in a one-day meeting in Amsterdam under the title 'engaged research symposium'. In a group of about twenty people we discussed a wide variety of themes. Amongst the topics were movement networks, critiques of Keynesianism, the role of the media, the relationship of social democracy with capitalism, and police repression- to name just a few. One of my comments in the closing plenary discussion was that we can only contribute to positive change if our struggle for it is fundamentally democratic and participatory. I argued that our strategies need to match our goals.

When I think back now about that remark, I have to admit I chose the easy way. I was sincere, but also kept a safe distance from concrete, practical applications of the ideals I was referring to. Limiting myself to such a general statement was the easy way because it's at the practical level that beautiful ideals get sticky. They require the working out of difficulties and dilemmas. And that also goes for that afternoon's meeting. Because participating in the symposium, while inspiring and useful, had also made me feel frustrated at times. From what I later learned by talking to others, I was not alone in feeling some ambivalence. This is why, when invited to submit a reflection on the symposium, I decided to write about this ambivalence and my reasons for it.

Experiences with 'neutrality'

I'll say a bit more about the symposium in a minute. But first, let me go back to the autumn and winter of 2011/2012, when I was deeply involved with the Occupy movement in Amsterdam. Especially in the first weeks after the camp was set up, there were many euphoric moments as the movement managed to attract and give a platform to people who were not used to speaking out, and to being listened to. Our insistence on inclusivity led to some beautiful encounters. For example, I clearly remember the moment that a tall, lean man who had been hovering around a public General Assembly abruptly demanded the meeting's attention for his loud complaint about our use of 'fancy words'. After a few minutes' discussion, in which the tall man explained in some more detail what he meant, we agreed on ways to cut out on jargon, unnecessarily technical language and inside jokes.

But many less rosy memories also present themselves. There were seemingly endless meetings that excluded those who could not stay out in the winter nights, for example because of the cold or because of duties at home or work. Our insistence on there being no leaders in our little camp made it very hard to discuss informal leadership structures. Looking back, I think in a way this was

similar to so-called 'gender-blind' and 'colour-blind' approaches to equality. These approaches aim for equality by treating everyone alike. Unfortunately, insisting on neutral standards often amounts to rendering invisible how privilege and power work. Therefore, claiming that everyone has the same opportunities can easily perpetuate oppression. The many critiques of such 'gender blind' or 'colour blind' approaches show that you just can't wish away inequality and you shouldn't wish away difference.

It should have been no surprise that the 'leader blindness', as I now think of it, in our Occupy camp was not helpful in the long run. The simple truth is that our good intentions of horizontality and equality were not enough. And while the camp provided a steep learning curve and valuable experiences for many, connections to other groups and struggles beyond our Occupy camp remained more limited than in numerous other Occupy groups worldwide.

In hindsight, I think the inability to forge links with other struggles was connected to our inability to thoroughly address dynamics of power, privilege and diversity within the camp. We often put up with people creating an atmosphere that did not feel safe or inviting to many. Ironically, this was partly due to a wish not to exclude anyone, even if they harassed others. Sometimes, it was because we judged that it would be more useful to focus our energy on even more pressing issues.

This wasn't the reason the camp ended. There were many other reasons, too. But still, it was important. Being aware of internal power differences is not sufficient for building a strong movement, but I am sure it is necessary. We can't afford not to address these issues because the sources of different types of domination and exclusion are connected. They are connected through the way our societies are structured, for example through the state. You see it in the way LGBT rights issues get hijacked to support anti-immigrant discourse. As many have argued, this is not a coincidence: capitalism works *because* it creates exclusion, *because* it is sexist and racist, to name just two of the axes of difference that are relevant. Necessarily, our struggle for more equality and justice needs to take into account these connections between different types of privilege and domination. For me, talking this through with fellow activists has been helpful, as have been writings by other participants in the Occupy movement, such as many thoughtful pieces in the recent book 'We are many. Reflections on movement strategy, from occupation to liberation'.

So, how does this connect to my experiences in the symposium in June 2013? While the meeting was in many ways valuable to me, I can think of two ways we could have made more out of it. Firstly, I think it would have been useful to foreground the difference in perspective between academics and activists. Following from this, an explicit commitment by the group for inclusive communication would have made it easier to remind ourselves and each other to talk in ways that everyone could relate to, and to keep a good balance between speaking and listening by people with different backgrounds.

Putting our differences to good use

Our group consisted of people with a variety of ages, experiences and interests. A prominent distinction was the one between scholars and activists. While some of those present combined both roles, it was usually with emphasis on either the academic or the activist role. This was true for me, too: while I had recently started a PhD project about participatory democracy, I was invited and presented myself mostly as an activist.

While many of us expressed our excitement about the mix of people in the symposium, we didn't really discuss what this meant in terms of our outlook on the meeting. I guess you could say we adopted a 'perspective-blind' approach, which made it harder to perceive and discuss how differences in communication style, expectations and needs might structure our meeting. Instead, we enthusiastically dove headlong into discussions about many important topics.

While we discussed topics that were interesting to all of us, we approached them in different ways. As I perceived it, the academics tended to feel more at ease discussing issues on a relatively abstract level and seemed to assume that concepts like neo-keynesianism would be familiar to all. On the other hand, I myself hadn't realised that not all the researchers were necessarily aware of things like the recent March Against Monsanto actions, or the way some activists use n-1 software. In order to make those differences work to the advantage of all, I think it would have been useful to explicitly foreground the implications of our positions as researchers and activists. We could even have woven this into the structure of the meeting. For example, the central question for the last session was 'how can we win?' Because the range of responses to this question was so wide, I think we lost out in depth of analysis and in making links between different perspectives on the answer. Perhaps we could have agreed on focusing the question on our complementary roles, as in 'how can movements work together and what kind of relationship with academics would be helpful in this?'

Opportunities for exchange and mutual learning between activists and scholars are very valuable. To me, the June 2013 symposium was no exception. In order to make even more out of future encounters, I think a more explicit and strategic use of our differences in perspective is key.

I. Where are movements at? New and old elements, strengths and weaknesses

They removed ... so much from them that they also took away the fear (anonymous, Spanish social movement) Garan Hobbelink

One of the sentences written on the walls of Madrid in relation to the activities of the social movement was "Without fear!!" If you read it on the street without knowing what all the implications are in relation to this meaning, you probably will pass through it without any clear insight. The worst thing is that probably, the fear is what make you avoid some individual behaviors and when this happen you are going against your own rational interests. In the context of social movement, where people fight for more social rights and for a more solidarity and equally society, this micro actions that you don't allow yourself to do, due to fear, have an influence in the development of strategist to take action around the concept of social movement.

Fear is an emotion that has a big influence on human behavior. Our whole life is determined by our personal fears and also determines our relation with the world. In our process to ask for social changes, fear is something that can limit us aspirations. For example, one fear can be represented by the possibility to lose what you already have, and this makes a contra balance against the intensity of your demands. For this reason, it is important to become aware of this process to be a bit freer of the social constrictions that manage our live and don't allow yourself to do what you really believe in. In the process of overcoming your fears, you are also giving permission to the others to do the same. This is a way to find the change that you are looking for.

The social stigma is a fear that could slow down also the speed of social changes in relation to the participation in social movements and the position of the discourse that you manage. When you ask for changes for a better life conditions, it is because you see yourself in a society group that have more worse conditions that the others, if you do not have anything to lose, your determination will be clearer and stronger, but if it is not the case, probably you will be in an unclear situation that gives you the chance to identify yourself with the better conditions group. In that unclear situation, do you feel free to accept all consequences of possible stigmatization or the possible reprimand of others because they are full of fear and think different? These situations create fear and in consequences immobilization. One of fear's characteristics is that it makes a stronger influence the more it has a vague and diffuse origin. Maybe in Europe it is not yet completely clear for everyone who is liable and what are the consequences of the chaos that has been created in some countries. We should look to Latin America, they have been able to define a narrative against the policies that has not allowed them to grow as they could in the past, and probably this happens since they lost the fear because they define which policies

and which institutions were responsible. Maybe the same that now are playing an important role in the European crisis.

Until now, a lot of news and opinions have been written since the origin of the crisis but the time is coming to the end in the sense that the consequences of this European economic policies are coming with stronger consequences, and they do not promise any better social life conditions (I would like to think different but Europe is taking money from schools and hospitals and giving it to the banks). Then, it is necessary to physically articulate the civil society and imprint on them clearly which are the real consequences of the austerity plans that are going on now. We have spend time studying and analyzing the crisis and probably it produces less fear, you also may think that reading an article and becoming indignant at home is enough, instead of going to the street and organize yourself with the others but. I know... it produces more fear, stigma and other consequences than reading an article, but as is written in walls of Madrid, it is necessary to win the fear and de consequences related to it to feel to free participate actively.

On the “decline” of Madrid, the state re-appropriation of public space, and strange hope

Cristina Flesher Fominaya

During the GJM the constant refrain in Madrid's movement network was how to break out of the activist ghetto, how to reach out to the people on the streets. With 15-M it seems those dreams were fulfilled beyond our wildest imaginings. And yet...I recently attended a protest against corruption in Madrid. Everyone in Spain, and I mean everyone, is aware of the corruption scandals that have rocked the PP, and also now two of the large unions, added to which are scandals involving the royal family and recurring urban political scandals encompassing both major parties. I therefore expected many outraged citizens to fill the square. Instead very few people were there, in fact, it felt a lot like the “manis” we used to have before 15-M, before 13-M, when we still were quite happy if 50 or 60 people showed up. Of course, just because not many people were there does not mean they don't care. Maybe they simply had not heard about it. Or maybe they were too busy fighting on the frontlines of the attack on the victims of the crisis, defending people from evictions, or organizing against the privatization of our hospitals in one of the many citizen tides (mareas). I asked someone in one of the groups I know if he was surprised at the low numbers. He seemed surprised by the question. “No, if the big unions don't call for the mani, then this is what there is”.

All movements have ups and downs and there is definitely a sense of protest fatigue after the exhilaration of the large 15-M mobilizations. Part of the reason I imagine is the relentless and inflexible response of Spain's ruling parties, who continue to act as though the people of Spain had never taken to the streets at all. The feeling of having exhausted all legal media and mobilizing resources and yet not being able to slow the inexorable advance of the dismantling of the

public good by the “PPSOE” (the acronym used to denote the largely indistinguishable nature of the two major parties by many activists, combining the Popular Party-PP- and Socialist Party-PSOE-acronyms) has to be deeply depressing. It certainly is to me and the same feeling has been expressed by many in the past days. El País recently published a piece called “The decline of Madrid” cataloguing the effects of “austerity”, the dirty streets, the cuts in funding for cultural and other programs, the drop in tourists, the corrupt politicians. The article describes how deeply indebted city leaders refuse to cede a city theatre for a few nights, forcing the last minute cancellation the up to now annual jazz festival that would have brought 40.000 spectators, and place all their hopes and dreams on a *Eurovegas* casino project. Yet, the city still pulses with the life and chaos of any great city, with new surprises around each corner, however many times you might have walked down the same streets. For me the decline, depressing as it is, is of an even deeper nature. It is a corruption of the city’s spirit by those who govern it.

Madrid’s council is proposing an ordinance whereby itinerant musicians will now need to pass an audition to be able to perform on the streets. Musicians not certified will be subject to a high fine. Probably they will need to play Wagner to pass. Jokes aside, it is ironic to say the least that such staunch advocates of private enterprise as Madrid’s city leaders should seek state regulation of an activity that more than any other I can think of requires the free market system to work. After all, if no one likes the music the tips are not likely to keep the musician on the streets. It is a self regulating system par excellence, a perfect example of Adam Smith’s assertion that human nature is to truck, barter and exchange. One street musician said on the news that she was not a particularly skilled musician but that she juggled and did a few other things to engage her public, and that for her sense of pride she wanted to be able to do that to earn her daily crust. She does not want to beg, she said, but the city ordinance might force her to in order to get by.

Not so fast, lady. A few days after the news about the required auditions, another ordinance under consideration was made public, this time against public begging, which will incur a 750 Euro fine. Since people have now resorted to searching through the garbage to forage for food, I expect the city to pass an ordinance that will also make this a fineable offense. Many other “anti-social behaviour laws” or what I prefer to call anti-social laws full stop are being proposed, including forbidding using a bench for any purpose other than sitting. But the city’s leaders are working hard to find a legal loophole for one law that actually protects citizens’ and workers’ health—you guessed it, they want smoking to be allowed inside *Eurovegas*.

I think what disturbs me most about this is that it is not subtle or cunning or dressed up in any sort of padded language. Not because I want to have the wool pulled over my eyes, but because what it means is that we are passed that stage. It is blatant and brutal with no attempt to hide that fact. How much clearer can the message be when the Puerta del Sol, historic central plaza of Madrid, *de rigueur* end point of protests of every stripe, emblematic *agora* of 15-M, is now

Vodafone (logo) Sol. I am not making this up. Every sign in the metro now reads Vodafone Sol and the announcer voice, which sounds exactly the same as it always has, now says "Next stop Vodafone Sol". Every map of the metro also reads Vodafone Sol, and the red line (Linea 2) is now Vodafone 2. If you have Vodafone you can get a mobile signal on Line 2, excuse me, I mean Line Vodafone 2, and if you don't, well, too bad. At first I thought it was a culture jam—a profound commentary on the privatization of public space. Then I realized that no, there was no jam involved, that what might have been a jam years ago has now just become a depressingly banal description of reality. Although I note with satisfaction that a few people have drawn black lines through the "word Vodafone", there are countless "Vodafoned" signs and logos throughout the metro system. Someone told me the city got a million Euros from Vodafone. It probably cost that just to change all the signs. If they were going to sell off the name of the Puerta del Sol they could have at least gotten more for it.

What relevance does this have for social movements? It has to do with a re-appropriation of the public sphere by the state, a move which cannot be understood independently of the crisis and crucially the public response to the crisis. Not content with privatizing public goods such as education and healthcare, the public sphere itself needs to be regulated, not only by repressing marginalizing and criminalizing protest, but by making it clear that those victims of the crisis unable to pull themselves up by their bootstraps and tighten their belts at the same time need to be excluded from the public sphere or punished. It is a systematic alienation from our humanity, a denial of the spirit of solidarity, the same impetus that makes it a crime for the citizens of Lampedusa to rescue drowning immigrants, the same inhumane spirit that forces sailors to violate the first rule of the sea, which is to rescue shipwrecked people, and leaves our shores with piles of bloated bodies. It is the same spirit that tosses thousands of people on the streets when they cannot meet their mortgage payments or rent, offering them no alternatives, while houses sit empty, repossessed by banks bailed out with public money. If not too many people were in the squares, plenty of people are organizing to stop the evictions, putting their bodies on the line to show solidarity to their fellow citizens. But stopping evictions, important as it is, is a measure of last resort, and everyone knows it. The spirit that compels those evictions marches on, slowed but unimpeded.

And yet...My sense of anger and shame in these ordinances and laws is tempered by the strange hope I find in the actions of the old age pensioners I have been speaking with lately as part of my research. Strange because in reality I have no basis for expecting anything to change and yet I find them deeply inspiring. Two days after the protest in the Puerta del Sol, some pensioners chained themselves to a post—in the Puerta del Sol. The next day I went down to Bankia to speak with the pensioners who call themselves simply "swindled by Bankia" or "afectados por preferentes" (affected by the "preferential" investment scheme). According to the stories they tell me, many of them lost their life

savings through an aggressive marketing campaign conducted by the bank managers who would call them at home, one, two, three times and encourage them to shift their savings into an investment product called *preferentes* without explaining the risks. As one recounted to me the bank manager said "Why do you want your money only earning 3 % interest? Here shift it over here and you will get 7.5%". The scheme was called "*preferentes*" as in preferential clients and they were told they had been chosen because of their long association with the bank. One told me he had been saving since 1965 for his old age, and now his savings are gone. Since they had their savings in Caja Madrid (later Bankia) they had every faith in their bank manager. They believe they were deliberately targeted because of their low level of education and their age, both factors making them vulnerable to signing contracts they did not understand, or in the case of one blind pensioner could literally not even read. He kept telling me, "They say we were investors. Liars! We were savers! We saved for years! We did not want to be investors! We would have left our money where it was". Bankia was bailed out with millions of Euros of public money, but they still have not got their savings back. (Meanwhile the ex-director of Bankia, Rodrigo Rato, who was accused of fraud, has been given a lucrative job at *Telefonica*, one of Spain's largest companies). The pensioners meet every Tuesday and Thursday in front of Bankia and blow whistles and make a lot of noise, holding signs reading slogans such as "Bankia steals from its clients" and "PP + Bankia = Stealing from Old People. Give us back our money". Then they decide collectively where to go from there, sometimes blocking city traffic or occupying other bank branches. They don't ask for permission, they don't decide in advance, they have no weekly assembly. They don't have internet. Somehow, they give me hope.



Pensioners blow whistles and hold a banner in protest in front of the bank branch office of Bankia in central Madrid. The banner reads "preferentes" of Bankia, the corralito of Spain, swindled by the government and their cronies, corruption without solution." October 8, 2013. Photograph: Cristina Flesher Fominaya

II. How can movements help each other? Networking across differences, solidarity, building a European movement?

**"If we don't burn together, who will illuminate this darkness?"
Sat Trejo**

I want to speak about solidarity, I want to introduce myself as a young Mexican activist. I am a member of *#yo soy 132 Holanda*, and I represent none. In a sense *#yo soy 132* is a movement based on solidarity, first of those students of the Iberoamerican University who got together to prove how Mexican media lied to the public about the presidential candidate Pena Nieto's visit to the University. A visit that unlike what several newspapers showed in their cover the day after, was not successful and was actually interrupted by hundreds of students protesting. Then, other universities reached out and declared themselves *#yo soy 132*. For the first time in what is a classist and racist society, students from private and public universities with a wide range of sub cultures, political inclinations from around the country got together. The claim was: media democratization, the spirit was based on the principles of nonhierarchical organization and solidarity. Later it was expressed how solidarity and fraternity

were indeed part of the essence of this movement, and how there is a collective memory of the many injustices that have been experienced by individuals and groups in Mexico. Poverty, direct violence, repression of student movements, the disappeared ones, feminicides, indigenous and peasant struggles, unforgettable episodes of State violence like Acteal and Atenco.

After a year of the emergence of this movement, those who like myself are part of it outside Mexico, have a lot to fight for. We organize locally (in The Netherlands) and we are trying to connect to those *#yo soy 132* around the world, share our ideas, our work, and inspire each other. Even if the future of the movement itself is uncertain there are people around the world trying to create a different reality. Some may even argue that the present of the movement itself is uncertain. I can only speak of my experience in the tiny cell *#yo soy 132 Holanda* and those who I have the privilege to work with. We are young, some students, some have a paid job, an engineer, a physicist, a veterinarian, a chemist, etc. Many of us with probably not much in common but the nationality and awareness that makes us get together and organize. In the past few months we have worked on denouncing and making visible the violence in Mexico to the International community. Taking advantage of our position outside Mexico and knowing that we are safe to speak about these issues as we probably wouldn't feel back home. So we speak of violence towards freedom of expression, repression of protests and feminicides. These are but a few examples of the many types of violence experienced in Mexico today.

I think solidarity is what has made *#yo soy 132* possible inside and outside Mexico. I think the work we do in The Netherlands is based on this. Those who can, prepare an interview, others may carry it out, someone might volunteer to put in on the blog, or to translate it. We organize skype meetings to make proposals, decide our roles in the coordination of an event, those who can are present, those who cannot may support in another way, making publicity, etc. Each person decides the way and extent of her involvement. That is how *#yo soy 132 Holanda* works. I also think solidarity is vital to relate to other groups and struggles. I try to be present or support in anyway I can events organized by other collectives of movements in the Netherlands. With the International Socialist, 15-M, Reinform, etc.

I can think of examples in which solidarity has been crucial, as in the case of Zapatista communities in Mexico where international observers have been of great importance particularly due to the military presence in the area. On the recent events in Turkey, a friend of mine from there asked me to join the facebook international solidarity group. She explained what was happening and how important it was for them to know that the world was watching, to feel international support. We talked about the similarities in many of our struggles, in many cases looking to validate our rights to freedom of expression, protest, or being tired of corruption, of governments that are completely disconnected of the realities and needs of the people, and that favor an elite. And we know that these are not exclusive of the case of Mexico and Turkey.

At blockupy Frankfurt 2013 there were people of different parts of Europe chanting in more than 6 languages and denouncing a system that creates the inequalities and crisis we are experiencing today. To me that is solidarity. At that protest there was also police repression, in different scale, but still repression. I was at a protest in Madrid this past week and there too was police repression and intimidation of protesters. I come from Mexico with a history of direct repression (many times violent) but this type of violation to the people's right to peacefully protest is not exclusive of the South. It has been evident to me that the European countries with their human rights discourses have a lot to account for as well. The democratic countries of the world need to respect freedom of expression in order to be considered truly democratic. And in the meantime those who like myself are organizing can find in solidarity strength and common ground to keep on doing what we do. Solidarity is in my view almost an automatic response (for many of us) to the issues that affect us globally (economic crisis) and locally (violence towards freedom of expression). I may not be able to do much about these, but a "we" has a better chance. In Mexico we have some examples of autonomous communities and other ways of organizing collectively in Oaxaca and Chiapas. I know there are examples of autonomous organization in Madrid and in some towns outside the city. Can we win? To me that is not the important question, I think we just need to try to create together these different realities, the different ways of relating to each other. It requires a change of perception and this is present in many tiny cells around the world. Maybe a more important question for me is can we see what is already happening in many places around the world? Can we spot the tiny cells wherever they exist?

Solidarity Economies in Times of Crisis

Marianne Maeckelbergh

Since the start of the latest economic crisis (~2008), informal networks of solidarity, many of which were already in place, became key mechanisms of survival for many people. Since so many of these solidarity practices and networks are informal it can be very hard to grasp how they function, where they come from and what the effects of this kind of mutual aid are for people's survival at a time when they cannot fulfill their needs through financial income.

One of the most curious aspects of the current economic crisis is that although so many people who are unemployed, have no income and have little opportunity to earn income, they somehow still get by and still get many of the basic things they need. In the countries that I am most familiar with, the US, Spain and Greece, many people get by through networks of solidarity – friends of friends or total strangers who provide them with essentials. People regularly give each other food, provide essential services, and provide each other with shelter – all for free. It seems to be a very large non-economy, but because it is so informal it eludes the spectator.

In New York, when the housing crisis first hit, people helped each other meet their basic needs by opening their homes to family and friends – multi-family homes were common and fewer and fewer earners had to provide for more and more people. Other tactics of solidarity included providing help to people who had been evicted from their homes to re-enter and re-claim an empty building. But smaller acts of solidarity abounded as well, such as free drinks and food at local shops and bars. Much of this solidarity rested on personal friendship and acquaintance networks and appeared to the receivers of the solidarity to be the result of individual ties, but the scale at which it was happening indicates that it was much more than an individual's good luck.

In Barcelona people face a similar housing crisis, only in Spain the housing crisis is combined with an national unemployment rate of 26.2% and a youth unemployment rate of 56% (as of June 2013). Family networks are the main providers of housing – an entire generation of 20-30 year olds still lives at home with their parents. But there have also been large scale neighbourhood based re-occupations of empty apartment buildings to provide housing for people in the community that have lost their jobs and/or their homes. The occupations have involved thousands of people demonstrating in the streets, and each occupied building hosts a social centre that serves not only those living in the building, but the entire community. Smaller scale solidarity is present as well, everywhere one looks. Clothes are bought second hand or exchanged through informal networks and entire families can be fed by food coops that provide cheap and organic vegetables.

Perhaps the solidarity economy is strongest in Greece. It is not uncommon to hear people talk about supporting their partner, their own family and their partner's family with only their one very low income. And yet people survive. In Athens, many people seem to know someone with a farm not too far from the city, or they mysteriously get vegetables and other essentials for free from a friend of a friend who knows someone who grows his own food. Even tobacco can be gotten cheap if you know someone who sells it as pesticide instead of tobacco – thereby avoiding the high taxes on tobacco. The neighbourhood assemblies that have emerged and solidified over the past few years of political organizing now serve as hubs for the distribution of resources. Regular exchange markets are organized where children can get 'new' toys and everyone can get clothes and other goods for free or in exchange for a few hours volunteer work.

In Greece too housing seems to be the main source of solidarity. Due to the high percentage of mortgage-free property ownership in Greece, a housing crisis has thus far been avoided, but due to 64.9% youth unemployment, 27.6% general unemployment (as of August 2013), plus dramatic salary cuts, many people have nevertheless ended up homeless. Or they would be homeless if it weren't for the generosity of others. For many people in Greece family support is not enough – the wider solidarity networks have become essential and are already functioning on the one step removed as people resort to friends of friends and family of friends to survive. The need for solidarity beyond existing friend and

family networks has led to the many solidarity networks sprouting up all over Greece and last October in Athens, many people came together from across Greece to discuss how better to coordinate these disparate solidarity initiatives as well as how to turn these “emergency solutions” into structural alternatives to the existing economic system.

I have never carried out systematic research into these informal solidarity economies and the anecdotal examples I give here, are only that, examples of something that is happening. What strikes me most about all of these initiatives is that they don't function along the lines of existing hierarchies, and at times they can even break these hierarchies and create new social relations, some hierarchical other less so. For example, these initiatives (un)intentionally shift the boundaries between legality and legitimacy by making illegal action legitimate in the eyes of the public due to a shared sense of need (such as providing illegal housing for homeless people in the millions of empty buildings). These solidarity initiatives challenge the money-centrism of the economy, the production-consumption chain, property relations and individualism, to mention only a few of the taken for granted social relationships we unwittingly reproduce everyday. It may seem unimportant, and the actions of helping each other may seem mundane and simply human, but in a capitalist economy and a world that believes people are motivated only by self-interest, these types of simple gestures represent a divergence from economic doctrines of individual responsibility and blame that is valuable in and of itself.

International solidarity with the Greek movement **Markos Vogiatzoglou**

I left Greece for Italy in 2010, when the anti-austerity movement of the former was making its first steps. Upon arrival at the latter, I found myself a complete stranger, trying to remain politically active in an uncharted territory. I didn't speak the language, yet what made the situation truly difficult was the “cultural gap”. Unaware of the Italian movement's political map, I was constantly failing to perceive the connotations behind the movements' claims, their historical references, as well as the thin ice of the intra-movement relations that one should be careful not to step upon.

Three years have passed ever since and I 'm still some sort of *no land's man*, a misaligned observant, one eye fixed on the constant turbulence in Greece, the other on my new home's peculiar political habitus. I 've spent my time here roaming the Italian organizations' assemblies and evenings dedicated to Greece, giving speeches and interviews, writing articles and pamphlets, editing, translating and subtitling propaganda videos.

To cut a long story short, I've given my best to become a decent *mascot* of the Greek movement in Italy, in an attempt to reinforce what was termed as *international solidarity to the Greek protesters*. What follows are a few things I've learned during this period.

1. Technically speaking, movement solidarity is the direct or indirect transfer of resources from an entity (individual or organization) to another, in order to serve the latter's political goals.
2. When speaking about "resources", one should not only consider the material ones. Visibility, information dissemination, know-how exchanges, a "helping hand" in practicalities, assistance in building a critical mass, even a mere public statement of a shared stance on an issue, may become movement resources, if treated wisely.
3. In order to maximize the efficiency of the resources' transfer, good intentions are not sufficient. Contrariwise, sometimes good intentions might prove a royal path to hell.
4. I am confident the above cliché has been confirmed several times in the case of the international solidarity to the Greek anti-austerity movement. What is important is to make good use of our shortcomings, through a careful analysis of what went wrong.
5. Running the risk of over-simplifying, I shall note hereby four usual problems international movement solidarity is encountering, using examples from the Greek case to build up my argument:

- a. *One may offer a resource the recipient does not need, or does not know how to handle.*

During the preparations for the 2012 *Blockupy Frankfurt*, the organizers set up a proposal for a "free ride" to the German city. The idea was that the Germans would put the money for the coaches - and the Greek protesters would fill them, carrying their indignation to the entrance door of the European Central Bank's headquarters. The proposal dramatically failed, as the organizers forgot to notify anyone in Greece about their intentions, not only with regard to the practicalities of the transportation, but also relating to the protest event itself! The lesson to be learned here is that one needs *first* to build up strong contact networks in the recipient's country and *then* discuss with them how to concretize the solidarity bonds through jointly organized initiatives.

- b. *Insufficient mapping of the recipient's field might lead to erroneous alliances, embarrassment and, ultimately, waste of resources.*

In June 2013, a wide array of organizations all over Europe organized the Alter Summit in Athens. This was a major project for all sides involved and had all the potentials to be a successful one: the organizers had not repeated the mistake mentioned in point 5a; prior to taking their decisions, they had secured the support of what seemed like the strongest ally in the Greek setting: The party of SYRIZA, which had received some 27% of the votes in the last years' general elections. What they didn't know, though, is that SYRIZA's strength at the grassroots/movement level was negatively correlated

to its rising electoral influence. Furthermore, the way that the party had set up the general framework of the Alter Summit ended up prohibiting any other Greek movement organizations from participating in it. Ultimately, the party people withdrew from the project, leaving behind only a handful of honest activists to cope with the event's content, themes to be addressed, as well as all its practicalities. The Alter Summit was a dreadful waste of resources, in the sense that it passed completely unnoticed by the Greek society. It is important to note here is that securing a strong ally might not be sufficient, if the solidarity sender is unaware of the intra-movement balance in the recipient's field.

- c. *Failure to recognize the incompatibility of the respective sender's and recipient's political projects might lead to erroneous alliances, embarrassment and, ultimately, waste of resources.*

It is rather common for organizations to loosen their political criteria when addressing a spatially distant potential collaborator. This is not to be considered as a flawed practice in itself, yet some prudence is required, in order to avoid reaching outcomes opposite to the ones desired. There are numerous examples to bring from the Greek case, the most hilarious, perhaps, being the June 2012 keynote speech of Tariq Ali at the annual festival of the radical left-wing party ANTARSYA. Ali was supposed to offer a major electoral boost to the party, as the event took place only a few days before the general elections –ANTARSYA was hoping, at that time, to reach the 3% threshold and enter the Greek Parliament. The famous intellectual arrived at the venue under a thunderous applause, but then made a monumental gaffe, as he urged the ANTARSYA supporters to vote for ...SYRIZA, i.e. the party's direct competitor. Needless to note how easily this major embarrassment could have been avoided, should the organizers have asked, beforehand, Tariq Ali on his views with regard to the elections.

- d. *One should avoid focusing too much on material resources, but rather concentrate on a mutual exchange of know-how.*

What has been proven beyond any doubt all these years is that the deficit of international solidarity towards the Greek movement *was not* a material one. What the Greeks missed, what all the Europeans missed, was a cross-national common space for exchange of information, know-how and experience. What I'm referring to is not an umbrella "organization of the organizations", but rather a set of horizontally interlinked nodes operating in a common trajectory. Such a concept might not only prove more efficient than our current organizational forms, but also partially restore the balance between the solidarity sender and recipient. One-way solidarity is a heavy burden for both.

In the years to come, the great challenge we'll need to face will be to

imagine, develop and, finally, create these complex networks in both a concrete and politically coherent way.



A pensioner who lost his life savings in the Caja Madrid /Bankia protests in central Madrid. October 8, 2013. Photograph: Cristina Flesher Fominaya

III. How can movements win? Movement strategy in the crisis

A few notes on the current movements

Ewout van den Berg

1) Finding new and creative ways to organize resistance is very important. Political parties do not represent them, while the leadership of unions is focusing on negotiating with the government within the framework of 'necessary cuts' rather than organizing resistance. This often leads to a fetishizing of the movement, and rejection of existing structures. But refusing to engage with these arena's of ideological and social struggle will take the movement backwards. On the height of the Indignados movement, partly because the movement did not care about parliamentary democracy, the conservative party was brought to power. Because protesters at Occupy Amsterdams denied entry to unions, the protest remained restricted to people able to stay at the camp 24/7, and the protest came to a firm end.

Formal democracy is an important way in which political consciousness takes shape. The only established bourgeois party in Egypt came to power on the wave of the revolution. Not being able to fulfill the demands for social justice the party was removed from power by the masses – and the military intervening to prevent further radicalization and economic damage. (If) There will be new elections, new governing parties will not be able to meet the demands of the masses either. This is how people learn. The choice between a former opposition party (the MBs) or the army's contra-revolution democratically voted in (Shafiq) was very real and the outcome was at once a reflection of radicalization as it was a stepping stone towards further clarity of ideas.

Organized and (as of yet) unorganized labour still is key. The working class in Egypt was late to rise, but when it did in Mahalla and Suez Mubarak was lost. Over the last six months the movement on the streets receded, while a huge strike wave swept the country. The analysis put forward by Rosa Luxemburg in 'the mass strike', the cross-fertilization of economic struggle and political demands, is here as relevant as it was 100 years ago. This is also the important lesson from Occupy Oakland, where activists linked up with the longshoremen to blockade the port drawing in new layers of workers and extending the (class) notion of the 99% versus the 1% to include a sense of economic power.

2) There is no place for autonomy within capitalism. Autonomous spaces can be important in that they provide an environment for people to be involved and organize not for profit, but for want. But these places have to deal with all the things capitalism throws up: homelessness, racism, sexism, etc. The logic of occupying spaces is that it soon becomes the goal itself, rather than a means to get somewhere. For the majority of the people these autonomous spaces cannot be an alternative to their current lives. This is not something particular to the current movements. The documentary 'Berkely in the sixties' about the student revolt clearly shows the limitations of such a movement and ideas of autonomy go back to the 18th century philosopher Charles Fourier.

An important lesson from the Indignados movement is that it recognized when the occupation of public space became an impediment to the movement, and they dissolved into wider neighbourhood assemblies. This was possible mainly because of the local networks already in place before the movement took off. There is no general blueprint for the way in which movements develop.

3) Strategy does matter. This is the lesson of the Quebec student struggle. They organized patiently throughout the province, had maximum democratic structures with local representatives and centralized decision-making and aligned themselves with different workers struggles. The local government was forced to a tactical retreat. We need to draw and generalize lessons from different movements, and go beyond mere enthusiasm. What causes one movement to go down, and another to sustain activism and build broader links within society?

4) Understanding the current conjuncture: left reformism and the crisis. Support for classic social-democratic parties is rapidly declining as they pursue

absolutely horrendous policies to make us pay for the crisis. With the radicalization of the people by the crisis and resistance, this opens up a huge space to the left. This is the vacuum the Linke originally came to fill in Germany, and now widely popular parties like Syriza and Front the Gauche are occupying. This is a welcome development as more people will be reached by radical politics. But as these parties include both revolutionary and reformist tendencies, they also face a number of problems.

As the space they are occupying on the left is so broad, there is a strong pull from the centre. Due to the hollowing out of the political centre and further radicalization by struggle the question of change through the existing state becomes increasingly important. They are called forward by the ruling class to manage capitalism more effectively. This is the case with both Syriza and the Socialist Party in the Netherlands. The July conference of Syriza is the latest example of the parlemantarian logic that influences these parties. This decided to abolish the constituent components, strengthened the leadership over the base and did away with the most radical demands.

What can we learn from this episode: a) theory does matter. A great number of activists were very enthusiastic about the electoral rise of Syriza – as it ‘transcended’ the question reform or revolution – but now these same people are doing away with elections altogether. b) political parties influence the movement, as the rise of Syriza definitely promoted the idea that change could come through parliament. c) political parties do matter, in order to have a focus point where the lessons from the movement and the work places are generalized. There is a need for revolutionary parties which use parliament as an arena for the struggle of ideas, while being involved in the day to day struggles.

Everything is impermanent. Capitalism too! **Laurence Cox**

Somewhere in the fifth century BCE in north India, Siddhartha Gautama told a gathering of homeless wanderers “All conditioned things are impermanent”. Looking at events since that time, it is hard to disagree, whether in relation to states, world economies or cultures. The same is true in our own time: empires and monarchies, fascism and state socialism, dictatorship after dictatorship, have crumbled away within living memory. *This is what they do*, however terrifying they seem at the time.

In fact researchers (and some movement theorists) do activists a disservice when they act as though the most radical analysis is the most deeply structural, the one which proves just how bad things are and how little hope there is of actually changing them. They play into the hands of elite attempts to intimidate and disempower, to use the failures of past movements to discredit the possibility of real change, and they encourage us to rationalise our own depression, paranoia or cynicism as Theory rather than see it for what it is.

What we desperately need, I think, is a stronger sense of *agency* – “theirs”, in understanding not just how the system works but how the *alliances* which underpin it work and how they can come to be taken apart, and in understanding how we can form the kinds of alliances that are capable of bringing about the change we say we want.

Why do regimes of accumulation end?

However we date it, the capitalist world system is not so old – a few centuries – although societies structured around class inequalities, patriarchy and ethnic inequality go back further in different parts of the world. It had an origin, and it would be remarkable if it was “the end of history”. Within capitalism, regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation – particular *forms* of capitalism – often coexist (not always peacefully) and succeed each other with great speed. There are of course different analyses, but most will agree that neoliberalism is at most about forty years old; the Fordism / Keynesianism which predated it in western Europe similarly lasted a few decades and in turn replaced earlier arrangements. If we look at European empires in Asia and Africa and their replacement first by national developmentalism and then by neoliberalism, the timeframes are compressed; for Eastern Europe or Latin America it would be more complicated but we would arrive at the same basic conclusion.

As an activist, I am not so interested in the exact analysis – or, come to that, its supposedly underlying economic reasons. What I *am* interested in is the processes whereby such forms of capitalism come to an end and are replaced by something new, whether capitalist or otherwise. At the level of actors and agency – and this has been shown very nicely in a book called *The end of organized capitalism* – what happens is that elite actors, part of the existing hegemonic arrangements, come to conclude that the current arrangements no longer suit them, and the cost of remaining within is higher than the exit cost; and / or that popular actors who have given their consent and participated within the system, withdraw it for much the same reasons. Which side is more important is not a foregone conclusion, and this is part of what makes the study of revolutions interesting as a field of study. 1917 in Russia and 1923 in Ireland, 1945 or 1989 in Europe, 1994 in South Africa or what may be happening in Burma – these are not all identical processes which can be neatly dismissed with the same set of clichés.

By looking at *how forms of capitalism come to an end* we can see two things. One is hope: this is a normal process, it happens frequently enough for many of us to have already lived through one such set of changes if not more. That does not mean that what happens afterwards is always good; that is up to us. It *can* be worthwhile, even if it is not always what we want: feminism, the end of dictatorships, welfare states, the withdrawal of empires – these are not trivial things for those of us whose lives are affected by them.

The other is to focus closely on these *alliance processes*. To the extent that we have seen a long “phony war” – the existence of well-developed challenges to neoliberalism which for all their repression have not gone away (and have not

been crushed by tanks and torture chambers as they would have been in earlier periods) – it represents “their” inability to mobilise enough consent to squash “us”; and both the extent and the weakness of US control of Latin America and the Arab World are illuminating in this respect too. We are seeing a system which has no plan B, and which finds it easier to coerce than to gain consent – but which then has to gain the consent of those who have to support the coercion. This was, as we have seen internationally, easier in Afghanistan than in Iraq; internally it was easier in the US after 9/11 than in Western Europe; and there are real limits, in Europe or Latin America at least, to its hegemony.

To the extent that “we” have provoked a crisis of the routine modes of US hegemony in those regions - as well as (for example) a “retreat to Versailles” of global summits, an intellectual delegitimation of neoliberalism itself, a forcing of climate change onto a global elite which has no ability to resolve it, and a crisis of the EU’s mode of governing, where its political legitimacy is now on very shaky ground in much of Europe – we find ourselves in the situation of the “irresistible force” (or what should be that) and the “immovable object” (or what desperately needs to present itself as that).

On our side of events...

It is, I think, difficult to think this through because so many of our modes of analysis are structured by an earlier situation, one in which movements could have relatively sustained and organised existences (in good times at least), were held in check by the wider Cold War and before that world war conflicts, and – crucially – could often aim to have systematic representation “within the system” (in the form of parties, unions, intellectuals etc.) The other part of the picture, of course, is one where the national economic level was particularly significant, for well-known reasons, so that this representation had an immediate, practical, target.

We are now in a different situation, one more similar to that of the late 19th century, with large movements largely operating outside a system which has very little capacity to accommodate them on their own terms, individual elite members taking on particular movement demands in a very instrumental way, and huge ups and downs of movement participation because of this unstructured situation. In this context, many of the themes around which movements have disagreed through the 20th century in particular have less purchase than they did. The ritual (and in itself quite neoliberal) celebration of “new” ways of thinking as though they were good in themselves is one way of talking about this situation. What it really means, though, is not that we can afford *not* to think but that we have to think twice as hard – and, if possible, learn from *each other* and across our differences.

I want to highlight two points which seem particularly important to me here. One is the extent to which ordinary people – certainly in western Europe, which is what I know – have become so to speak latent political actors. Since the Right gave up on trying to create a situation in which non-elites had no voice and instead to construct forms of populism, nationalism, fascism, Christian

democracy and the like, this has been a key part of politics. It forms so to speak an unspoken "social contract" which is what Barroso is talking about when he says that there are limits to austerity in Europe. Push people beyond a certain point, in terms of their interests but also in terms of what they feel is acceptable politically, and they will respond.

Secondly, the really transformative moments have to do precisely with these wider social groups becoming political subjects, taking a conscious hand in collective political agency. This is a standard observation in the study of historical revolutions, and it is equally obvious in movement "waves" such as 1968. However we categorise the present, one of the differences between (say) Ireland and Spain or Greece is that in Ireland these groups are not active (yet); and one of the challenges we face on a European scale is that they are only active in a few countries, while in others (the Netherlands!) it seems almost impossibly far away. Part of the difference here, of course, is the different modes of capitalism in operation in different European countries, and the different relationships between movement institutions such as trade unions and political parties with austerity politics.

When these groups do burst into the political sphere they have a double learning process. Partly they use a language inherited from above – nationalism, football, constitutionalism, facebook, hostility to activists. Partly they struggle to find a suitable language to express what they know, on a practical level, about how to do things – the experience of survival in the modern workplace, the loose network of friends with shared interests scattered around a city, design and media skills, and all the discontents they are aware of but for which politics does not yet have a language. It is naturally challenging as well as exhilarating for activists who are not on their first engagement with politics to navigate this terrain. In my own work, one of the best experiences has been seeing how such events bring out *part-time* activists, as well as people who had dropped out of politics for decades but now think it worthwhile re-engaging, and people who are finally finding a way to act on things they have felt for a long time. Not everyone in the protests is 19 (though it is great that so many are!)

Finally

We do, I think, gain something in terms of personal emotional resilience as well as strategic focus if we think about how we can contribute to the breaking-apart of the alliances that currently underpin neoliberalism; if we understand that they are only medium-term alliances, and that right now they are stretched, frayed or brittle (choose your metaphor) in a range of contexts.

Along with everything we are doing anyway, I think we also need to be constantly aware of the broader *potential* represented by the latent political agency of ordinary people, and have a sense of the complexities involved when they do burst into the political sphere, and the rapidity with which this changes.

So I think insofar as we do have a chance – it is only 50-50 but we are here now, and many of us have children whose futures are at stake – it is bringing this

broader picture to what we are doing anyway, putting the things that are (relatively) easy to name because they are in our own zone of knowledge against this harder-to-quantify background, that we have most chance of acting strategically and – to use that unpopular word – win.



Puerta del Sol Madrid. October 5, 2013. An activist holds a sign that reads "We want our money", indicating the high risk preferentes product aggressively sold to many old people with the "100% guarantee" of Caja Madrid, later "Bankia". On her hat she has a 15-M symbol. Photograph: Cristina Flesher Fominaya

Avrupa Sosyal Forumu yolun sonunda mı?: İstanbul 2010 ve sonrası

Yavuz Yıldırım

Özet

2002’de hayata geçen ve son olarak 2010’da İstanbul’da yapılan Avrupa Sosyal Forumu (ASF), geçen on yıllık sürede Avrupalı hareketleri bir araya getiren en önemli oluşum haline geldi. Küreselleşme karşıtı hareketin, Dünya Sosyal Forumu (DSF) çatısı altında alternatif küreselleşme hareketine dönüşmesiyle birlikte, sürecin en baştan beri içinde olan Avrupalı hareketler de yerel düzeyde olduğu gibi kıta çapında Forum sürecini ilerlettiler. Ancak 2010 sonrası süreçte, DSF’den gelen tartışmaların ASF bünyesinde de devam etmesi ile bu arayışın sonuna gelindiği ve yeni bir güzergah geliştirmek gerektiği görülmektedir. ASF’nin 10. Yılında Firenze (Floransa) 10+10 toplantısı ve Avrupalı hareketleri bir araya getiren diğer organizasyonlar, taban hareketlerinin yeni bir siyasete evrilmesi için çabaların devam etmesi gerektiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Öfkeli ve İşgal Et hareketleri, kurumsal siyasetin karşısında hareketlerin gücünü göstermeye devam etmektedir. Bu çalışmada, hareketlerin siyasal olanı belirleme gücünün Forum süreci ve İstanbul’daki Sosyal Forum sonrası gelişen son örnekler nezdinde nasıl işleyebileceği incelenmektedir. Sosyal Forum güç kaybetse de bu tarz yatay ve kapsamlı örgütlenmeler, toplumsal hareketlerin yeni dönemdeki biçimi olarak öne çıkmaya devam etmektedir. Bu açıdan eski usul üyelik tabanlı hiyerarşik yapılara karşı, gönüllülük ve eylemle şekillenen harekete dayalı bir siyasetin temelleri atılmaktadır.

Giriş

Dünya Sosyal Forumu’nun (DSF) kıtasal ayaklarından biri olarak hayata geçen ve ilki 2002’de İtalya’nın Floransa kentinde yapılan Avrupa Sosyal Forumu (ASF), 10. yılını geride bıraktı. Bu süreçte Avrupalı toplumsal hareketlerin buluşma ve işbirliği alanı olarak önemli bir işlev üstlenen ASF’nin son birkaç toplantısında ivme kaybettiğini söylemek mümkündür. 10. yıl vesilesiyle yapılan Firenze (Floransa) 10+10 toplantılarında, bu etkinliğinin bir Forum buluşması ya da 10. yıl kutlaması olmadığının altı çizildi. Yakın zamanda gerçekleşen ve toplumsal hareketlerle kurum temsilcilerini bir araya getiren toplantılarda, aşağıda değinileceği gibi Forum sürecinin daha öteye taşınması gerektiği yönünde görüşler ifade edildi. Bu bağlamda Forum tarzı “açık alan” ya da hareketler adına konuşmayan bir oluşumdan ziyade hareketlerin ortaklık düzeyini artıracakları, kurumsal zemine yakın yeni birlikteliklerin hedeflendiği söylenebilir. Esasen bu sürecin temelinde, Forum’un alan mı aktör mü, hareket mi kurum mu olacağına dair ikilemler ve tartışmalar yer almaktaydı. 10 yıllık geçmişin sonunda, ASF’nin DSF’nin yataylık vurgusundan çıkıp aktör ve kurum şeklinde örgütlenmeye doğru bir eğilime ulaştığı söylenebilir. Bu bağlamda

Forum süreci Avrupa’da, yeni bir biçim ve içerik edinerek ve forum adını kullanmaktan imtina ederek yeni bir güzergahta girmiş görünmektedir. Çalışmada, bu duruma neden olan etmenler genel hatlarıyla incelenecektir.

ASF adıyla son toplantı 2010 yazında Türkiye’de İstanbul’da gerçekleşmişti. Geride kalan iki yıl içerisinde yeni bir ASF örgütlemek yerine, hareketlerin farklı eklemlenme ve yakınlaşma alanları aradıkları görülmektedir. ASF’nin, Forum’u açık alan mantığıyla kurgulayıp kurumsallaşmaya karşı direnci simgeleyen DSF ilkeleriyle uyuşmasında bazı sıkıntılar bulunmaktadır. Dolayısıyla hareketlerin yeni bir birliktelik arayışını Forum adıyla örgütlememesinin temelinde, 2004 Londra Forum’undan bu yana devam eden dikey-yatay gerginliğinin etkisi büyüktür. ASF, hareketleri bir araya getirerek yerel sorunları kıtasal çapta bir muhalefete dönüştürmede önemli kazanımlar elde etse de somut politikalar geliştirme noktasında eksik kalmakta ve DSF çizgisiyle ayrışma iyice belirginleştiği için artık pratikte yolun sonuna gelmiş görünmektedir.

Bu çalışmanın amacı, ASF’nin 2002-2012 arasındaki gelişim sürecini genel hatlarıyla aktararak, Forum’un Avrupa hareketleri açısından önemini ortaya koymaktır. Avrupalı muhalif hareketlerin işbirliği ve koordinasyon eksikliğini önemli ölçüde gideren ASF, yarattığı etkilerle “başka bir Avrupa mümkün” mücadelesinin baş aktörü olmuştur. Küreselleşme karşıtı mücadele ile yeni bir noktaya evrilen toplumsal hareketlerin ulaştığı bu yeni noktada ASF aracılığı ile tekil mücadelelerin ortak bir bakış açısına evrilmesinin önemi ortaya konmuştur. 2000’li yılların başında karşı-küreselleşme sürecinin içinde büyüyen Forum hareketi, toplumsal hareketlerin yeni yüzyıldaki konumunu anlamak açısından önem kazanmaktadır. Dolayısıyla ASF’nin yatay hiyerarşide işleyen hareketlerle, eski tür siyaseti simgeleyen sendika ve partilerin arasında yeni bir güzergah açma girişimi kısmen başarılı olmuştur. Ancak kurumların Forum üzerindeki etkinliği belirginleştikçe, Forum mantığının devam ettirilmesi zorlaşmıştır. Bu çerçevede ASF, hareketleri bir araya getirme açısından bir kültür yaratsa da bu adla devam etmekte zorlanacağını söylemek mümkündür. Bu yazıda özellikle halihazırda son ASF olan 2010 İstanbul Forumu’na odaklanılarak, ASF’nin 10 yıl içerisinde değişen yapısı ve hedefleri aktarılacaktır. Bu çerçevede öncelikle sosyal forum sürecinin yeni toplumsal hareketler yaklaşımı açısından nasıl anlamlandırılabilirliğine değinilecek, ardından DSF ilkeleri ve ASF özelinde sürecin Avrupa’da yaratmaya çalıştığı değerler, yeni bir siyaset yaratmak hedefiyle ele alınacaktır. Son olarak 2010 sonrasındaki süreçte hareketlerin yarattığı ve yaratacağı yeni alternatifler incelenerek, Avrupalı muhalif hareketlerin yeni bir Avrupa hedefindeki önemli rollerinin altı çizilecektir.

Yeni toplumsal hareketler ve sosyal forum süreci

1970’lerin sonunda gelişen yeni toplumsal hareketler (YTH) yaklaşımı, 1968 ile sembolikleşen çeşitli protestoların, eylemlerin ve toplumsal muhalefet gösterilerinin genel adını ifade eder (Scott 1990; Johnston vd. 1994). Üniversitelerdeki öğrenci işgalleri ve direnişleri, barış, çevre, kadın ve nükleer

karşıtı hareketin farklı örnekleri YTH'lerin genel karakteristiğini yansıtır. Bu hareketler yerleşik değerler ve hakim siyasetten kopuşun farklı boyutlarını simgelerler. Temel eleştirileri hem sosyal demokrasinin kapitalizmle barışık refah devleti yaklaşımına hem de sosyalizmin bürokratik versiyonlarına yöneliktir. Önceki dönemden farkları, bir toplumsal dönüşümü kendi otonom alanlarını kurarak ve mesajlarını topluma bu alanlar üzerinden vererek gerçekleştirmek istemeleridir (Melucci, 1985: 815). Hareketler, bir dayanışma temelinde taşıdıkları çatışmacı durumu sistemin sınırlarını zorlama yönündeki eylemleriyle ortaya koyar (Melucci, 1985: 794-795). Bu açıdan toplumsal hareketler, toplumsal değerlerin oluşumunu ve yerleşmesini sorgulayan ve yeniden anlamlandıran süreçlerdir. Bu yeni süreçte toplumsal muhalefetin toplumsal hareketler eliyle nasıl ilerletileceği, özellikle ilk dönemlerde Amerikan ve Avrupa ekollerince farklı yorumlanırken (Olofsson 1988:16), 2000'li yıllarda bu ayrım kapanmaya ve analizler arası geçişkenlikler artmaya başlamıştır (Della Porta, 2009a).

Toplumsal muhalefet ve mücadele perspektifini siyasal iktidarın değişmesi ve sınıf önderliğinden uzaklaştırması YTH'lerin siyasal değil kültürel alanla ilgili olduğu ya da kültürel hareketler olarak analiz edilebileceği yorumlarına neden olmuştur (Scott 1990:19). Hareketlerin, toplumsal değişimi sınıf mücadelesinin getireceği siyasal dönüşüme değil, kimlik, aidiyet, tanınma pratikleri gibi alanlara endekslemesi sol mücadeleye bir engel olarak da görülmüştür. Bu açıdan yeni toplumsal hareketlerin post- marksizm adlandırılan teorik çerçevesi ve siyaseti eleştirilere maruz kalırken hareketlerin taleplerini reformizmle sınırlı görüp sosyalizmle uyuşmayan bir perspektif olduğu ileri sürülmüştür (Wood, 2011). Öte yandan kültürel eksenin ön plana çıkması, hareketlerin rasyonel yaklaşımların ya da yapısal engellerin ötesinde anlaşılmasını sağlar (McAdam 1994: 37-38). Ancak buradaki temel farklılaşma, kültürün siyasetten ayrı olarak görülmesi değil, hareketlerin toplumu ve özneyi kuran bir süreç olarak görülmesidir (Touraine 1985, 1995). Dolayısıyla modernizmin getirdiği ikilemler ve sınırların sorgulanması gündeme gelmektedir. Toplumsal hareketler, verili olarak kabul edilen her türlü toplumsal rolü sorgulamaktadır. Bu bakış açısı, yapılardan ziyade özne; hareketin hedefi ve başarılarından önce sosyal etkilerini ve toplumsalı kuruluş sürecine odaklanmayı sağlar. Bu açıdan yaşamsal olanı gündelik hayattan başlayarak daha geniş bir çerçevede ele alan ve sistemin işleyişine karşı direnişi sadece ekonomik ve sınıfsal terimlerle değil kültürel ve sosyal boyutlarıyla da ele alan hareketler muhalefet dinamiklerini farklılaştırmıştır. Hareketlerin sosyolojik tabanı genişlerken orta sınıf nitelikleri artmıştır (Offe, 1985). Böylece yeni toplumsal hareketler, aslında sistemle olan her türlü uzlaşmazlığı sorunsallaştıran ve direniş alanlarını ve aktörlerini çoğaltan bir özellik göstermektedir. Bu özellikleriyle yeni hareketlerin, yaşamsal olanı doğrudan siyasetin konusu haline getirdiği söylenebilir. Hareketler, siyasal olanın sınırlarını zorlayarak yeni çatışma alanları ve buna dayalı bir siyaset üretmektedir.

Dolayısıyla 1970'lerden itibaren toptan bir mücadelenin yerini parçalı ve somut konular üzerine odaklanan bir sürecin geliştiğini söylemek mümkündür. Bu çerçevede sendika ve partilerin öncü özelliği de sorgulanırken, hareketin yatay

ilişkiler üzerinden geliştirdiği yeni bir demokrasi anlayışı, YTH'lerin genel siyasi bakışını oluşturmaktadır. Sistemin farklı alanlarında ortaya çıkan iktidar görünümünü sorgulayarak genel yargı ve tartışmaların aksine Ancak yeni toplumsal hareketlerin sınıf mücadelesini ortadan kaldırmadığını, sınıfı tanımlayan ve sınıfsal mücadeleyi geliştiren dinamikleri farklılaştırdığını vurgulamak gereklidir.

Bu açıdan sistemin farklı alanlarında ortaya çıkan iktidar görünümünü sorgulayan hareketlerin hareketlerin yeni siyaseti, yaşamsal olanın gündelik hayat dolayımıyla yeniden ele alınması ve eski usül hiyerarşik siyasetin karşısında, bireylerin kendi hayatları üzerinde daha çok söz hakkı olduğu bir işleyiş talep etmektedir. Böylece demokrasinin de teknik bir süreç olmaktan çıkıp köklerindeki doğrudan katılım boyutunun öne çıkarılması istenmektedir. Dolayısıyla YTH'lerin ortaya çıktığı ve geliştiği süreç, Marksizm içi tartışmalar başta olmak üzere epistemolojik bir dönüşümün yaşandığı, modern olanın sorgulanarak aşıldığı ve yeni değerlerin temel alındığı, bunun yerel ve ulusal düzelda pratik sonuçlarının da yaşandığı bir değişim dönemini simgelemektedir (Arrighi vd., 2004: 100-107). Bu süreçte toplumsal anlamda olanaksız sayılan her türlü kabul tersine çevrilme girişimine maruz kalmıştır (Badiou, 2011: 54-55) Hareketler bu değişim sürecinin hem etkileyicisi hem de etkileneni olmuştur.

1970'lerde ekonomik mücadele ile kültür ve kimlik temelli mücadeleler arasında net bir ayırmadan bahsedilebilirse de aradan geçen 30 yıllık dönemde bu mesafenin kapandığını söylemek mümkündür. Özellikle küreselleşme süreci, toplumsal muhalefetin direniş mekanizmalarını da etkilemiştir (Smith, 2008). Ekonomik, kültürel hareketler, kimlik ve tanınma pratikleriyle siyasi talepler arasındaki yakınlaşma görülmektedir. Bunun temel nedeni, bu alanlar arasındaki etkileşim ve geçişkenliğin artmasıdır.

Sermaye akışı kadar fikirsel paylaşımların ve değerlerin de sınırları esnemiş ve genişlemiştir. Bu çerçevede hareketler, siyasetin neo-liberal ilkelerle yeniden düzenlenmesine karşı çıkmaktadırlar. Karşı olunanın birleştirdiği, diğer bir deyişle ortak düşmana karşı güçlerini birleştiren hareketlerin, küresel sistemi belirleyen büyük toplantılara karşı kendi toplantılarını örgütlenme fikri de bu düşünceden doğmuştur. Sosyal Forum fikri, toplumsal hareketleri bir araya getirerek sadece karşı olunan değil hayali kurulan ve tasarlanan toplumsal düzenin de temellerini atma yönünde ortaklaşma çabasıdır. Sosyal Forum, kapalı kapılar ardından uzmanların ve teknokratların aldığı kararların aksine farklı fikirlerin ve deneyimlerin birbiriyle temas kurduğu, farklı düşüncelerin seslendirildiği ve bunun bir liderlik ya da karar alma biçimine dönüştürülmediği bir "açık alan" fikrine dayanmaktadır (Whitaker Ferreira, 2006: 11). Sadece buluşma ya da etkinlik günleri değil, hazırlık süreçleriyle birlikte Sosyal Forumlar iletişimsel süreçleri geliştirir, siyasal ilişkiler kurar ve böylece yeni bir kamusal alan fikrinin temellerini atar. Sosyal Forumların, hem pratik hem de teorik düzlemde yerleşik siyasal işleyişin sınırlarını değiştirme çabasına dayandığını söylemek mümkündür (Della Porta 2005;

Della Porta vd 2006). Bu açıdan, toplumsal hareketlerin tipik bir özelliği olarak,

Sosyal Forumlar da var olan sınırları sorgulayıcı ve yeni sınır koyucu pratiklerdir. YTH'lerin 1970'lerde ortaya koyduğu karşı çıkış düzleminin 2000'li yıllardaki somut görüntüsü Sosyal Forumlar olmuştur. Bu anlamıyla yerleşik değerlere farklı alanlardan yürütülen protestolar ve onları değiştirme çabası, Forum zemininde bir bütünlük göstermiştir. Forumların alternatif örgütlenme yaratma çabasının, fiziksel düzeyde işlediği ancak forumların detay noktalarda her zaman aynı açıklıkta olmadığı çeşitli ASF'lerde ve özellikle aşağıda değinilecek olan İstanbul Forum'unda görülmüştür. Benzer şekilde, yakın tarihlerde toplanan ve Dünya Şehircilik Forumu'na alternatif olarak geliştirilen Sosyal Şehircilik Forumu'nda da bazı etkili sivil toplum örgütü, siyasi parti ve akademisyenlerin süreci yönettiği kaydedilmiştir; böylece kentli fakir kesimlerin süreçte yer alamaması nedeniyle alternatife bir alternatif yaratma hissinin geliştiği vurgulanmıştır (de Souza, 2010: 574-575).

Sosyal Forumların, yatay ilişkilere, ağ-mantığına ve açık diyaloga dayanan yapısı ile yeni bir siyasetin sınırlarını kurmak istediği söylenebilir. Söz konusu yeni siyaset, kendi hayatına dair söz söyleyen bireylerin demokratik değerleri yeniden kurduğu bir süreci işaret etmektedir. Mücadelenin çokluğu, onu kurucu bir yeniliğe evrilmesinde engel değildir. Bu mücadeleler yeni bir ortak olan kurgularken, kendi bilgilerini üretir ve ortak var-oluşu bilgi kendi bilgileri üzerinden kurar (Negri 2006:38). Anti-modern'den alter-modern'e yönelik bu geçiş yeni bir yaşam tarzı yaratırken, tikelliklerin belirlediği yeni kurumlar üretme kapasitesine sahiptir (Hardt-Negri 2011:112; 332). Bu açıdan yeni toplumsal hareketlerin kuruculuk vasfı, farklı alanların ve kimliklerin birbiriyle eklemlenmesinin sonucu oluşmaktadır.

Laclau'nun (2007:149-150) tabiriyle, toplumsal hareketlerin eşdeğerlik zincirinin parçaları olarak işlediğini söyleyebiliriz. Bu zincirin uzaması evrenselliğin kurulmasında önemli bir yoldur. Hareketler, eklemlenme pratiklerini ilerlettikçe, tikelliklerin evrenselli kurma potansiyeli de artmaktadır (Laclau, 2009:333). Esasen Laclau ve Mouffe'un (1992) radikal demokrasi perspektifi yeni toplumsal hareketler düşüncesinin 1980'lerin sonundan itibaren teorik arka planını oluşturması açısından önemlidir. Bu yaklaşımda, demokrasiyi demokratikleştirmek esastır; bunun için çatışmaları ve anlaşmazlıkları ortadan kaldıracak bir bütünlük tahayyülü yerine çatışmaların hegemonik mücadelesiyle şekillenmiş bir demokrasiden bahsetmek gerekir. Bu sürecin taşıyıcıları, tam anlamıyla kurulmuş özneler, tikellikler ve onların sorunsuz bir şekilde kurduğu evrensellik değil, sürekli kurulup dağılan ve yeniden üretilen yüzergezer gösterenlerin eylemleridir. Demokrasi mücadelesi de herhangi temel bir eksenin (örneğin sınıf mücadelesi) etrafında değil bu eksenlerin eklemlendiği çoğulluklar evreninde sürekli yeniden üretilen bir mücadeledir. O nedenle ne sınıf mücadelesi ne de başka bir eksen bu mücadelenin tek taşıyıcısı olabilir. Toplumsal hareketler, toplumsal antagonizmaları, çekişmeler ve çatışmaları bünyelerinde taşıyan göstergeler ve demokrasi mücadelesini sürdürebilecek önemli süreçler olarak ön plana çıkar.

Bu çerçevede farklı alanlarda faaliyet gösteren toplumsal hareketlerin, kendi deneyimlerini paylaştıkları ve diğerleriyle temas kurdukları alanlar olarak

Sosyal Forumlar, yeni ortak duygular etrafında çerçevesi çizilecek yeni bir toplumsal oluşturmak hedefiyle yeni bir siyaset üretmeyi amaçlamıştır. Yeni siyaseti kuracak siyasal ilişkiler, her biri kendi alanında değerli ve önemli hareketlerin Forum'un açık alanında eklemelenmesiyle, diğer bir tabirle çoklukta birliği kurmasıyla mümkün olacaktır. Böylece yaşamsal olanın çerçevelediği yeni siyasal alan, herhangi bir üstbelirleyicinin değil kendi bilgisini üreten ve kendi deneyimlerine dayanan içkin bir mücadelenin eseri olacaktır. Çeşitli kurumsallık düzeyinde faaliyet gösteren bu hareketler, Forumlar sayesinde hem kendi alanlarında faaliyetlerini sürdürüp hem de yeni alanlarda işbirliklerine gitme şansı bulmaktadır. Dolayısıyla karşılıklı öğrenme ve gelişme süreci, herhangi bir üst makam ya da belirleyici olmadan bu işleyişin devam ettirilmesi esastır. Forum ilkeleri, bu açıdan açık alan, yataylık, kapsayıcılık temellerine dayanmaktadır. Bu ilkeler temellerini, küreselleşme-karşıtlığı sürecinde ortaya çıkan deneyimlerden almaktadır. Seattle, Prag, Cenova gibi şehirlerdeki ortak eylemlerin birbirine bağladığı kesimler yeni bir ortak mücadele alanı kurmanın arayışına girişmişlerdir (Juris 2008; Pleyers 2010). Eski tür muhalefetin tersine yeni nesil hareketler, yataylığa ve doğrudan eyleme dayalı yeni bir siyaset için adımlar atar; bu noktada verili olanı kullanmak yerine yeni bir siyasal zemin kurgular.

Bu yöndeki çabalar 2000'li yılların başından itibaren Dünya Sosyal Forumu (DSF) adıyla hayata geçmektedir. Bu yeni yapı, yeni yüzyılda bir araya gelme ve işbirliği geliştirmenin yeni yollarını geliştirmek adına önemli bir adımdır. DSF, diğer kıtasal forumlara ve ASF'nin kuruluna örnek olacak bir bakış açısı geliştirmiştir.

Dünya sosyal forumu ve yeni siyaset arayışı

İlki 2001 yılında Brezilya'nın Porto Alegre kentinde düzenlenen DSF, bu toplantısında bir ilkeler bütünü de açıklamıştır. 14 maddelik ilke listesi genel hatlarıyla DSF'nin sosyal adalet talebiyle neoliberal küreselleşme biçimine karşı olduğu, ancak Forum'un hareketleri temsilen konuşma yetkisinin olmadığı, hareketlerin siyasal parti ve kurumsal örgütlerden bağımsız olarak işleyeceği, açık ve bağımsız bir süreç olarak küresel sivil toplumu oluşturmak hedefinin olduğu vurgulanmıştır. Bu ilkeler, Forum hareketinin çerçevesini oluştursa da kısa sürede önemli tartışmaların da merkezi haline gelmiştir. Özellikle Forum'un açık alanının kurumsal siyasetle arasında mesafe koyması, siyasi parti ve uluslararası örgütleri dışarıda bırakması tartışma konusu oldu. Bir eylem biçimi olarak Forum'un nasıl ilerleyeceği ve şekilleneceği konusunda Brezilya eksenli Organizasyon Komitesi ile farklı kıtalardan katılımcıların olduğu Uluslararası Konsey arasında uyuşmazlık olduğunun da altı çizilmelidir (Schönleitner, 2003). İlkelerin nasıl uygulanacağı ve yorumlanacağına dair fark, temel olarak bu uyuşmazlıktan kaynaklanır. Forum'un Porto Alegre'deki deneyimden ve İşçi Partisi'nin başarısından feyz alması ve öncülerinin Brezilyalı aktivistler olması, bu bölgedeki hareketlerin ve aktivistlerin Forum içerisinde daha görünür olmasına neden olmuştur. Ancak Forum'un teorisyenlerinin ve kurdukları organizasyon komitesinin bir liderlik vasfıyla donanıp, sürecin

yukarıdan belirleyen bir hiyerarşi yarattığına dair eleştiriler yükselmiştir. Buna tepki olarak yerel forumlar daha içe kapalı şekilde örgütlenmiştir. Forum'un kurumsal siyasetle ve partilerle ilişkisinin ne düzeyde olacağına dair net bir uzlaşma olmamasından dolayı Forum'un başka kıtalarda düzenlenmesi ya da çok-merkezli olarak gerçekleştirilmesi sürecinde yerel ve bölgesel güçlerin etkisi daha fazla görülmüştür. Bu açıdan DSF her ne kadar yatay bir oluşum hedefinde olsa da örgütleyiciler arasında dönem dönem belli ekipleri ya da kurumların baskın olduğu ve gündemi onların belirlediği söylenebilir. Benzer sıkıntılar bütçe ve mali kaynaklar, alınan destekler, silahlı gruplarla kurulacak temaslar gibi konularda da gündeme gelmiştir (Glasius-Timms 2005:222-231). Forum içerisindeki yatay-dikey, mücadele-müzakere, alan-aktör eksenli, temelinde devrim-reform tartışmasının yer aldığı, tartışmalar toplumsal muhalefetin “ne yapmalı” sorusuna hala cevap aradığı şeklinde yorumlanabilir. Forum, bu cevaba yeni bir bakış açısı geliştirmek niyetinde olsa da geleneksel olanın kolaylıkla değişemeyeceğini göstermektedir. Forum mantığı, gelenekle yeni arasındaki çekişmenin sembolü ve bu geçişin taşıyıcısı olarak görülebilir.

1970'lerden bu yana bir dağılım içinde olan hareketlerin güçlerini artırmak için genel bir toparlayıcının varlığına ihtiyaç duysa da bu toparlayıcıya atfedilecek önem ve rolde uzlaşma sağlayamaması; dahası henüz ortak bir dil ve hedef oluşturamaması Forum'un bir fikir olarak sahiplenilse de pratikte güçlenmesini engelleyen nedenlerin başında gelir. Forum hareketinin güçlenerek küresel bir aktör olması gerektiğine dair yorumlara karşı, Forum'un kurucuları bunun bir açık alan mantığı ve bir araya gelme aktivitesi olduğunu savunmaktadır (Waterman-Sen 2007; Fisher-Poniah 2004). İlk görüştekiler için Forum yeni bir Enternasyonel'e evrilerek daha devrimci bir çizgide mücadelesini yoğunlaştırması gerekir; ikinci görüştekiler içinse Forum'un bir kurum ya da örgütsel hareket olmaması, tersine her hareketin ve aktivistin kendi sözünü söyleyebildiği daha gevşek yapıli bir yataylıkta devam etmesi, onu farklı kılan özellik olacaktır (Teivanen, 2003). Bu tartışma, devrim-reform tartışması ekseninde tarihsel bir birikime sahiptir. Geçmişten gelen bu tartışma, hareketin anarşist eğilimlerinin güçlenmesi ile beraber yeniden canlanmıştır. Ancak yeni bir siyaset hedefindeki Forum'un, yeni ilkelerle yoluna devam etmesi daha doğru görünmektedir.

DSF'nin zaman içinde kıtasal ve bölgesel ayakları oluştu ve böylece Forum mantığı, küresel bir eylem biçimi haline geldi. Pek çok yerel ya da bölgesel Forum, ilkelerin açık alan ve tartışma ana fikrine atıf yapsa da bazı Forumlarda sürecin daha “devrimci” bir içerikte ve yerel anlamda güçlü örgütlerin etkisinde ilerledi. Esasen yerel ve bölgesel Forumların kurulması, DSF'nin onayı ya da isteğinden bağımsız bir şekilde gelişti. İlk DSF'nin ardından Sosyal Forum, bir tür yeni eylem biçimi olarak kabul gördü ve çeşitli alanlardaki muhalif hareketlerin bir araya gelmesinin aracı haline dönüştü. Kimi forumlar ulusal, kimileri daha yerel ya da bölgesel düzeylerde kuruldu. Keza belirli alanlara odaklanan tematik forumlar da düzenlenmeye başlandı. Dolayısıyla ilkelerin gevşek şekilde bir arada tuttuğu forumlara pratik düzeyde atfedilebilecek genel özellikler ve nitelikler, ortak sonuçlar ya da kazanılmış başarılar belirlemek zordur (Glasius-Timms, 2005: 234-235).

Esasen yeni toplumsal hareketlerin kurumsal siyasetle ilişkileri genel olarak sorunludur ve Sosyal Forum özelinde yaşanan bu sıkıntıları da kurumsal siyaset karşısında yeni hareketlerin beklenti ve taleplerinin yükseldiği şeklinde yorumlamak mümkündür. Önceki dönemlerde sorun olmayan gelişmeler, hareketlerin geliştirmeye çalıştığı tabana dayalı yeni siyasetle birlikte daha görünür ve sorgulanır hale gelmektedir. Her halükarda DSF süreci, farklı hareketleri ve mücadele alanlarını bir araya getirerek yüzbinlerce kişinin temas kurmasını sağlamış ve hareketin kurucu gücünü yeniden ortaya koymuştur. Bu durum toplumsal hareketlerin kendilerini sorgulamasına ve hareketin eski ayrımları yeniden üretmemesi noktasında geliştirmesine olanak tanımıştır (Smith, 2012: 378). Dolayısıyla Forum eksenindeki tartışmalar küresel hareketin kendi içindeki “ne yapmalı” tartışmasına olumlu katkılar sunmuştur. Forum’un devrimciliğinin, siyasal iktidarı ele geçirmekten ziyade iktidarların gündelik hayata kadar girmiş uygulamalarının ortaya çıkarılması ve bunlara direnilmesi olarak işlediğini söylemek mümkündür. Dolayısıyla yaşamsal olanın değiştirilmesinin kurumsal siyasetin değiştirilmesinden daha önemli olduğu düşünülür. Yüzyılı aşan devrim mücadelesinin, kazandığı başarı ve başarısızlıklarla, 21. Yüzyılda bu yönde bir değişim göstermesinin gerekli olduğu söylenebilir.

Bu çerçevede Sosyal Forum sürecinin, temel olarak daha anarşist gelenek ve taban demokrasisine vurgu yapan hareketler ile görece daha örgütlü ve kurumsal siyasetin işleyişine yakın toplumsal hareket temsilcileri arasındaki gerginliğe sahne olduğu vurgulanmalıdır. Bu gerginlik, özellikle komünist geleneğin, sendika ve parti organizasyonlarının güçlü olduğu Avrupa’da daha etkili olmuştur. Avrupalı hareketler ve Forum katılımcıları, sol ve sosyalist hareketin değerlerine daha bağlı görünmektedir. Avrupalı aktivistler arasında yapılan çalışmalar, bu kişilerin güçlü örgütsel bağlantılarını ortaya koymaktadır (Andretta-Reiter, 2009). Küreselleşme karşıtı eylemler boyunca dikey hiyerarşi karşıtı ve doğrudan eylemci anarşist gelenek güçlense de krizlere ortak cevap üretme konusunda örgütsel deneyimlerin geleneğini aşacak güce erişememiştir. Dolayısıyla Forumların yataylığı, özellikle Avrupa’da örgütlerin baskısıyla dikeyleşme yolunda ilerlemekte ve Forum nezdindeki işbirliği bu açıdan zedelenmektedir. Özellikle Hazırlık Toplantıları’nın belirli grupların etkisiyle şekillenmesi, gerçekleşen ASF’lerin içeriğini etkilemektedir. Bu durum net olarak İstanbul’daki forumda deneyimlenmiştir. Dolayısıyla açıklık ve yataylık hedeflerinin harekete geçirici yanı pratikte oluşan sonucu tamamiyle etki edememektedir.

ASF’nin 10 yıl içerisinde yaşadığı temel sorunlarda, esasen eski dönemin reformizm-devrimcilik gerginliğine benzer şekilde, parti ve sendikalar ile hareketi ön plana çıkaran kesimler arasındaki uyuşmazlığın etkisi büyüktür. Neoliberal değerlerin yerleştiği küreselleşme döneminde, üretilmesi gereken cevapların aciliyeti, kurumsal siyasetin bu tür Forumlardaki etkisini artırmaktadır. Ancak üretilen cevapların yeni yüzyılın değerlerine, yeni toplumsal ve siyasal gelişmelere ayak uydurmaması da taban hareketlerini yeniden biçimlendirmektedir. Kurumsal siyasetin önceki dönemlerdeki hatalarına düşmek istemeyen toplumsal hareket aktivistleri üretecekleri yeni

formlarda henüz uzlaşma sağlayamamıştır. Ancak bu uyuşmazlığın üretici bir sürece evrildiği söylenebilir. Yeni toplumsal hareketlerin tasarlamaya ve uygulamaya çalıştığı yeni siyasetin farklı yorumlarının Sosyal Forum zemininde buluştuğunu ve çatıştığını söylemek mümkündür.

Avrupa sosyal forumu'nun temelleri

2001'deki ilk DSF'nin ardından 2002'de ilk ASF gerçekleştirildi. Bu forumun temellerini de özellikle Prag, Genova gibi kentlerde gerçekleşen büyük protesto eylemlerinde temas kurmuş ve bir araya gelmiş hareketlerin aktivistleri attı. İlk dönemlerinden itibaren ASF'de İtalyan hareketlerin belirleyiciliği vardı. DSF'nin de kurucularından olan ATTAC, Avrupa'daki yerel örgütlenmeleri ile birlikte ASF'yi belirleyen eksenlerden bir diğerydi. 2002'de İtalya-Floransa'da, 2003'te Fransa-Paris'te, 2004'te İngiltere-Londra'da gerçekleşen Forumlar, daha sonra iki yıl arayla 2006'ta Yunanistan-Atina'da, 2008'te İsveç- Malmö'de ve son olarak 2010'da Türkiye-İstanbul'da yapıldı. İlk Forumların gündemini savaş karşıtı hareket belirlerken Avrupa'da yükselen ekonomik krizle birlikte finans piyasası belirleyiciliğine karşı yürütülen mücadele son Forumlarda ön plana çıktı. Bununla birlikte DSF sürecinde yaşanan tartışmaların benzerleri Avrupa ekseninde de yaşandı. Özellikle 2004 Londra'daki ASF'nin ardından Forum içindeki dikey-yatay çekişmesi belirginleşti (Juris, 2005). Londra'da Forum'un örgütlenmesinde komitenin ve Socialist Workers Party (SWP) gibi siyasi partilerin belirleyicilikleri tepki topladı (Reyes, 2005). Forum içinde alternatif programın ve oturumların yapılmasıyla verilen tepki, sonraki Forum'ların hazırlık süreçlerinde de kendini gösterdi. Bazı oluşumlar desteklerini çektiler ya da temsilci düzeyinde katılmaya başladılar.

Forumların çeşitli aralıklarla bir araya gelen Hazırlık Toplantıları etrafında şekillenmesi, gündemlerinin ve programının bu toplantılarla yapılması Avrupa çapındaki hareketlerin işbirliği ve koordinasyonunu güçlendiren bir etkiydi. Her ASF öncesi düzenlenen hazırlık toplantılarının etkili ve verimli geçmesi o forum'un başarısını önemli ölçüde belirlemektedir. Çünkü bu toplantılar, hem Forum'un pratik düzeydeki altyapısını kurmak hem de ulusal sınırlardan çıkıp kıta çapında bir harekete dönüşmesi için eylem ve söylem birliği geliştirerek yeni bir kamusalılık yaratmak açısından önemli bir araç konumundaydı (Haug, 2006; Doerr, 2009). Hareketlerin birliğine dayalı kamusalılık, Avrupa Birliği'nin temsil ettiği değerlerin karşısında ASF'nin değerleri üzerinden yeni bir birlik kurma açısından da kritik önem taşıyordu. Çünkü hareketler, Avrupa'nın halihazırdaki birliğine ve yönetsel pratiklerine karşı olsalar da yeni bir Avrupa fikrine yakın durmaktadırlar (Andretta-Reiter, 2009). ASF, hazırlık toplantılarından itibaren yeni bir Avrupa'nın ekonomik ve sosyal temellerini atmak hedefindeydi. Bunun için hareketlerin farklı alanlarda yürüttükleri mücadeleleri ortaklaştırma ve birbirine eklemlenmenin önemli olduğunun her toplantıda altı çizildi. Avrupa'yı ekonomik temeller ve finans çevrelerinin beklentileri doğrultusunda değil sosyal ve siyasi anlamda bir birliğe çevirmek temel hedefti. Sonuç metinleri bu ortak hedefin çerçevesini çizen ifadelerden oluştu. Della Porta'nın (2010) "eleştirel Avrupalılar" adını verdiği Forum

aktivistleri, Avrupa'yı yeniden kurarken yeni bir ortak alan yaratmanın temellerini de oluşturmaktaydılar.

ASF, toplumsal hareketlerin yürüttüğü mücadelenin kıta çapında sonuç vermesi için önemli bir araç olarak görüldü. Yerel düzeyde zayıf olan bu hareketlerin işbirliği ve ortaklaşması, daha güçlü bir hareketin ve sonuç alıcı etkilerin doğmasını sağladı. Bu açıdan Avrupa Birliği'nin para temelli politikalarına karşı ASF, sosyal bir Avrupa'yı haklar temelinde şekillendirmeye çalıştı.

Son ASF: İstanbul 2010

Forum, 2006 Malmö ve 2008 Atina'dan sonra 2010'da Türkiye'de İstanbul'da yapıldı. 2006 ve 2008 Forumları'na Avrupa Anayasası ve yerel krizlerin kıta çapındaki olası etkileri temel gündemi oluştururken, 2010'daki Forum'a hareketin kendi iç krizi de eklendi. Atina Forumu, doğu Avrupalı hareketlerin etkisini göstermesi ve Yunan hareketlerinin örgütlü gücüyle ASF'ye yeni bir soluk kazandırmak açısından önemliydi ancak İstanbul'daki Forum, Malmö'deki sıkıntıların fazlasıyla arttığı bir sürece sahne oldu. 2010 Forum'undaki konuşmaların ortak noktası, ASF'nin kendi sınırlarına dayandığı ve Avrupa hareketi için yeni bir girişimin kendini göstermesi gerektiği idi.

Rosa Luxemburg Vakfı ve dahil olduğu Transform! Ağı; 4. Enternasyonel'in yayın organı International Viewpoint, Türkiye'den Yeni Yol, Rusya'dan Vpered, Yunanistan'dan Sprataküs gruplarının oluşturduğu dayanışma; 5. Enternasyonel ve yayın organı Workers Power; Comitee for a Workers' International (CWI), ATTAC, Comite pour l'Annulation de la Dette du Tiers Monde (CADTM) ve Uluslararası Af Örgütü'nün etkin katılım gösterdiği İstanbul 2010, organizasyondaki ve hazırlık sürecindeki sıkıntılar nedeniyle, oldukça kötü geçti. Önceki forumların sıkıntılarına çare üretilemediği gibi yeni bir çıkış yolu üretmek yerine kapsayıcılığın giderek daralması, Forum'un başarısızlığını artırdı. İstanbul'daki etkinlik, bir açık alan mantığıyla işleyen Forum'dan ziyade klasik usul konferanslar bütünü şeklinde ilerledi. Türkiyeli organizatörlerin hazırlık toplantılarında yaşadığı örgütsel çatışmalar dikey-yatay ayrımına benzer şekilde Forum'un işleyişini etkiledi. Programı 24 saat öncesinde açıklanabilen, Türkiyeli katılımcı sayısının oldukça düşük olduğu, hareketler arası ortaklaşma alanlarının kurulamadığı, belirgin kurumların denetiminde işliyor görüntüsünün hakim olduğu ASF 2010, Forum ruhunun can çektiğinin göstergesi oldu.

Örneğin, pek çok oturumda, konuşmacılar ya da katılımcılar çeviri konusunda gönüllü oldu; pek çoğunda ise eğer konuşmacının dili anlaşılıyorsa çeviri yapılmadı. Yabancı ekiplerin organize ettiği oturumlar yabancıların, Türkiyelilerin organize ettikleri ise yerli katılımcının ağırlıkta olduğu oturumlara dönüştü. Aynı anda pek çok oturumun yapılması, bu oturumların benzeşen başlıkları ve dahası oturumların iki farklı kampüse yönlendirilmesi, katılımcıların bölünmesine ve sürekli bir koşturma içinde olmasına neden oldu.

Esasen Türkiyeli aktivistlerin Malmö ve Atina'daki Forumlara etkin katılımları, Forum'un Türkiye'ye getirilmesi açısından etkili olmuştu. 2000'li yılların

başından bu yana savaş-karşıtı eksenin bir araya getirdiği çok sayıda örgüt ve aktivist, Türkiye’de bir Sosyal Forum örgütlenmesinde katkı sundu. Bu bağlamda Sosyal Forum süreci de 2002’den bu yana çeşitli derecelerde Türkiyeli muhalif hareketleri etkilemiştir. Sürecin başlarında bireysel olan katılımlar, ilerleyen yıllarda örgütsel katılımlara dönüşmüştür. İlk forumlardan itibaren, bu toplantılara katılan kişiler (çeşitli sendikaların temsilcileri) Türkiye’de bilgilendirme ve benzeri bir oluşumu şekillendirme girişiminde olmuşlardır (Uysal, 2008). Ayrıca, Nisan 2004’de, Eylül 2005’te, Aralık 2007’de ASF-Hazırlık Toplantıları İstanbul’da gerçekleşmiştir. Örneğin, 2005’teki toplantıya 34 ülkeden 450 civarı delege (100’den fazla Avrupalı örgütün ve 60 dolayında Türkiyeli örgütü temsilcisi) katılmıştır (Haug vd, 2009:27). Bu şekilde Avrupalı hareketlerle doğrudan temaslar kurulabilmiştir.

Ancak ortodoks solun, anarşist temelleri olan yeni toplumsal hareketleri bir tür karnaval olarak görüp siyaseten dışlaması, Türkiye sınırlarında da yoğun bir destek görmüş, dolayısıyla Sosyal Forum süreci başlangıçta yeterli ilgiyi görmemiştir. Ancak İstanbul Sosyal Forumu’nun, 2005’te Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (DİSK) ve Kamu Emekçileri Sendikaları Konfederasyonu’nun (KESK) çağrısı ile Türkiye Sosyal Forumu’na (TSF) evrilmesiyle birlikte süreç ileri bir adıma taşınmıştır. TSF’nin ASF ilkelerine yakın biçimde, üyelikleri değil katılımcıları olduğunu belirten Şensever (2005:75-76), sürece doğrudan katkıda bulunan yapıların söz sahibi olduğu bir yapı kurarak çalışma grupları aracılığı ile küreselleşme sürecine dair politikaların oluşturulması, bu politikaların yaygınlaştırılması; bir eylem ve etkinliğe dönüşmesi açısından olanaklar yaratılmasının hedeflendiğini belirtmiştir. TSF organizasyonu ile Atina ve Malmö’deki ASF’ye yoğun bir katılım gerçekleştiren Türkiyeli aktivistler, 2010’da Forum’un Türkiye’ye taşınmasını da sağlamışlardır. Ancak 2005’ten 2010’a kadar geçen sürede TSF’nin gücünü koruyamadığı ve 2010 ASF’nin örgütlenmesinde de başarısız olduğu söylenebilir. Geleneksel sol örgütlerin kurduğu ittifaklar ve platformlara duyulan güvensizlik karşısında daha kapsayıcı ve yeni bir siyaset ve birliktelik hedefindeki TSF’nin, eski kurumsal engelleri ve sol içi politik tartışmaları aşamadığı görülmektedir.

Dolayısıyla çeviri sıkıntısının yanı sıra, sürecin öncesinde bazı grupların dışlanması ve uzaklaştırılması ASF İstanbul’un bir Forum mantığıyla örgütlenmesini engelledi. Hazırlık sürecinde Türkiyeli sol gruplar arasındaki tartışmalar bu durumun temel nedeni oldu. Hükümetin darbe karşıtlığı ve demokratikleşme adı altında yürüttüğü kimi politikaları destekleyen Küresel Barış ve Adalet Koalisyonu (Küresel BAK) ve Devrimci Sosyalist İşçi Partisi (DSİP) gibi gruplar ile iktidarın demokrasi hedefiyle bu politikaları yürütmediğini savunan diğer sol gruplar arasındaki mesafe, özellikle referandum sürecinde açılmıştır. Küresel BAK ve DSİP’in “yetmez ama evet” tavrı ile hükümete kerhen destek verirken, diğer tarafta DİSK ve KESK gibi sendikalar, Türkiye Mühendis Mimar Odaları Birliği (TMMOB) gibi meslek odaları Halkevleri gibi dernekler ve Türkiye Komünist Partisi (TKP) ve Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi (ÖDP) öncülüğünde “hayır” cephesi oluşmuştur. Bu süreçte Kürt siyasal hareketi de boykot kararı ile “hayır”a yakın bir çizgi

izlemiştir. Dolayısıyla iktidar partisinin çizdiği demokrasi çerçevesi, sol grupların buna karşı aldığı mesafe, Sosyal Forum'da bir araya gelmeye çalışan kesimleri etkilemiştir. Süreçten çekilenler Küresel BAK ve DSİP gibi daha önceki Forumlarda daha çok yer alan kesimlerken, sendika ve diğer dernekler yeterli maddi desteği sunamazken tabanlarını da bu sürece yönlendirememişlerdir.

Daha önceki Forumlarda da yer alan Yeni Yol aktivisti Fırat Genç (2010), İstanbul'daki Forum sırasında yapılan söyleşide “(forum) birkaç ufak grubun inisiyatifiyle yürüyor. Büyük kurumların bu işin gerektirdiği meblağları ödemeyi kabul etmemesinden kaynaklanıyor. Aynı çözümlerle geçiştirmeye çalıştılar” görüşünü dile getirmiştir. Daha önce Atina'daki foruma katılmış olan Uluslararası Af Örgütü aktivisti Yeşim Yaprak Yıldız da (2010) İstanbul'daki organizasyonun başarısızlığını forumu organize edenlerle ve onların diğer oluşumlarla işbirliği yapmaya ne kadar istekli olduğu ile ilgili olduğunu belirterek, “Türkiye’de Forum’u organize edenler farklı grupları dahil edememişler. Aslında her yerde bir grup domine ediyor. Atina’da savaş karşıtı hareketin görünürlüğü daha fazlaydı. (...) seminerlerin, stantların olduğu yer hepsi aynı mekandaydı. Bir araya gelip bir şeyler planladığı bir networking alanı gibiydi. İnsanların bir araya geleceği mekanlar yok. Burada karşılaşma ve tartışma ortamı yok. Buradaki temel sorun her yerin birbirinden ayrı olması. Organizasyondaki insanlar katılımcılara neyin ne olduğunu açıklamıyor” şeklinde görüş belirtmiştir. Bu ifadelerden yola çıkarak, İstanbul'daki Forum'un önceki forumların sıkıntılarını aşmak bir yana, yeni sorunlar ürettiği söylenebilir.

Forum'da, ASF'nin geleceğine dair tartışmalarda hareketin içinde olduğu kriz sıkça dile getirildi. Örneğin Norveçli sendikacı Wohl (2010) konuşmasında ASF'yi bireysel aktivistlerin faaliyetlerinden çıkarıp gerçek bir harekete çevirmekten bahsederken Belçikalı aktivist Mestrum (2010), ASF'nin benzer kıtasal forumların etkisine göre geride kaldığını vurguladı. Mestrum, benzer tarihlerde gerçekleştirilen Amerika Sosyal Forumu ile karşılaştırdığı ASF'nin yeni bir politik kültür geliştirmek açısından başarısız olduğunu söyledi. Bu iki farklı bakış açısı, “gerçek bir harekete dönüşmek” ile “yeni bir kültür geliştirmek”, Forum’a yaklaşımları göstermek açısından önemlidir. ASF'nin geleceği var olan hareketlerin gerçekliği ile hedeflenen yenilik arasındaki gerilimde gizlidir. Öte yandan Forum'un geleceğine dair önerilerde ayrıca Doğu Avrupalı hareketlerle işbirliğine önem verilmesi ve gelecek Forum'un Doğu Avrupa şehirlerinden birinde yapılmasına dair de görüşler ifade edildi. Forum'un ana konuları arasında ekonomik kriz, Filistin ve Kürt halklarının mücadelesi olduğu için sonuç metninde Ortadoğu halklarıyla dayanışma ve savaş karşıtı vurguyla birlikte “krize karşı Avrupa’da ortak hareket” vurgusu öne çıkarıldı. Forum'un son günü yapılan kapanış yürüyüşü, katılımcıların bir arada bulunduğu nadir anlardan biriydi ve katılımın düşüklüğü bu yürüyüşte net bir şekilde ortaya çıktı. Daha önceki Forumlarda 10binlere çıkan sayı, İstanbul'da 2-3 bin kişi civarındaydı.

ASF adıyla düzenlenen son organizasyon olarak 2010 İstanbul, her ne kadar ortak hareketin önemini ön plana çıkarmak istese de, uygulamada bu talebi gerçekleştirememiş ve taban hareketleriyle kurumsal siyaset arasındaki bağın net şekilde koptuğunun göstergesi olmuştur. Forum katılımcılarının da gözlemlerinde belirttiği gibi, hareketler arası ağ kuracak bir zemin yaratılamamış ve Forum'un öncesiyle sonrası arasında bir süreklilik sağlanamamıştır. Bu durum da Forum'un siyasi bir aktör olarak belirgin bir konum almasını zorlaştırmaktadır. 2010 sonrası süreçte krizin derinleşmesiyle ve kurumsal siyasetin parti ve sendikalar düzeyinde bu duruma net cevap üretememeleri, taban hareketlerinin, yatay eksenli toplumsal hareketlerin önemini artırmıştır. Özellikle Yunanistan ve İspanya'daki gösteriler, Öfkeli ve İşgal Et hareketleriyle hareketleri siyasal gücü bir kez daha kendini göstermiştir.

10. yılında ASF: yeni arayışlar

ASF'nin toplumsal hareketler ve diğer muhalif örgütler arası işbirliği ve koordinasyonu güçlendirmesi, yerel sorunlarla bölgesel ve kıtasal sorunları birbirine ekleyebilmesi açısından 10 yılda önemli adımlar attığını söylemek mümkündür. Bu adımlar sayesinde hareketler ortak eylem günleri düzenlemiş, kendi gündemlerini birbiriyle eşleştirmiş ve sorunların Avrupalılaştırılması ile muhalif seslerin daha güçlü ifade edilmesi için fırsatlar yaratmıştır; özetle “başka bir Avrupa”yı kurmak için adımlar atılmıştır (Della Porta, 2009b; Della Porta-Caiani, 2009). Ancak bu süreç içerisinde, eski-yeni çatışmasının da yeniden gözler önüne serildiği bir teorik olarak dile getirilen kriz karşı ortak hareket söyleminin pratik düzeyde de işleyebilmesi için, eski kurumsal aidiyetler ve dikey hiyerarşik yapılar ile anarşizm etkilenimli ve doğrudan eyleme odaklı hareketler arasındaki çekişme, ASF'nin etkili olma yollarını tıkamaktadır. ASF'nin bir kurum olarak işlemesi düşüncesi son Forumlar'da ağır basarken bu durumun yeni hiyerarşiler yaratacağı çekincesi de ifade edilmektedir. ASF'nin hazırlık sürecinde “destekçi” olan büyük sendikalar ve ağlar, on yıl içerisinde “belirleyici” güç haline gelmeye başlamışlardır. Tabii ki bu durumda krize karşı ortak hareket etme ihtiyacının ve Avrupa çapında sosyal, kültürel, ekolojik ve kültürel durumların gün geçtikçe kötüleşmesinin etkisi büyüktür. Özellikle Fransa, İspanya ve Yunanistan gibi ülkelerde siyasi görünümü etkileyecek derecede ortaya konan tepkiler, eylemler ve uzun süreli grevler, Avrupa'da toplumsal hareket tabanının genişlediğini ortaya koyarken, bu hareketliliğin anlamlı bir sonuç üretebilmesi için ortak zeminlerin yaratılması ihtiyacı da aynı derecede geçerliliğini korumaktadır. Yerel sınırlar içinde kalmayıp Avrupa'yı dönüştürmek hedefindeki bir perspektifin bu tür toplantılara halen ihtiyacı bulunmaktadır. Ancak bu zeminin ASF adıyla ilerlemesi şimdilik zor görünmektedir. Örneğin Charter for Another Europe projesinin Ekim 2010'da yaptığı toplantıda ASF'nin çok zayıf bir durumda olduğu ancak onun Avrupa kamusal alanının birliğini simgeleyen tek oluşum

olduğu vurgulanmıştır¹. Son birkaç yıl içerisinde çeşitli toplumsal hareket oluşumları kendi aralarında yaptıkları toplantılar ve ortak eylemlerle, Forum ruhunu yeniden canlandırmaya çalışmaktadır. Benzer şekilde ASF'nin 10. Yılında yeniden Floransa'da toplanan hareketler, bundan sonraki sürecin nasıl şekilleneceği konusunda görüş alışverişinde bulunmuşlardır.

Firenze 10+10 adıyla 10-12 Kasım 2012 günlerinde düzenlenen toplantılarda 28 ülkeden, 300 civarı ağ ve yaklaşık 4 bin katılımcı yer alırken sonuç metninde onların kemersizliğine karşı bizim demokrasimiz sloganı öne çıkmıştır. Kriz karşıtı mücadeleyi destekleyecek sürekli bir Avrupa hareketi yaratmanın önemini vurgulayan metin, bu hareketin yakınlaşma ile merkezleşmeyi aynı anda sağlaması gerektiğinin altını çizmiştir². Bu doğrultuda ilki 14 Kasım'daki grev olmak üzere 2012 ve 2013 içinde ortak eylem günlerinin takvimi ortaya çıkarılmıştır. 14 Kasım grevi, Avrupa çapında hayata geçen ilk ortak grev olarak kayıtlara geçti ve önemli bir destek gördü.

Floransa'daki toplantı öncesinde yapılan duyurular ve çağrılarda, bunun yeni bir ASF olmadığı, amacın ASF'nin 10. yılını kutlamaktan çok daha öte olduğunu ifade edilmişti. Buna göre, geçen 10 yıldaki başarıların üstüne koyup, eksikleri giderme yönünde bir irade görülmektedir. Yerel hareketlerin Avrupa nezdinde mücadelesi, onların yerel düzeydeki zayıflıklarının da üstesinden gelmenin bir yoludur. Bir Avrupa hareketinin parçası olarak işleyen daha küçük hareketler, yeni bir ortaklaşma yaratma adına daha büyük bir çerçevenin içinde faaliyetlerini anlamlandırabilirler. Ancak Mestrum'un (2012) belirttiği gibi farklılıklar ve ayrımlar üzerinde sessiz kalmak ve bu farkları görmezden gelerek ortak bir tutum geliştirmek hareketi güçlendirmemektedir.

Hareketlerin, yaşanan sorunlar üzerinde söz söyleme ve politika belirleme gayreti devam etmektedir. Bu durum, mücadelenin yeni biçimlerde sürdürülmek istendiğinin göstergesidir. Floransa'daki toplantılar öncesinde, farklı oluşumlar benzer içerikte toplantılar düzenlemişlerdi. Bu toplantılarda farklı ülkelerden siyasi parti, sendika ve hareketler bir araya geldi. Bunlardan biri Malmö'deki ASF'nin ardından sendikalar ve hareketler arası işbirliğini geliştirmek için kurulan Joint Social Conference³ (Ortak Sosyal Konferans) idi. Bir çoğu ASF'nin de örgütleyicilerinden olan Konferans'ın 29-30 Mart 2012'de düzenlediği Sosyal Bahar Kongresi'nde "demokrasiyi yeniden kazanalım" sloganıyla 5 aciliyet alanı belirlendi. Vergi ve para politikaları, borçların ödenmesi konusunda alternatiflerin geliştirilmesi eksenindeki öneriler, Avrupa Birliği ekonomi politikalarında yerel düzeyde daha çok demokratik kontrol, ticaret ve finansal düzenlemelerin kontrol edilmesi, sosyal haklar ve kamusal yatırımların desteklenmesi konusunda hükümetlere baskı yapılmasına dayanmaktaydı. Önerilerin sosyal demokratik bir dönüşüme daha yakın olduğu

¹ <http://openfsm.net/projects/esf-assembly-in-paris-22nd-24th-october-2010/blog/2010/11/03/1-charter-for-another-europe-paris-october-22nd-2010-by-franco-russo/>, erişim: 03.11.2010

² <http://www.firenze1010.eu>

³ <http://www.jointsocialconference.eu>

ve kimi hareketlerin talep ettiği radikallikte olmadığı söylenebilir. 28 Haziran 2012’de gerçekleşen Another Road For Europe⁴ (Avrupa için Başka Bir Yol) forumu da Avrupa’daki kriz üzerine toplumsal hareketlerin, sendikaların, akademisyenlerin ve diğer kesimlerin işbirliğini geliştirmeye yönelik bir girişimdi. Forum sonrası yayınlanan çağrı metnini Samir Amin, Seyla Benhabib, Chantal Mouffe, Zygmunt Bauman gibi isimler de imzaladı. Metinde, daha küçük finans, daha bütünleşik ekonomi politikaları, daha fazla iş ve çalışma hakkı-daha az eşitsizlik, çevreyi korumak, demokrasiyi işler hale getirmek, barışı ve insan haklarını yerleştirmek başlıklarıyla 6 hedef vurgulandı. Metinde, temsili demokrasinin talepleri daha az karşıladığı ve ASF’den öfkeliilere uzanan demokrasi taleplerinin kurumsal bir karşılık bulmaya ihtiyacı olduğunun altı çizildi. Benzer şekilde, İngiltere merkezli Coalition of Resistance⁵ (Direniş Koalisyonu) ve onun öncülüğünde bir araya gelen Europe Against Austerity (Kemer Sıkma’ya Karşı Avrupa), eski İşçi Partili siyasetçi Tony Benn öncülüğünde Muhafazakar Demokrat hükümete karşı refah devleti uygulamalarını savunmak amaçlı bir oluşum olarak geniş katılımlı toplantılar düzenledi. Bu toplantıların sonuncusu 20 Ekim 2012’de gerçekleşti.

Son ASF’den bu yana ortaya çıkan kriz karşıtı eylemler, en çok Öfkeliiler ve İşgal Et eylemlerinde sembolize oldu. İspanya’da başlayıp Avrupa’nın farklı şehirlerine, ardından ABD’ye yayılan bu eylemler, öncelikle otoriter sistemlere karşı başkaldıran Arap halklarından esinlendi. Tunus, Mısır gibi ülkelerde yıllardır süren otoriter yönetimler, ekonomik krizlerin etkisiyle isyan noktasına gelen halkın tabandan örgütlenen hareketi neticesinde el değiştirdi. Bu hareketlerin uluslararası dengelerin de etkisiyle kısa sürede farklı bölgelerin gündemlerine gelmesi kaçınılmazdı. Demokrasinin sadece seçim sistemleri ve temsili süreçlerle sınırlı kalmaması gerektiği ve karar-alma süreçlerinde daha fazla müdahale hakkı isteyen bireylerin Arap isyanlarından etkilenmemesi mümkün değildi. Neticede, yukarıdan alınan kararlarla, küresel sermayenin gereklerine uygun olarak işletilen politikalar, Avrupa başta olmak üzere pek çok ülkede halkın sokaklara dökülmesine neden oldu ve sokaklar yeniden hareketlerin eylem alanı olarak belirdi. Böylece kurumsal siyasetin karşısında, kendi hayatına dair söz söylemek isteyen örgütlü ya da örgütsüz tüm kesimler, farklı meslek ve yaş gruplarından insanlar, taleplerini doğrudan eylem yoluyla dile getirmeye başladı. İspanya’daki “Gerçek Demokrasi Şimdi” sloganıyla meydanlarda toplanan insanlar, “öfkeliiler” olarak anılmaya başladı. Bu ifade, uygulanan her türlü politikaya karşı kızgınlığı ve şikayetleri birleştirdi. Hareket, ortak olan her şeyin ticarileşmesi karşısında bunların geri kazanılmasını talep etti. Ortak olanı sembolize eden sokaklar ve meydanlar bu talebin yükseldiği mekanlar oldu (Dhaliwal, 2012). Ortak olanı yeniden kurmak isteyen ve yerleşik sistemle çatışma içinde olan bu yaklaşım, toplumsal hareketin siyasal talepleri oluşturma gücünün de bir göstergesiydi. Yatay düzeyde karar-alma mekanizmalarını geliştirmek çabası, bu hareketin ön plana çıkan en önemli özelliğiydi ve karşı-küreselleşme sürecindeki demokratik değerlere vurgunun da

⁴ www.anotherroadforeurope.org/index.php/en/the-appeal

⁵ www.coalitionofresistance.org.uk

devamı niteliğindeydi (Maeckhelberg, 2012). Meydanları işgal etme düşüncesi, Arap isyanlarının başarısıyla birleşip farklı ülkelerde İşgal Et hareketinin öncüsü oldu (Castenada, 2012). Hareketler arasındaki bu bağlantı, farklı coğrafyalarda benzer tepkilerin yeni biçimlerde üretildiğinin göstergesiydi. Böylece Sosyal Forum'larla başlayıp Öfkeliiler, İşgal Et Hareketi ve Arap İsyanları üzerinden 2000'li yıllarda yeni toplumsal hareketlerin yeni bir hat geliştirdiği söylenebilir. Bu hat ortak olanı kurmak eyleminde toplumsal hareketlerin kurucu rolünü belirginleştirmektedir (Yıldırım, 2013).

Bu gelişmelerin önümüzdeki süreçte Sosyal Forum sürecine yeni perspektifler sunması muhtemeldir. Çünkü başlangıçta liberal demokratik sistemin, karar alma mekanizmaların ve finansal küreselleşmenin işlemeziği eleştirisiyle yola çıkan Sosyal Forum mantığı, taban inisiyatiflerine ve toplumsal hareketlere daha çok söz hakkı istiyordu. Gelişmeler karşısında aktif bir tutum almak isteyen hareketlerin yakınlaşma alanı (Routledge ve Cumbers, 2009) olarak Sosyal Forumlar, içlerinde farklı düşünceler ve çözüm önerileri taşısa da, temel olarak kapitalist sistemle çeşitli derecelerde uyumsuzluk içinde olan grupların birliğiydi. Geline nokta, pratik olarak Sosyal Forumların krize karşı net cevaplar üretememesi ancak bu yönde çabalarının devam etmesi, krize karşı bir tepki olarak doğan yeni eylemlerden etkilenecektir. Öfkeliiler ve İşgal Et eylemlerinde taban hareketlerinin gücü, örgütsüz kesimlerin bir arada oluşu öne çıkmıştır. Daha önce eylemlere katılmayan, aktivist özelliği göstermeyen pek çok kişi bu hareketlerde tepkisini ortaya koymuştur. Bu eylemler, her türlü elitizme, dikey hiyerarşiye, politikayı ve ekonomiyi teknikleştirmeye çalışan uzmanlaşmaya karşı "sıradan insanların" sözlerini duyurma çabasıydı. Bu eylemler çerçevesinde çeşitli metinlerde dile getirilen talepler, biz sıradan insanlar tanımlamasıyla başlamaktaydı. Buna benzer bir süreci Sosyal Forum'un ortaya çıktığı küreselleşme-karşıtı hareketin içinde de gözlemlemek mümkündür. Orada da gençler başta olmak üzere farklı kesimler ilk kez sistemi bu kadar güçlü protesto etmiştir. Dolayısıyla, Öfkeliiler ve İşgal Et girişimlerini iyi analiz etmek, Sosyal Forum paydaşları için önemlidir. Ayrıca bu hareketlerin gücünü çoğaltmak için Sosyal Forum benzeri yakınlaşma alanlarının önemi önümüzdeki günlerde daha da artacaktır.

Sendika ve partilerin siyasal etkisine daha çok girmeye başlayana ASF'nin, işgal Et ve Öfkeliiler hareketlerinin anti-kurumsal eleştirisini dikkate alması gerekir. Burada eyleme geçen gençlerin pek çoğu daha önce eylemlere katılmamış, kendisini doğrudan bir siyasal çizgiye ait hissetmeyen ancak sistemin işleyişinden mutsuz, özetle liberal demokrasinin meşruiyet krizini yansıtan kişilerdir. Bu kesimlerin, kendilerini temsil edilmiyor hissi onları harekete yönlendiren temel motivasyondur. Bu eski yapıların içinde temsil edilemeyecek taleplerin çokluğu, kendini kurmaya çalışmaktadır (Hardt ve Negri, 2012: 50). Dolayısıyla "bir bilenin" yönlendirdiği, uzmanlaşmış siyasete karşı, her şeyi bildiğini iddia etmeyen ancak kendi deneyimlerinden öğrenen kesimlerin bir arayışı söz konusudur. Siyaseti, bilenlerin ve katı teorik çerçevelerin içinde algılayanlara karşı yaparak öğrenmenin, eylemin ve karşı-çıkışın temel alındığı bu arayış kendi sözüne sahip çıkma çabasıdır. Hareketlerin önemini artıran bu eylemler, Sosyal Forum benzeri yapılarda bir araya gelebilmektedirler. Ancak bu

Forumların ASF İstanbul biçimiyle örgütlenmesi, yeni arayışların önünde engel oluşturacaktır. Yeni bir örgütlülük, Arap isyanları ve İşgal Et hareketlerinde görüldüğü gibi tabanın üretici enerjisini açığa çıkaracak iletişim kanallarını kullanarak sağlanabilir. Hareketlerin tetikleyeceği beklenen “devrim” tam da bu taban mücadelelerinin gücüne bağlıdır.

Sonuç

Küreselleşme karşıtı hareketin DSF’ye ve oradan da kıtasal Forumlara evrilmesi ile birlikte, karşıtlık eksenini alternatif arayışları ve kurucu güce dönüştü. Alternatif ya da karşı-küreselleşme hareketi, tüm farklılıkları, kapsayıcılığı, bölünmüşlüğüne rağmen yeni bir siyaset arayışı içindeki kesimleri ifade ediyordu. Söz konusu yeniliğin temelinde devletin ve siyasal iktidarın değişiminden ziyade kendi hayat alanını genişletici doğrudan eylemlere odaklanmak vardı. Yeni siyaset, ekonomik ve kültürel mücadelelerin kesiştiği bir siyasal alanda, karşılıklı etkileşimin şekillendirdiği bir kamusal çerçevesinde örgütlenmek istendi. Bu süreçte karar-alma mekanizmalarında daha çok yer alarak bu mekanizmaları dönüştürmek isteyen toplumsal hareketler, mücadeleyi farklı derecelerde örgütlemeyi başardı; daha önce herhangi bir harekette ya da örgütsel siyasette yer almamış kesimler bu sürecin içinde kendilerini ifade edebildiler. Yeni siyasetin bir hedefi de eski kurumsal siyasetin geleneksel yollarını değiştirmektir. Forum süreci böyle bir perspektifte, açık alan ve müzakere kavramlarını temel alarak hayata geçti. Forum süreci, kendini bir hareket ve ucu açık bir süreç şeklinde tanımladığı için yönlendirici olmaktan ziyade hareketlerin yönlendirmesine açık olduğunu ortaya koydu. Bu durum, farklı bölgelerdeki Forumlarda farklı perspektiflerin ortaya konmasını sağladı. Bu bir yandan olumlu bir yandan olumsuz bir gelişme oldu; hareketin çeşitliliği onun üretici kapasitesini ilerletirken DSF yerel ayakları tarafından tanınmama noktasına kadar geldi. DSF ilkelerinde vurgulanan siyasi parti ve örgütlerle mesafe, bir çok ülkede geçersiz kaldı. Hatta DSF’nin doğduğu Latin Amerika’da dahi muhalif liderlerin kazandığı başkanlıklar neticesinde, Bolivya, Venezuela, Brezilya gibi ülkelerde siyasi liderler konuşmacı oldu. Keza 2004 yılında Londra’da gerçekleştirilen ASF’de SWP, hazırlık sürecinin ve Forum’un bütününde belirleyici rol oynadı. Forum ilkelerinden “sapma”nın temelinde sol ve sosyalist mücadelenin sivil toplum eliyle, hareketlerin çeşitliliğiyle bir taban hareketi olarak götürmek yönündeki bakış açısının görece liberal bulunması ve Forum’u daha devrimci bir çizgiye çekmek düşüncesi vardı.

ASF özelinde, DSF’nin yataylık ve açık alan stratejisi ilk forumlarda kendini hissettirse de Forum gündeminin ekonomik krizlere cevap üretme eksenine kaymasıyla birlikte, ortodoks solun etkisi belirginleşti. Forumların hazırlık süreçlerinin etkili biçimde işletilmesindeki aksaklıklar, asıl hedef olan Avrupa kamusalı yerine yerel sorunların ve örgütlerin belirleyici olmaya başlaması, Forum’un örgütlenmesinde belirli kesimlerin etkisinin artması ve sendika-siyasi parti temsilcilerinin görünürlüğünün belirginleşmesi ile ASF, başlangıçtaki hedefinden farklı bir noktaya evrildi. Özellikle 2010 yılında İstanbul’da gerçekleştirilen ASF, hem katılımın azlığı hem hareketler arası işbirliği ve

eklemlenme alanlarının işletilememesi ile en sönük forum olarak öne çıktı. Bir taban hareketi olarak ASF ile sendika ve kurumlararası işbirliği olarak ASF arasındaki ayrım İstanbul'da netleşmiştir. Bunda Türkiye solunun işbirliği yapma pratiğinin çok düşük olması kadar yerli ve yabancı katılımcılar arasında bir uyum, etkileşim ya da yeni bir eklemlenme yaratılamamasının da etkisi vardır. Dolayısıyla zaten kötü giden ASF süreci, İstanbul'da kendi sınırlarına ulaşmıştır.

Buna rağmen, Forum mantığını oluşturan bir araya gelme ve ortak bir muhalif cephe oluşturma talebinin vurgulanması, bir açıdan önemliydi. Çünkü 2010 sonrasında bu vurgunun devam ettirilmesi adına önemli girişimler oldu. Yine Forum'un ortak eylem kararları, ekonomik krizlerin belirginleştirdiği demokrasi açığının vurgulanması ve tabanın karar alma süreçlerine daha çok sahibi olması taleplerini ortaya koydu. Bu eylemler, yerel ve kıtasal çaptaki sorunların tek bir bakış açısıyla çözülemeyeceğinin, bunların birbirini etkilediğinin ve piyasanın tek güç olarak kabul edilemeyeceğinin altını çizdi. Böylece yerel olandan çıkıp Avrupa çapında bir muhalif birlik oluşturma gereği göz ardı edilmedi. Temel sorun, yeni nesil muhalefetin geniş tabana yayılması için kurumların "öncü" rolünün yeterli olmadığı; gündelik hayattan doğan taleplerin ve sıradan insanın bu eylemlerde rol almasının sağlanmasıdır.

2010'un ardından ASF adıyla yeni bir Forum örgütlenmedi. 2012 Kasım'ında, Forum'un 10. Yılı nedeniyle İtalya-Floransa'daki Firenze 10+10 toplantısı, Avrupa çapındaki işbirliği ruhunu hayatta tutma konusunda bir adım oldu. 2010-2012 sürecinde benzer oluşumlar, hareketler, sendikalar ve diğer sivil toplum örgütleri arasındaki ortak eylem pratiğini canlı tutmaya çalıştı. Bu girişimler, ASF'nin geliştirdiği Avrupa hareketi kavramını devam ettirebilmek için önemli araçlardı. Avrupa birliği'nin yaşadığı aidiyet ve meşruiyet krizlerine karşı, Avrupalı hareketlerin yeni bir sosyal birlik hedefiyle bu taleplerine ve girişimlerine devam etmesi önemlidir. Ancak eylemlerin, sadece sendikalar üzerinden değil, kurum-hareket birlikteliğini ve etkileşimini sağlayacak zeminlerde, bir öncülük rolü olmadan yürütülmesi gerekir.

Her ne kadar hareketin yataylık vurgusu zarar görmüş olsa da 2010-2012 arasında gelişen kriz karşıtı protestolar ve özellikle Öfkeli hareketi tabanın hala önemli bir unsur olduğunu ve geleneksel siyasetle bağının onarılamadığının göstergesidir. Ardından gelişen İşgal Et eylemleri, hareketin anarşist temellerinin canlı olduğunu ve "sıradan insanın" taleplerinin duyulması için doğrudan eylemin önemini ortaya koymuştur. Kurumların hareketlerin taleplerine ve tabanın karar alma süreçlerindeki etkisine açık olması, yeni bir siyasetin eskinin daha ileri taşınarak geliştirilmesini sağlayacağı için önemlidir.

Sokak eylemlerinin ve işgallerinin, yani doğrudan müdahalenin ve hiyerarşi karşıtı bakış açısının halen canlı olması, Forum'un bundan sonraki işleyişinin nasıl olması gerektiğini işaret etmektedir. Bu bağlamda, Avrupa'nın sınırlarında, İstanbul'da yolun sonuna gelmiş gibi görünen ASF'nin kendi alanını genişletmek için yeni bir bakış açısına ihtiyaç duyduğu söylenebilir. Bu bakış açısı kurumsal siyasetin klasik aktörlerinin hatasına düşmeden, kendi hayatına dair söz söylemek talebindeki taban hareketlerini yeniden bir araya

getirmek yönünde olmalıdır. Bu bir araya gelişler, kurumların işleyişini de etkileyecektir.

Doğrudan eylemin öneminin arttığı yakın zamanlı eylemlerde görüldüğü gibi Sosyal Forum benzeri oluşumlar, talep ettikleri köklü değişimler kadar katılımcılarının yaşamlarında söz sahibi olmaya olanak tanıyacak pratikleri geliştirmelidir. Bunun için yataylığın yeniden bir değer olarak öne çıkarılıp, Hazırlık Toplantısı gibi var olan kanalları daha etkin kullanarak, Forumları bir konferans ya da paneller bütünü olmaktan çıkarmak gereklidir. DSF'nin ASF'ye göre yoluna devam etmekte daha başarılı olmasının nedeni, yerel ile küresel arasındaki bağı bu katılımcı kanallarla sağlamaya çalışmasındandır. Tarihsel olarak çeşitli toplumsal dönüşümlere ve devrimlere öncülük etmiş Avrupalı mücadele geleneğinin bundan sonra da ayakta kalabilmesi için yeni yüzyılın dinamiklerine uygun şekilde bu kurumsal engelleri aşması gereklidir. Bunun için ekonomik talepler dizgesinden önce, vatandaşların kendi yaşamlarına sahip çıkacak alanlar yaratmanın daha önemli olduğu söylenebilir. Son söz olarak, Forum'un açık alan mantığının yeni siyasetin örgütlenmesinde karşılıklı etkileşimi ve modern siyasetin sınırlarını aşmak açısından hala önemli bir potansiyel taşıdığını söylemek mümkündür.

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Yazar hakkında

Nidge Üniversitesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası ilişkiler Bölümü

Yavuz82 AT gmail.com

Breaking through the 'invisible prison': the National Federation of the Blind and the right to organize, 1959

Amy M. Lane

Abstract

In 1959, the US-based National Federation of the Blind (NFB) attempted to enact civil rights legislation for the blind and challenged the institutional authority of professional services for the blind¹. The organization sought to create a change in national policy and the discourses of blindness. The NFB seized hold of an opening window of political opportunity during the civil rights movement. However, the broader cultural environment was not ready to extend the rights of full citizenship to people who are blind.

While the NFB's attempt to enact civil rights legislation for the blind at the national level was not successful, several states enacted legislation guaranteeing the right of the blind to organize on their behalf. Further, these actions began a shift in the language and discourse of blindness in the US. The NFB successfully began to redefine blindness based on the real capabilities of blind people, countering the assumption that blindness is disabling.

Introduction

The National Federation of the Blind (NFB) is a US-based organization of blind people composed of over seven hundred local chapters that became a pioneer of rights-based legislation for disability-centered organizations. In 1959, the NFB sought to enact civil rights legislation for the blind. From its beginning, NFB members have been trained to lobby for progressive policies for the blind. One of its early endeavors was a campaign that led to a hearing on proposed legislation, the Kennedy-Baring bill (HR 14), brought to the table by then

¹ This article uses the language preferred by the National Federation of the Blind rather than "people-first" language to honor the practices and ongoing social action of the organization. People-first language argues that the use of "people who are blind/visually impaired" rather than the use of "blind people" or "the blind" places the person ahead of the disability. The NFB, however, continues to maintain the position that blindness is nothing of which to be ashamed and prefer to be identified as "the blind" and "blind people." During the 1993 NFB convention, the organization passed a resolution against people-first language stating, "BE IT RESOLVED by the National Federation of the Blind in Convention assembled in the city of Dallas, Texas, this 9th day of July, 1993, that the following statement of policy be adopted: We believe that it is respectable to be blind, and although we have no particular pride in the fact of our blindness, neither do we have any shame in it. To the extent that euphemisms are used to convey any other concept or image, we deplore such use. We can make our own way in the world on equal terms with others, and we intend to do it" (Jernigan 2009, n.p.). Also see Vaughan (2009) for further discussion. Samples of recent presidential speeches and current issues of the *Braille Monitor* can be accessed on the Website of the National Federation of the Blind.

senator John F. Kennedy and representative Walter Baring. The purpose of the bill was to "protect the right of the blind to self-expression through organizations of the blind" (US Congress 1959: 2). Administrators of services for the blind were interfering with NFB organizing in several states. Though HR 14 did not make it past the subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor, "the organized blind movement came to be granted a kind of tacit legitimacy by the agencies of the blindness system" (Matson 1990: 93).

A study of the organized blind movement in 1959 has implications for understanding the history of disability-based rights and the boundaries of contentious politics. Social movement scholars Tilly and Tarrow (2007) describe contentious politics as the convergence of contention, collective action and politics. Contentious action involves making claims that will have an impact on others' interests. Contentious politics is employed when individuals come together to raise claims that will hold others, groups or government officials accountable, especially in the field of politics.

Analyses of the disability rights movement assume that disability-centered groups were not active in contentious politics until the 1970s when people who are deaf and people with physical or mental impairments began to stage protests that eventually led to the adoption of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act and the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (Barnartt and Scotch 2001; Groch 2001; Shapiro 1993). However, this paper raises awareness of the early contentious politics engaged by the NFB, by analyzing the institutional, cultural, and political contexts in which the NFB pushed for civil rights for the blind and asserted an identity based on an understanding of blindness as nothing more than an inconvenience.

In its efforts to enact civil rights legislation for the blind, the NFB was located within a particular institutional context referred to as the "blindness system" (Vaughan 1993). The blindness system was composed of agencies focused on rehabilitation and services. This system placed limitations on the extent to which blind persons were able to exercise autonomy. Asserting professional status, blindness agencies controlled public perceptions of the meaning and limitations of blindness throughout the early-to-mid twentieth century. As a result, the NFB asserted an identity based on the notion that blindness is nothing more than an "inconvenience" and fought to gain control over the training and services which were provided for the blind at the time. The NFB challenged the authority of professionals in the blindness system and governmental legislation for the blind. The 1959 actions of the NFB can thus be defined as contentious politics, thereby setting the stage for future disability-centered protests.

Research methods

In order to track and analyse the changing strategy of the NFB, primary and secondary historical documents were organized, coded, and analyzed using qualitative research software.

The initial stages of research focused only on the 1959 issues of the NFB's *Braille Monitor*. The *Monitor*, the NFB's monthly publication, is one of the main sources for exploring the historical foundation of the NFB. It is rich with stories that give a sense of the organized blind movement, locally and nationally. The philosophy of the movement is embodied in this publication (Colvert 2000; Lane 2002). The cultural heritage of an organization is often passed on through stories and narratives, sustaining a collective sense of an organization's culture (Coffey and Atkinson 1996). The narratives told in the *Monitor* not only express movement identity and philosophy, they also illuminate the late-1950s context by describing the actions of blindness agencies and broader cultural understandings of the meaning of blindness.

I next worked outward to collect primary and secondary material that made reference to the NFB's actions by conducting a comprehensive media and literature search which uncovered a handful of news media stories, government documents, and secondary historical and sociological accounts of the NFB's actions. This material deepened the analysis as source material either supportive, in opposition to, or indifferent to the efforts of the organized blind.

This paper is a piece of a larger project which looks more deeply into the NFB's identity and organizational strategies in the political and cultural context of the United States in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Institutional context: the 'blindness system'

The NFB was formed by blind leaders from seven US states in 1940. They designated the organization as one *of* the blind, not *for* the blind. This rhetorical distinction was meant to assert an identity based on individual and organizational autonomy in a context of extensive poverty and little control in the lives of blind people. The poverty and unemployment rates for the blind in the US far exceeded those rates on the national level. Some blind workers were paid as little as five cents per hour (Matson 1990). Though countless were capable of "normal" professions, based on a history of negative attitudes toward the blind, organizations and schools for the blind maintained that their occupations should focus on menial tasks. In a testimony before a US House Subcommittee on Education and Labor in 1959, the NFB founder Dr. Jacobus tenBroek said the "traditional system" of work for the blind was characterized by,

(1) concern for vested interests distinct from the interests of the blind, (2) a philosophy of custodialism that impedes the efforts of the blind to attain self-support and economic independence, (3) defeatism and conservatism, both of which would continue the customs and limitations of the past from which the blind are striving to emancipate themselves. (US Congress 1959: 504)

Dr. tenBroek's argument served as the foundation for opposition between the NFB and "blindness system" organizations throughout the NFB's early history. Early on, the NFB particularly targeted the American Foundation for the Blind (AFB), the American Association of Workers for the Blind (AAWB), and the American Association of Instructors for the Blind (AAIB).

The professionalization of work for the blind meant increased bureaucratic control over the lives of blind people and the images of blindness portrayed to the public (Vaughan 1993). Helping professionals claimed work for the blind as a specialized activity, thereby gaining a monopoly on knowledge about blindness. The "facts" portrayed by the blindness system began to be accepted by the public as the reality of blindness by virtue of the legitimacy ascribed to professionals. Edelman (1984) argues that the lay public's acceptance of the perspective of professionals is "politically crucial" because it "confers power upon professionals and legitimizes their norms for society generally" (53). Professionals come to be relied upon by policy makers. Consequently, those not designated as *professional* are taken less seriously, if listened to at all, in the policy-making process.

The American Association of Instructors for the Blind was created in 1853 and formally organized in 1871. It was a "cohesive" and "exclusive" group, with a membership limited to educators of the blind (Ferguson 2001: 67). They formulated educational policies and legislation. The public looked to the AAIB for "counsel and leadership" on matters concerning the blind (ibid.). The American Association of Workers for the Blind can be traced to 1895 with the establishment of the Missouri National College Association for the Blind. This was a group of graduates from the Missouri School for the Blind who were interested in higher education opportunities for the blind. In 1896, they admitted graduates from other schools for the blind and became the American Blind People's Higher Education and General Improvement Association (ABPHE and GIA). Their organization was originally established as a group *of* the blind, not *for* the blind (Ferguson 2001: 67; Matson 1990: 6). By 1905, they had changed their name to the American Association of Workers for the Blind and opened their membership to anyone in work for the blind. At this point, they were no longer an organization *of* the blind.

The reasons for this change are contested. Koestler (1976: 15) wrote that "By 1905, the group was ready to admit the failure of its efforts to interest federal or state officials in financing" programs that advocated colleges for the blind and government scholarship programs. According to Koestler, the ABPHE and GIA simply changed their philosophy by targeting "general improvement" for the blind and went from a restricted membership to an open-membership (Koestler 1976: 15). Importantly, Koestler's work is copyrighted by the professional organization, the AFB. Ferguson (2001) and Matson (1990), whose work was published by the NFB, tell a story of a co-optation.

Ferguson wrote that there was opposition to the ABPHE and GIA within the blindness system. Richard French, principal of the California School for the Blind criticized the ABPHE and GIA, writing that it "...at first confined its

membership to the blind and declared war, covert and overt on the [AAIB], then [became] a purely institutional organization" (Ferguson 2001: 68). Even after changing their name and philosophy in 1905, French wrote that the AAWB still "constituted itself the merciless but not altogether undiscerning critic of all that was representative of the older institutionalism" (ibid.). Matson (1990: 6) wrote that the ABPHE and GIA changed their name, philosophy and membership standards when in 1903, several school administrators appeared at their convention, uninvited, and proceeded to rule the floor. As these authors assert, one of the earliest American organizations of the blind was successfully co-opted by members of the blindness system.

By 28 June 1921 the American Foundation for the Blind (AFB) was established at a biennial convention of the AAWB in Vinton, Iowa. Prior to the meeting, the president of the AAWB had already set forth a proposal for the formation of the AFB and had gathered support from numerous professionals in the blindness field including members of the AAIB (Ferguson 2001: 70). H. Randolph Latimer, the AAWB president, "representing a powerful group of professionals, was not interested in having conference participants discuss the issue [which had previously been the rule]. He was only looking for the group to put their stamp of approval on the proposal" (Ferguson 2001: 70). According to Ferguson (2001: 76-7),

What seems evident is that the rise of the [AFB] reflected the climate of the time [i.e. a faith in bureaucracy]. Furthermore, the residential school directors, although still entrenched as the power elite, surely must have seen the breaches forming in the wall [There was a trend at the time to incorporate blind children into public schools]. It appears that the AFB was to be a means by which the elite could broaden their influence and keep the reins of control in their hands. Thus, there were more than purely altruistic motives when the AAIB supported the establishment of a national organization for the blind.

There were many hurdles faced by the blind in the 1920s. Koestler (1976) suggested that these circumstances led to the formation of the AFB. The AFB raised several questions including: how best to educate the blind; how to create and circulate Braille books; through what means could blind literacy best be increased; how could the blind be helped to earn a living wage; how could technological devices be developed and circulated to aid the blind; and how could attitudes – both of the public and of the blind – be changed (Koestler 1976: 8-10). Koestler (1976) saw the AFB as "a pivotal national body that could serve as a storehouse of available knowledge, a coordinator of existing efforts, a generator of new ideas and directions, and a voice that could make itself heard in the corridors of power" (10).

The first president of the AFB, Moses Charles Migel, was a millionaire silk manufacturer. From 1921 to 1945, he poured a large sum of money into the AFB and ran it like a business (Ferguson 2001: 78-9). With access to such extensive resources, the AFB was able to make progress in "research, resources, [and]

services" for the blind, but not in "representation" (Matson 1990: 7). Some of the AFB's research served only to reinforce negative stereotypes about the blind. For example, in 1931, Charles Cutsforth, a psychologist working with AFB funding, argued,

...if a blind person manifests the position that blindness is merely an inconvenience, one can be assured he or she is disturbed. On the other hand, if they give up and retreat they are abnormal. The conclusion is that blind people are not and cannot be normal. (Quoted in Ferguson 2001: 82)

Prior to 1940, the AFB and the AAWB, from Matson's (1990) perspective, "resembled nothing so much as a colonial regime of the nineteenth-century variety imposed, with benevolent purpose and some constructive effort, upon a dependent and inarticulate people" (7). Similarly, Ferguson (2001) argued that in the AFB policies and research initiatives, "...there were no efforts to champion programs to help the blind to be independent, fully equal and participating members of society" (81). Enmeshed in an institutional context of professional services for the blind, the organized blind movement sought to grab hold of civil rights through legislative means. From the perspective of the NFB in 1959, this was the only means to break free from external control over individual and collective life.

Campaigning for support and the logic behind HR 14

The 1959 hearings on HR14 were the climax of a two-year campaign for the right of the blind to organize and to be consulted on policy decisions. By the end of 1956, according to tenBroek, it was clear that attacks on the NFB by agencies were "concerted and orchestrated" (Matson 1990: 62). In a number of reported cases, blind workers in state-run employment programs were being fired or threatened with dismissal if they joined the NFB. Confidential records of NFB members receiving public aid were opened and exploited by state agencies in the offending states. Citing these examples, the NFB believed the right of the blind to organize, to speak, and to be heard was being violated (Matson 1990: 73-4).

This sentiment reached beyond the leadership and into the hearts of local constituents. This kind of harassment led one NFB member to comment, "If armed men terrorize a community and put voters in such fear that they do not dare go to the polls, one would scarcely argue that they have the right to vote..." (Taylor 1959: 5). Dr. tenBroek argued that the need for self-expression is "indispensable to life" and consequently he considered self-expression a "natural right" (tenBroek 1959: 2). He further believed that the blindness system created an "invisible prison" for the blind, arguing that many blindness workers operated on the principal of "paternalistic custodialism." The combination of these perspectives and evidence of open and covert repression of

blind people's freedom of association provided the foundation for the development of HR 14.

Responding to these concerns, Senator John F. Kennedy and Representative Walter Baring introduced the first right to organize bills in 1957. Kennedy said that his bill was "designed simply to prevent the thoughtless, needless and unjust rejection of the views of the blind and their organizations when policies vitally affecting them are formulated" (quoted in Card 1959b: 52). In support, Congressman Thomas J. Lane of Massachusetts submitted a statement to the *Congressional Record* discussing the success of consulting with the organized blind, as had been done in Massachusetts. Congressman Lane wrote,

In some parts of the United States, the right of the blind to join this organization has been questioned. Officials of agencies created for the sole purpose of serving the blind, and financed in part by Federal funds have used their position to intimidate, coerce and threaten blind persons who have joined the [NFB]. (from the *Congressional Record*, quoted in the Card 1959b: 3)

Between the fall of 1957 and the spring of 1959, local and national-level NFB members campaigned vigorously for support of HR 14. In Washington, DC, national-level NFB activists John Taylor and John Nagle attempted to interview as many senators and representatives as possible. They requested help from state and local affiliates of the NFB, stressing the importance of letter writing and petitions. Kennedy publicly announced his support of HR 14 on 16 February 1959. The *New York Times* noted that Kennedy and thirty-one other Senators were sponsoring this legislation and that the right of the blind to "promote their own viewpoints in dealing with Government agencies" was being denied (UPI 1959: 19). State-based rights to organize bills were being introduced up until the time of the hearings in March, 1959.

NFB historian Floyd Matson provided extensive coverage of the hearings on HR 14. He wrote that the advent of the hearings was "One of the two or three most significant events in the entire history of work for the blind in this country and an episode of crucial importance for the organized blind themselves" (Matson 1959: 1). The hearings not only addressed the right to organize bills; several bills were introduced by opponents of HR 14 calling for a "national advisory commission to study the problems of blindness" (Matson 1959: 4). The NFB argued that the two types of bills were not incompatible and therefore should not have been proposed as mutually exclusive.

The hearings were held in early March 1959. Over five days, those present were shifted from room to room, often in cramped conditions. Matson (1959) wrote, "...far from dampening the spirits of the participants, these quick changes and crowded conditions served rather to create an atmosphere of intimacy and to underline the plain determination of the committee to give full scope to the hearings regardless of any inconvenience" (4). During the hearings, tenBroek

delivered the main body of the testimony and submitted an extensive, written volume of information on the status of the blind in 1959.

Twenty-five members of the NFB testified in support of HR 14. Eleven members of Congress gave testimony at the hearings and more than a dozen submitted written testimonies. Organizational support included: the Jewish Braille Institute, the Associated Blind of New York, the Blind Professional Association, the National Association of the Physically Handicapped, Inc. Gloria Swanson also appeared to give testimony. Those who testified made a "visibly profound and sympathetic" impression upon the committee (Matson 1959: 6).

The NFB argued that because the Constitution of the United States is not a self-executing document, legislation is often required to enforce general provisions in the First and Fourteenth Amendments. While the right to organize is guaranteed by the Constitution, the blind were faced with attacks by state officials when they sought to join the NFB. These attacks created the need to seek redress through national legislation. HR 14 opponents actually denied that any such intimidation had occurred. One person testifying against HR 14 said, "We have not, however, found anything to resemble a unified movement designed to inhibit the growth and development of organizations of blind persons" (US Congress 1959: 246).

The executive director of the Texas State Commission for the Blind wrote a letter to the president of the Houston Chapter of the Texas Federation of the Blind. This letter was to be read at the opening of a meeting held by the Houston Chapter, which was considering formal affiliation with the NFB. The director wrote, "We do not need any national organization to tell Texas how to run its program... If you want to wreck the work for the blind in this state, then you follow the recommendations [of the NFB]" (US Congress 1959: 585). While this letter did not openly deny blind persons the right to join the NFB, the state agency took a clear stand against NFB organizing in Texas. Blind people from Texas testified that state officials threatened to fire operators of vending stands, a typical occupation for the blind in that state, if they joined the NFB. Twenty-nine blind people in Amarillo were threatened with loss of their pensions and talking books for considering NFB affiliation. The Texas Commission for the Blind told a number of blind individuals, "You do not have a right as ordinary citizens to associate with people from out of State" (US Congress 1959: 202).

In Colorado, the director of the state agency for the blind submitted a letter to the Governor of Colorado condemning the NFB. Seventeen workers in a blind sheltered workshop were forced to sign his letter. The president of the Colorado Federation of the Blind said that even though these workers signed the letter, several of them secretly continued their affiliation with the Colorado Federation. They said they would have been dismissed from their jobs had they not signed the letter (US Congress 1959: 587). A number of similar instances were reported during the hearings as having occurred in North Carolina, Florida, Arkansas, Mississippi, Kentucky and West Virginia.

The NFB also argued that,

The right of representative citizen groups to be consulted in the formulation and execution of policies affecting their interests is securely established in democratic theory and administrative practice... [the] organized blind [ask to] be included in the process of systematic consultation. (Matson 1959: 10)

They emphasized that the right to consultation did not exclude other groups, such as agencies *for* the blind or other organizations *of* the blind. However, the *Monitor* quoted a statement made by an AFB representative that was printed in the AFB's *Legislative Bulletin*. The representative said that "'The AFB continues to regard HR 14 and similar proposed legislation as extraneous issues which would serve to compound existing problems rather than to resolve them...'" (Card 1959: 51). The AFB believed problems would be compounded because they understood HR 14 to be exclusionary despite the NFB's emphasis on inclusion. The opposition continued to stick to their opinion that HR 14 was exclusionary even after hearing testimonies from NFB members. Dr. tenBroek said,

The blind individually and through their organizations are seeking, above all else, a means to social and economic integration on a basis of equality with other persons. For blind individuals, this means simply that they are seeking a way to earn a living, to become taxpayers rather than tax-users, to be independent of charity and public assistance. *Blind aid programs and rehabilitation services are essential to this goal. If this goal of the organized blind is to be achieved, it will only be with the help of assistance and rehabilitation services* [emphasis added]. (US Congress 1959: 455)

In the end, the Elliott subcommittee decided to conduct a sweeping study of services for the blind. The *Monitor* noted,

In view of the May 22nd announcement, we must also face up to the possibility that the Subcommittee may very well postpone any recommendation with respect to our 'Right to Organize' bills until its own investigation has been completed which will probably mean a delay until the next session. (Card 1959: 2)

The right to organize bill was not reintroduced at the national level. Lowenfeld (1975) wrote that even though HR 14 was not passed, it "served as a warning to those guilty of obstructing the blind person's right to organize and be heard" (238). "Little Kennedy Bills" were proposed in a number of states and passed by several (Matson 1990: 93). The first state to adopt a right to organize bill was Pennsylvania, despite being opposed by the state agency every step of the way. Matson (1990) wrote the objectives of HR 14,

...came to be at least partially achieved in practice where they were not formally granted by law. Like the trade union movement a generation before, the organized blind movement came to be granted a kind of tacit legitimacy by the agencies of the blindness system. (93)

Discussion

Part of understanding the ongoing process of a social movement is considering the response of the opposition (McAdam [1982] 1999: 52-3). Non-institutional means, like protests and boycotts, tend to be more threatening to the opposition, generating a greater response than institutional means, like lobbying and pushing for legislation (McAdam [1982] 1999: 57). HR 14 opponents clearly felt threatened by the bill and mustered their forces against the NFB. While Barnartt and Scotch (2001: xxi) argue the actions of the NFB do not fall into the realm of contentious politics because its main tactic has been lobbying, context and opposition responses must be considered when describing particular actions as contentious. The historical and cultural location of the NFB's push for the right to organize places its actions squarely within the realm of contentious politics because its claims were viewed as threatening to the interests of professionals in the blindness system.

According to agency logic, blind people were considered second-class citizens without the same rights as "ordinary citizens." Agencies for the blind expected the blind and the public to treat them as professionals with knowledge to which other groups were not privy. Agencies for the blind considered the NFB's claim for the right to organize and the right to consultation a direct threat to their rights to professional knowledge. They therefore reacted against HR 14 with vigor. The reaction of the opposition defines the NFB's action as contentious given blind people's location within the blindness system. Because they had vested interests in maintaining control of the blindness system, agencies appealed to the Constitution and states' rights to thwart the civil rights bill of the blind. As Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) assert, "What counts as disruptive will thus depend on the rules of 'doing business' in any given institution" (92).

Cultural context

Johnson ([1983] 1999: 26) claimed that the main thrust of legislation for disabled groups prior to the 1973 Vocational Rehabilitation Act (PL 93-112) was not concerned with civil rights, but with vocational rehabilitation for GIs. Similarly, Barnartt and Scotch (2001: 35) wrote that it has been difficult for disabled groups to apply a civil rights frame to their own movements because access to equal facilities could only be gained through modifications to those facilities. The NFB, however, has maintained the position that blind people do not require environmental alterations, making the civil rights frame more easily

adapted to the organized blind movement. Their emphasis on "sameness" with the dominant population is according to Bernstein (1997) the deployment of a particular identity strategy that has the ability to tackle both cultural and instrumental goals. While claiming likeness with another oppressed group who sought likeness with the dominant US population, the NFB attempted to mobilize its strong organizational base and its ties to important political figures.

According to Kenneth Jernigan (1991), former NFB president, the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act focus on the issue of *accommodation* for people with disabilities. The NFB, instead, works to uphold the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which states that race, sex, national origin or religion should not stand in the way of equal opportunity. For example, blind people reported to the NFB that they were required to sit in handicap seating on public buses. Regarding this claim, Jernigan (1991) asserted, "Some may regard disputes about seating as quibbling, but Rosa Parks and others brought the entire civil rights movement to a national focus by exactly this type of issue" (n.p.).

When the rights of the blind to organize and speak for their interests were being denied and challenged, the NFB proposed a solution to the problem that was consistent with civil rights activity at the time. According to Ferguson (2001: 113), the blind were dealing with some of the same issues and struggles as blacks in the US. Jernigan (n.d.: 27 and 29) captured this idea when he wrote,

One could say, for instance, that a black man living in the United States in 1920 (or, perhaps even much later) might have been rich or poor, old or young, Methodist or atheist, intelligent or stupid, and that he, therefore, really had nothing in common with other blacks; but beyond all of these differences was the fact of society's attitudes toward him and his own attitude toward himself – attitudes which he had absorbed from the larger society. Overshadowing almost every other factor in his life (whether economic, social, or intellectual) was the fact of his blackness and the reactions to it...As it is with the blacks, so it is with the blind.

Unfortunately, the cultural climate at the time was not ready to receive the demand for equal rights from the blind. For example, despite the variety of supporters, the *New York Times* described HR 14 as a battle between *tenBroek* and agencies serving the blind. The opening line of one article stated, "Agencies serving the blind marshaled their forces today against a blind California college professor who demands that the blind lead the blind" (Furman 1959: 26). Dr. tenBroek's position as a college professor in California was mentioned prior to his presidency of the NFB. The NFB was only cited once in this *Times* article. Three-quarters of the article was devoted to describing the opposition's position on HR 14. The article attacked tenBroek's character and emphasized that the bill was "unnecessary and self-serving" (Furman 1959: 26). That HR 14 was an initiative driven by the organized blind movement was not considered. The bill was referred to as *tenBroek's* bill and the NFB as *his* organization. A de-

emphasis upon the organized blind movement made HR 14 appear to be simply the opinion of one man.

Political context

Just as the institutional and cultural contexts encouraged and limited the NFB's push for civil rights legislation for the blind, the political context similarly provided a contradictory landscape; seemingly open to such legislation, but closed off by national-level political maneuvering. With the 1957 death of Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy, who had led an anti-liberalism, anti-communism crusade (Diggins 1988),

...there was a sense of relief, a rediscovery of old values, a healing, and a resurgence of liberalism...[leading] to reform and to advances in the cause of individual civil rights, in the courts, in the political make-up of Congress and in the views of many of the citizenry. (Treanor 1993: 28-30)

Growing liberalism was evidenced by the passage of the 1957 Civil Rights Act. The Senate pushed a strong civil rights bill, but President Eisenhower supported only the minor provisions. In his January 9th State of the Union address, Eisenhower said that he would support a bill reinforcing freedom from discrimination in employment, voting and public legislation, but his primary message was balancing the budget (Gordon 1966: 32). However, the 1957 bill did little to address "job discrimination, access to public accommodations, and school desegregation" (Diggins 1988: 284). When asked in 1957 if he would urge Republicans to break a "Southern filibuster which was blocking a civil rights proposal," Eisenhower replied that it was not his place to interfere with the decisions of Congress (Gordon 1966: 38-9). Though the 1957 Civil Rights Act was mild, Patterson (1996) pointed out that the bill gave some people hope. The NFB was inspired by this rising tide of support for civil rights and began to get to work on its own civil rights proposal.

In 1958, the nation began to move out of a recession, which bolstered popular support of the President, strengthening his political power to limit the interests of the Democratically-controlled Congress, one of which was to further civil rights legislation. Gordon (1966) suggested "the basic conservatism of the President, reinforced by prevailing conservatism in the country, was as important in enabling Eisenhower to dominate the Democratic Congress, as was his personal power to mold public opinion" (88). If the Democratic Congress was able to accomplish very little as the *Times* and Gordon (1966) argued, the legislative void would have surely had an effect upon the NFB's right to organize bills.

The 1957-1959 political contexts illuminate compounding factors faced by the organized blind. Not only did they encounter agency opposition, they pushed for civil rights legislation in an unsympathetic political climate. Armstrong and

Bernstein (2008: 76) point out that when a group confronts domination by multiple institutions, the challenge becomes especially difficult. Unfortunately, after 1959 the NFB was consumed by internal strife and would not recover for a few years². Had they been able to reintroduce their right to organize bill, as it seems they were planning, perhaps it could have been passed during the Kennedy or Johnson administrations, when the civil rights movement was reaching a climax.

Conclusion

In attempting to enact civil rights legislation for the blind, the NFB challenged the institutional authority of the blindness system and sought to create a change in policy that was meant to represent blind people as "normal" citizens. They seized hold of what looked like an opening window of political opportunity historically situated in the civil rights movement. The NFB's actions were therefore cut off by the power of blindness agencies to influence state actors and the public. Despite support from other local agencies *of* the blind and from several members of Congress, the broader cultural discourse favored professionalism and scientific knowledge. This position was exemplified by the Committee's decision to instead fund a study on the condition of blind people in the US conducted by agencies *for* the blind.

One of the NFB's major weapons against the blindness system, however, was the recognition that the custodial care of agencies was largely a result of being able to sustain negative images about blindness. The NFB therefore began a new discourse on blindness. They sought to redefine blindness based on the real capabilities of blind people to counter the assumption that blindness is disabling. The NFB understood what Foucault (1984) asserted years later when he wrote that "discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination but is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized" (110). It is important, therefore, to include this early engagement of contentious politics within the broader framework of disability-centered movements. Though failed, the NFB's actions were an attempt to drive a wedge between elements of an interlocking system of oppression by engaging a new discourse on blindness and by seeking the right to be consulted on policies and practices affecting their own lives.

² A faction within the NFB developed during this time period resulting in a splinter group which came to be the American Council of the Blind. Much of the conflict centered around movement philosophy, tactics, and personality conflicts. The NFB's identity claims are especially evident during this conflict. Despite floundering for a few years, both the NFB and the ACB became strong organizations of the blind with slightly different philosophies and tactics (Lane 2002).

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About the author

Amy Lane is a visiting assistant professor of sociology at Kalamazoo College in Michigan. Her research is concerned with the lived experience of social inequalities and the ways social change organizations seek to impact the structural and cultural environments in which they are embedded. She is passionate about teaching sociology and has co-authored two papers with students from Kalamazoo College that address issues of religious tolerance and socio-economic diversity and inclusion on college campuses in the US. She can be contacted at alane AT kzoo.edu

Reflexiones sobre la institucionalización del movimiento LGTB desde el contexto catalán y español

Patricia Aljama y Joan Pujol

Resumen

Desde los más de 40 años de existencia y más de 30 desde que se legalizó la primera asociación, el colectivo LGTB español ha conseguido tanto la derogación como la aprobación de leyes que reconocen los derechos de los que carecían estos colectivos. Los logros en el ámbito legal-institucional y la proximidad a las instituciones políticas de los sectores más reformistas del movimiento LGTB plantean la situación, conveniencia y repercusiones de la institucionalización del movimiento LGTB, al ser ésta una crítica habitual vertida sobre el colectivo LGTB.

Este artículo explora las perspectivas teóricas alrededor del concepto de “institucionalización” con el objetivo de realizar una lectura teórica del debate. En este sentido, se identifican las siguientes dimensiones: definición legal de los colectivos como agentes políticos; incorporación institucional de las demandas de los colectivos; dependencia económica; cooptación de las categorías identitarias; participación institucional; y mimetismo organizacional respecto a las instituciones gubernamentales. Esta lectura permite entender la institucionalización no tanto como una posición dentro de un campo social sino como un proceso constante de dimensiones múltiples que dificulta una categorización simple de los colectivos en términos de “institucionalizados”.

Palabras clave: institucionalización, LGTB, movimientos sociales, política

Contexto del movimiento LGTB en el estado español

La *Ley de vagos y maleantes*, incorporada al código penal español el año 1933 fue modificada en el año 1954, durante la dictadura franquista, para incluir a los homosexuales en su ámbito de aplicación. La represión derivada de la aplicación de la ley fomentó, al igual que los hechos ocurridos en Nueva York en 1969, la emergencia de un movimiento LGTB en el estado español. Esta ley fue sustituida en 1970 por *La ley sobre peligrosidad y rehabilitación social* que, junto a la de “escándalo público” sirvió para el control y represión de la homosexualidad. En 1970, con miras de conseguir una reforma del anteproyecto, Armand de Fluvià i Francesc Francino, escribieron una carta a todos los obispos procuradores en Cortes para que presentasen mociones contra el proyecto legislativo, dándose a conocer esta primera acción reivindicativa en todo el estado español (Mirabet 1984, 2000). Dos años más tarde, se inicia la publicación clandestina de un boletín mensual, AGHOIS (Agrupación Homosexual para la Igualdad Sexual) y se dio nombre al primer grupo de liberación sexual en España, el MELH (Movimiento Español de Liberación

Homosexual), que se reunía clandestinamente en Barcelona. Este grupo llegó a implantarse en Madrid pero la presión policial hizo que se desarticulase, volviéndose a reactivar años más tarde, con la muerte de Franco.

España inicia un proceso de transición política en 1975 tras la muerte del general Franco. En Cataluña, aparece el Institut Lambda, en 1976, como escisión del MELH y este último pasa a llamarse FAGC (Front d'Alliberament Gai de Catalunya) y se extiende a Baleares y Valencia. En 1977 nace en Bilbao el EHGAM (Euskal Herriko Gay Askapen Mugimendua), en Madrid el FHAR (Frente Homosexual de Acción Revolucionaria), el MDH y el Mercurio. En Aragón el FAGI, AM y MH, y en Galicia el FLH. Este mismo año, todos estos grupos constituyen la COFLHEE (Coordinadora de Frentes de Liberación Homosexual del Estado Español), y se realizan actos públicos en contra de la LPRS. También se celebra la primera manifestación estatal del orgullo gay en Barcelona, que arplegó entre unas 4000 y 6000 personas. El número de colectivos continuó aumentando, creándose en 1978 el primer grupo mixto en Madrid, el FLHOC (Frente de Liberación Homosexual de Castilla), del cual surgió un colectivo de lesbianas en 1981, el CFLM (Colectivo de Feministas Lesbianas de Madrid), junto con otros colectivos como ESAM de Euskadi y el GLAL (Grup de Lesbianes per a l'Alliberament Lesbià) en Cataluña. Finalmente, los grupos transexuales comenzaron a surgir a finales de los 70, principios de los 80, formándose la Pluma en Cataluña en 1979 y a nivel estatal, Transexualia, en 1987. La actividad de los movimientos sociales conlleva la transformación de aspectos legales y sociales relacionados con el colectivo LGTB: se suprime la homosexualidad de la lista de peligrosos sociales; se legaliza la primera agrupación LGTB (el FAGC); se modifica la ley sobre el escándalo público que había cerrado bares de ambiente durante el Mundial de Fútbol en 1982; y se despenaliza la cirugía transexual, la cual era considerada un delito.

El SIDA se convierte a mediados de los 80 en un elemento movilizador del colectivo LGTB que lleva a campañas preventivas, como la campaña "Póntelo, pónselo". También se denuncia la homofobia resultante de la pandemia y la vinculación de la enfermedad con la homosexualidad, como si se tratase de una enfermedad de grupos desfavorecidos: homosexuales, yonkis y trabajadoras del sexo. La falta de campañas informativas por parte de las instituciones responsables sobre las vías de transmisión del virus y las formas de evitarla provocaron en los diferentes colectivos la creación de fanzines y carteles con lemas reivindicativos como el de la Radical Gai "Limpia las chutas con lejía. Protégete del SIDA", "Ponte un condón. Si no...olvidalo. El SIDA mata a las mujeres" (Grupo de Trabajo Queer 2005) o el del FAGC "Estima com vulguis" (Rodríguez y Pujol 2008). Sin embargo, las primeras colaboraciones que mantenían algunos colectivos con las instituciones públicas y los locales de ambiente para hacer frente al SIDA, y las diferentes visiones que mantenían los colectivos respecto a la pandemia, hizo que se acentuasen las diferencias de contenido ideológico, marco de modelo social y de perspectivas de lucha, identificándose dos posturas: aquellos que luchaban por la erradicación y autoayuda en relación a la pandemia, y los que huían de la identificación, apostando por un cambio global y uniéndose a la lucha de otros movimientos

(Corcuera 2012). Esto provocó la escisión de varios colectivos importantes como el FAGC en Cataluña, el EHGM en el País Vasco y el COGAM en Madrid. En cambio, en otros países las asociaciones reivindicativas de los 70 habían moderado sus planteamientos políticos, estando dispuestas a colaborar sobre estas cuestiones con las instituciones públicas (Coll 2006). A nivel de colectivos se consolidan diversas coordinadoras estatales como la Coordinadora de Frentes de Liberación Homosexual del Estado Español (COFLHEE), en el año 1985, que agrupaba al sector más reivindicativo, y que fue perdiendo protagonismo debido a la consolidación de la Federación Estatal de Gays, Lesbianas y Transexuales (FELGT) en el 1992 por el sector menos ideológico, disolviéndose en 1994. En Cataluña, en el 1989, se creó la Coordinadora Gay-Lesbiana (CGL) con dos ejes principales de trabajo: la lucha contra el sida y la demanda de igualdad legal. También se creó la Comissió Unitària 28J (CU28J) en 1988, impulsada por el FAGC, para organizar los actos del día de la liberación LGTB.

En los años 90 empiezan a emerger locales y comercios de ambiente, creándose zonas “de ambiente” dentro de las grandes ciudades (Chueca en Madrid y el Eixample en Barcelona) al mismo tiempo que proliferan agresiones homófobas como el asesinato de la transexual Sonia en la Plaza de la Ciutadella de Barcelona o la elaboración de fichas policiales a personas homosexuales en Sitges. Dentro del movimiento LGTB surge el debate sobre si las actividades de los movimientos sociales deberían dirigirse a apoyar a personas LGTB o a fomentar un cambio social, llevando a la especialización de los colectivos más dirigidos a la transformación política o al desarrollo de servicios asistenciales. Como respuesta a esta disección comienza a emerger el activismo queer, procedente de los Estados Unidos. En Cataluña, aparece el grupo “Act Up” en 1991, y en Madrid el LSD y la Radical Gai. Este activismo, vinculado al movimiento okupa, utiliza estrategias de confrontación y performance para hacer llegar sus mensajes (Coll 2006), quedando el movimiento dividido en 3 grandes líneas de pensamiento, aún vigentes, según un estudio elaborado por el Ajuntament de Barcelona. Estas líneas son las siguientes (Coll 2006, 2009; Ajuntament de Barcelona 2009):

- Normalización: integración del colectivo LGTB, presionando a las instituciones políticas para conseguir la igualdad legal, tal y como establece la Constitución (Calvo y Trujillo 2011). Propone el desarrollo de un proceso de interlocución entre el movimiento y las instituciones públicas. Desarrolla estrategias políticas basadas en la lucha contra la homofobia (Ajuntament de Barcelona 2009).

- Transformación: estos colectivos abogan un cambio social más amplio. La discriminación se define por parámetros de tipo estructural, existiendo una relación directa con los elementos culturales, económicos y de organización social imperante en nuestra sociedad. La estrategia está dirigida a acciones de carácter proactivo con una visión crítica a los mecanismos municipales existentes (Ajuntament de Barcelona 2009, p. 7-8). No aceptan el sistema tal y como está sino que ha de ser transformado o bien, pueden vivir al margen de la sociedad. Tal y como dice el autor “[...] *integración con condiciones: la*

transformación de elementos centrales del llamado “sistema heteropatriarcal”” (Coll 2009, p. 132). Desarrollan una relación de colaboración y de conflicto con las instituciones públicas, desarrollando estrategias basadas en acciones políticas de tipo libertario.

- Activismo queer: plantea discursos de influencia transformadora que cuestiona el sistema heteropatriarcal, cuestiona los binomios (hombre/mujer, homo/hetero); y se resiste a la normalización del hecho homosexual. Se oponen a la existencia de límites excluyentes ya que la propia demanda de libertad puede conllevar dominación. La relación con las instituciones públicas es de conflicto o inexistente, manteniendo *“una lógica de trabajo que combina la reflexión (a través de planteamiento trans/intersexuales) con una acción social y de denuncia, con una crítica a la segregación que padecen las personas lesbianas, transexuales e intersexuales dentro de las políticas y el asociacionismo LGTB”* (Ajuntament de Barcelona 2009, p. 8).

Durante la década de los 90 se formaliza la Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos (LAU, 1994) en la que se aprueban las parejas de hecho independientemente del sexo de los miembros y, en 1995, la homofobia pasa a ser delito tras la reforma del Código Penal. Sin embargo, estas leyes no cubren otras demandas presentadas por los colectivos como el matrimonio, temas de herencia, adopciones... Estos avances legales llegan años más tarde de manos del gobierno del PSOE que incluye el derecho al matrimonio para personas del mismo sexo en su programa electoral. La aprobación de la ley del matrimonio homosexual (2005) trae consigo la obtención de otros derechos como la adopción conjunta, la herencia y las pensiones (Corcuera 2012). Sin embargo, el matrimonio no tenía la aprobación de todos los ciudadanos. Días antes a su aprobación se produjo en Madrid una manifestación multitudinaria en defensa de la familia, en la que participaron el PP y la iglesia católica. Al mismo tiempo, se organizó en Barcelona una manifestación espontánea a favor del matrimonio entre personas homosexuales (Coll 2006).

Con la llegada del matrimonio homosexual y el intento de legalizar la situación de los/as transexuales con la ley de identidad de género, aprobada en 2007, hay un descenso de la movilización social ya que los sectores organizados alrededor de la igualdad de derechos perciben que “está todo hecho”. Sin embargo, este reconocimiento destapa *la carencia de otras libertades* (las lagunas sociales que vive el colectivo LGTB):

- Se impone la institución matrimonial y médica para ser legales. Es decir, para que las personas homosexuales puedan acceder a derechos de viudedad, pensiones, derechos laborales y adopciones han de estar legalmente casadas (Corcuera 2012). En el caso de las transexuales, para poder cambiar su nombre y sexo en el DNI han de reconocerse como enfermas y hormonarse durante dos años. Aquí vemos el peso que pasan a tener las instituciones en las vidas del colectivo LGTB.

- La ley de identidad de género excluye a las personas menores e inmigrantes, no trata temas de promoción laboral e inserción social, e impide el

traslado en prisiones si la persona transexual no se ha sometido a la cirugía de reasignación de sexo. En este caso, la ley no protege al colectivo transexual más vulnerable y con menos recursos.

- Falta de cobertura médica gratuita por la que han de pasar las personas transexuales para ser legales y el tratamiento de reproducción asistida para las mujeres homosexuales. Sin embargo, esto no ocurre en todas las comunidades autónomas del estado español ya que por ejemplo Andalucía y Extremadura incluyen las operaciones de cambio de sexo en las prestaciones de la seguridad social.

- Por último, la indefensión legal que padece el colectivo LGTB en casos de abusos y agresiones, porque la homofobia se considera como un agravante pero no como la raíz de una agresión, y sobre la transfobia no se legisla.

La inclusión de las necesidades LGTB en el terreno político, la relación que mantienen los colectivos con los diferentes partidos y la gestión de programas para los cuales reciben dinero público, abren el debate sobre la institucionalización del movimiento LGTB y los efectos que tiene sobre la movilización. Esta "institucionalización" es leída por parte de algunos de los colectivos en términos peyorativos. Por un lado, los cambios producidos en la sociedad civil han llevado a la rearticulación de las relaciones entre lo público, lo privado y lo estatal (Natalucci 2012), cambios que suponen la presencia de los movimientos sociales en el sistema institucional y la transformación de sus demandas en políticas públicas. Por otro lado, esta participación no es, por otra parte gratuita: puede suponer el abandono de las reivindicaciones de carácter más radical y transformador. Según este debate encontramos dos posturas contrapuestas: 1) que los avances legales no estancan el movimiento y que las subvenciones permiten que se continúe luchando por la sociedad que se desea, y 2) que los avances legales y las ayudas financieras coaptan, desmovilizan y despolitizan al movimiento LGTB. De este debate surge la creación de este artículo, donde se exploran las distintas comprensiones del concepto "institucionalización" y sus posibles consecuencias, aplicándolas al movimiento LGTB en general y aportando ejemplos localizados en Cataluña al hilo de nuestra militancia con el movimiento LGTB catalán.

Formas de institucionalización del movimiento LGTB

Inclusión en las formas de asociacionismo institucional

Una primera acepción del concepto de "institucionalización" tiene que ver con la aceptación del "juego político". En este sentido, la legalización de una asociación implica, en sí mismo, un primer nivel de institucionalización ya que una asociación debe pasar por un registro para que pueda constituirse como agente reconocido por el entramado gubernamental; legalización que implica la aceptación de unas reglas de organización interna y de determinado juego político (Corcuera 2012, p. 39). Hay que tener en cuenta "la obligatoriedad de registrar una asociación para tener acceso a subvenciones y ayudas públicas"

(Ruiz 2004, p. 144), lo que permite a las asociaciones recibir recursos económicos que permiten el mantenimiento de la asociación y el desarrollo de una actividad política de transformación social. En Cataluña, las asociaciones son personas jurídicas privadas constituidas por tres o más personas para conseguir, sin ánimo de lucro, un fin común que deben cumplir con unos ciertos requisitos organizativos como, por ejemplo, (a) la existencia de una asamblea general, que se reúne periódicamente y que constituye el órgano soberano de la asociación y de la que todas las socias; o (b) la existencia de una junta directiva que, como mínimo, estará compuesta por los cargos de presidencia, tesorería y secretaría. La Generalitat de Catalunya cuenta con un registro de asociaciones con alrededor de 60 asociaciones con temática LGTB. La vitalidad del movimiento puede apreciarse en la variedad de asociaciones inscritas como, por ejemplo, la "Asociación de Moteros Gays de España – AMGE", la "Gaylespol Asociación de Gays y Lesbianas Policías" o la "Associació Gay d'Òssos i Admiradors Bearssitges".

Incorporación de las demandas del movimiento en el sistema institucional

La incorporación en la agenda política de los movimientos sociales dentro del sistema jurídico-legal implicaría otro nivel de institucionalización (Rucht y Neidhart 2002), una institucionalización que, desde algunas perspectivas, se consideraría imprescindible: ningún cambio es posible sin nuevos compromisos políticos, sin el establecimiento de nuevos límites políticos, reglas y garantías que aseguren que estas necesidades se vuelvan "derechos" (Melucci 1996, p. 204). En tanto que el sistema legal de Cataluña depende en gran medida del desarrollado en el marco del Estado Español, podemos destacar el reconocimiento de derechos como el matrimonio homosexual o la posibilidad del cambio de nombre en el DNI para personas transexuales. A nivel de Cataluña, la reivindicación por el cambio de nombre de la glorieta "dels Músics", situada en el Parc de la Ciutadella de Barcelona, por el de la glorieta "de la Transsexual Sònia" fue aprobada el pasado 18 de marzo para conmemorar el asesinato de la transexual Sonia, ocurrido a finales de 1991¹.

Dependencia económica respecto de las instituciones gubernamentales

La dependencia económica con el sistema estatal señalaría otra dimensión de institucionalización (Ibarra y Grau 2008); una dependencia percibida habitualmente en términos negativos en tanto que moldearía la actividad política en función de los intereses de las agencias financiadoras. La institucionalización, en este caso, supondría la renuncia de la actividad más

¹ Se puede consultar por ejemplo http://w3.bcn.cat/V01/Serveis/Noticies/V01NoticiesLlistatNoticiesCtl/0,2138,1653_1802_1_1_928741716,00.html?accio=detall&home=HomeBCN para obtener más información.

reivindicativa y crítica para transformarse en una entidad prestadora de servicios coherentes con las necesidades gubernamentales del momento; una dimensión de la institucionalización que incide en la radicalidad de las acciones que se desarrollan (Ibarra y Grau 2008) y que puede llevar a transformar la actividad política en una prestación externalizada de servicios. Otra crítica a esta forma de institucionalización tiene que ver con la dificultad de las asociaciones emergentes para acceder a subvenciones dada la capacidad de las asociaciones que llevan funcionando más tiempo y más orientada a servicios (sociólogo y activista trans Miquel Missé en la entrevista realizada para IdemTV el 5 de marzo del 2013²). El Casal Lambda³ constituiría un ejemplo de asociación consolidada orientada a la prestación de servicios (asesoría jurídica, psicológica,...), institucionalización que se refleja en los logos institucionales que aparecen en su web. Si bien esta forma de institucionalización incide en la radicalidad política, permite la estabilización económica del tejido asociativo LGTB.

Coaptación de las categorías LGTB

El uso de las categorías LGTB por parte de organismos gubernamentales o comerciales constituiría otra forma de institucionalización en la que el potencial de la posición política se transforma en una dimensión identitaria que homogeneiza las diferencias (Ibarra y Grau 2008, p. 127). La convivencia entre poder político y económico facilita el proceso de homogeneización de las identidades políticas y de consumo, generalizándose a nivel mediático una imagen estereotipada del colectivo LGTB. En el apartado de "turismo" de la web del ayuntamiento de Barcelona se hace eco de los comercios y bares destinados a los colectivos lesbianos y gay, el barrio del "Gaixample", o los eventos promovidos por locales comerciales como el Pride de Barcelona⁴. La homogeneización de la identidad LGTB, asociándola a un modelo consumista y capitalista (Ajuntament de Barcelona 2009a), deja fuera a aquellas personas LGTB que no se ajustan al modelo consumista, no reconociéndose la existencia de un "ojo" y de un cuerpo diferente en el mundo, una forma diferente de ver, establecer y mantener las relaciones (Melucci 1996). De este modo, el acceso al mercado transforma el movimiento en un grupo de presión, segmentándolo, burocratizándolo y disipándolo (Melucci 1996, p. 140-141).

Este hecho queda reflejado en Cataluña en la celebración del 28 de junio, en la que se organizan dos actos paralelos. En una parte de la ciudad de Barcelona nos encontramos con una manifestación política, en la que las organizaciones crean sus propias carrozas para dar un toque más lúdico-festivo a la

² Para acceder a la entrevista consultar <http://www.idemtv.com/es/2013/03/05/entrevista-miquel-misse/>

³ <http://www.lambda.cat/index.php/qui-som.html>

⁴ Para más información puede consultarse la web http://w3.bcn.cat/turisme/0,4022,495525130_743555915_1,00.html

manifestación. Al final del recorrido, se realiza la lectura de un manifiesto en el que se reclaman los derechos y las libertades del colectivo LGTB. En otra parte de la ciudad tiene lugar una manifestación más festiva, con la presencia de carrozas de locales comerciales y empresarios, en la que participan otros colectivos menos reivindicativos y tratan cuestiones como la prevención del VIH mediante la distribución de preservativos entre los asistentes.

Participación institucional

Un reflejo más claro del proceso de institucionalización tiene que ver con la aproximación y/o integración de un movimiento social a otras formas de acción colectiva y a otras organizaciones sociales o políticas ya existentes (Kriesi 1996; Ibarra y Tejerina 1998; Jiménez 2003; Ruiz 2004). En este caso lo que se producen son formas de cooperación entre los movimientos sociales y las instituciones para desarrollar las demandas que persigue el movimiento, llegándose a unir a las estructuras institucionales (Giugni y Passy's 1998) o incorporándose al sistema (Ruiz 2004). Sin embargo, no todas las propuestas políticas tienen cabida en el sistema político o van a ser absorbidas por las instituciones. Esta elección está *“determinada por cómo el estado y los movimientos sociales se ven cada uno y por la extensión de qué percepciones son compartidas y estructuradas por las presiones externas, oportunidades, experiencias pasadas y estructuras institucionales”* (Kim 2005, p. 12). De esta manera, hay ciertas condiciones que van a facilitar la incorporación de las demandas de los movimientos sociales a los cauces institucionales. Se señalan, por ejemplo, la presencia de una estructura organizacional interna lo suficientemente centralizada para contar con interlocutores definidos; unos repertorios de acción de carácter más moderado y convencional; o plantear reivindicaciones que no entran en conflicto con los intereses de posiciones de poder (Kim 2005, p. 12-15). Estos aspectos señalan, en definitiva, que se aceptan las transformaciones que supongan una reforma que no transforme radicalmente el panorama político. A estos aspectos podemos añadir la existencia de un espacio político abierto, receptivo y eficiente para representar las demandas de los movimientos⁵.

Semejanzas formales con las instituciones gubernamentales

La participación en el juego político implica desarrollar una determinada estructura organizacional coherente con el marco legal en que la acción se desarrolla (McAdam, McCarthy y Zald 1999). Los movimientos sociales adquieren estructuralmente y organizativamente cierta semejanza con las formas organizativas y estructurales de los partidos políticos, por lo que se les

⁵ Hay que tener en cuenta que la institución política no ejecuta todas las acciones demandadas por los movimientos sociales, ya que si esto fuese así podríamos considerar la existencia de un nuevo espacio político con el cual actuar sin perder la capacidad de autonomía, sin institucionalizarse ni convertirse en partidos políticos o grupos de interés (Melucci 1999).

puede confundir con grupos de interés (Ibarra 2000, 2005). Desde esta perspectiva, el grado de institucionalización depende de la complejidad y dimensión de la organización, que conlleva la emergencia de una estructura burocrática que operacionaliza los objetivos y las ideas centrales del movimiento. El estudio de Sonia Ruiz (2004) muestra, en este sentido, cómo la pluralidad de grupos y formas de organización dificulta la institucionalización de movimientos sociales, a la vez que facilita los procesos de cooptación de algunos grupos por parte de las instituciones debido a un aumento en la atonicidad del movimiento (Ruiz 2004, p. 142).

Coll y Cruells (2008) estudian la interrelación de 3 factores para hablar de institucionalización: el tipo de interlocución, que puede ser fluida o conflictiva; el grado de dependencia financiera y su repercusión en la autonomía de la asociación; la actividad de la asociación —orientada a la intervención o a la acción política— junto con el marco contextual en el que se produce, que puede ser institucional, no institucional o mixto. De esta interrelación extraemos que los colectivos con una interlocución más conflictiva, sin dependencia financiera, y por tanto más autónomos, y con una actividad dirigida a la acción política en un contexto no institucional, serían colectivos LGTB poco o nada institucionalizados. En cambio, en el polo opuesto encontraríamos aquellos más institucionalizados. El problema de esta visión son todos aquellos colectivos que se escapan a los márgenes de esta interrelación, es decir, a los que podríamos situar en la frontera de la institucionalización. Aquellos colectivos que, por ejemplo, mantienen un diálogo conflictivo, tienen un grado medio de dependencia financiera y conservan cierto grado de autonomía, y tienen una actividad orientada a la intervención pero también a la acción política. En este caso, podríamos decir que dentro del movimiento LGTB hay colectivos más institucionalizados como el Casal Lambda o la Coordinadora Gai-Lesbiana⁶ y menos o nada institucionalizados como la Asamblea Stonewall o la Guerrilla Travolaka, según el trabajo de Coll y Cruells (2008). Revisando la situación actual, y teniendo en cuenta que la Asamblea Stonewall o la Guerrilla Travolaka no existen en la actualidad, la institucionalización parecería ser un requisito para la supervivencia en el tiempo. En el centro tendríamos colectivos que se mueven entre la frontera de la institucionalización como el Front d'Alliberament Gai de Catalunya (FAGC) que se identifica por mantener un diálogo más bien fluido, con un grado medio de dependencia financiera y que mantiene su autonomía, y con una actividad más dirigida a la intervención pero sin descuidar su actividad política dentro de un contexto que se mueve entre el institucional y el mixto.

Devenir institucional

Al abordar la institucionalización del movimiento LGTB hay que tener en cuenta que nos encontramos con un movimiento transversal, que facilita la

⁶ La Coordinadora Gai-Lesbiana o Coordinadora hace referencia a la Coordinadora de lesbianes, gais, transsexuales i bisexuales de Catalunya

incorporación de sus propuestas en el ideario de los partidos políticos. En el año 2008, por ejemplo, nace "Convergais"⁷, un grupo homosexual dentro de "Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya", un partido que ha gobernado con el democristiano "Unió Democràtica de Catalunya", contrarios al matrimonio homosexual o a la adopción por parte de parejas LGTB. Esta dimensión constituiría un factor que da cuenta de la incidencia y repercusión a nivel legal de las demandas de este colectivo. Al mismo tiempo, esta inclusión es leída como una forma de normalización e integración al sistema heteronormativo que marca una frontera entre las formas legalmente reconocidas de "familia homosexual" en detrimento de las formas de organización sexo-afectiva cuestionadoras del sistema heteropatriarcal.

En todo caso, el contexto político debe ser receptivo a las demandas de los movimientos sociales. Esto implica tener en cuenta los puntos de acceso que propone la estructura de oportunidad política a los movimientos sociales, entre los que destacan las oportunidades políticas, culturales y sociales; el sistema de alianzas con otros movimientos sociales; el alineamiento de las élites y la conexión con los valores que se desarrollan en el contexto global (Ruiz 2004; Bodelón y Giménez 2008). La permeabilidad del contexto institucional está relacionado con el grado de estabilidad de las alianzas políticas, la posible existencia de relevos en posiciones estratégicas, y la capacidad del estado en desarrollar políticas públicas (Müller y Neveu 2002). Otra explicación proviene de la estructura del estado (Kim 2005): una estructura estatal descentralizada facilita que una mayor variedad de formas de acción colectiva puedan acceder a la misma (Amenta y Young 1999), a la vez que una estructura fragmentada horizontalmente (distintos organismos institucionales al mismo nivel en oposición a una estructura vertical en que el organismo superior tiene mayor poder que el inferior) facilita la emergencia del diálogo y debate aportado por los movimientos sociales (Amenta y Young 1999; Kitschelt 1986; Kreisi 1995).

Ateniéndonos a estas cuestiones podemos mencionar cómo la transición a la democracia ofreció nuevas oportunidades para la movilización LGTB, creándose frentes de liberación homosexual en las principales ciudades como Barcelona, Madrid o Valencia. A nivel de consecución de derechos cabe decir que la mayoría de leyes concernientes al género, la sexualidad y la familia se han alcanzado durante el liderazgo del PSOE como por ejemplo la ley del aborto, la adopción, la de reproducción asistida, la ley regional que reconoce las parejas homosexuales, la ley contra la violencia de género, la legalización del matrimonio homosexual, una nueva ley de divorcio y una ley de identidad de género (Pichardo 2011). Esta priorización del PSOE hacia los derechos civiles y las políticas ciudadanas que favorecen el reconocimiento del colectivo LGTB, y que no han sido disputadas por partidos más conservadores (Calvo y Trujillo 2011) nos hace pensar que este partido político es más sensible o vulnerable a las demandas de dicho colectivo.

⁷ Ver <http://www.324.cat/noticia/282535/altres/Neix-Convergais-un-grup-homosexual-dins-de-CDC>, accedido el 11 de Abril de 2013.

Como se ha argumentado en el texto, el concepto de institucionalización incluye distintas dimensiones. El movimiento LGTB está formado por asociaciones y colectivos que están registrados, algunas de sus demandas han sido incluidas dentro de las políticas institucionales, su forma de organización refleja el contexto legal en que desarrollan y reciben distintas ayudas y subvenciones por parte de los organismos públicos. En el caso de Barcelona, por ejemplo, tiene el Consejo Municipal de Gays, Lesbianas y Hombres y Mujeres Transexuales, un órgano consultivo en el que participan representantes de colectivos LGTB, grupos políticos, sindicatos, representantes de asociaciones de empresarios/as, instituciones, universidades u otros sectores relacionados o que trabajan temáticas LGTB. También hay respuesta a demandas sociales concretas, como dar nombre a la glorieta del Parque de la Ciutadella de Barcelona a "Transsexual Sònia", en conmemoración del brutal asesinato ocurrido en 1991. Desde una perspectiva general, y teniendo también en cuenta la existencia de colectivos que mantienen una postura crítica hacia el trabajo institucional, podemos observar que el entramado institucional atraviesa el tejido asociativo LGTB en Cataluña.

Desde esta perspectiva, podríamos conceptualizar la institucionalización como un proceso que da un papel a los agentes políticos dentro del juego político. Alain Touraine, por ejemplo, nos propone tres fases sucesivas por las que pasa un movimiento social: *"la ruptura antiinstitucional, el afrontamiento político y la influencia institucional"* (1978, p. 269), considerando como más importante la fase central en la que se gestan alianzas con las fuerzas políticas en el momento en que el sistema político adquiere un estado más receptivo a los movimientos sociales, desembocando en la deseada influencia en el proceso institucional. Kriesi (1996) y Jiménez (2003) también consideran la institucionalización como la última etapa de un ciclo de protesta que atraviesa 4 fases: comercialización (si es o no proveedora de servicios retribuidos), la involución (si se dedica o no al altruismo o la autoayuda), la radicalización (si se fortalece o no la relación directa entre el movimiento y la institución), y la institucionalización (la movilización se aproxima a las instituciones sin haber una participación directa de los miembros, convirtiéndose así en un grupo de interés).

Desde la perspectiva del interaccionismo simbólico (Blumer⁸ 1969), Christiansen (2009) propone que los movimientos sociales atraviesan cuatro etapas en términos de "emergencia", "coalescencia", "burocratización" y "deterioro". En la primera etapa, existe un descontento generalizado hacia una política o condición social y la acción es más individual que colectiva. En la segunda, se focaliza el descontento y se identifican responsables, el descontento se hace manifiesto y se elaboran estrategias de acción que se llevan a cabo colectivamente, como por ejemplo manifestaciones para demostrar el poder del movimiento. La etapa de burocratización se caracteriza por altos niveles de

⁸ Fue uno de los primeros autores en identificar las 4 etapas por las que atraviesa un movimiento social. Él las describió como: fermento social, excitación popular, formalización e institucionalización (Della Porta y Diani 2006, p. 150).

organización, que requieren de personal especializado, y estrategias de coalición con el poder político, por lo que tienen un acceso regular a las élites políticas. Por último, en el deterioro o institucionalización, desaparece el colectivo por desgaste, éxito, prohibición o cooptación. En esta perspectiva, el proceso de institucionalización es considerado negativo en tanto que desaparece el potencial político del colectivo.

Está claro que el movimiento LGTB: (a) presenta grados de organización interna de considerable magnitud que permite, para algunos colectivos, la gestión de ayudas importantes para ofrecer servicios al colectivo LGTB; y (b) está presente de forma importante en distintos organismos institucionales. Este sería el caso, por ejemplo, de la Coordinadora LGTB y el Consejo Municipal.

El trabajo de Coll y Cruells (2007) propone la existencia de 3 etapas y/o procesos: institucionalización (proceso en el que se desdibujan los límites de los movimientos con las instituciones públicas en base al ámbito estatal, la prioridad de las actividades —de interlocución o de gestión— y el alto nivel de dependencia financiera), formalización (el proceso a través del cual las organizaciones aumentan su nivel presupuestario, formaliza su estructura organizativa y aumenta el trabajo asalariado) y estatalización (control por parte del Estado de la problemática que muestra el movimiento, como por ejemplo implantando políticas públicas). En base a esta definición vemos como el Consejo Municipal de Gais, Lesbianas y Hombres y Mujeres Transexuales es el órgano más estatalizado al estar formado por *“los representantes de partidos políticos y sindicatos que tengan constituida una comisión específica destinada a trabajar con los colectivos representados en el consejo”*⁹.

Este trabajo conjunto entre partidos, sindicatos y colectivos (de los cuales una gran mayoría tiene representación en el Consejo Municipal) nos lleva a la visión pragmática del término institucionalización aportada por Ana Natalucci (2012). Según la autora, siguiendo a O'Donnell (1993), no estamos hablando de la cooptación por parte de un partido político ni una mera integración a las estructuras gubernamentales, sino de una mediación entre la sociedad civil y el régimen político (entre lo social y lo político respectivamente), con la potestad para definir las formas de participación, los mecanismos de representación y los dispositivos de legitimación que conforman una comunidad política. Pensado en estos términos la institucionalización respondería a un proceso de interacción entre lo social y lo político en el que se debate, negocia, hay toma de decisiones, etc.; en el que se producen desplazamientos entre ambos ámbitos. En este sentido lo importante es responder cuáles son los vínculos y los efectos que tiene en el proceso de movilización.

El debate sobre la institucionalización, por otra parte, abre una distinción entre un espacio (más) institucionalizado y otro no (o menos) institucionalizado; un espacio de carácter (más) político y otro de (más) social. Bajo esta perspectiva,

⁹ Ver

http://w3.bcn.cat/XMLServeis/XMLHomeLinkPI/0_4022,1224745232_1263728843_2,00.html

la existencia del Consejo Municipal, donde están representados la gran mayoría de colectivos, constituiría el punto de engranaje que conectaría ambos espacios. Sin embargo, y siguiendo a Tapia (2009), la transformación de la sociedad ha ampliado los espacios de política por lo que la sociedad civil ha pasado de ser un espacio no estatal en el que se está realizando política (Natalucci 2012, p. 4-5). Podemos afirmar, de este modo, que en las sociedades liberales postfordistas la institucionalización atraviesa progresivamente el conjunto de lo social.

Estas visiones no han estado exentas de críticas. Por un lado, se ha cuestionado el proceso linear de las diferentes fases que atraviesan los movimientos sociales considerándose la posibilidad que se puedan dar varias fases simultáneamente (Coll y Cruells 2008). También es posible que un movimiento social no desarrolle todas las etapas o que se salte alguna de ellas. De hecho Christiansen (2009) matiza que hay colectivos que han rechazado la burocratización por cuestiones ideológicas. Esto deja entreabierto la visión de rechazo que inicialmente muestran los colectivos así como la visión crítica que mantienen, todo y negociar con las instituciones. Por último, este autor añade que el proceso no ha de interpretarse de forma rígida sino flexible ya que es posible que haya retrocesos en algunos momentos de la movilización.

Por otro lado, asumir la institucionalización como un proceso puede llevarnos a pensar que esta es una parte inevitable de la maduración del movimiento (Dalton y Kuechler 1992; Martin 2008). Esto ignora el hecho de que se produzcan situaciones que guíen a los movimientos a adoptar ciertas formas o comportamientos, por lo que más bien respondería a un proceso complejo, no automático, influenciado tanto por aspectos ambientales como internos a la propia organización. Por último, esta postura sustenta como factor explicativo de la institucionalización la antigüedad de los colectivos. Es decir, a mayor antigüedad, más afiliados, más recursos financieros y humanos, y por tanto, mayor presión hacia la formalización debido a la necesidad de gestionar el presupuesto y regular las relaciones entre los afiliados, y a la profesionalización con la finalidad de gestionar la compleja estructura organizativa y conseguir más recursos (Kriesi 1995, 1996). Sin embargo, hay otras posturas que ponen énfasis en el proyecto político en lugar de la antigüedad o la estructura interna (Coll 2009), ya que es este el que determina la relación política y financiera que mantiene el movimiento con las instituciones así como su estructura.

Conclusiones

Abordar la institucionalización en el movimiento LGTB nos lleva a descubrir las tensiones que se desprenden del mismo. Por un lado, la legalización de asociaciones, la aproximación al Estado y al sistema político, mediante la creación de la Coordinadora y el Consejo Municipal, la participación directa con representantes políticos y la legalización de determinadas demandas nos puede llevar a la conclusión de que el movimiento LGTB está institucionalizado. Esta institucionalización explicaría la recepción de fondos, por parte del movimiento, provenientes de la Generalitat, la existencia de personal contratado, una mayor

profesionalización, más recursos de organización, etc. Pero también, menor radicalización en sus acciones, pérdida de autonomía, pérdida de protagonismo, etc. El problema de esta asunción es que dentro del movimiento LGTB habitan una gran cantidad de colectivos muy heterogéneos, que no cumplen con todas las repercusiones que teóricamente se desprenden de la institucionalización. En este sentido, encontramos colectivos que no reciben fondos públicos, o que no disponen de personal contratado, que cuestionan los cambios legales que se han conseguido, porque contribuyen a un espejismo de igualdad social y no plantean otras formas de relación que no sean las institucionalmente establecidas, y la crítica que realizan a la relación que mantienen con las instituciones públicas ya que esta relación puede ser utilizada para la recepción de fondos.

Sin embargo, la posibilidad de que el movimiento sea convertido en grupo de interés por su falta de participación directa o a que pueda deteriorarse o incluso desaparecer, es cuestionable a través de la actividad que tienen en las redes sociales, por los últimos cambios conseguidos que nos muestran como todavía siguen luchando, y por el trabajo que realizan con representantes políticos mediante la participación en el Consejo Municipal. En este caso, podríamos considerar que el movimiento LGTB no ha llegado a institucionalizarse. Con esto no solo quiero decir que puede llegar a hacerlo sino que también puede llegar a perder la influencia institucional existente si tenemos en cuenta cómo puede influir el contexto político, pudiendo existir partidos políticos más sensibles a la cuestión LGTB, o bien que se interesen por el movimiento con la finalidad de conseguir aliados, asegurarse los votos tras la promesa de realizar algún cambio si consiguen gobernar, y atribuirse el mérito si el cambio ha podido ser realizado. Además, muestra como todo esto responde a un proceso en el que el movimiento ha pasado de no disponer ningún derecho a interactuar con la institución que les tenía el acceso denegado.

Por otro lado, la diversidad que muestra el movimiento en cuanto al proyecto político divide al movimiento en dos posiciones bien diferenciadas. Así por ejemplo, ante la legalización del matrimonio nos encontramos con una parte mayoritaria del movimiento para la cual la regulación del sexo/género era una de las temáticas más importantes a tratar, mientras que otro sector del movimiento mantiene una actitud crítica sobre el control que el Estado ejerce sobre las relaciones personales. Algo semejante ocurre con la ley que regula el cambio de identidad de género. Algunas asociaciones valoran positivamente los cambios producidos en la ley de identidad de género mientras que otras critican que el Estado tenga el poder de dictaminar el género de las personas y que tengan que someterse a un tratamiento psiquiátrico para poderse producir el cambio de género¹⁰. Esta divergencia política, sumada a que no todos los colectivos disponen de los mismos beneficios institucionales puede llevarnos a pensar que se podría hablar de la institucionalización de ciertos colectivos, aquellos con un proyecto más normalizador y provistos de recursos.

¹⁰ Para más información consultar Coll y Cruells (2008).

La legalización de ciertas demandas reclamadas por el sector más normalizador del movimiento LGTB no ha estado exenta de consecuencias. Por un lado, se consiguió imponer una institución matrimonial que tiene posicionamientos religiosos y homófobos, y una estructura heteronormativa, patriarcal (Calvo y Trujillo 2011) y masculina (Platero 2007), en lugar de conseguir otras maneras de relacionarse y convivir que no sean privilegiadas económica ni institucionalmente. En cuanto a la transexualidad, la necesidad de pasar por un proceso de hormonación o someterse a cirugía para conseguir el acceso a ciertos derechos pone de manifiesto que vivimos en una sociedad genitocentrada y patriarcal en base a la cual se determinan los roles de género.

Por otro lado, esta legalización es criticada y considerada como un riesgo ya que la institucionalización y burocratización del movimiento puede llevar a perder su esencia (Corcuera 2012), haciendo que las estrategias pasen a ser los objetivos de algún partido político. Una crítica actual que se realiza a la sección institucionalizada del movimiento LGTB hace referencia a la des-sexualización de sus reclamaciones (Calvo y Trujillo 2011) centrándose principalmente en el bienestar de las comunidades LGTB, dejando de lado la temática sexual. De esta manera se incorporan todas las sexualidades no normativas a un discurso igualitario basado en la consecución de derechos humanos y ciudadanía, en lugar de adoptar un discurso transformador en el que las relaciones puedan ajustarse a la diversidad y diferencia.

Esta falta de apuesta por la diferencia también se muestra en la relación que establecen estos colectivos con la subcultura comercial (Calvo y Trujillo 2011). El tránsito por determinados ámbitos geográficos (como puede ser Chueca), o por bares y saunas diseñadas para la comunidad gay responde a la creación de guetos oprimidos, políticamente excluidos, con necesidades y problemáticas comunes. En este sentido, la subcultura comercial actúa como un elemento controlador y homogeneizador de la ciudadanía homosexual.

Estas posturas críticas hacen que el horizonte de la liberación sexual continúe percibiéndose como algo lejano ya que las leyes actuales no permiten que las personas puedan decidir libremente sin por ello pasar por una institución, ya sea la matrimonial o la médica. Es por esto que la institución es considerada como un mecanismo de poder que privilegia a un sector de la sociedad mediante la opresión de otro sector. De hecho, la acción de contraer matrimonio o someterse a una operación quirúrgica, significa conformarse con la norma, lo cual tendría que ir acompañado de reconocimiento y aceptación social. Una igualdad legal que no significa necesariamente igualdad social (Pichardo 2011), alimentando el debate sobre los logros de la institucionalización y la pérdida de radicalidad y potencialidad política.

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Sobre los autores

Patricia Aljama es Estudiante de Doctorado en el Departamento de Psicología Social de la Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona y miembro del grupo "Fractalidades en Investigación Crítica". Su investigación trata de analizar la posible institucionalización del movimiento LGTB en Cataluña, haciendo hincapié a la historia del movimiento, su relación con las instituciones políticas y los cambios conseguidos. Sus temáticas abarcan los movimientos sociales, las relacizaciones de poder y las identidades sexuales.

Patricia.aljama AT campus.uab.cat

Joan Pujol es Profesor Titular del Departamento de Psicología Social y miembro del grupo "Fractalidades en Investigación Crítica". Su investigación desarrolla una perspectiva semiótico-material y gubernamental de los fenómenos sociales. Sus temáticas abarcan el discurso tecnocientífico, el desarrollo tecnosocial, los actuales mecanismos disciplinares y de control, la producción de corporeidad y las identidades sexuales.

Joan.pujol AT uab.cat

The 5 Star Movement and its discontents: A tale of blogging, comedy, electoral success and tensions

Eric Turner

Abstract

This paper seeks to provide English speaking readers with a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the rise to prominence of Beppe Grillo's 5 Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle). This movement recently captured a quarter of the popular vote in the February 2013 general elections in Italy but, in spite of extensive media coverage, it has received little coverage in English speaking academia. This paper seeks to fill this gap, first by providing an overview of the movement through recording its (brief) history, then by comparing this case to similar cases of comedians-turned-politicians, media figures as social movement leaders and populism in Italy. Subsequently, this paper analyzes the reasons for this movement's success, as well as discussing the merit of the different labels that it has been given, including populism and personalism, and attempts to classify this movement on a left-right spectrum. Through these different lenses, this paper seeks to provide the English-speaking audience with an in depth analysis of the main characteristics of this movement and its main actors and activists' motivations.

Introduction

Few political movements in recent years have shaken the world around them so quickly and so heavily as Beppe Grillo's 5 Star Movement. It was formed in 2009, and, after a few mildly successful early forays in the electoral arena, its popularity rapidly rose in 2012 and, building on several successes in local elections that same year, it took Italian politics by storm by obtaining 25% of the popular vote in the February 2013 Parliamentary elections (Ministero dell'Interno, 2013). The 5 Star Movement polled as the most popular single party in the nation, and third most popular coalition. Its success, and its unwillingness to share power in a coalition with any other party, forced an uneasy coalition between the PD and the PDL,

whose members had campaigned against each other for the last two decades, as well as the centrist *Lista Civica*.

But this party's meteoric rise is far from being its only anomalous aspect. Commentators have been at pains to describe its ideology, labelled, at times, as populism, anti-political, anti-establishment and demagogic. Yet, under closer scrutiny, it is difficult to characterize the movement under the frame of other examples of left-wing or right-wing populist. The 5 Star Movement, for the most part, lacks the nationalist rhetoric and racism of Haider's *FPÖ* or of the French *Front National*, but at the same time, it also lacks the Marxist radicalism of Hugo Chávez or Greece's SYRIZA party.

The other anomalous aspect is the way this movement was formed: a group of fans of comedian Beppe Grillo and his blog first took their first foray in political mobilization by organizing a successful drive for petition signatures in 2007 called V Day. This highly fruitful effort, during which hundreds of thousands of signatures were gathered, was the catalyst to the movement's entry into the arena of electoral politics. There are two main anomalous aspects in this movement: first, the role of its leader and founder, with his irreverent style and charisma combined with his refusal to take up political office in spite of the movement's successes. The second is the alleged role of online tools in fostering this movement's success. Both aspects have been widely discussed, and both praised and criticized.

This paper discusses the most important aspects of this movement and seeks to clarify the often contradictory commentaries that have been provided by the popular press and sometimes even by academia. The purpose is to provide an overview of its characteristics, including policies and structure, as well as the most important controversies which have enveloped it. Thus, the first chapter will provide a summary of the 5 Star Movement's recent history. Then I will pick three similar leaders with which this movement and its leader has often been compared, and provide an exhaustive account of common and divergent points. Then I will evaluate the main reasons for this movement's emergence. The discussion seeks to take all the main labels which have been often associated with this movement, and provide both motivation and critique of their use. By analyzing the 5 Star Movement through these different lenses I intend to clarify and further our understanding of this fascinating and new social actor.

From media excommunication to electoral success: a brief history of Beppe Grillo and the 5 Star Movement

Grillo the comedian

As mentioned before, the comedian Beppe Grillo, the 5 Star Movement's leader and co-founder, has had such a profound impact on its formation that an accurate history of the movement needs to start with an account of Grillo's political and media trajectory. Beppe Grillo was a well known actor and comedian in Italy in the 1980s: he was most famous for his performances as a standup comedian, but was also the protagonist of shows like *Te la do io l'America* and *Te lo do io il Brasile* in which he commented on the lifestyle and culture of Brazil and the United States, as well as starring in an advert for yogurt and appearing in several films (Scanzi 2008). But Grillo fell out of favor with Italian TV when, in 1986, whilst appearing on the Saturday night variety show *Fantastico 7*, he made a pungent joke about the Socialist government administration of the time.

After that episode he was considered persona non grata by mainstream TV, but in 1993, after seven years of not appearing on television, his show was broadcast by state TV RAI, his last appearance on Italian mainstream TV (Scanzi 2008). As his standup show grew in popularity, he received some exposure on foreign TV (most notably Canal + from France and TSI from Switzerland). In the late 1990s he received extensive exposure for predicting the Parmalat financial scandal (Grillo 2004a). His show, which at first discussed more intensely issues such as finance, consumerism and economics, grew gradually political in its tone.

Grillo the blogger

By the early 2000s he was an experienced and well respected standup comedian, well known for his abrasive style and at times controversial arguments. At first he wasn't a fan of new technologies, and one of his shows in the 1990s featured him destroying a computer in front of a live audience. However, an encounter with the entrepreneur Gianroberto Casaleggio persuaded him to give these technologies the benefit of the doubt. Thus, in 2005, Grillo founded his own blog, 'www.beppegrillo.it' which enjoyed rapid success, gaining a viewership which in its early days was much higher than that of Italy's main political party websites, and, more surprisingly, higher than those of Italy's main newspapers.

Meanwhile both his shows and his online activities grew more political in character. An online petition in 2005, aimed at forcing Italy's President of the Republic to recall the army back from Iraq, was rapidly followed, in 2006, by a page printed in the *International Herald Tribune*, and paid for through fundraising on the blog, which denounced the presence of members of parliament who had been previously convicted of crimes ranging from collaboration with organized crime to embezzlement of public funds as well as violent crimes (Grillo 2004b, 2006).

Grillo the mobilizer

This in turn set the stage for the V Day (V stands for a strong Italian expletive), Grillo's first foray into open political mobilization. Confident of the exposure that Grillo had given to the issue of Italy's previously convicted and currently serving members of parliament, the comedian called for his supporters to take the streets across all squares of Italy on September 8th 2007, to sign a nationwide popular law initiative. The petition had three proposals: the first called for the removal of all previously convicted members of parliament; the second proposed a change of electoral system from the current one, which doesn't provide for voters indicating personal preferences (voters can currently only choose parties and coalitions but not individual candidates); the third called for a limit of two parliamentary terms and a ban on holding two elected posts at the same time.

The V Day was a great success. Some observers have called it the greatest demonstration up until then to be organized through the web, which gathered between 300,000 and 500,000 people according to more conservative estimates and a million people according to the blog (Al Jazeera 2008). After that, Grillo's supporters also organized a second V Day, aptly called V2 Day, in 2008. The theme of this event was freedom of the press, with proponents collecting signatures for a referendum that would make it easier to obtain state permission for publication and end public subsidies for newspapers and periodicals. This demonstration was not as big as the first one, but still reasonably successful, with between a hundred thousand and about half a million people showing up in many squares of Italy (De Maria, Fleischner and Targia 2008).

Early discontents and praises

Yet these early successes were met with widespread criticism in some circles. Grillo's blurring of the lines between comedy and political power, a position popular with the movement's supporters, is still markedly unappealing to many. Because of this, many who agree with the movement's overall message tend to disregard the movement as a viable political entity. To this they add that Grillo, even if he is an able communicator, mobilizer and entertainer, would not be a good or creditable administrator. Grillo's own good friend and TV producer Antonio Ricci observes that 'he's a man of monologues, a striker, whereas politics is a world made up of subtle tones, of shades of gray. I will say more: if Grillo stops doing monologues and starts arguing he will lose.' (De Maria et al. 2008:117)

Furthermore, many have accused the 5 Star Movement and their leader of not living up to their ideas and principles. Many have pointed out that Grillo has vast personal assets. Yet the most scorching accusations have come from fellow bloggers. Quite a few of them have pointed out that communication in the blog is mostly in that one way, top down modality which Grillo deplores Italian politicians and journalists for using. The blogger Massimo Mantellini has the most to say on this matter:

Grillo may well be using the internet (...) but he does not live there. (...) Do the thousands of comments count? (...). The management of the comments is (...) totally abandoned to the unavoidable background noise of a web site with high traffic levels. You see participation pulverized in a few moments into useless confusion. (De Maria et al. 2008:188)

Yet many have also praised the movement, and have generated persuasive answers to the points raised by critics. In the first place, the derogatory term anti-politics has been defended by contending that in the currently murky environment it is far from a bad idea to strive to reject the political elites altogether. After all, Grillo's radical and somewhat unrealistic ideas do not match the inaction of his critics: 'those who accuse Grillo aren't moving a finger to change outrageous situations and laws.' (Carbonetto 2007).

Furthermore, if he has attracted the ire of many conservative and centrist commentators and politicians, he has also received praise all across the political spectrum. Even though his audience is mostly progressive, his policies and message seems to

appeal to many conservatives. Therefore, if, as his critics contend, his style and content have ruffled a lot of feathers within the political arena and civil society of Italy, without doubt just as many have welcomed his message with open arms.

To further this point, we should also look at how Grillo had been received outside Italy. It is interesting to see the difference between foreign TV channels and Italian ones. Italian TV ignored him for decades and then, at the time of the V Day, still tried to ignore him until they had no choice but to do otherwise. Instead, various foreign TV channels covered Grillo and were aware of him even before the V Day (De Maria et al. 2008). Furthermore, Grillo was included in *Time* magazine's list of Europeans of the year for the year 2005 (De Maria et al. 2008:57), he has also received various awards for the blog, and was the first comedian ever to speak at the European Parliament. If Italian civil society saw Grillo from the start as a somewhat contentious force, the international community has been more willing to recognize him as a new voice and a valid contributor to current international political debates.

Birth and rise of the 5 Star Movement

The blog developed quickly as a new web tool of civil societal aggregation and communication. It is in this context that his supporters started forming local grass-roots groups, through Meetup forums linked to the blog (Grillo 2008). These groups have been used to campaign on local issues, (most notably, initiatives against the privatization of council owned water supplies and against building incinerators for garbage disposal) receiving in turn publicity and support from the website. The Meetups have also been a base for the movement's first few electoral bids, and the movement has presented candidates in many regions and councils at local elections during the last few years.

The movement also started to focus on running in local elections. Typically, the largest Meetup group in each city proposes candidates and political platforms, as well as collecting the deposit necessary to present the candidatures (Meetup 2011). At first Grillo's candidates made a limited, yet not insignificant, impact. In 2008 a few supporters ran with a pro-Grillo agenda in municipal elections in eight large towns and cities of Italy, averaging 2.43% of the vote in these places (Ministero degli Interni 2008). In 2009, running for the first time under the 5 Star Movement monicker, they ran in fourteen large towns and cities, obtaining an average of 3.2% of votes in these elections (Ministero degli Interni 2009).

In the months following the second local electoral foray, and in an attempt to flex his political muscle, Grillo somewhat surprisingly attempted to join the centre-left PD as part of a bid to run for party leader in its forthcoming primaries. However the PD refused to grant Grillo membership, with some of its leaders explaining that, since he had in the recent past run candidates and electoral lists against them, the comedian was ineligible (*La Repubblica* 13/07/2009). This event consolidated Grillo and his supporters' willingness to see themselves as a voice outside of previously established political forces, and the 5 Star Movement was officially founded, with a statute being approved by delegates at the official founding event in Milan in October 2009 (Ascione 2009).

The movement started flourishing in elections during the second decade of the millennium. In 2010 they contested five regional elections, averaging 3.7% of the vote and getting four of their candidates elected to the regional councils of Piedmont and Emilia-Romagna (Ministero degli Interni 2010). They also ran in four important municipalities, averaging 3.5% of the vote (Ministero degli Interni 2010). 2011 saw the 5 Star Movement boasting both their share of votes and their territorial presence, as they contested 14 municipal elections in large towns and cities, obtained a very solid average of 5% of the vote and elected about 34 councillors (Ministero degli Interni 2011).

After a conference in 2012 the 5 Star Movement outlined their set of national policies in a manifesto. This integrates the proposals put forward in their two V Day initiatives together with proposals aimed at making political administration cheaper, more accountable and more transparent (such as a drastic reduction to the deductible expenses of members of Parliament, online participation of citizens to Parliamentary debates, more power to nationwide referendum proposals, and the abolition of the Provinces as administrative divisions), drastic reforms to Italy's environmental and energy policies (including tougher emissions caps and more investment in renewable energy), and a plethora of changes to Italy's economic policies (an end to state incentives for newspapers, TV and magazines in favor of more promotion of Internet use; new regulations to limit the power of banks and financial institutions; privatization of state monopolies on railways, highways and energy supply; incentives for non-profit organizations and local businesses and protection and new resources for Italy's public health care system) (Beppegrillo.it 2013).

After Berlusconi's resignation in late 2011 and Monti's appointment as PM with the support of most major political forces, the 5 Star Movement found more opportunities to frame themselves to voters as one of the few oppositional voices in Italian

politics. Furthermore, between late 2011 and early 2012, the main parliamentary parties which opposed Monti (the left leaning IDV and the more conservative *Lega Nord*) faced investigations into instances of corruption. Conditions were thus increasingly ripe for the 5 Star Movement to capture dissatisfied left-wing and right-wing voters.

The movement thus achieved some landmark successes in the June 2012 municipal elections. Whereas their share of support had so far corresponded to single figure percentage points, and had been limited to urban, progressive areas, this election saw them make significant inroads in more conservative and rural areas. They polled between 8% and 12% in several northern Italian cities, peaking at 14% in Grillo's home city of Genoa (Ministero dell'Interno 2012). But more impressively, the movement elected its first mayors in four municipalities: of these, three were small and medium sized Northeastern towns (Sarego and Mira in Veneto and Comacchio in Emilia-Romagna), yet the 5 Star Movement also triumphed in the municipal elections in Parma, a small city whose council had been under special commissioner administration because of a corruption scandal.

Even more outstanding results were to come in the following months. The 5 Star Movement had so far failed to make much of an impact in the more predominantly rural and conservative South of Italy. Yet in the Sicilian Regional election in October 2012 the movement came in third amongst coalitions and first among individual parties, with just over 18%, far above their previous poll results in the allegedly more electorally fertile ground of northern cities (Ministero dell'Interno 2012). This also resulted in the election of 15 regional councillors under the movement's monicker.

Year	Type of elections	Significant results	Elected officials
2008	Municipal and regional	1.7% in Sicily, 2.4% in Rome, 3.6% in Treviso	1 municipal councillor
2010	Municipal and regional	7% in Emilia-Romagna, 4% in Piedmont, between 1 and 3% in Lombardy, Campania and Veneto	4 regional and 8 municipals councillors

Year	Type of elections	Significant results	Elected officials
2011	Municipal and regional	Between 9 and 12% in several cities in Piedmont and Emilia-Romagna, less than 2% in several cities in the South, 2.5% in Molise	34 municipal councillors
2012	Municipal and Regional	14% in Genoa, 18% in Sicily and between 8 and 12% in several other cities in Central-Northern Italy	4 mayors in Parma, Sarego (VI), Comacchio (FE), Mira (VE), 15 regional councillors and 86 municipal councillors in councils above 15'000 people

Table 1: The 5 Star Movement's local election performances, 2008-2012.

Source: Ministero degli Interni 2008-12

The present: electoral zeniths and internal tensions

However, as Grillo's movement grew in popularity, criticism and internal tensions grew accordingly. A few months before, in March 2012, Valentino Tivolazzi, one of the movement's councillors in Ferrara, was expelled for disagreeing with Grillo on some issues and organizing activities in his city against Grillo's will. Then, the following month, Giovanni Favia, one of the movement's newly elected regional councillors, appeared on the TV show *Servizio Pubblico*, against the wishes of Grillo and co-founder Gianroberto Casaleggio (who had first persuaded Grillo to start his own blog and since then has been working closely with Grillo on media and political strategy), had told the movement's candidates and elected officials not to accept invitations from TV talk shows. Subsequently, in September, an off-air comment came to the light in which Favia harshly criticized Casaleggio for stifling internal democracy in the movement and effectively controlling it behind the scenes.

Consequently, Favia was expelled from the movement in December, together with Bologna's municipal councillor Federica Salsi, who had made, in the eyes of the movement, a similar mistake by appearing on the TV show *Ballarò* two months earlier. During that same month, another regional councillor, Fabrizio Biolè, was also expelled from the movement, but for a different reason: it had in fact emerged that he had served as municipal councillor for 11 years in the village of Gaiola, thus

violating the guidelines which prescribed a limit of two elected mandates at all levels of government.

These and other democratic tensions in the movement, related to Grillo and Casaleggio's capacity to 'purge' members at will, as well as the lack of accountability that the two 'godfathers' of the movement have, were summed up recently by the blogger Federico Mello, one of the 5 Star Movement's most staunch critics, in the recently published *Il Lato Oscuro delle Cinque Stelle*. Here, Mello argues that the movement's online form is actually less democratic than conventional movements that organize mainly offline. In fact, the web makes it easier for abuse and manipulation to happen. Thus, even though the 5 Star Movement makes frequent appeals to direct democracy, it is in effect closed, rigidly vertical and more tailored to the hegemonic interests of Grillo and Casaleggio than to those of its members (Mello 2013).

In spite of all this, there were other, bigger political shockwaves that were emerging elsewhere. The other notable aspect of the Sicilian regional poll result was Berlusconi's PDL's loss of an election (it only polled in second after the centre-left PD, as well as losing a large part of its support to both the PD and the 5 Star Movement) in what had been previously considered safe home ground. This happened amidst a low turnout that was a sign of increasing disaffection amongst conservative voters, and took place to the advantage of new forces like the 5 Star Movement. With a general election looming in the early summer of 2013, and fearing that support for the austerity measures enacted by the provisional Monti government was making him lose too many voters, Berlusconi withdrew his support for the government in late 2012, prompting the elections to be anticipated to February 2013.

In the build up to the elections, the 5 Star Movement held primaries to allow its members to choose its candidates for parliament. This was done in response to Italy's current electoral law, which was chosen by Parliament in late 2005, and which does not allow voters to choose candidates directly, but only parties, and which Grillo and his supporters had long deemed illegitimate. In the aftermath of the primaries, the movement asserted proudly that a majority of women had been picked, including 17 out of 31 top-of-the-list candidates (these positions assure the greatest of odds for election) an outstanding fact due to the Italian political environment's traditionally overwhelming presence of men (Beppegrillo.it 2012).

However others were more critical: the daily *Il Fatto Quotidiano* noted that there were 95,000 votes and, if we factor in that each activist had three votes, only about

30,000 people voted on about 1400 candidates, resulting in a ratio of about 23 activists per candidate (*Il Fatto Quotidiano* 12/07/2012). To put this more succinctly, commentators noted that this felt more like an 'inside job' style of decision making instead of an exercise of direct democratic rights. Another criticism was that the online form of voting was not transparent and lent itself to manipulation and rigging by hackers (*Il Fatto Quotidiano* 12/07/2012).

While many were expecting these elections to deliver a stable left-of-center government for the coming years after the recent doldrums of the previous Parliament, this hope was betrayed by the results. The PD's coalition did come in first with almost 30% of the votes, Berlusconi's PDL still performed solidly and was only half a percentage point behind. But the real surprise was the 5 Star Movement, which performed beyond most expectations (because of the movement's novelty and the very short notice period in which the election took place, it had also faced difficulties in registering in all the electoral colleges) and captured 25.5% of the votes, the third biggest in terms of coalitions and the biggest in terms of parties if we exclude votes from constituencies of Italians abroad. Monti's centrist alliance, the *Scelta Civica*, was a distant fourth with a mere 10% of the votes.

Coalition Name	Main Component Parties	Percentage of Votes in Chamber of Deputies	Number of Seats in Chamber of Deputies	Percentage of Votes in Senate	Number of Seats in Senate
Common Good (Centre-Left)	Democratic Party, Left Ecology Freedom, Democratic Centre, South Tyrolean People's Party	29.54%	345	31.63%	113
Centre-Right	People of Freedom, Northern League, The Right, Pensioners' Party	29.18%	125	30.71%	116
Five Star Movement	Five Star Movement	25.55%	109	23.79%	54
With Monti for Italy	Civic Choice, Union of the Centre, Future and	10.56%	47	9.13%	18

	Freedom				
Civil Revolution	Italy of Values, Federation of the Left, Federation of the Greens	2.25%	0	1.79%	0
Act to Stop the Decline	Act to Stop the Decline	1.12%	0	0.90%	0

*Table 2: Italian 2013 Parliamentary Election Results.
Data: Ministero degli Interni, 2013*

While the extent of support for the 5 Star Movement was outstanding, the distribution of support was rather anomalous. The movement obtained more than 30% of the votes in two of Italy's more progressive regions, Marche and Liguria (part of the 'red belt' which in the past composed the bulk of Communist Party supporters), while also building on its recent successes in traditional Sicily and breaking the 30% roof there. The 5 Star Movement also obtained almost 30% of the votes in Sardinia and Abruzzo, two more traditionally conservative and rural regions. This shows how, compared to the movement's early electoral forays, the composition of the majority of its support has changed substantially.

The final outcome of these poll results was that while the PD controlled Italy's Chamber of Deputies, thanks to the electoral rules that granted the largest coalition 55% of the seats in the lower house, it needed external support to govern with a viable majority in the upper house. Commentators had hoped that *Scelta Civica*, the party most compatible for a coalition with the PD, would have commanded enough votes for the two to control both houses, but this was not the case. As a result, the PD needed to turn to either the 5 Star Movement or the PDL for support. Seeing as the PDL was seen by many as the PD's natural enemy, PD leader Bersani made overtures to the 5 Star Movement for a coalition, asking for external support in exchange for delivery on some of the latter's proposed policies.

This came to nothing. Both Grillo and the 5 Star Movement elected officials made somewhat contradictory statements, at times opening up to the idea of a coalition but placing very high demands in terms of policies, and at others declaring that they were opposed to an alliance as a matter of principle. In the end the PD was bottlenecked into negotiating with the PDL. No more successful were the 5 Star Movement's attempts to co-opt members of the PD during the election for the Pres-

ident of the Republic, which took place while the new parliamentary majority had yet to be formed, and in some ways pre-empted the upcoming shifts in alliances.

In the event, Stefano Rodotà, who had become the 5 Star Movement's preferred name after the first two candidates preferred by its membership declined to run (Quotidiano.net 17/04/2013), was unable to obtain the two-thirds majority of the assembly, required for election under Italian constitutional law. Even though Rodotà won a relative majority of preferences during three of the first five (inconclusive) rounds of voting, enjoying the support of 5 Star Movement members plus some support from PD members, during the sixth round outgoing president Giorgio Napolitano was elected with support from the majority of PD and PDL members (Rubino 2013).

These negotiations were no less troublesome than the attempted dialogue with the 5 Star Movement, and Berlusconi made high demands and at times shut off any possibility of a compromise. Eventually, in April 2013, the parties reached an agreement and a government was formed with Enrico Letta, a PD member of parliament and former minister with centrist credentials, as Prime Minister.

In conclusion, we must note that the 5 Star Movement's decision not to ally itself with the PD may have seemed politically naïve and destructive for some. It was the movement's best opportunity in its recent history to see the policies it desired to be enacted. On the other hand, the movement may also profit in the future from any unpopularity that the new coalition may gain, as well as its inherent contradictions and political differences. Yet, concurrently, the 5 Star Movement's internal harmony is far from guaranteed, and current Italian news media is rife with reports on how Grillo and Casaleggio have been attempting to micromanage their newly elected members of parliament. Nevertheless, their recent (July 2013) decision to allow members of parliament to appear on television may be an indication on how the movement's leaders may have realized that these controversies between them and the elected representatives can do nothing but damage to the movement's reputation.

In the recent past, the movement was able to capitalize upon its enemies' divisions more than its enemies were to make gains on theirs. It follows that the future successes of the 5 Star Movement depend on its ability to repeat this pattern. The municipal elections in June 2013, in which the movement took merely between 5 and 10 percent of the votes in most places in which it ran, peaking at 12% in Rome, 14% in Ancona and 19% in the Friuli regional election (Ministero dell'Interno 2013),

may be the most compelling data to show that the movement's potential political influence may have reached its zenith a few months before, and that, after three years of steady rise, electoral setbacks are more than likely to occur.

The Grillos of the past: comedians in politics, media figures as movement leaders and Italian populists

The 5 Star Movement and Grillo's peculiar role in its formation and rise to prominence may seem so unprecedented and anomalous that recounting its tale in its own terms may be the only fair way to depict it. However, many have attempted to equate Grillo and his supporters to past cases of populism and celebrity leadership. This could be a useful exercise because, even though contexts, grievances and outcomes vary significantly, it helps to unveil the various rhetorical and ideological undercurrents. Here I would like to focus primarily on Grillo's leadership and rhetorical style. As mentioned before, this is one of the standout characteristics of the movement, which has attracted abundant praise and criticism from all quarters. Conversely, and as a balancing act, the next chapter will focus more on the movement's structure, policies and context.

The three leaders I am comparing Grillo to are the French comedian Michel Coluche, the Nigerian writer and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Italian leader of the *Lega Nord* (and former minister) Umberto Bossi. I have chosen these three examples for two reasons. First, in the case of Coluche and Bossi, these leaders are the ones Grillo is most often compared to. Second, these examples all shed a different light on particularly salient aspects of Grillo's leadership style. Coluche is a politically provocative comedian who made an attempt at political candidacy. Saro-Wiwa is an example of a prominent media figure who used his status to bring attention to a cause and mobilize a movement. Bossi is the last prominent and successful populist to emerge on the Italian political scene before Grillo, and is a famous precedent to Grillo in terms of the contentious language and political strategy in use. Thus with these three examples I purport to shed light on Grillo's relationship with past examples of respectively, political satire as a vehicle to advance political candidacy, celebrity status as a mobilizing tool, and populism in Italy.

Coluche and Grillo: when comedy gets serious

Coluche was a well known comedian and radio show host in the 1970s who in 1981 announced his candidacy for the upcoming French presidential elections. Like Grillo, Coluche moved in a favorable environment in which the established political leaders were facing a worsening economic situation- rising unemployment, decrease in the purchasing power of salaries and increase in strikes and industrial action- as well as a number of scandals, most notably the one that involved illegal donations to the then President Giscard D'Estaing on behalf of the African military strongman Bokassa.

Moreover, like Grillo, Coluche, even though he had more leftist than rightist sympathies, sought a broad appeal, that would especially include the working class, and those who had grown disillusioned with conventional politics and leaders. Finally, just like Grillo, Coluche could count on the sympathy of some of France's most prominent intellectuals, Pierre Bourdieu and Alan Touraine amongst others, but was also the object of many intimidations and criticisms from established politicians and the press (Biorcio and Natale 2013).

Because of these intimidations, which extended in some cases to death threats, but most notably, because of the murder of his close collaborator Rene Gorlin, Coluche eventually withdrew from the race. But before Coluche pulled out, the pollsters placed the French comedian's share of support at 15%, comparable to Grillo's support a few months before Italy's recent Parliamentary election (Biorcio and Natale 2013). Yet, with Coluche choosing not to run, the similarities end here: while Grillo did not run himself, he has campaigned profusely for his own candidates, and contested several elections, regional, municipal as well as national, and built a movement around his ideas, whilst Coluche simply did not advance that far in the political arena.

While we can note how some policies were clearly similar, including the struggle against corruption, political elitism and the dominance of economic interests in politics, it is their communication style that is most strikingly parallel. Biorcio and Natale (2013) provide the most useful commentary of this parallel:

The entry of a comedian into politics can have a particular type of effectiveness because it uses and transforms elements of popular culture, often put in evidence by anthropologists, which are very important. With the language of satire, imitations and political caricatures it is possible to communicate contents that are otherwise

unmentionable. These are contents that can more easily overcome the barriers put in place by social norms and profoundly influence the ideas and feelings of the public. The representations that are put on stage can revitalize 'rituals of inversion' and carnival-like celebrations that allow the popular sectors to give free rein to their repressed rage and frustrations. (Biorcio and Natale 2013:13-4)

Thus there is a twofold advantage in Grillo and Coluche's styles of communication: as comedians, they are able to use cultural and linguistic codes that are precluded to established politicians and more conventional media figures. Moreover, they can engage with their audience in carnivalesque and ritualistic vilification and ridicule of established leaders and power structures. Here we can see the potential of comedy not only in terms of spreading awareness and creating a sympathetic audience, but also fostering a peculiar form of common identity with the audience. However, there is also a significant difference between the two in that Coluche did not start a durable political movement or political party, and, in spite of the warm signals he received in opinion polls, he did not contest any elections.

Saro Wiwa and Grillo: how celebrities create social movements

The next precedent to be discussed is that of Nigerian writer and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. Why is it worthwhile to compare him to Grillo? On the whole, there are plenty of examples of celebrities like Saro-Wiwa running for elections, and providing a comprehensive list would go beyond the scope of this paper. Besides, Saro-Wiwa moved in an authoritarian context, unlike Grillo, their goals were very different and his struggle ended in tragedy with his death. However, from the brief list of the most notorious cases we can deduce some important trends. First of all, in most cases celebrities have opted to run for well established parties (Boris Johnson, Al Franken, Arnold Schwarzenegger and Ronald Reagan are just a few of the most well known cases), and in these situations we can find many success stories.

On the other hand, when celebrities have chosen to start their own movement, their efforts have been mostly short lived and of limited success at the ballot box. Yet success can also be measured in terms of mobilization, so the legitimate question that I want to ask at this point is the following: have there been cases of celebrities that have been successful at mobilizing in the long term, that have gone beyond short lived mobilizations (such as the Rally to Restore Sanity and the Restoring Honor rally, as well as the less recent examples cited)?

Bob and Nepstad (2006) provide a perfect example of this with the figure of Ken Saro-Wiwa, a well established writer who used his status successfully in order to promote the cause of his ethnic group, the Ogoni, and their movement, the MOSOP (Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People). Saro-Wiwa's charisma, and his visibility through his media ties helped turn the attention of the international community to the grievances of one of Nigeria's ethnic minorities, the abuses of the Nigerian government and the environmental exploitation of the Niger Delta.

These efforts came to a head in 1993, when MOSOP organized demonstrations that mobilized as many as 300,000 Ogoni people, accounting for almost half of their total population. Later that year, the Nigerian government militarily occupied the region, and by 1994 Saro-Wiwa and the other main MOSOP leaders were captured and put on trial. In spite of international pressure demanding his release, Saro-Wiwa was executed in 1995.

In spite of the tragic final outcome, this experience shows the potential of a movement led by a figure who was recognized both nationally and internationally with a communicative outlet that went beyond the movement's formal resources. While there is abundant literature dealing with the role of celebrities as successful political candidates (most notably West and Orman, 2002; Meyer, 2002; Street, 2004), the suggestion here is that they can also be very successful mobilizers, and the cases of Grillo (especially in the early phases of the movement during the V Day and V2 Day demonstrations) and Saro-Wiwa are points in case. Celebrities can bring attention, publicity and support to certain issues and grievances that had been previously ignored or considered secondary or unimportant by most observers and actors.

Thus we can see the parallel here between Saro-Wiwa's efforts to bring the international community's attention to the hardships of the Ogoni alongside Grillo's efforts to bring the Italian political community's attention to problems relating to Italy's electoral system, the presence of previously convicted members in parliament, as well as issues relating to the way the laws in Italy regulate journalism. The contexts in which these two actors moved couldn't be any more different, yet their use of their social capital as celebrities is very similar.

Bossi and Grillo: a tale of Italian populists

The last comparison intends to analyze Beppe Grillo in tandem with that other highly successful populist leader and mobilizer in the last 30 years of Italian political history, the Lega Nord leader Umberto Bossi. While the current political align-

ment and relationship with the political establishment of the current Lega Nord is very different from that of Grillo and the 5 Star Movement, there are some striking similarities between the latter and the *Lega Nord's* early history in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Indeed, some aspects of the *Lega Nord's* early rhetoric could almost be seen as a blueprint for the slogans that have been shouted recently by Grillo. Bossi and his supporters lamented the corruption and the inefficiency of Italy's Rome-based political establishment. They blamed Italy's national representatives for squandering the wealth produced in the economically thriving North, and sought to put an end to this through calls for devolution and independence.

Thus, Grillo shares the destructive aspect of Bossi's rhetoric in his early days but not the constructive one. That is, while the two lamented similar problems, they proposed vastly different solutions, at both the theoretical and practical level. Bossi wanted to create a new 'Northern Italian' or 'Padanian' regionalist identity and looked at the past for evidence of its pre-existence. Grillo's rhetoric is more interested in emerging concepts such as direct democracy and web tools, and looks towards the future for solutions to present problems.

Grillo and the Bossi of the early days also share a similar political and media trajectory. In the 1980s, and during the *Lega Nord's* first bids in local and European elections, Bossi was considered little more than a buffoon. Most conventional media snubbed him, and thought that it was highly unlikely that his Federalist cause and his fostering of 'Padanian' identity would gather much support. This situation was parallel to the Italian media's portrayal of Grillo's party before 2012. And just like everything changed for Bossi after Italy's 1992 Parliamentary elections, in which the Lega Nord gained a creditable 9%, everything changed for Grillo after his successes in 2012 and 2013. They both became too big to ignore and too big not to be taken seriously.

Thus, Bossi's rhetoric and political trajectory in the 1980s and early 1990s are important precedents for Grillo, because they highlight the continuing potential for anti-establishment messages in Italian politics. These types of messages may give birth to highly successful political movements in spite of the hostility from mainstream media and political leaders. In fact, far from damaging them, in both cases this hostility was used by these anti-establishment leaders to give further ammunition to their rhetoric and message.

On the whole, what can be learned by comparing Grillo to Coluche, Saro-Wiwa and Bossi? My suggestion is that Grillo's success as a leader and as a mobilizer is parallel to the dynamics that had brought these three leaders success in the past. Grillo shares Coluche's ability to use a wide range of cultural and rhetorical codes with his use of satire for propaganda. He also shares Saro-Wiwa's ability to use his social capital to bring media attention to previously overlooked political issues and mobilize supporters around them. Finally, Grillo also shares Bossi's ability to tap into resentment with Italy's political establishment, using the criticism from outsiders to his advantage. Additionally, Grillo, like Bossi, has also been able to form a new political movement and oversee the rapid growth of the movement at the polls by gathering support from voters who are disaffected with older and more established political forces.

The reasons for the 5 Star Movement's success: organizational structure, leadership, policies and context

While the previous two chapters have traced the historical imprint of the 5 Star Movement and its leader by looking at the movement's most salient events and analyzing notable precedents in past political leadership, the next two chapters bear an approach closer to the social sciences. Specifically, I seek to first trace the reasons for the movement's popularity by looking at the four main alleged reasons for its success, then I provide an overall assessment of the 5 Star Movement's placing on the political spectrum based on the available literature on the composition of its supporters.

In this chapter I thus seek to analyze the four most widely discussed factors that have been attributed for the 5 Star Movement's success. First off, I will look at the role of the movement's organizational structure, and I will seek to first consider all of the organizational components of the movement (the blog, the Meetup groups and the political candidacies and candidates) and assess their role in mobilizing supporters as well as assessing how much of a role has been played by online tools. Secondly, I will try to determine to what extent Grillo's leadership has played a crucial role in mobilizing support, and in part this chapter will synthesize some of the arguments made in the previous chapter. The third part of this chapter will deal with the role of the movement's policies.

Organization

As summarized in the second chapter, there are three partially overlapping phases in the history of the movement, which have made significant contributions to the movement's structure. First off is the start of the *beppegrillo.it* movement and the campaigns for the two V Days (up until 2007), in which the movement was more of a loosely tied network of fans of Grillo who had started debating through the blog. In the second phase, the Meetups were developed and widely promoted by the blog and the movement undertook its first forays in the electoral arena (from 2008 to 2009). The third phase (from 2009 onwards) saw the definite acquisition of the 5 Star Movement monicker, and is the more institutionally mature phase in which the transition from social movement to political party was completed (Passarelli, Tronconi and Tuorto 2013).

My suggestion is that every phase of the movement's institutional development took place as a response to some of the limitations of the previous one. After the V Day campaigns, the activists as well as Grillo and Casaleggio observed how the blog had fostered much online debate but few horizontal connections between activists. Thus, the Meetup groups were created and promoted to fulfill this task. Consequently, once the Meetup groups had been developed, the movement and its leaders thought that its territorial presence was sufficient to devote its energies to electoral campaigns.

Thus at first the blog provided the initial social capital for the movement, which could count on a large but loose group of fans of Beppe Grillo as potential targets for recruitment. Its initial role is fairly unequivocal. But how much of a role has been played by the Meetups? The available literature points out that there is a significant advantage in the fact that this is a non-hierarchical network of activists (unlike the much less egalitarian party organizational structures) (Mosca and Vaccari 2013). But there is another, much greater, advantage, to mobilizing through this platform:

'Social networks (...) favor a weak interaction between participants, which is much different from being a member of a traditional party- or also of a volunteering association- which presupposes a precise moral connection. The Meetup allows you to remain with a foot inside and a foot outside the movement. (...) The audience of potential activists which can be reached through the Meetup is massive, also because it is amplified by Grillo's blog. And this constitutes an incommensurable advantage com-

pared to traditional organizational forms.' (Passarelli, Tronconi and Tuorto 2013:128)

While the weak ties fostered by the Meetup groups have played perhaps the most important role in recruiting supporters, the movement's continued electoral presence in the years leading up to the 2013 election was its vehicle to mass popularity. In this context, the movement's refusal to affiliate itself with other political forces which were facing increasing setbacks, and the visibility it enjoyed and continues to enjoy thanks to Grillo and the popularity of the blog, have been decisive in guaranteeing the popularity and appeal of its candidates. In sum, my argument is that while the Meetups in combination with the blog have been the most decisive factors at the early stages of recruitment, the electoral wing of the movement in combination with the leader and the blog have been most crucial in the movement's electoral growth during the two years preceding the 2013 Parliamentary election.

Now that I have accounted for other organizational aspects, I will tackle one of the most widely asked questions about this political movement: how much of a role have online sources played in its success? The movement itself has extensively emphasized its intensive use of online sources for mobilizing supporters, however the literature takes a more pragmatic approach: Mosca and Vaccari (2013) observe that, beyond the dominant role of the *beppegrillo.it* blog in the movement's national and local initiatives, the lack of charismatic leadership at a peripheral level means that personal websites and blogs of its members only play a marginal level in campaigns. This is testified by the fact that the movement's candidates do not have much greater support on networking platforms compared to their counterparts in other political parties (Mosca and Vaccari 2013). Thus on the supply side, the movement's use of online tools is not much different than that of the more established political parties.

However, the picture on the demand side is much different. Mosca and Vaccari (2013:191) show that the 5 Star Movement candidates enjoy a much greater utility from being present on the web compared to other parties because their own supporters are much more attentive to what happens on the web compared to supporters of other parties.' Thus, while the movement's online activity on the web may not be greater than that of other parties, it is much more fruitful because its constituents are much more responsive to online campaigning. Mosca and Vaccari argue that this difference is crucial in ensuring the 5 Star Movement's electoral successes in spite of its relative poverty of resources compared to other parties.

Lastly, when assessing the role of online tools in the movement's success, we should consider their noticeable role in all of the movement's main mobilizing and participatory tools: even the Meetups, which are the movement's more exclusively offline organizational tool, are extensively advertised and organized online. But even though these online tools have certainly played a prominent role, we should not share the movement's activists' unconditional advocacy of their importance and prominence. Their success has been confirmed by a constituency that is exceptionally sensitive to online media as well as a large network of offline meetings and offline based groups. Thus, while it is certain that the Internet has played an unprecedentedly large role in the 5 Star Movement's success, it has been aided by a favorable context and an ability and willingness to use, at times, more conventional and offline based forms of organization.

On the whole, we have seen in these pages how the role of exclusively online tools, especially the movement blog, have played a decisive role in both recruiting supporters and ensuring the movement's electoral growth. However the movement's promotion of candidates, and the Meetup groups, which happened both online and offline, have been just as important. The 5 Star Movement's peculiar and informal organizational structure has done much to make it appealing to its prevalently young and highly educated constituents.

Leadership

Next up I will discuss the role of Grillo's leadership in fostering support for the movement. Grillo's centrality to this movement's success per se is beyond doubt. Many, if not most of this movement's supporters were fans of the comedian before they were supporters of the movement (Vignati 2013) and Grillo, through his and his staff's regular posts on the blog, has been crucial in mobilizing support for the V Days first and for the electoral campaigns later. Instead I will discuss a more contentious matter here: to what extent has Grillo been crucial as opposed to the movement's organizational structure and use of online tools?

Even when compared to a fairly important and innovative organizational structure, Grillo's leadership stands as even more crucial. Put simply, Grillo in many ways created the organizational form, by emphasizing direct democracy, use of online tools to foster support for his initiatives in his blog as well as in his standup show. The blog is a crucial part of the movement's organization, because it hosts and publicizes the Meetups, it publicizes the movement candidates, and it is the single most

important communicative outlet for this movement. And this blog is ran single handedly by Grillo and his staff. Even though activists do find a voice through the many forums and discussion groups, these are far less visible, and often liable to deletion by the web admins.

Thus is Grillo really the 'Deus ex Machina' which is by far the single most important factor that makes the movement exist in the way we know it? My answer is a definite yes in terms of Grillo's role in the movement's formation and his ability to aggregate and articulate the common grievances that he shares with his fans, yet the tensions over the control of the movement, especially in terms of the behavior of the elected officials show that this situation is very problematic and will likely be the source of tension in the years to come. However I will discuss this in the next chapter. For now I will limit myself to saying that this movement in many ways could have never existed in the way we know it without Grillo. He created a fan base and rapidly turned it into an ever expanding constituency of supporters. This shouldn't be seen in any way as a small achievement.

Policies and grievances

Next, I will try to shed light on the grievances which Grillo has brought to the fore and discuss which causes he has most effectively mobilized support for. The movement program is a good starting point for understanding the policies. It is divided in 7 chapters: 'state and citizens', 'energy', 'information', 'economy', 'transport', 'health' and 'education;' (beppegrillo.it 2013). In the chapter dealing with state and citizens this manifesto purports to cut public expenses in administration, including the abolition of provinces, cuts in parliamentary salaries and reduction of the number of councils (beppegrillo.it 2013). In the chapter on energy there is plenty on investment in renewable resources and reduction of wastes in energy production, while the chapter on information calls for drastic cuts in public financing of newspapers, television and radio but also seeks to guarantee Internet access for all citizens, as well as loosening copyright laws.

The chapter on the economy calls for greater regulation of the financial sector, abolishing state and private monopolies including those on railways, highways, telecommunication and energy as well as calling for establishing unemployment benefits and incentives to non profit organizations. The movement's transportation policies include more funding for public transport but an end to large public works such as the bridge on the Straits of Sicily and high speed train lines, while the

health care policies include reductions of public health care bills and prices of pharmaceutical products together with more investment of the state in health care, as well as increasing the accountability of doctors (beppegrillo.it 2013). The final chapter on education calls for more online education infrastructure, more overall investment in public schooling and in universities, and more extensive teaching of English starting in kindergarten.

Economically, this manifesto is very ambiguous: the many calls for privatization and reduction of public spending (especially in administration, politicians' salaries and incentives to media) are matched by extensive calls for increases in public spending (especially in health care, investment in renewables and education and research), so the 5 Star Movement can be seen as economically centrist whilst being very radical in its spending and cutting priorities. But this is also a very eclectic radicalism, which is dominated by ideas that have been the domain of the far left (such as environmentalism, support of renewable energy, public health care, education, public transport and no-profit organizations as well as regulation of the financial sector) as well as introducing ideas that are either extraneous or in opposition to the far left (especially the proposed abolition of state monopolies and reduction of public administration). Thus, it is an economically ambiguous manifesto, with some elements of far left dogma combined with others that have nothing to do with it. On the whole, the ideas that stand out the most are environmentalism, anti-corruption and support for reduction of costs of public administration.

But how much of an impact do these ideas have on the movement's support? Biorcio and Natale (2013) provide a very useful distinction between different members of the 5 Star Movement, which can be used to make sense of both the overall extent of policy support amongst the movement supporters as well as its relative importance as opposed to the recruitment capabilities of Grillo's charisma and the movement's organizational structure.

Biorcio and Natale divide the supporters in four groups. Amongst the more faithful supporters behind the movement we have the 'militants', who have a lot of enthusiasm for Grillo and are greatly motivated by the political program, as well as having a variable past electoral history with a large number of previously abstaining voters. This group amounts to about 25% of supporters. The second group, the 'leftists' has also been faithful to the 5 Star Movement and is composed by supporters who see themselves as radically left-wing and have a history of voting for left-wing parties. They are not as enthusiastic as the first group about Grillo and they tend to

worry about internal democracy within the movement, but they do wholeheartedly support most of the program and amount to 20% of supporters.

The next two groups have been supporting and/or voting for the movement in more recent times. First off we have the 'rationals' who have only started supporting the movement after the recent positive results at the administrative elections, and they see the 5 Star Movement as an opportunity to exert more control over national and local politics. Thus, this is more utilitarian-minded support which is not very enthusiastic about the proposed policies or Grillo's leadership, and amounts to about 30% of the total. The last group is called the 'least worse' group and it exhibits a widespread hatred of different forms of authority, including the state, law enforcement and the European Union. This group has more conservative leanings than the other and even some xenophobic tendencies and accounts for about 25% of supporters.

On the whole we can see that while the movement does not lack supporters 'of principle', due to its recently found ability to capture undecided voters who have had a history of voting for a wide range of political forces (as well as abstaining), these supporters do not amount to more than 45% of supporters. However, this data also indicates that the movement's policies are likely to bring more votes than Grillo himself, since the latter seems to only enjoy the wholehearted support of the first group. So, does Grillo actually enjoy less support than once thought? This may very well be the case amongst the movement voters. However, support for Grillo is likely to be higher amongst more engaged activists, who are far more likely to come from the first group and, to a lesser extent from the second, than the latter two. Because of this, even though the party's organizational structure may have encouraged participation and helped the movement in its emergence, it is likely that this has had a more limited impact on the movement's electoral successes at its peak, because during this period the movement's success was built on the recruitment of undecided and apathetic voters, belonging thus predominantly to the last two groups.

These four typologies can also help us think of how to assess the role of context in the 5 Star Movement's successes. While the first group is the only one that supports the movement exclusively because of its internal qualities, it is clear that the failings of the Italian radical left (especially its inability to capture seats in parliament in 2008) have played a large role in the movement's ability to recruit leftist supporters. Likewise, the failings of Italy's mainstream politicians and the uncertainty associated with the political crises in late 2011 and late 2012 which led, respective-

ly, to Berlusconi's resignation, and Monti's resignation and the preponement of elections, have played a significant role in recruiting many from the third group. Finally, the support from the fourth group has also depended on the widespread frustration and disappointment of Northern League and Forza Italia voters, as well as potentially the inability of any other far right formation to gain prominence in Italy's political arena.

Factors	Extent of influence in movement emergence	Extent of influence in growth of electoral support
Organizational structure and use of Internet	Medium/high	Medium/low
Grillo's leadership	High	Medium/high
Policies	None	Medium/high
Italian political context	Low/none	High

Table 3: Main factors behind the emergence and growth of the 5 Star Movement

In conclusion, I am convinced that Beppe Grillo and his ability to aggregate and articulate the grievances later expressed by the movement was the most decisive factor in this movement's emergence, together with the movement's peculiar organizational structure and use of Internet communication tools. I am conversely skeptical that the grievances themselves played a role: Italians have always been dubious of their political system, skeptical over the effectiveness of administration, and there have been no significant changes in recent times in support for environmental causes.

Furthermore, although the Italian political system is far from being the most closed to new entrants, I do not see any contextual variables decisively explaining the 5 Star Movement's entry into the arena. There may have been some factors over the last few years that have facilitated the 5 Star Movement's growth, but certainly not its birth. Likewise, the policies, which catered to a mixture of previously apathetic, conservative and left wing voters, have played a significant role in the movement's electoral expansion, while Grillo's charisma and the party's organizational structure are sources of dissatisfaction rather than motivation for new found support.

The 5 Star Movement in between populism, personalism and ideology

In this section I will analyze the 5 Star Movement in terms of the four most widely discussed labels that have been given to the party. The first is the issue of populism. I will compare this movement to past examples of populism as well as extensively using Corbetta (2013)'s discussion of this matter. In the second part I will contend with two contrasting labels that have been given to the movement: while on one hand some have described it as left-wing, others (including the movement's own posts and leader) have insisted in calling it 'post—ideological' or 'non-ideological': thus this part will discuss the movement's political philosophy and determine whether and how it can be defined on a left-right spectrum. In the last part I will continue the discussion of the role of personalism in this movement: after the previous account for its role in forming the party and fostering support. Finally, I will consider whether this movement can be seen as personalist in form.

Populism

So is this a populist party? Corbetta (2013) is wholeheartedly convinced that this is the case. They provide six aspects of populism (broad appeal to the people, identification of 'enemies of the people', strong and charismatic leadership, direct communicative style, oversimplification of complex issues and widespread use of mass media for appeal) and demonstrate the commonalities between the 5 Star Movement and previous populist parties and leaders along these dimensions.

Indeed, Grillo and his supporters do share many characteristics with famous populist leaders of past and present, ranging from Juan Perón to Jörg Haider, from Umberto Bossi to Hugo Chávez and Lázaro Cárdenas. But I seek to go beyond the authors' analysis and point out that the 5 Star Movement resembles some populist leaders more than others. For example, although Haider and Vlaams Block share some characteristics in their rhetoric and their leadership with recent right wing European populists such as Bossi, their vaguely redistributionist and at times anti-corporate policies have more in common with movements such as Hugo Chavez's *PSUV* or the recently prominent Greek SYRIZA party. In fact, the 5 Star Movement may be one of the few available examples, together with their Greek counterparts, of a successful fine tuning of mild Euroskepticism, anti-corporatism and environmentalism. With Hugo Chávez the commonalities may lie more with communicative style and personalism as well as some aspects of rhetoric.

On the whole, the 5 Star Movement has more in common with left-wing than right-wing populism, and the lack of examples that mirror the experience of the movement may also be due to the dearth of recent examples of successful left-wing populism in Europe. Therefore, Grillo and his supporters are an anomaly because their combination of rhetorical style and ideology has not been seen in Europe in recent years. In sum, Grillo is certainly a populist, and he is more of a left-wing than a right-wing populist. The lack of recent precedents of this political formula may partly explain why he is seen as such an anomaly.

Ideology

My placing of Grillo as a more of a left-wing populist than a right-wing populist, as well as the observations made about his movement's manifesto in the previous chapter also mean that in my opinion this is not a post-ideological movement, and that, even though there are abundant anomalies and contradictions, this is still much more of a left-wing political movement than a right-wing political movement.

After all, the manifesto only includes some policies that can be associated with conventional right-wing economic policy (most notably some proposals for privatization of public assets and for a referendum on the Euro), but this is counterbalanced by extensive policies (both economic and social) conventionally associated with the left (environmentalism, more investment in a number of public services, more control of the financial sector).

In spite of this, some newspaper reports have pointed to vaguely anti-immigrant rhetoric in some of the blog's posts and have attempted to compare the 5 Star Movement to right wing populists such as UKIP or the *Lega Nord* (*L'Eco Di Bergamo* 13/03/2013 and Painter 2013). However, I remain wholly unconvinced by these arguments, because there is little to no evidence that can support them in the party's official documents.

The blog very recently issued a statement (beppegrillo.it 2013) in which it refused classifications of the movement on a left-to-right wing scale, but the manifesto as well as Biorcio and Di Natale's discussion of the different components of the movement's electoral supporters tell a different story. In fact, the only positions of the movement that could in some way be considered "post- ideological" are the struggle against corruption and excessive administration spending and the emphasis and encouragement of Internet use.

But while the first two positions have been within the domain of the mainstream left in the recent past in Italy (notably Di Pietro's IDV party, one of the mainstream political forces that have been close to Grillo and, to a lesser extent, the PD), the Internet has been used so far predominantly (but not exclusively) as platform for support by other movements such as Anonymous, the *Indignados*, Occupy Wall Street and the Pirate Party, whose cultural and ideological DNA belong much more to the left than to the right. Therefore, I suggest that the 5 Star Movement's self-depiction as a 'post-ideological' force should be considered with caution: in terms of its policies and members, this is not a completely post-ideological force, and it is more left wing and progressive in nature than conservative.

Personalism

Last but not least, is the 5 Star Movement a personalist movement? In the previous chapters I have indicated that, Grillo's role has been nothing short of fundamental in both the formation of the movement as well as increasing the movement's electoral footprint by numerous speeches, rallies, public appearances and through his

posts on the blog. I am thus unequivocal in arguing that this movement is profoundly personalistic.

The leading academic (Lanfrey 2011; Biorcio and Natale 2013; Corbetta 2013; Mosca and Vaccari 2013; Passarelli, Tronconi and Tuorto 2013; Vignati 2013) and journalistic (Scanzi, 2008; De Maria, Fleischner and Targia, 2008) literature has been very ready to emphasize Grillo's overwhelming influence on the movement, and its role in triggering the tensions that have led to the expulsion of some of its elected officials. Moreover, the movement's rise in popularity and Grillo and Casaleggio's continued insistence in controlling the behavior of the movement's elected members and repressing dissent are well known by press and academics alike. Thus, not only is this a deeply personalist movement, where the leader's voice trumps all others, but this personalism is also very likely to be the main source and cause of internal disputes in the movement. The recent exit of some of the 5 Star Movement's newly elected members of parliament from their parliamentary group has given confirmation to these fears (*Il Fatto Quotidiano* 06/07/2013).

Why have these tensions happened? Some of this movement's features, especially the emphasis on direct democracy and its leader's choice not to run for elected office, are testimony to the fact that there is a strong desire for this to strive to be the most internally democratic political formation possible. Its elected members also shy away from conventional expectations about personalist political movements. Yet these tendencies are of lesser significance compared to the control that Grillo and Casaleggio exercise over the party's endorsement of candidates and rules for elected officials as well as Grillo's monopoly over the movement's main media outlet, the blog. Just like the movement's populism, this personalism presents anomalous characteristics that set it aside from previous examples and cases, but nevertheless it comfortably fits the label.

In sum, the 5 Star Movement, in spite of its idiosyncrasies and peculiar features is definitely a populist movement and is just as certainly a personalist movement. Its overall policy positions may cause some confusion, but they belong to the domain of left-wing parties more so than they do to the domain of right wing parties. This evidence also justifies why the labels 'post ideological' and 'neither left wing nor right wing', advocated by the movement and its leader, are not completely revealing in terms of its policy positions.

Conclusion: what next for the movement?

In these pages I have attempted to provide an overview for English speaking activists and academics about the movement that has shook Italian politics to the core in recent years. I sketch out the main characteristics of the 5 Star Movement. First I have traced its brief but eventful history, including its electoral growth, a summary of policies and a description of the main internal tensions that have occurred so far, providing an account that is far more comprehensive than the (scant) English speaking literature on this movement. In the second chapter I have tried to describe the movement's unique style of leadership and rhetoric through three notable precedents (of which two have been objects of extended comparison on behalf of past authors). This part will be of most use for activists and academics who are attempting to understand the degree of singularity in the Grillo phenomenon.

In the last two chapters I have discussed and compared the relative levels of agency of the main causes for the movement's emergence and success, including organizational form and role of Internet sources, unique leadership style, policies and context. These chapters thus seek to understand what are the essential components behind the movement and its success. In the last chapter I have argued that this is a personalist and populist movement, which shares far more policy positions with left-wing movements than right-wing movements. Thus, my conclusion goes beyond the reductionist labels given by the Italian and foreign press and towards a more nuanced understanding of the essence of the 5 Star Movement.

At this point it is reasonable to ask what lies ahead for the 5 Star Movement. The impressive recent electoral result has certainly bolstered the movement's supporters' hopes to become, at some point in the near future, Italy's sole governing force, as well as providing motivation for rejecting any compromise with other political forces. Yet many point out that the movement's level of potential support may have reached its peak, and the results of the elections that took place a few months after the Parliamentary elections seem to indicate that while the 5 Star Movement is still a very salient political force, its support may be on the decline rather than vice-versa.

Furthermore, the movement's internal tensions have been on the increase, and have been abundantly picked up by the Italian newspapers, which, due partly to Grillo's inflammatory declarations against journalists, as well as the 5 Star Movement's policy positions (especially what was advocated during the V2 Day) remains

overwhelmingly hostile. Thus, there is plenty of evidence to argue that the movement may have missed its best chance to influence policy by rejecting an alliance with the PD in the aftermath of the Parliamentary elections.

However, we should not forget that the 5 Star Movement is currently the main voice of the opposition to the current government. Should the PD-PDL coalition falter in its popularity, the 5 Star Movement will be more than willing to be a vehicle of popular discontent. Its recent history shows a track record of capitalizing on opponents' weaknesses whilst not succumbing to its own. If this pattern keeps repeating itself, it may not be unforeseeable that the movement's support grows even bigger.

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About the author

Eric Turner is a 4th year half Italian half British PhD Sociology student from the University of New Mexico, specializing in social movements in Europe and the US and comparative sociology. Eric also teaches classical and contemporary sociological theory and social movements. In 2013 he has published 'The Grillini in Italy: New Horizons for Internet-based Mobilization and Participation' (in *Social Movement Studies*) as well as 'New Movements, Digital Revolution and Social Movement Theory' (in *Peace Review*). In his current project, which will be the topic of his dissertation, Eric is analyzing city-level dynamics of mobilization, repression and the role of online tools in the Occupy Movement in the US. Email address: eturne84 AT unnm.edu

Transnational diffusion of a high-cost protest method: open field destructions in France, Germany and Spain

Franz Seifert¹

Abstract

This contribution analyzes the cross-border diffusion of the radical protest method of open field destruction, i.e., the destruction of fields cultivated with Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) coram publico. Open field destruction was a key protest method in France's relatively successful anti-GM movement. The analysis elucidates how this method has been adopted by activists in Spain and Germany, in order to shed light on the mechanisms involved in the cross-boundary diffusion of movement repertoires. Through a review of the literature this study specifically analyzes the diffusion of a practice that incurs high costs, because activists who engage in this practice can be held accountable in a court of law and often face severe penalties. While the protest method's cross-border transmission is shown to be based on simple emulation, the reasons for its relative success or failure in a new environment are shown to depend on local factors such as public responsiveness and the severity of state repression. It is found that the social context created by actors, discourses and practices within the receiving anti-GM movement is of particular importance.

1. Diffusion of high-cost protest methods: the case of open field destruction

Movements assert their claims by employing a range of routines, actions, methods and tactics the entirety of which has become established in the literature by the term 'repertoire of contention' (hereinafter repertoire) (e.g. Tilly 1995: 26-27). A repertoire is historically contingent and alterable; it changes as a result of adaptation, innovation and learning processes. One central learning mechanism is based on 'diffusion', that is, the adoption of ideas and practices by movements from other, geographically or temporally distant movements. Diffusion within and between movements is a ubiquitous phenomenon. Protest movements do not entirely reinvent themselves with every new conflict; rather they are influenced by other movements. Observing the link between diffusion and movements therefore gives us a clearer picture of their interconnectedness, allowing us to perceive them as a common flow rather than distinct entities (McAdam and Rucht 1993, Soule 2004, Kolins Givan et al.

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2010). It has been hypothesized that transnational diffusion processes increase as social movements adapt to economic, legal, and political globalisation by engaging in activities that cross national boundaries. With the interaction between national arenas intensifying, movements are expected to increase their inclination to adopt ideas and practices from one another, thus allowing nationally fragmented movements to become more homogenous (Della Porta and Kriesi 1999: 6-10).

Against the background of this far-reaching claim this study explores, in detail, the diffusion of a protest method which is *not* expected to diffuse smoothly across country boundaries as it burdens adopters with particularly 'high costs'. According to the prevailing school of thought in the study of social movements, some practices are adopted more easily than others since "(m)ovement actors will make their strategic choices on the basis of their appreciation of the specific chances of reform and threat, and the specific risks of repression and facilitation they face" (Kriesi 2004: 78). Consequently, practices and ideas that spare potential adopters significant costs or risks will be more easily adopted than practices presumed to require a substantial amount of resources and commitment, or that are feared will provoke repression by state authorities or counter reaction from opponents. By the same token, the diffusion of low-cost practises can be thought of as a regular and straightforward process. The spread of Guy-Fawkes masks among Occupy and Anonymous activists in the U.S. and Western Europe may serve as an example. Provided there are no bans on face coverings, the cost of wearing these masks equals their purchasing price. Unhampered by costs or constraints, the identifying mark for smart subversion spreads quickly.

Comparatively, the diffusion of a high-cost practice should occur rarely, for example, exposing oneself to state reprisals or excessive police violence through acts of civil disobedience. These practices, too, sometimes set precedents and find imitators abroad but it is obvious that movement actors need strong reasons for engaging in them. While the diffusion of 'low-cost' practices appears to be straightforward, the diffusion of 'high-cost' protest calls for further explanation. Is the collective grievance that gives rise to the movement constructed in a way that calls for heroism and self sacrifice? Or is the method expected to generate a high 'pay off' in terms of public resonance and political impact that justifies its costs and risks? How does the diffusion process of such a demanding practice work? Does it require more than mere imitation as, for example, in the case of the Guy-Fawkes mask? Does the adopted practice spread in the new environment, or turn out to be a non-starter? Does it deliver the desired pay-off? What are the reasons for success or failure?

In short, the adoption of a high-cost practice can be expected to be a relatively rare, demanding and therefore complex process. Consequently, the exploration of such a process promises to yield insights into the social mechanisms that form the basis of diffusion in general. The analysis of just one specific, 'improbable' case of diffusion is not designed to test the general hypothesis of a general rise in diffusion between national movements. It does, however, help to

develop a realistic understanding of such a process by shedding light on the problems that arise when activists, under the impression of their successful fellow campaigners abroad, decide to adopt their methods in order to make a difference in their own countries.

I will examine a particular high-cost practice within the European anti-GM movement- the open destruction of fields cultivated with genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Within the anti-GM movement's repertoire the practice of open field destruction is arguably the most confrontational and the one that entails the highest costs for activists. An open field destruction is when activists, within the public eye, vandalise GMO-fields that are set up for commercial and/or experimental purposes and thereby take on the full responsibility for the consequences in terms of police repression and legal repercussions. The activists use the mass media and public attention thus generated to launch their political criticism of the technology and the state support it garners. Open field destructions must be distinguished from covert or anonymous field destructions, which, however, also constitute an important direct action method within the repertoire of the anti-GM movement in various countries, mostly the UK and Germany. While activists sometimes combine these action forms, they are nevertheless distinct: covert action does not burden activists with the same costs and risks as does open protest (unless they are caught), nor is covert action designed to create the same amount of publicity since the perpetrators remain anonymous and cannot stage their message openly at public trials, nor do activists enjoy the same amount of legitimacy as they refuse to be held accountable for their actions.

While most countries have never been confronted with open GMO field destructions, in France the method was of key significance. In using this method, activists dominated the public debate over a period of ten years, thus significantly contributing to the fundamental reform of France's biotechnology policy. Impressed by the campaign's impact in France, certain activist groups in Germany and Spain engaged in the same practice in their countries. As these cases present clearly defined instances of diffusion, an analysis based on these three countries provides a rare occasion to study the diffusion of a high-cost practice. The analysis examines the emergence, continuance and effect of this practice, focussing on its transfer from France to Germany and Spain. It enquires into the ways by which the concept of open field destruction travelled to its adopters, and into the qualities of the receiving environments that proved responsible for its relative success or failure.

The study contributes to both the general literature on diffusion of protest repertoires (e.g. Kolins Givan et al. 2010) and to the growing body of research focussing on the method of open field destruction (Heller 2002; Hayes 2006; Bonneuil et al. 2008; Doherty and Hayes 2012). It also goes beyond the last-cited studies, most of which focus on France (Doherty and Hayes compare activism in France and the United Kingdom) by adding evidence from Germany and Spain. So far, studies on GM-field destructions in Germany in particular, and the anti-GM movement in Spain, in general, are lacking.

The remainder of the article is structured as follows: to begin with, the term diffusion will be explained along with an overview of materials and methods given (Chapters 2 and 3). Chapter 4 covers the EU-wide anti-GM movement while Chapter 5 outlines the anti-GM movement in France, which will be followed by an account of the diffusion process involving Spanish and German activists in comparison to France (Chapters 6 and 7). In conclusion, there will be an analytical discussion of the diffusion of open field destruction (Chapters 8 and 9).

2. The concept of diffusion

Diffusion is an established concept in movement research (Kolins Givan et al. 2010). As a general social phenomenon, diffusion denotes the dispersion of practices and ideas. From an analytical perspective, diffusion always runs from a sender to a receiver or adopter. From an empirical standpoint, diffusion entails contents as diverse as behaviours, strategies, world perspectives or material and technical objects. Diffusion operates through social mechanisms such as contagion, emulation, social learning, or deliberate dissemination. Diffusion takes place between or within movements as they learn from each other and serve as models for one another. Diffusion crosses temporal and geographic gaps, which might imply a transnational adoption process.

The concepts prevailing in the literature look into the social mechanisms underlying diffusion from two angles. Firstly, they deal with the media and channels of diffusion; secondly, they seek to explain the reasons why adoption processes succeed or fail. In regards to the first aspect, the main differences here are between hierarchical and proximate diffusion models (Soule 2004). In the hierarchical model, diffusion emanates from actors on a higher ranking level, whereas in the proximate model contents are being adopted mainly as a function of geographical proximity (ibid., 295). McAdam and Rucht (1993) draw a further distinction between 'relational' and 'non-relational diffusion'. The first type denotes diffusion processes in which movements are 'learning' from each other through direct, that is personal, ties between activists. In the second type adoption processes take place without personal contact between actors. Instead, adopters receive information about action models circulates through the mass media or digital networks. McAdam and Rucht (1993) describe this as relational as opposed to non-relational diffusion; however, while they argue that direct contact decisively facilitates diffusion, they also acknowledge that relational and non-relational mechanisms work mostly in tandem.

Regarding the second aspect, Giugni emphasizes that "once information about events abroad is available through direct or indirect channels, organizational, political, and cultural factors may facilitate the diffusion of protest from one country to the other" (1995: 188). The key organizational condition to be met is the presence of a movement subculture at the receiving end. "If no political potential is available for mobilization, diffusion cannot take place" (ibid.). The major cultural factor that facilitates diffusion is the attribution of similarity

between adopters and transmitters: if potential adopters recognize their counterparts abroad as being 'of the same kind', they are more prone to adopt some ideas and practices of the transmitter's repertoire. Finally, political opportunities and constraints in the receiving environment improve or limit the chances of success of any innovation in repertoires, including those adopted from movements abroad. In the presence of favorable political opportunities, diffusion is likely to occur, while weak opportunities or constraints have the opposite effect. Political opportunities influence an imported innovation's chances of success by creating a repressive or facilitative environment, by constituting a threat, which renders mobilization necessary, or, conversely, by inducing a reform process that renders protests unnecessary.

These concepts, both on the channels of diffusion and the organizational, cultural and political factors that influence the adoption process, guide the empirical exploration of how the protest method of open field destruction found its way from France to Germany and Spain, respectively. As a background hypothesis it is assumed that social movements are subject to a trend towards transnationalisation and—by means of diffusion—transnational homogenisation.

3. Materials and methods

This analysis employs qualitative as well as quantitative materials and methods. The qualitative approach makes use of available online media material from the three countries involved, information materials from the movement scene, as well as qualitative interviews and notes taken during participant observation and field research among radical activists in Germany, France and Spain. In Germany, I participated in a gathering of anti-GM activists preceding an open field destruction that took place in Kitzingen (Bavaria) in June 2008 (see Photos 2 and 3), and a public trial held against activists who had participated in open field destructions in Aschersleben (Saxony-Anhalt) in 2010; furthermore, I attended a strategic activist workshop in Leipzig (Saxony) in 2011. In France, I took part in the annual meeting of anti-GM activists committed to open field destructions near Lyon in July 2008. In Spain (Photo 1) I conducted field research, meeting Spanish anti-GM activists over a two weeks period in April 2009 in Saragossa (Aragon), Bilbao (Basque Country), and Barcelona (Catalonia) (Photo 4). The qualitative data gained on these field trips constitute detailed sources for understanding activists' appraisal of adopted action repertoires, contextual factors influencing success or failure of the adopted method, and internal decision-making processes.

The quantitative approach allows for an objectified comparison of national movements and the assessment of the relative weight of radical protest forms within these movements. For this purpose, the method of comparative protest event analysis is employed, which constitutes a standard method in social movement research (Koopmans and Rucht 2002). According to research questions, protest event analyses are designed in various ways; however, generally, they are geared toward the creation of quantitative data sets whose

unit typically is the protest event or, generally speaking, a concrete example of movement action. The given protest event analysis builds on the basis of pertinent articles published in the widely read periodicals *El País*, *Le Monde* and *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, spanning the entire range of the respective anti-GM movement's activities during the years 1995 to 2009. These progressive, qualitative periodicals of national standing are frequently analysed for like purposes as they count as comparable (ibid.; for a critical appraisal of the method see also Fillieule and Jimenez 2003).

In the analysis at hand, a pre-selection on the basis of comparable key words in the respective languages was executed. All protest events, which are defined as the units of analysis, were drawn out of this population of articles (N = 1,341). From these protest events, 138 occurred in Spain, 590 in Germany and 612 in France. The database encompasses a broad range of movement actors and repertoires, for example events as diverse as street protests, political lobbying, hunger strikes, but also court trials or activists' arrests. For each event, information regarding the time, place, actors, co-operations, methods, goals, targets and counter actions were coded. The analysis and categorization of these multi-faceted events will follow according to the research questions.

4. The European anti-GM movement

The European anti-GM movement started in the summer of 1996 when Greenpeace began to campaign against the importation of unlabelled GM corn and soybeans from the US. In the following years, public opinion shifted in several EU countries and brought about key changes of national policies. The EU-wide approval process for the commercial release of GMOs stalled and, in summer 1999, was finally blocked by a group of member states that vetoed any further authorization. In the years that followed, the EU regulatory framework underwent a profound overhaul focusing on food labelling and risk management. After the authorization process, which allows companies to seek permission to grow and sell GMOs, resumed in the year 2004, the conflict between GM-averse member states and the European Commission lingered on.

The European anti-GM movement has been described as a multi-level movement whose actors also seek to influence the policy process beyond the national arenas (Ansell et al. 2006). A key role is played by international environmental organisations such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth whose operational scope ranges from national arenas to supranational organisations and whose engagement was decisive in the political change of the EU and global environmental agreements (ibid., 100). These and other transnational NGOs who coordinated campaigns across national borders also acted as vehicles of transnational diffusion processes. An example of this would be Greenpeace's Europe-wide campaign against unlabelled GM food. The coordination of these Europe wide campaigns by transnational movement organisations also brought about a diffusion of protest methods whereby transnational organisations, in this case, either hierarchically instruct their local

organisational branches or act as mediators of transnational diffusion processes. However, despite these examples of the movement's transnationalisation, evidence suggests that both national states and national publics continue to constitute the essential context of movement action.

This specifically holds for radical protest methods such as the damaging of GM fields. Studies that compare GM field trashing campaigns in France and the UK, where this radical method became a key tactic of anti-GM activism, highlight the idiosyncrasies of these national campaigns. They argue that their radicalization follows from national political opportunity structures, while the way the anti-GM movement made use of field trashing was shaped by specific movement traditions (Doherty and Hayes 2012). Yet, despite this radical method's rootedness in local contexts, traditions and repertoires, the following paragraphs will show that even the method of open field destruction diffuses across national boundaries.

5. France's anti-GM movement and open field destructions

There are two features that distinguish the French anti-GM movement from respective national movements: the initially prominent role of the *Confédération Paysanne* (subsequently *Confédération*) and the charismatic leadership of the farmer activist José Bové (Seifert 2009). The left-wing *Confédération*, founded in 1987, advocates small scale, sustainable agriculture and denounces agriculture's industrialisation and liberalisation respectively. The *Confédération* has its roots in the national protest movement against the setting up of a military precinct in the Larzac, a limestone plateau in Southern France (1971 to 1981).

José Bové is one of the founding members of the *Confédération* and acted as its spokesperson from 2000 to 2004. He ran in the French presidential elections of 2007 and received 1.3 percent of valid votes (generally considered a modest outcome). In 2009, he became elected as a Member of the European Parliament for the alliance *Europe Écologie*. Bové is widely famous in France. He owes this popularity to his spectacular engagement against agricultural biotechnology. The initial event, however, which catapulted him into the media spotlight was his arrest and subsequent three week long incarceration for damages caused to a McDonald's restaurant in the city of Millau during farmer protests against the WTO in the summer of 1999. This incident triggered a wave of public solidarity, which turned him into a national celebrity overnight. In later controversies, the rural activist made good use of his newly gained reputation in a skilful combination of activism, provocation and polemic, for instance by his appearance in the WTO protests in Seattle in November 1999 (Heller 2002: 29-33), or by his prominent participation in the campaign regarding the referendum over a proposed EU Constitution in May 2005. The lion's share of Bové's fame, however, can be attributed to the controversial methods he used during his engagement against agricultural biotechnology, namely the method of open field destruction.

These two key actors - José Bové and the *Confédération* - entered the debate after 1997 when the decision within the *Confédération* to actively engage with agricultural biotechnology was taken.² After a first field destruction in June 1997 went largely unnoticed by the public, in January 1998 a crowd of about a hundred activists, among them the then still unknown José Bové, invaded a Novartis storehouse in Nérac (Aquitaine), where they proceeded to render GM seed stored there unusable. The event was the first to receive any amount of public attention. Even more intense was the public interest in the trial that followed in February 1999. Three activists were convicted to suspended sentences of several months and ordered to pay a considerable amount of money for damages to Novartis.³ The activists' strategy was to turn the trial into a trial against the genetic technology, for which they were even prepared to receive higher sentences. At the same time the legal defence, who called prominent critics of biotechnology as witnesses, insisted that the actions were legitimate. According to this argument, the true offence did not consist of a damage to private property but of the fact that a harmful technology was being introduced for the sake of corporate profit (Heller 2002: 16-18). Over the following years, legal complications stemming from this trial generated a series of further protests.⁴

These events mark the beginning of a field destruction campaign by the *Confédération* lasting several years. Two fields were destroyed in 1998 and seven in 1999, each modelled upon the same pattern. A protest in June 1999 conducted jointly with a group of peasant activists from India marks another highlight. About 50 peasant activists associated with the 'Intercontinental Caravan' and *Confédération* respectively, once again under the leadership of Bové and others, entered the precincts of the *Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le développement* (CIRAD, International Centre of Cooperation for Agronomical Research for Development) in Montpellier where they destroyed a trial of transgenic rice. Yet another protest action against the *Centre technique interprofessionnel des oléagineux métropolitains* (CETIOM, Technical Center for Oilseed Crops and Industrial Hemp) in Gaudiès followed suit (ibid., 21-23).

Public research facilities were deliberately chosen as targets. In the course of the ensuing trials, the activists denounced the, according to them misleading, distinction between private, profit oriented research and research for the public good. According to the activists, what was legitimized as research in the public interest was in fact industry's Trojan horse. The destruction of state-funded

² This corresponds to the period when François Dufour was spokesperson for the *Confédération* (1996-2000). Dufour together with the founding members Bové and René Riesel had a decisive part in designing the organisation's radical strategy.

³ 500,000 Francs which equals €76,000.

⁴ There are 50 follow up events directly related to this trial that are registered on the data-base, at least half of which represent demonstrations and acts of solidarity with the convicted activists.

trials served as both material and symbolic acts designed to cause damage to industry and the abundant state support from which industry benefits.

Open field destruction established itself as the central protest method, combining several functions. Beyond the material damage it inflicts on field trials and related facilities, the ensuing principled debate on the uses and dangers of biotechnology sought to force a change of perspectives on both the public and decision makers. Activism in the leftist tradition of civil disobedience and 'active Republican citizenship' (Doherty and Hayes 2012: 14-15) won the favour of major parts of the French public and served as justification in court. Moreover, Bové's concomitant anti-neoliberal engagement, addressing both national and transnational publics, coupled the GMO issue with the rapid rise of the French alter-globalization protest cycle (Heller 2002; Bonneuil et al. 2008: 219; Seifert 2009).

In the following years, the *Confédération* activists continued their direct action campaign whereby the popularity of the 'activist star' José Bové helped turn the public eye toward the campaign.⁵ Sympathizers of the movement frequently participated in field destructions, such as representatives of the alter-globalization think tank *Attac* and France's Green Party. Noël Mamère, well known in France particularly after he ran for president in the 2002 presidential campaign, can serve as an example of the latter. Others are the vice president of the European Parliament Gérard Onesta, or Gilles Lemaire, who was secretary of the Green Party from 2003 to 2005.

In 1999 three additional field destructions followed, four in 2000, nine in 2001, and twenty-one in 2003. Anonymous groups carried out the majority of these actions. 2003 was a key year: the public debate peaked anew, since Bové had to serve a prison sentence regardless of many attempts to avert this. In this year, 64.4 percent of all protests revolved around Bové. Moreover, the 30-year anniversary of the Larzac movement (rallying 200,000 followers) brought about the foundation of the *faucheurs volontaires* ('voluntary mowers', henceforth '*faucheurs*'). In subsequent years, the organisation that committed itself to the non-violent struggle against agricultural biotechnology by means of civil disobedience and open field destructions grew to 6,700 (*Faucheurs volontaires* 2007). The founding of this specialised organisation combined several functions. Firstly, it expanded the basis of activists beyond the *Confédération* into urban milieus. Secondly, the growing financial pressure from past convictions and fines should be taken off the *Confédération*. Finally, the support for Bové within the *Confédération* was no longer divided. Even though the proverbial 'Bové-effect' boosted the *Confédération's* popularity, the media savvy activist also divided his rural following (Seifert 2009: fn. 12, 25).

Since 2004, the *faucheurs* claimed responsibility for most of the field destructions as well as the ensuing trials. The data set between 2004 and 2007

⁵ In no other country did the anti-GM movement focus so greatly on a central figure as it did in France. Almost a third of all protest events (32.4 percent) actually centred on José Bové, a further 10.9 percent involved Bové in one way or the other.

yields 72 field destructions, of which 43 were claimed by the *faucheurs*. The majority of the attacks were directed towards field trials used for pre-commercial, industrial cultivation, which therefore became a risky undertaking. While the number of field trials decreased, the amount of field destructions increased. In 2001 one of six field trials was destroyed, the figure was one of three in 2003, and in 2004 it grew to half of all field trials (Bonneuil et al. 2008).

The *faucheurs* proceeded peacefully. Aggression was directed against test fields or facilities only, never against people. Only on the side of the *faucheurs* were there ever injuries. At the protest in Valdivienne in 2004, 500 *faucheurs* were confronted by 300 anti-riot officers from the Mobile Gendarmerie who guarded the trial field with the use of tear gas and shock grenades, injuring 15 people (Kempf 2004). The campaign took a confrontational turn when after the end of the moratorium it began targeting commercial fields. On these few occasions, *faucheurs*, proprietors and agro-biotech supporters clashed.



Photo 1: June 17th 2008, Simandres (Rhône). After the annual meeting of the faucheurs in 2008 Grigny (Rhône) near Lyon, activists come together at a field supposed to be cultivated with GM maize. As there was no other way to identify GM-fields, a DNA test had to be conducted on plant material. After the samples tested negative the activists desisted from invading the field. The episode illustrates that not even the very act of an open field destruction is as straightforward as one might imagine. Photo by the author.

The actions were followed by a series of consequences. In the course of the campaign "the police response evolved from initial watchfulness to prevention and intervention" (Hayes 2006: 834). This brought about several instances of severe police action against activists involving the employment of "barricades, tear gas, stun grenades and baton charges" resulting in injuries among activists such as "burns, broken bones, shrapnel wounds, and punctured eardrums" (ibid.: 831). As regards legal consequences, from 2004 until 2009 the activists appeared before court twenty-four times, often with much media coverage. Activists were convicted fourteen times; on nine occasions (mostly suspended) jail sentences and fines were imposed on single individuals or groups respectively. Actual jail time was served in only four instances from 1999 to 2003, affecting both José Bové and his fellow campaigner René Riesel. Since the prosecution only held the instigators or organizers responsible, they were soon charged with a virtually unmanageable amount of penalties. The attempt of the *faucheurs'* lawyers to set up the movement of the '*comparants volontaires*' (voluntary accused), with hundreds of activists claiming penal responsibility for the acts, failed in court. Sometimes reluctance to cooperate in the course of repressive measures resulted in additional penal consequences, thus multiplying legal procedures and generating further media reports.⁶

In the end, the campaign of the French anti-GM activists proved an outstanding success. Even though France's biotechnology policy had been a cautious one since the summer of 1998, when France had played a leading role in establishing the EU-moratorium on GM-product authorizations, in the mid-2000s France began to turn away from GMO releases in general. Beginning in 2001, a growing number of communities issued local bans against field trials on their territory (Bonneuil et al. 2008: 222). In 2004, France's Socialist Party (*Parti Socialiste*, PS) adopted a critical stance on biotechnology (ibid. 221). In 2007, presidential candidate Ségolène Royal (PS) made a moratorium on GMO releases a promise of her campaign. In late summer 2007, the summit conference *Grenelle Environnement*, deciding on the future directions of France's environmental policy, set the course to the prohibition of the only GM corn variety approved for commercial cultivation in the EU. In January 2008, president Nicolas Sarkozy enacted the prohibition of the GM corn MON 810 marketed by Monsanto. Remaining field trials were destroyed in 2008 and 2009.

The direct action campaign against GMO releases led by the *Confédération* and, since 2004, the *faucheurs* constituted the driving force and outstanding feature of the French anti-GM movement.⁷ The reasons for the strong public resonance,

⁶ For example, the categorical refusal of many activists to deliver saliva samples for the purpose of 'DNA fingerprinting' resulted in fines and (suspended) jail sentences. In 2006, the refusal to pay the compensation fee of €63,000 to the seed company Pioneer led to the closure of Noël Mamère's private account. Since 2006, Gilles Lemaire was threatened with the forced sale of his Parisian apartment in order to satisfy the compensation claims of the company Biogemma (sans-gene.org 2012).

⁷ This is reflected in numbers: the *Confédération* took part in 38.7%, the *faucheurs* in 23.7% of all protest events, almost always in a leading position, while the third most important actor, Greenpeace France, appears in only in 14.5 %.

thus, political influence, that these groups and their key protest method attained are, first, the activist genius of José Bové who positioned himself as a dramatic focus in France's public arena; secondly, the skillful framing of open field destruction as a legitimate defence against corporate domination, ecological degradation and neo-liberal globalization and finally, the consistency and intransigence with which the method was applied in spite of, at times, harsh police repression and penal sanctions.

6. The broader anti-GM movements in Spain and Germany

Groups in Spain and Germany have adopted the method of open field destruction. However, both the method and the groups that make use of it are only a few elements among many in wider national anti-GM movements. In order to better understand the course and eventual success of this adoption process, it is pertinent to first take a look at the wider anti-GM movements in these countries.

6.1 Spain's anti-GM movement

Spain lies at the permissive end of the European spectrum in national biotechnology policies. Only in Spain is large scale commercial cultivation of GM crops taking place. Currently, this is happening on about 8,000 ha, mainly in the autonomous communities of Catalonia and Aragon. Spain also belongs to the few EU member countries where field trials have not been reduced significantly in the past ten years.

The reasons for this exceptional position are, first, the relatively early authorization of GM corn in 1998, immediately after EU-wide approval, while other EU member states still hesitated and eventually withheld the authorization. Secondly, Spain persistently maintained a permissive policy regarding biotechnology product approval and regulation, upheld by both the conservative government under José María Aznar (1996 – 2004), and the socialist government under José Rodríguez Zapatero (2004 – 2011). Another important factor is Spain's weak anti-GM movement, which up to today has hardly any public support. The environmental group most consistently involved in anti-GM activism is *Greenpeace España*.

In the early years the movement's activity level was low and, after an intermitting mobilization in the year 1999, remained so in subsequent years, with a concentration of most protest events in Catalonia. Greenpeace did not step up its campaign until 2002. In 2006, Greenpeace, together with the Catalan peasant organisation *Assemblea Pagesa* (Catalan: Peasant Assembly) and the Catalan anti-GM group *Transgènics Fora* (Catalan: GMOs out!) presented an internationally recognized study which demonstrated that interbreeding of conventional and GM varieties was inevitable, thus rendering the coexistence of both cultures impossible. From 2007 to 2008 the initiative *Som lo que sembrem* (Catalan: We are what we sow) rallied the public in

Catalonia to a popular initiative demanding a prohibition of GM technology in agriculture. The initiative culminated in 106,000 supporting votes, yet yielded no conclusive decision in Parliament. In April 2009, the first and only nation-wide anti-GM demonstration took place in Saragossa (Aragon), rallying 4,000 activists (Photo 4). In sum, however, the Spanish movement, in spite of the best efforts of some of its propagators, never succeeded in sensitizing Spain's public, igniting a nation-wide debate, or impacting Spain's biotechnology policy in any considerable way.

6.2 Germany's anti-GM movement

In Germany, a critical domestic debate had begun already in the 80s, which resulted in Germany's early promotion of strict biotechnology regulation at the European level. The issue, however, declined in importance in the early 90s. Germany only reluctantly fell in line with the dynamic of the general European policy change since the mid 1990s. Consequently, for a long period Germany's policy course lingered between the positions held by supporting and critical countries. German authorities, for example, did not support, rather criticized, the collective of countries who supported the European moratorium. Furthermore, it was not until April 2009 when Federal Minister of Nutrition, Agriculture and Consumer Protection Ilse Aigner, then under pressure from the Free State Bavaria, decreed a prohibition of the GM corn variety MON 810. Since then, commercial GM-cultivation is practically, albeit not officially, banned in Germany.

Similar to how Germany's public debate reached back farther into the 80s, the country's anti-GM movement has a lengthier history than in other countries. Against the backdrop of the general European dynamic, however, a new mobilisation did not come to pass until 2004, which is relatively late. Furthermore, unlike in France, the alter-globalization movement in Germany did not create a culturally persuasive, symbolic link between GMOs and corporate globalization (Rucht and Roth 2008). While the movement was slow to gain resonance with Germany's public, the prominent professional environmental organisations BUND (Federation for the Protection of Environment and Nature) and *Greenpeace Deutschland* figured as pivotal actors throughout. Apart from this, a 'hard core' of activists remained engaged over the years, committing direct actions against GM field trials. However, it is not until the second half of the 2000s that a particular group adopts the method of open field destruction.

6.3 The wider anti-GM movements in comparison

Protest event analysis can give us an idea about the distinct character of national movements in Germany and Spain. Tables 1 and 2 summarise specific features related to the predominant choice of methods employed in a national movement and its relationship to the state.

	<i>Demonstrative</i>	<i>Informational</i>	<i>Political</i>	<i>Legal</i>	<i>Confrontational</i>
Spain	36	88	3	5	6
France	125	202	13	130	142
Germany	182	229	4	75	100

Table 1: Aggregated Protest repertoires of three national movements

Table 1 aggregates the diversity of protest methods into five categories. Movements are usually associated with demonstrative methods such as group demonstrations, sit-ins or hunger strikes. Of even greater significance are various forms of disseminating information such as blacklists, whistle blowing, declarations and petitions, critical books or documentaries etc. Among political methods are lobbying, the initiation of referenda, popular initiatives or parliamentary commissions etc. Legal forms of action comprise reports to the police, complaints, litigations or threatening to litigate, standing public trial etc. Among confrontational actions are, for example, clashes with police forces or opponents and destruction of, or damage to, third party property.

Table 1 illustrates that the French movement is deeply involved in confrontational and legal conflicts while in Germany and, even more, in Spain, demonstrative and informational methods prevail. These differences mirror the key importance of open field destruction in France.

	<i>State Repression</i>	<i>Counter Repression</i>
Spain	10	1
France	99	126
Germany	43	17

Table 2: State Repression and Counter Repression

Table 2 reflects the fact that social movement action often provokes or meets with repressive state reaction, be it through police, in court or the penal system. State repression as it is used here generally refers to constraint or force exercised by the state, or the threat of punitive action with the goal to prevent or sanction undesired behaviour. State repression is generally exercised assuming conformity with valid legal norms and derives its legitimacy from legality. The identity of legality and legitimacy, however, frequently become a matter of political dispute. The percentages in Table 2 indicate actions related to state repression. In turn, movement actors respond to state repression by counter repression in various ways, for instance through displays of solidarity for activists in custody. The highest percentages for both state repression and

counter repression are observed in France. Yet it is worth noting that even in Spain acts of state repression occur relatively frequently.

7. Open field destructions in Spain and Germany

7.1 Spain

The case of Spain is a short story to tell. In 1999, a group of about twenty organic farming and environmental organisations, mostly from Catalonia, gathered to establish the activist group *Transgenics Fora!*. Inspired by the 'International Caravan' the new group chose, among others, direct and confrontational action as their method. Together with members of the *Assemblea PAGESA* the group proceeded to openly destroy a GM trial field in the Catalan town of Gimènells (province Lérida) in July 2003. An estimated 70 activists clad in white overalls wearing face masks and 'biohazard' badges used scythes and reaping hooks to destroy GM wheat in a trial field maintained by the public research institute IRTA (*Instituto de Investigación y Tecnología Agroalimentaria*, Institute for Research and Technology in Food and Agriculture). A similar action followed course in September of 1999. When activists of the *Assemblea PAGESA* cut down an unregistered trial field of the company Syngenta, police and activists came head to head, which allegedly left a policeman injured.

The legal consequences for those involved were extremely severe which sympathisers generally regarded as politically motivated and intended as intimidation. The activist Albert Ferré who publicly claimed responsibility for the first action was ordered to pay damages of €470,000, received a fine of €24,000, and a jail sentence of fifteen months. The accused perpetrator of the second action, the renowned peasant activist José Pàmies, was facing three years of prison time and payment of damages up to €50,000. Ferré was acquitted due to lack of evidence. Pàmies received a fine of €22,000 in a trial which attracted severe criticism from civil society. While displays of solidarity followed mainly in support of Pàmies, the activists were not successful in reversing the legal arguments put forth by their opponents in their favour, i.e. transforming the court trial into a trial against genetic engineering. In the years that followed no further field destruction occurred.

7.2 Germany

The German case requires a more detailed account. It has been mentioned that Germany's anti-GM movement goes back farther than in the other two reference countries, which also holds for the prevalence of direct action methods. Beyond professional 'mainstream organisations' such as BUND and Greenpeace, over the years a 'hard core' of activists employed direct action methods such as field occupations or anonymous field destructions. In Germany, activists carried out field destructions or caused damages to research facilities such as greenhouses

already in the early 1990s. Occupation of GM fields is a development that is specific to Germany (Photo 2).

It began in 1993, when a crowd of teenagers and young adults occupied a field in Northeim (South Lower Saxony) where Germany's first trial with a potential GM crop was scheduled to be conducted. A field occupation in Melbach (Middle-Hesse) by a group that called itself '*die Wühlmäuse*' (the voles) dragged on from 1995 to 1997 and was effective as publicity. Often the field occupations were accompanied by a mobilization of the neighbouring communities, damages to third party property, brawls and evictions by police. Occupants sought to ward off the dissemination of GM seed. When it happened nevertheless, open field occupations were accompanied by nighttime field destructions. Between 1995 and 2009 five field occupations of that kind, and 74 anonymous field destructions took place (Table 3).

In 2005, the method of open field destruction was employed for the first time. The demonstrative act in itself and the resulting legal persecution was thus mobilized to attract public attention. The idea was born during the planning of a mass demonstration that took place in 2004 in Stuttgart (10,000 demonstrators) and marked the beginning of a revitalized anti-GM movement in Germany because, with the end of the EU-wide moratorium on GM-product approvals, the gates were opened for the commercial cultivation of GM-crops in EU-member states. A core of about twenty individuals emerged from the demonstration's organisational network with the aim of launching an action campaign which emulated the French model. The activists came from various regions of Germany, with a large number coming from an alternative rural community who live in Tonndorf castle (Thuringia, near Weimar).

After a year of strategic discussions the group, which had named itself *Gendreck weg!*, (Gene-crap get lost!) launched its first action. It targeted the field of a farmer in Strausberg (Brandenburg, near Berlin) who cultivated GM corn for commercial distribution. The approach was carefully considered. Firstly, the damaging of an experimental field trial, because of its high developmental costs, would have resulted in payment of damages far beyond the group's meagre resources. Furthermore, the action intended to draw public attention to the introduction of commercial GM-cultivation. The plan combined elements of the French model with the established German field occupation tradition. In the time leading up to the event, a website appealed to potential sympathizers, successfully recruiting 200 to 300 people, to participate in an '*Aktionscamp*' (action camp) close to the field. On the eve of the scheduled '*Feldbefreiung*' (field liberation) the farmer was given the opportunity to justify his decision to grow GM corn to the (highly partisan) activist audience attending the event. The next day, a crowd of activists, in strictly pacifist manner and mostly in vain, sought to break through a police cordon to get on the farmer's premises. A police dog caused injuries, and 70 activists were taken into police custody.

In the court trial that took place the following year, prosecution brought the charge of 'call to a criminal offence' (*Aufruf zu einer Straftat*) against two activists, the beekeepers Michael Grolm and Jürgen Binder. Like the French

faucheurs, the German activists sought to turn the trial into a trial against biotechnology, but the strategy hardly paid off as the judge disqualified arguments that were brought forward against the technology. Neither displays of solidarity nor media interest came close to the nation-wide debates in France. Like the French *faucheurs*, the German activists justified the action as an act of self-defence- 'GM-contaminated' honey can be considered a threat to a beekeeper's livelihood. However, the attempt to reframe the issue in legal terms failed before the court. The judge handed out minor fines. The activists refused to pay and lodged an appeal.

Subsequently, *Gendreck weg!* proceeded to stage one open field destruction each year. In the summer of 2006, one such event took place in the vicinity of the village Badingen (Brandenburg). Some hundred activists joined the *Aktionscamp*. According to activists' accounts, on the day of the 'field liberation', some 80 persons succeeded in circumventing the police cordon and entered the field, whereupon 64 activists were taken into custody and 24 arrested (freie-radios.net 2006). In the following summer, *Gendreck weg!* was active in Oderbruch (Brandenburg). In spite of massive police presence, activists incurred damages to a commercial GM-field, provoking clashes and arrests. In 2008, the *Gendreck weg!* activists shifted their focus to the relatively agrarian *Land* of Bavaria, which for the same year, scheduled the large scale introduction of GM corn for commercial cultivation. After several hundred activists and sympathizers had congregated over some days in an *Aktionscamp* near Kitzingen (Lower Franconia), and in a night-time action activists destroyed a tightly guarded GM-maize field. (Photos 2 and 3)

In addition, two atypical open field destructions occurred in the years 2006 and 2008. At Pentecost 2006, a handful of activists broke into the guarded precincts of the Justus Liebig University in Gießen (Hessen) and attempted to uproot GM-plantlets, while being filmed by a TV team they had contacted. In April 2008, in an unannounced nighttime raid, six activists entered a guarded facility of the research centre IPK (Leibniz Institute of Plant Genetics and Crop Plant Research IPK) in Gatersleben (Saxony-Anhalt) where they destroyed a GM wheat field trial. In both cases police stepped in immediately and legal consequences followed.



Photo 2: June 29th, 2008, Kitzingen (Bavaria). Activists instruct participants in how to set up a 'tripod', i.e., a simple high stand that is often used in 'GM-field occupations' to foil attempts by the police to remove activists from the fields. A month later, I was present when a German activist presented this protest method in a meeting of faucheurs in France where it had been unknown till then: another case of cross-national diffusion? Photo by the author.

From 2006 to 2009, *Gendreck weg!* activists stood trial another ten times. Vandalism of commercial GM fields mostly resulted in (usually moderate) fines. In 2009, however, activists had to serve prison sentences on four occasions. The most spectacular case is the one of the beekeeper Michael Grolm. (Photo 3) For ignoring a prohibitory injunction Grolm received a fine of €1,000. Rather than paying the fine, Grolm, insisting on the rightfulness of his action, decided to serve the equivalent of two days in prison. As he refused to make the mandatory oath of disclosure, however, the court imposed coercive detention on the activist. Thus, in autumn 2008, Grolm actually served 27 days, until a constitutional complaint ended his stay in prison. In an act of solidarity the activist Christian Pratz also served two weeks in prison. In August 2012 the activist Erasmus Müller served 23 days in coercive detention for having participated in the 'field liberation' in Kitzingen in 2008 and, like Grolm, refusing to pay the fine. The 'field liberation' in Gießen also resulted severe legal repercussions. A trial that stretched over two years led to a prison sentence of half a year for the activist Jörg Bergstedt.

In general, both the actions and the resulting proceedings attracted the attention of several national media and some support among sympathisers, yet

public resonance never came close to the magnitude of the debate in France. Around the year 2008, when the intensity of the German anti-GM movement generally began to rise, mostly in Bavaria, wherefrom local politicians started to put pressure on the Federal government, local field destructions also captured more attention. In September 2008, the left-leaning daily *die tageszeitung* (taz) elected Michael Grolm '*Held des Alltags*' (everyday hero) in recognition of his outstanding political engagement. Yet, this did neither come close to the nationwide waves of solidarity José Bové set in motion in France, nor did the group's direct action campaign spawn any imitators within Germany's anti-GM movement. In August 2012, *Gendreck weg!* disbanded. The activists justified the move by explaining that since the end of commercial GM-cultivation was brought about through the banning of GM corn variety MON810, their major objective had been achieved. Political reform had thus rendered protests unnecessary.



Photo 3: June 30th, 2008, Kitzingen (Bavaria). Michael Grolm in a workshop on conflict management in the Aktionscamp in Kitzingen. In his appearances as anti-GM activist Grolm consistently dressed as bee-keeper. He thus embodied an authentic rural occupational group that is directly affected by biotechnology's advance (since 'GM-contamination' makes the sale of honey virtually impossible) while enhancing his recognition value. We are reminded of José Bové's iconic, somehow 'Gallic' features. Photo by the author.

8. Discussion: diffusion of open field destruction

Groups in Germany and Spain have adopted the method of open field destruction, which had been so successfully put to work by the French movement. How did the adoption of this high-cost method come to pass? How can the differences in the diffusion processes in the two countries be explained?

8.1 Adoption as emulation

The analytical concepts regarding the media and channels of diffusion, which have been presented before, are only of help in addressing the first question. In both Spain and Germany the adoption processes correspond to the proximate model, i.e., the adoption or, in a wider sense, emulation of the open field destruction method. This model was not based on a common organisational structure, but on the receiver's attribution of similarity with the model actor. To be sure, by coordinating transnational campaigns, organizations such as Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth have considerably stimulated the diffusion protest objectives and strategies across Europe; however, they have not been involved in the diffusion of the open field destruction method. Furthermore, diffusion came to pass in a non-relational manner. Adopters in Spain and Germany planned and conducted their actions without having prior contact to their French role models. This is true in spite of the fact that, during my field research, I observed that in all major activist rallies in Germany, France and Spain delegates from the respective other countries were present and actively involved. This occurrence of international networking among advocates of open field destruction, however, took place in 2008 and 2009. Interviews with both the Spanish and the German activists clearly indicate that they made contact with the *faucheurs* after having conducted their first open field destructions. Not until 2006 did the *faucheurs* begin to make regular visits to the German *Aktionscamps*. This same year the Catalan activists started to attend reunions of the *faucheurs* in France after their operation in *Gimenells* and the ensuing trials. It can be concluded that the mere example of the successful *faucheurs* sufficed in inspiring the emulation processes in Spain and Germany with personal contact occurring later.

8.2 Spain: failed emulation

While ideas lightly travel across national boundaries, it depends on contextual factors whether they can be implemented successfully. The striking difference between the Spanish and the German experience illustrates this. However, why did the Spanish direct action campaign, in contrast to that in Germany, soon fade out? The reasons for the failure of the Spanish venture are not only in Spain's socio-political context but also in its wider anti-GM movement. In the first instance, it seems obvious to hold the harsh legal reaction responsible for the method's early failure. Interviews with Spanish activists confirmed that direct action in Spain was often met with severe state repression. Reasons include the historical influence of Franco's dictatorship as well as more recent

anti-terror legislation directed both against Basque separatism and militant Islamism. On this legal base, according to those interviewed, state repression often hinders civil society protest (see also Todt 1999: 203; O'Brien 2009: 153).

A further, more significant reason is that the anti-GM movement never caused any serious public resonance with the Spanish public. Consequently, the court trials did not raise a great deal of public attention beyond activist circles. Several reasons account for the low public resonance attained by anti-GM campaigns. Despite their importance, food issues rarely become controversial in Spain and are still not as prominent as in most West European countries (see also Jiménez 2007). Even though, in the first decade of the 2000s, various movements in Spain adopted the alter-globalization discourse (Martínez 2007), GMOs never became a symbol for neoliberal globalization as they did in France. Finally, the progressive *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE, Socialist Workers' Party of Spain) is not prone to technological criticism.

In addition to these factors, however, the conditions within Spain's broader anti-GM movement are not conducive to open field destructions. Thus, Spanish, in particular Catalan, activists lack important allies in the rural sphere similar to the *Confédération* in France. For example, the left-leaning farmers organisation *Coordinadora de Organizaciones de Agricultores y Ganadores* (COAG, Umbrella Association for Farmer- and Stock-Breeder Organisations) opposes the use of biotechnology in agriculture, but does not support field destructions (open or covert) because a great number of COAG members grow embarked on GM-crops in the late nineties. A protest campaign based on field destructions therefore would provoke considerable internal conflicts. Taking pains to avoid infighting the COAG settled with this contradictory position on GMOs. The critical farmers organization's dilemma shows that the quick and early onset of GM cultivation in Spain had decisive consequences for the later anti-GM movement: once in mass use, the technology became entrenched in Spain's agriculture and thus pre-empted the formation of any decisive farmer resistance in later years.



Photo 4: April 14th, 2009, Saragossa (Aragon). On this day the biggest, nation-wide anti-GM demonstration in Spain took place since a (weak) oppositional movement emerged in the mid 1990s. It rallied a great number of collectives and about 4,000 activists from the entire country. The picture shows COAG union leaders. On the one hand, the progressive farmer organisation advocates an anti-GM position; on the other it opposes the use of radical protest methods as these might raise conflicts among its members. Photo by the author.

8.3 Germany: moderate success

Even though Germany's 'field liberators' were more successful than their Spanish counterparts, we still might ask why the public resonance, provoked by their actions, lagged so far behind the publicity of the *faucheurs'* activism. This is particularly remarkable given the high costs carried by the activists, in terms of police force and legal procedures endured, fines and jail sentences. In France, José Bové served jail sentences on four occasions, which in the end totalled two months spent in prison. In addition, his former fellow campaigner René Riesel (who, as a matter of principle, refused to be granted privileges for political reasons) served a jail sentence of six months. No other *faucheur* activists had to serve time in jail. In Germany, by contrast, four activists were kept in jail for considerable periods, with Jörg Bergstedt serving half a year.

The impact of the jail sentences on the public (which the activists seem to have provoked at times), still fell short of the respective events in France. In France, activists staged 114 protest events in order to display their solidarity with activists threatened by or actually serving a prison sentence. Of these protest

events, 94 (82 percent) focused on José Bové, and 85 (75 percent) took place in 2002 and 2003, when public debate mainly revolved around his looming incarceration. In Germany, a total of only 17 displays of solidarity took place, out of which 15 occurred in 2008 and 2009, the years of the trials and jail sentences. Of the activists involved, no one ever came close to José Bové's 'heroic' celebrity status. In sum, the German 'field liberators' appear as a smaller model of the French *faucheurs*. They paid a relatively high price for a comparatively small 'pay off' in terms of movement mobilization and generated public attention.

How can these differences be explained? One possible way would be to argue, that the protest method of open field destruction was still at an infant stage in Germany when its desired result—the banishment of GM crops from German soil—was attained so that the cause for radical action ceased to exist. Then again, in the evolution of movement in France the large waves of mobilisation and solidarity also took place at an early stage. Furthermore, Germany's biotechnology policy has proved responsive to some extent. The virtual end of commercial GM crop cultivation in 2009, for example, was followed by a drastic reduction in GM field trials.⁸

It is therefore instructive to examine the contextual factors, particularly those that are elements of the wider anti-GM movement in Germany. Firstly, it needs to be stressed that the open field destruction method never was pivotal to the German anti-GM movement whose supporting pillars are professional NGOs such as Greenpeace and the BUND. Greenpeace Germany was involved in 30.2 percent of all protest events, mostly in a leading role, the BUND participated in 17.8 percent. By contrast, *Gendreck weg!* was involved in only 8.8 percent. Neither of the big, professional NGOs made open field destructions a strategic priority. BUND was never openly involved in such an action and mostly engaged in informational activism (83.2 percent of BUND's activity). Greenpeace focussed on demonstrative and informational measures (43.6 and 46.9 percent respectively). Yet, Greenpeace at times targeted experimental and commercial GM-fields, mostly by conducting demonstrative actions, although they also sometimes employed direct action tactics, for example by preventing the planting of GM seed. In a few cases these actions were accompanied by field destructions, which however, were conducted anonymously. Only in one case did Greenpeace perform an open field destruction. In August 2006, fifteen Greenpeace activists invaded a GM field in Wölsickendorf (Brandenburg) as part of a campaign against the use of GM feed in dairies, where they uprooted maize plants and were temporarily detained by police. No noticeable juridical process followed.

Then again, while these few Greenpeace-led actions remained isolated events, *anonymous* field destructions are common practice in Germany since the first field trials in the early nineties. As Table 3 illustrates, this action method by far

⁸ While, in 2007, 81 open trials took place in twelve federal states, in 2011, their number shrank to 15 in four federal states (most of them in Saxony-Anhalt).

outweighs open field destruction. In France, the *Confédération* and the *faucheurs* respectively carried out 71 percent of all field destructions, the remainder was carried out anonymously. In Germany, the majority of field destructions were anonymous acts. Most of the cases listed in the category 'not specified' can also be assumed to be anonymous field destructions. Since 2005, a public database that discloses the locations of field trials made it easier to launch anonymous attacks against such trials. To a considerable extent, the drop in the number of field trials since 2007 is due to the increase in anonymous crop trashing. Against this background, and also taking into account the established German tradition of field occupations, the relatively few cases of open field destructions appear as a marginal phenomenon.

	<i>France</i>	<i>Germany</i>
Not specified	15	49
Anonymous field destruction	9	74
<i>Confédération paysanne</i>	16	.
<i>Faucheurs volontaires</i>	43	.
Field occupations	.	15
<i>Gendreck weg!</i>	.	4

Table 3: Crop-trashing in France and Germany (protest event analysis El País, le Monde, SZ 1995-2009)

To be sure, open field destruction constitutes an 'action package'. The act of civil disobedience is meant to cause a series of follow up events such as police and legal repression as well as protests against repression, all designed to attract media attention. The package's function is to challenge and reframe the way the technology is commonly understood. The German 'field liberators', however, were lacking the influential allies their French heroes could fall back on. Unlike their French counterparts, they were not supported by the Green Party or any other influential social group. The French activists, through the *Confédération*, had roots in France's rural world. The *Gendreck weg!* activists, by contrast, while stressing their connection to beekeeping, hardly represent a rural constituency. The mobilization potential of the group, which might be dubbed 'young idealists', hardly reaches beyond activist circles.

9. Concluding remarks

It has been demonstrated that even high-cost protest methods travel easily across national boundaries. Personal contact via transnational networks certainly facilitates adoption. Indeed, activists engaged in open field destructions sought to establish transnational contact networks but it is not

required for it to take place. The mere existence of a successful and visible role model abroad suffices as a motive for adoption. Both, in Germany and Spain, adopters began to establish contacts with their French role models only *after* having conducted their first open field destructions. Moreover, these networks emerged independently from transnational organizations such as Greenpeace, which, if at all, only marginally took part in GM-field destructions.

However, as predicted by current concepts about diffusion, whether the *implementation* of the high-cost practice under different circumstances succeeds, depends on the opportunities and constraints provided by the new context. This study has shown that, in addition to general features of the national political system, particularly the level state repression, contextual factors within the wider movement are of decisive influence. Two questions emerged as being of specific importance. Firstly, how do other actors within the wider movement receive the innovation? While sharing with adopters their general commitment, these actors often diverge in their short-range objectives, strategies and repertoires. They may become allies, even adopt the novel practice from them, but they might also remain indifferent or favour competing repertoires and strategies.

Secondly, does the general movement generate public and political resonance? The cases of Germany's and Spain's anti-GM movements seem to suggest that the likelihood of a successful adoption of a high-cost practice increases with the wider movement's success. While in the finally successful German movement the new high-cost practice could be sustained for several years, it did not survive a single attempt in Spain. Yet this suggestion needs to be further examined. As argued by this study, the diffusion of high-cost practices follows other routes than less costly tactics. What holds true for one class of protest methods does not necessarily apply to others. Furthermore, movements that fight for the same cause in different countries look quite different in terms of actor composition and prevailing strategies. Whether a new practice strikes roots and diffuses within another national movement does also depend on its specific characteristics peculiarities. We thus conclude that, in spite of a supposed trend towards transnationalisation of social movements which manifests itself through diffusion among other things, movements, particularly if they resort to high-cost practices, still unfold and evolve depending on the opportunities and constraints they face within their national boundaries.

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About the author:

Franz Seifert is a biologist and political scientist, independent social researcher and lecturer at the University of Vienna. His major fields of interest are social movements engaging in technology and rural controversies such as the controversy over agricultural biotechnology; the linkage of local and global political dynamics; the democratization of technology policies. He is currently conducting a comparative study of anti-biotechnology movements in Austria, France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. He can be contacted at fseifert AT gmx.at

Ultras in Egypt: state, revolution, and the power of public space

Connor T. Jerzak¹

Abstract

In this article, I explore the relationship between organized soccer fans—Ultras—and the Egyptian state. I argue that Ultra groups became politicized as they sought autonomy in public space, but faced resistance from Egyptian security forces. To make this argument, I trace the history of Ultra groups. I show how Ultras made relatively few political statements in the first years after their 2007 inception. However, these groups become increasingly politicized in reaction to police harassment. This harassment was motivated by the fact that Ultras subverted state control over public spaces. The events of the 2011 Arab Spring further politicized the Ultras and transformed them into revolutionary actors by giving them the opportunity to delegitimize the authoritarian state's entire presence in public space. However, the greater public visibility of Ultras came at a cost, partially fracturing Ultra groups and giving state forces a desire for retaliation that was realized in the Port Said massacre. Despite these challenges, Ultra groups have continued to seek autonomy in public spaces, protesting authoritarian tendencies in the post-Mubarak era. I conclude with an afterward, explaining how Ultras not only defy authoritarianism in Egypt, but also dominant narratives about Egyptian society.

Introduction

In Hosni Mubarak's Egypt, several forces within the state competed for power and privileges against other state actors such as the military and the surveillance agency (Amar 2011). However, in everyday life, most Egyptians interacted with Mubarak's state via the police in public space. Indeed, the police apparatus controlled public spaces and expressions throughout Egypt. Even basic expressions of dissent were illegal under Mubarak's rule (Perkins 2010) and, to an extent, have remained so even after the revolutionary upheavals of 2011. As police suppressed dissent through verbal and physical harassment, fear and humiliation pervaded public spaces (Ismail 2012; Winegar 2012). The seemingly apolitical realm of public space was managed and controlled to retain the legitimacy of Mubarak's state apparatus. But all actors within Egyptian society did not acquiesce to these authoritarian mechanisms. In an unexpected fashion, sport and politics coalesced as organized soccer fans—Ultras—contested police control over civic expressions. In this article, I explore the role of these Ultras

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before, during, and after the Egyptian Revolution of 2011, with a particular focus on their relation to the state via public space.

I argue that Ultra groups became increasingly politicized as they sought autonomy and visibility in public space, but faced opposition to this autonomy from state mechanisms both during and after Mubarak's regime. Before the Egyptian Revolution, Ultra members made relatively few political statements. However, these groups became politicized through confrontations with the police, the state's chief representatives in the public arena. The Egyptian Revolution deepened Ultras' political involvement, giving these groups the ambition and opportunity to confront the authoritarian state's entire presence in the public sphere. In the post-revolutionary context, many Ultra members continued to seek civic autonomy by opposing the authoritarian tendencies of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) and President Mohamed Morsi. However, Ultra groups have had difficulty maintaining unity in this context due to their growing popularity and controversies surrounding the Port Said massacre. In the end, Egypt's Ultras defy dominant narratives implied by both the Western media and Egyptian leaders. They therefore enable us, as observers, to perceive the rich possibilities and unexpected political subjectivities that can emerge in democratic movements.

Ultras under Mubarak

Soccer has a long history in Egypt, having first appeared in 1882 when British soldiers organized matches with their Egyptian counterparts ("History of the Egyptian football game," n.d.). However, Ultra groups emerged very recently in the country. Even though most Ultras in Egypt were not explicitly political in the 2000s, they became politicized to the extent that they sought social autonomy, but experienced pushback from Mubarak and police forces. Ultras challenged these authoritarian mechanisms while sharing an ethos of resistance and cultivating a strong sense of collectivity.

The Egyptian Ultras movement began in 2005. It started via the Internet, as a network of soccer fan forums (Shawky 2012). Leaders converted these virtual groups into full-fledged Ultra organizations in 2007, inspired by the Ultra clubs of Italy. However, the political tendencies of the two movements vary considerably because Italian Ultras generally have rightist tendencies whereas Egyptian Ultras have anti-authoritarian leanings (Dunmore 2007). Indeed, Egypt's Ultras do not conform to sporting culture around the world, which is generally either apolitical or conservative (Mustafa 2013). Notwithstanding these differences, European and Egyptian Ultras share an ethos of intentional commitment directed towards their respective clubs. Ultras from both regions also exert a powerful physical presence at matches, an enthusiasm that sometimes spills over into small-scale brawls between rival fans (Kuhn 2011).

Ultras Ahlawy and Ultras White Knights were among the first Ultra groups in Egypt and later become the two largest and most visible Ultra organizations (Dunmore 2007; Mazhar 2009). Soccer enthusiasts founded Ultras Ahlawy to

support Cairo-based Club Ah-Ahly, while other fans formed Ultras White Knights to support Giza-based Club Zamalek, the second most successful Egyptian team after Club Ah-Ahly. Historically, Club Ah-Ahly and Club Zamalek have had a heated rivalry, a friction that still endures between Ultras White Knights and Ultras Ahlawy. This rivalry demonstrates how Ultras support different teams and, as a result, do not comprise a homogenous group. Indeed, from their 2007 inception onwards, Ultras occasionally engaged in fistfights with rival Ultras over game results, fomenting early hostilities between groups (Dorsey 2008).

Despite divisions and rivalries between Ultras, these groups nevertheless have similar attitudes, tactics, and motivations. For example, Ultra leaders founded their organizations in reaction against the perceived feebleness of other fan clubs. According to these founders, other fan clubs were more concerned about gaining prestige from talking with players or the media than supporting their teams (Dorsey 2008). In turn, Ultra leaders hoped to avoid the alleged vanity of these fan clubs by cultivating selflessness and group enthusiasm among Ultras (Dorsey 2008). In addition, Ultra founders and members also resented the commercialization of soccer, which, according to them, betrayed average fans and the original spirit of soccer (Dunmore 2007). Consequently, an early tension emerged between Ultra groups and the management of their respective clubs. For example, Club Ah-Ahly has retained a distance towards Ultras Ahlawy, refusing Ultra requests to use Cairo International Stadium to prepare for choreography displays (Dunmore 2007). And, just as clubs can be suspicious of Ultra groups, Ultras remain distrustful of club management: Ultra groups have regularly opposed increases in ticket prices and the monopolization of soccer broadcasts (Colla, Gumbiner, and Abouali 2012; Mazhar 2009). In this way, Ultra members resent the commercialization of profit-seeking soccer clubs even as they simultaneously remain committed to an idealized identity of their teams. Ultras thus share a sense of intentional commitment to team identity that is defined in opposition to profit-seeking clubs and less committed fans.

While Ultras oppose soccer commercialization and the perceived laxness of other fans, team pride unites members from diverse backgrounds, transcending (but not always excluding) ethnicity, religion, and regional identity. Mohamed Gamal Beshir (2012), an expert on the Egyptian Ultras and himself a (covert) Ultra leader, describes how Ultras instill such pride in young men. Poetically, he writes how

Your eyes cannot miss an ultra, whether inside or outside the stadium. By nature, he is proud, aware of his importance among the rest of his people who respect him for his capabilities. He walks with his head up high...doesn't talk much...and he never befriends fans of other football teams. (quoted in Shawky 2012)

In this passage, Beshir depicts how Ultra members gain pride from discipline, team commitment, and the collective nature of their Ultra groups. As we will later see, this collective pride, in the context of Mubarak's authoritarianism,

forged a subversive form of political agency and subjectivity that disturbed state control over public space.

While the collective pride of Ultra groups is evident, the class character of Ultras remains a more complex issue. Indeed, arriving at definitive conclusions regarding Ultras' class character is particularly difficult given the secrecy of Ultra groups. Nevertheless, some trends are discernable. For example, commentators such as Rabab El-Mahdi (2012) downplay class distinctions within Ultras groups, claiming that they are often cross-class organizations. For El-Mahdi, these organizations unify the educated and illiterate, the rich and poor, arguing that no single class or educational trait unifies Ultra members. While El-Mahdi is right to claim that no single characteristic unites all members, Ultra groups may reflect some class divisions. For example, according to Amr Kamal, an Egyptian sports critic, Ultra leaders generally tend to be well educated and come from upper middle class families (Mazhar 2009). These leaders are familiar with Ultra groups in Europe and have modeled Egyptian Ultras from these groups. Broadly speaking, then, Ultra groups contain members from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, but leaders tend to be better-educated than other members.

Although these class distinctions sometimes exist, they do not generally influence the central attitudes of Ultra groups, which consistently cultivate a class-conscious ethos of resistance. For instance, Ultras occupy the seats directly behind the goalkeeper—the cheapest tickets available—to enable the widest attendance possible (Solayman 2012). Moreover, as one Ahlawy leader known as Assad stated in an interview,

Soccer is bigger than politics. It's about escapism. The average Ahly fan is a guy who lives in a one bedroom flat with his wife, mother-in-law, and five kids. He is paid minimum wage and his life sucks. The only good thing about his life is that for two hours on a Friday he goes to the stadium and watches Ahly. People suffer, but when Ahly wins they smile. (Dorsey 2012a)

Here, the working class dimension of soccer enthusiasm is apparent: Ultra groups bring together young and sometimes underprivileged men into disciplined organizations, giving these youths an opportunity to form community ties through soccer. These ties are further strengthened by police harassment (Tarek 2012), which bonds Ultra members by reinforcing their ethos of collective resistance. In this way, class differences between members do not seem to fragment Ultras' central attitudes: Ultras consistently embody an ethos of resistance even though these organizations include members from diverse educational and socioeconomic backgrounds.

Although Ultra groups have a consistent set of central attitudes, individual fans may perceive their Ultra membership in various ways. For example, some members define their participations with reference to anarchism, claiming that they joined Ultra groups to become involved in clashes with police. On the

whole, these members may tend to be better-educated and are familiar with European anarchists (Lindsey 2011). In contrast, other members cite soccer as the primary reason they joined Ultra groups (Tarek 2012). However, because team affinity unites Ultra members across ideological lines, these tendencies are two among many. Indeed, team pride limits the influence of any one ideology and supports the unity of Ultra groups despite members' socioeconomic, educational, and ideological differences. Also, as one Ultra member stated,

There are no leaders among us — but there are organizational individuals who manage meetings and help guide the younger members. There is no hierarchy — organizers within the group are simply people with wisdom; as long as you have expertise in something, or a realistic idea, and, most importantly, a strong sense of humanity. (El-Nabawi 2012)

Accordingly, Ultra leaders advocate for horizontal structures that further limit the influence of any single ideology, balancing groups' central attitudes and members' diverse beliefs. In practice, Ultras groups are not perfectly horizontal, but combine elements of centralized and decentralized leadership. For instance, Ultra groups have centralized leadership committees that coordinate with regional subgroups through meetings with local representatives (Mustafa 2013). Indeed, it is easy to underestimate the sophistication of Ultras' organizational structures because members remain secretive. However, despite this qualification, Ultras' quasi-horizontal structures do help reinforce group attitudes and soften divisive issues among members with diverse ideological leanings.

Because Ultra groups united enthusiastic members, they quickly gained influence in the world of Egyptian soccer. For example, Ultras Ahlawy had only about 55 members during its first year, but the group prided itself on its selectivity and the large effects it could make with small numbers (Dunmore 2007). To generate large effects, Ultras Ahlawy members performed choreographed dances in stadiums during games, recited chants, and displayed tifos (banners). These tifos were large—50 by 30 feet—and often contained inspirational messages (Dunmore 2007). Tifos later commemorated Ultra members who died in clashes with police and indirectly carried political messages such as "We Are Egypt" (Dunmore 2007). Taken together, these various tactics gave Ultra groups a powerful physical presence in stadiums and public squares across Egypt, since, as mentioned above, some Ultra organizations have branches situated in cities spread throughout the country (Mustafa 2013). Ultras' organizational structures helped Ultras create such effects by giving eager members opportunities to organize events under the coordination of centralized leaders.

Although Ultras focused on coordinating fan spectacles prior to 2011, some members occasionally made statements on political issues. For instance, several White Knight members made controversial remarks about Palestine, the

Egyptian state, and the stagnant economy prior to the Revolution, leading to several arrests (Totah 2012). Also, a 2009 soccer riot foreshadowed Ultras' later politicization in the Egyptian Revolution. In this incident, Egyptian soccer fans attacked the Algerian national team bus and the Algerian embassy. While it is unclear how many Ultra members participated in this riot, the police confrontations prefigured those of the Egyptian Revolution. Media analysts reported that the violence, although tied to a soccer rivalry, stemmed in part from resentment against political repression and high levels of unemployment (Montague 2012a). Still, it is important to avoid overemphasizing the political involvement of Ultra members in the years prior to the Egyptian Revolution. Indeed, Ultra members who made political statements prior to 2011 did so largely as individuals, not as group representatives.

Furthermore, during this tenure, Mubarak attempted to manipulate soccer enthusiasm to legitimize his regime, complicating the political dimension of Ultra organizations. Indeed, Mubarak used soccer spectacles to appeal to Egyptians and divert attention from his regime's negative effects (Panja and El-Tablawy 2012). He also often met with players of the Egyptian National Team and made congratulatory remarks after notable matches ("Mubarak receives," 2010). And, in 2006, Mubarak's son, Gamal, even talked at the National Democratic Party (NDP) Conference about promoting Egyptian soccer (Slackman and El-Naggar, 2006). These actions show how Mubarak sought to distract young men from political issues by focusing their attention on soccer.

However, even though Ultras made relatively few political statements prior to 2011 and Mubarak attempted to manipulate soccer enthusiasm, the social character of Ultra organizations made them, in a way, inherently political. That is, Ultras remained autonomous organizations, creating politically charged graffiti and planning independent choreographies, performances, and demonstrations. In these acts, Ultras asserted group autonomy in public space, a fact that challenged the control of the state in these spaces.

By seeking autonomy in public spaces and stadiums, Ultra members reacted against the fear and humiliation that characterized everyday life under Mubarak. As Ismail (2012) has noted, in Egypt's authoritarian context, the police disciplined citizens in public space through extensive surveillance, physical intimidation, and degrading verbal abuse. Thus, according to Ismail, ordinary Egyptians felt humiliation in everyday encounters with the police, which, for them, came to represent the repressive state. However, by asserting autonomy and group pride, Ultra organizations interrupted this pattern of humiliation. As one Ultra explained, "The whole concept of any independent organization didn't exist, not unions, not political parties [*sic*]. Then we started to organize football ultras...to them [the police] it was the youth, in big numbers—very smart people—who could mobilize themselves quickly" (Montague 2012c). To give Ultras such autonomy against Mubarak's state, these groups relied on self-funding. For example, Ultra groups have designed t-shirts, mugs, flags, medals, and others products to raise money and eliminate the need for powerful state patrons (but, in the process, contributing to the very

commercialization that these groups have, at times, resented; Solayman 2012). In general, then, Ultra members made relatively few political statements prior to 2011, but these organizations became subversive insofar they sought social autonomy and rejected the culture of humiliation that characterized the public sphere under Mubarak. In this way, Ultras "politics of fun" subverted Mubarak's state and its police apparatus (El-Sherif 2012).

Because Ultras asserted autonomy in public stadiums and squares, state forces reacted violently against these groups in an effort to limit their visibility and notoriety. Indeed, police forces confronted Ultra organizations even when these groups were young and relatively marginal (Dunmore 2007) because they nevertheless threatened the control of the police in civic space. As Ultras gained popularity, police repression further increased. For example, starting in 2008 and increasing in 2009, police began confiscating Ultra banners, megaphones, and flares at stadium entrances (which some Ultra members would smuggle in anyway; Mazhar 2009). The police also began arresting Ultra members the day before or after notable matches (Mazhar 2009). When Ultra members did voice clear political positions, police forces quickly suppressed them, illustrating how Ultras' visibility in the public sphere made state forces especially sensitive to their political remarks. For example, after White Knight members demonstrated in memory of the second Palestinian Intifada, police arrested these members and held them for several days (El-Wardani 2011). Contrary to police intentions, however, this intensifying harassment further politicized Ultras organizations, which began to identify resistance against the police as a key component of Ultra character. Indeed, police aggravation unified Ultras under the collective slogan, "A.C.A.B" ("All Cops Are Bastards"), forging links and solidarity between rival Ultras (Totah 2012). Harassment from the state deepened Ultras' political involvement by provoking resentment and giving diverse Ultra organizations a common enemy—the security forces. During Mubarak's tenure, in other words, police repression and Ultras' activism formed a self-reinforcing cycle.

For these factors, Egypt's Ultras had a subversive edge before the Egyptian Revolution. As they combined organizational unity, team enthusiasm, and an ethic of rebellion, Ultras challenged the supremacy of the authoritarian state in public spaces. They sought social autonomy and, as a result, became increasingly antagonistic with security forces. But, as we shall see, the Egyptian Revolution transformed aspects of the Ultras, further politicizing these groups and giving members the opportunity to challenge the existence of the authoritarian state itself.

From subversive to revolutionary

Uprisings in Tunisia provided the spark for the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. Much media and scholarly attention has focused on the role of middle class youths and social networking technologies in the Revolution (Aitamurto 2011; Howard and Hussain 2011). Fewer commentators noted the crucial but unexpected role of Ultra groups. Indeed, Ultra groups became a surprisingly central protagonist in

the Egyptian Revolution by bringing their organizational unity, fighting experience, and rebellious ethos to demonstrations. As they played a central role in the Revolution, Ultras became increasingly politicized, seeking to eliminate the presence of the authoritarian state in public space through large-scale demonstrations. After all, as Egyptian blogger Alla Abd El Fattah stated in a 2011 interview, "The Ultras have played a more significant role" in the Egyptian Revolution "than any political group on the ground" (Zirin 2012b).

From the beginning of the Egyptian Revolution, Ultra members supported demonstrators on Tahrir Square and around Egypt, safeguarding protesters and clashing with security forces. For instance, an anonymous video uploaded to YouTube on January 22nd reassured Egyptians who intended to join the first protests on the 25th (Shawky 2012). The video encouraged Egyptians who might have feared the police presence by noting that Ultra members would be in attendance to protect protesters. And, true to this promise, Ultras did join protesters on the January 25th demonstrations. During these early demonstrations, Ultra groups appeared most prominently on Wasr Al-Aini Street (El-Wardani 2011). Shortly after these first protests, Ultra members expanded their reach in the Bulaq, Guiza, and Shubra neighborhoods (El-Wardani 2011). The first member killed in the Revolution died in Alexandria on January 28th. The second member killed, Mohamad Makwa, died in Suez, later on the 28th (El-Wardani 2011).

Originally, Ultra members joined the 2011 demonstrators as private individuals, meeting randomly on Tahrir Square and in similar squares throughout Egypt. As one participant stated,

Most of our guys met randomly in Tahrir Square after fighting with police on the first day. And the next day, after we'd all been forced out, we got together with some Ultras from another team, attacking the police just to tire them out. Two days later we took the square back for good. And we fought in the 'Camel Battle' the next week. (Dorsey 2012b)

After police brutality increased following initial demonstrations, most Ultras decided to join protesters (El-Sherif 2012): rival Ultra groups came together to act towards the common objective of dismantling Mubarak's repressive regime. This type of collective action is rare in Ultras' history. As Beshir, stated in an interview,

It's safe to say that 80% of the Egyptian population doesn't know anything about politics, and the same goes for the Ultras. The Ultras stand out because they are a sizable group, but they are not really unified when it comes to politics. Some members might be from all across the political spectrum, others are completely apathetic. Some participate in demos [demonstrations], others don't...They only appear as one body when they all agree on one thing, which happens very seldom. (Tarek 2012)

Thus, the Egyptian Revolution became one of the few instances where competing Ultra groups took some form of collective action, bolstering demonstrations in public squares around Egypt.

After they agreed to join demonstrations, Ultras helped immobilize police and security forces through their organizational unity and resistance tactics. As soccer writer David Levy noted, Ultras confronted security forces with tactical specializations that enabled them to resist the well-equipped security forces (Dorsey 2011). Ultra groups assigned rock hurlers, formed crews to find projectiles, and also designated some members to turn over and torch vehicles to create defensive structures ("Cyclones of Struggle," 2011). These tactical specializations enabled Ultra members to weaken security forces in strategic and coordinated fighting. Ultra groups also mastered attack and defense tactics to minimize losses while sustaining active resistance against security forces (El-Sherif 2012). Indeed, as discussed earlier, Ultras are sophisticated organizations that rely on partly centralized, partly decentralized structures. This quasi-horizontal arrangement gave Ultras a combination of group unity and strategic flexibility during clashes with state forces.

Examining one of the Ultras' first collective actions can highlight the dynamics of their protest tactics. Ultras came together for the Friday of Rage demonstrations on January 28th. In the hours prior to this demonstration, Mubarak had severed Internet access across Egypt and continued to defy protesters' demands for him to resign (El-Amrani 2011). To prepare for demonstrations, Ultra members led twenty smaller groups of front-line activists to Tahrir Square. Ultra leaders guided these units separately to avoid being noticed before arriving. According to one participant, "On our own, it was nothing. But together as a group in the Square we were a big power... 10,000-15,000 people fighting without any fear. The Ultras were the leaders of the battle" (Montague 2011). These Ultra-led groups converged on Tahrir Square, using specialized crews to resist the well-equipped security forces and confront these forces with coordinated strategies.

Indeed, Ultras played a key role in the revolution not only because of their strong organizational structures, but also because they had experience challenging police forces through coordinated fighting—skills that few other protesters possessed. After all, in 2011, some Egyptians were protesting for the first time. Also, while other demonstrators were affiliated with organizations such as the April 6 Youth Movement and had experienced police brutality in prior demonstrations, Ultras had more knowledge about confronting the police with active methods (Hassan 2010). Accordingly, Ultras played a crucial role in the Egyptian Revolution particularly because of their experience resisting the police, a skill that few other groups in Egypt possessed.

However, Ultras contributed more than their group unity and experience fighting the police to the demonstrations of the Egyptian Revolution. Indeed, as El-Sherif (2012) outlined, Ultras contributed at least six intangible qualities to demonstrations. For El-Sherif, Ultras added dynamism, flexibility, positivity, a refusal of traditionalism, a group mentality, and a rebellious attitude to the

Revolution. Taken together, these intangible characteristics helped infuse protesters with the motivation and enthusiasm necessary to participate in dangerous police clashes.

According to El-Sherif, Ultras' resilient dynamism originated from the intense, emotional attachments Ultra members have to their teams. Indeed, Ultra members aim to support their teams in the face of both victory and defeat. Second, Ultras' horizontal flexibility enabled them to maintain active resistance while minimizing losses and avoiding infighting between members. Third, Ultras' positivity infused demonstrations with energy and enthusiasm in clashes with police forces. Underlying this positive attitude was Ultras' experience cheering their teams. Fourth, Ultras defy social and cultural norms. They regularly criticize the traditional policies of clubs and reject cultural standards viewed as oppressive. For example, Ultras have fought rules on obscene language and restrictions on the attendance of women at matches (El-Sherif 2012). Fifth, the group mentality of Ultras gave them legitimacy in clashes with the security forces. Ultra members and leaders remain anonymous, ensuring that Ultras act as collective units and not for one leader's profit. Lastly, Ultras' spirit of rebellion helped mobilize protesters during police clashes. Bringing these six characteristics, Ultras' soccer experiences shaped their political subjectivities and, in the 2011 protests, helped Ultras galvanize other demonstrators.

While Ultras contributed these intangible factors, the Egyptian Revolution influenced Ultra groups by increasing their explicitly political nature. As explained earlier, individual Ultra members would sometimes make political statements prior to the Revolution. Also, the autonomous character of Ultra groups made them inherently subversive in the context of Mubarak's authoritarianism. Yet during the Egyptian Revolution, Ultra groups took more direct political positions.

For example, before the Revolution, Ultra chants were often about soccer. During and after the Revolution, however, these chants became openly political. Ultra chants honored members who died in police confrontations (Dale 2012), condemned the security forces, and criticized leading political and military figures (Lindsey 2011). In an example of this politicization, one popular chant during the Revolution linked the brutality of police forces with state corruption:

He [the police officer] was always a loser, a jest/he barely got 50% on his high-school test/with a bribe the rich kid's a fool no more/got 100 diplomas hanging on his door/You crows nesting in our house/why are you ruining all our fun?/We won't do as you tell us/Spare us your face/Cook up your case/That's what the Interior does/I'm arrested and charged as a terrorist/Just for holding a flare and singing Ahly. (Lindsey 2011)

As this chant shows, some Ultra members perceived that police and military leaders—those with status and secure employment—were the true “losers,” not

ordinary Ultra members. That is, Ultra members resented the police not only for their brutality, but also for their corruption and unearned privileges. In this way, Ultra groups became increasingly politicized in reaction to police brutality and their perceptions of injustice.

Still, this politicization is not uniform within and between Ultra groups. For instance, Ultras with anarchist leanings claimed that their participation in the Revolution was purely non-political. As one White Knight leader claimed, Ultras “don’t give a fuck about politics of the stability of the country. Zamalek is our country and Ahly is their country” (Lindsey 2011). Indeed, Ultra groups did and continue to encompass a wide range of ideological persuasions. By and large, however, the Egyptian Revolution politicized many Ultra members who fought to eliminate the Egyptian state’s repressive presence in public space.

In short, during the Revolution, Ultra groups became increasingly politicized as members resisted police forces and supported other protesters. More directly political, Ultras undermined the legitimacy Mubarak’s repressive regime by exposing how it sought to use violence to dominate public space. Indeed, although Ultras struggled against police forces in public spaces throughout Egypt, they did so most visibly in Tahrir Square—perhaps the grandest embodiment of public space in all of the country.

From revolution to tragedy

Ultra groups have had difficulty navigating post-Mubarak Egypt. In this post-revolutionary context, two contradictory tendencies characterize the Ultras movement, both of which center around the Ultras’ role in public space. First, the popularity and visibility of Ultra groups led to overextended memberships, thereby fragmenting the Ultras movement and enabling Egypt’s security forces to manipulate soccer violence. Second, many Ultras have continued to challenge authoritarian tendencies of Egyptian leaders. As a result, Ultras serve as a source of hope for some Egyptians alienated by military rule and the Muslim Brotherhood government.

Because Ultra groups gained notoriety following after the Revolution, many soccer enthusiasts sought to join the groups, attracted by their popularity and growing prestige. With increasing membership levels, Ultras became perhaps the second largest civic organizations behind the Muslim Brotherhood (Dorsey 2012f). However, new members often lacked the commitment and knowledge of longtime Ultras, leading to instances of unplanned violence.

For example, in April 2011, members of Ultras White Knights stormed the field of Cairo’s International Stadium during the closing minutes of an African Champions League Match. White Knight leaders claimed that this outburst demonstrated the declining discipline and unity of their group (Dorsey 2011). Such spontaneous violence gave some credibility back to Ultras’ enemy—the security forces. Indeed, state representatives cited such outbursts as evidence that law and order had broken down after police forces withdrew from public spaces following their embarrassing performance in the Egyptian Revolution

(Dorsey 2011). This argument, in turn, justified the renewal of police control in public spaces.

Despite this conservative reaction, many Ultras remained politicized, contesting authoritarian tendencies that endured in the Egyptian state. For example, after Mubarak resigned, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) took power, promising a six-month transitional period before elections. After this deadline passed and no elections were held, Ultras once again joined demonstrators around Egypt, this time to demand fair elections (Bilal 2011). At soccer matches, Ultras chanted, "Military police, you are dogs like the Interior Ministry. Write it on the prison's walls, down down with military rule" (Zayed 2012). Several Ultras died in these clashes and many protesters—10,000, according to some estimates—were arrested and tried in military tribunals (Mackell 2011). Eventually, in late 2011, SCAF did allow parliamentary elections to be held, complying with the demands of Ultras and other protesters. In spring 2012, SCAF permitted a presidential vote that resulted in the election of Mohamed Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood member and the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) candidate.

However, presidential elections came after leaders in the state apparatus exacted revenge against Ultras for their role in the Egyptian Revolution. More than perhaps any other single event since 2011, the Port Said massacre shaped Ultras' status in the public sphere.

The Port Said massacre occurred at a soccer match on February 1st, 2012, near the one-year anniversary of the Egyptian Revolution. Leading up to the Port Said events, Ultra groups—especially Ultras Ahlawy—had become increasingly vocal in condemning SCAF's authoritarian tendencies in cities throughout Egypt. On February 1st, Ultras Ahlawy members followed Club Al-Ahly to Port Said for a match against Al-Masry Club. After the match, which ended in an unexpected victory for the underdog Al-Masry team, people dressed as Al-Masry fans stormed the field and attacked Ultras Ahlawy members and other Al-Ahly supporters. More than 1,000 people were seriously injured and 79 died ("Egyptian police incited," 2012). Mahmoud Ghandour, a chief leader of Ultras Ahlawy, was among the dead (Dubois 2012).

Evidence indicates that state security forces were likely complicit in this violence. On the one hand, it is true that security forces sought to avoid interacting with Ultras after being embarrassed during the January and February demonstrations. Also, brawls between rival soccer fans are not uncommon in Egypt. However, on the other hand, such fights generally occur when fans from the losing team lash out against those from the winning side. Yet the Al-Masry team had unexpectedly won the match against Club Al-Ahly. Furthermore, numerous security officials and riot officers were present at the stadium when violence erupted against Al-Ahly fans. According to witnesses, these officers did not intervene to stop the dozens of men who attacked Al-Ahly fans with swords and knives. Mohamed Zekri, a forward on the Ahly team, described this scene in an interview. According to his statements, Zekri heard police tell Al-Masry fans to "Go and beat the shit out of them [the Ahly fans]"

("Egyptian police incited," 2012). He also saw "about 10 armed thugs gathering right in front of the police" armed with swords and other weapons "but not a single one of them [the police officers] moved" ("Egyptian police incited," 2012). Other eyewitness testimony suggests that police blocked stadium exits and turned off the stadium lights to prevent video footage and to increase the mayhem (Al-Youm 2012). At minimum, fact that almost all deaths and injuries were of Ahly supporters suggests premeditation on the side of the aggressors (Al-Youm 2012).

Because of these suspicious circumstances, Ahlawy members claimed that the attack was not a manifestation of soccer "hooliganism" but, rather, the carefully calculated revenge of state forces. These members saw the attack as retribution for Ultras' prominent role in the Egyptian Revolution, which, after all, occurred almost exactly one year prior to the Port Said massacre. As one Ultra claimed, "This is a conspiracy by those in the Tora" prison, where Mubarak's former ministers had been detained on charges of ordering the police to kill protesters ("Egypt: Port Said," 2012). Many Egyptians thus claimed that pro-Mubarak individuals instigated the massacre, with state security forces consciously neglecting to intervene (Mustafa 2013).

Whatever the precise origins of the Port Said massacre, the event had two main ramifications for Ultras.

First, the event partially isolated Ultra groups insofar as the massacre convinced more conservative and ultra-religious Egyptians that Ultras are violence-prone soccer fanatics ("Egypt: Port Said," 2012). These Egyptians suggested that the massacre stemmed from the hooliganism of soccer fans. For this reason, Port Said paradoxically strengthened the position of the police, renewing calls for law and order. While Ultras previously contested the control of the state in public spaces, ironically, violence surrounding them came to justify the role of the state in these spaces. Indeed, even many Ultras agreed that renewed law and order was needed in public space, but argued that such order would be impossible without police reforms ("Egypt: Port Said," 2012).

Second, the Port Said massacre brought Ultras more deeply into politics than some members perhaps intended. For example, just a week before the Port Said massacre, Ultras Ahlawy's Facebook page stated that the group was determined to remain non-political, but that its members were free as individuals to participate in politics or protest. The group "emphasize[d] that its members are free in their political choices" (Dorsey 2012a). However, the Port Said events pulled Ultras Ahlawy deeper into politics, its brutality reinvigorating a revolutionary urgency for Ultra members (Elgarnousy 2012). For instance, in the months following the massacre, Ultra members forced a former Ah-Ahly goalkeeper, Ahmed Shobeir, to withdraw his bid for the Egyptian Football Association (EFA) presidency by charging him with corruption and links to Mubarak (Maher 2012). Soon after these accusations, Egypt's main prosecutor began an investigation into Shobeir's financial irregularities. Likewise, throughout 2012, many Ultras continued to participate in demonstrations and protests (El-Gundy, Ali, and Sharnoubi 2012).

In these continuing protests, Ultras' political demands expanded to include justice in the legal system and the reform of the police. After an investigation, prosecutors charged 9 mid-level security officials and 72 citizens for the Port Said crimes ("After verdict," 2013). However, the slow pace of this trial frustrated Ultras members, who vowed to prevent domestic soccer from resuming play until the trial's conclusion. To pressure the EFA into accepting this demand, Ultras Ahlawy members led several demonstrations at EFA headquarters. Ultras also disrupted professional soccer practices around Cairo to prevent play from resuming (Dorsey 2012g). In November 2012, EFA submitted to Ultras' demands by approving plans to indefinitely postpone play until the conclusion of the Port Said trial. This postponement increased the visibility of the trial, focusing attention on the fact that few judicial and no police reforms had occurred since the 2011 Revolution (Brown 2012).

In turn, however, this postponement exacerbated tensions between Ultras and their soccer clubs. For example, Egyptian soccer players, workers, and managers went without work during this hiatus. In October 2012, these workers demonstrated to protest their circumstances, sitting in at a Cairo hotel where the Nigerian national team was staying prior to an international match (Halawa and Adam 2012). Ultras Ahlawy members sought to counteract this protest to ensure that the postponement of domestic soccer remained in place. These Ultras waged a counter-protest, arranging an escort for the Nigerian players to Cairo Stadium. One Nigerian player said after the event, "It is a unique position, to see fans with that much power" (Montague 2012c). Thus, in addition to showing the continued effectiveness of Ultras' strategies, this intervention also demonstrated growing tensions between Ultra groups and soccer workers.

In spring of 2013, the Port Said Criminal Court reached a final verdict in the slow-moving trail. The Court sentenced 21 of the 72 accused civilians to death. It sentenced one senior security officer to fifteen years in prison, another to a life term, and found seven of the nine accused policemen to be innocent ("After verdict," 2013). This ruling appeased some Ahlawy members, but spurred widespread riots in Port Said. Port Said's residents protested against the perceived harshness of the ruling as riots caused more than forty additional deaths ("After verdict," 2013). Although Egyptian soccer resumed play in April 2013, fans are not yet allowed to attend some matches due to security concerns (Dorsey 2013). Ultras have thus struggled to retain purpose without opportunities to organize stadium events during games—after all, these groups cannot attend most matches and the postponement of soccer lasted over a year. As a result, according to one Ultras leader, "everything has changed, yet nothing has really changed [since Port Said]— for us, the biggest challenge has been trying to stay united without our common ground of football" (El-Nabawi 2012). Without the bond of soccer, Ultra groups have struggled to retain group interconnectivity.

In this context, some Ultras have relied on demonstrations in public squares to reinforce group collectivity. Indeed, Ultras have remained active in demonstrations against lingering injustices and elements of state

authoritarianism. For example, in October 2012, Ultras members called for police reforms and clashed with other demonstrators in Tahrir Square. In these clashes, Ultras protested the acquittal of 24 people who had been charged with ordering the killing of protesters during the 2011 "Battle of Camels" ("After verdict," 2013). Furthermore, in a November 2012 decree, President Morsi assumed powers formerly reserved for the judicial and legislative branches. Perceived as a power grab, this act sparked renewed clashes between Ultra members and security forces. On Mohammed Mahmoud and Qasr al Aini Streets, Ultras joined demonstrators, their chants echoing those from the Revolution: "The people want to topple the regime," "Do not be afraid, Morsi has to leave," and "Down with Mohamed Morsi Mubarak" (El-Gundy, Ali, and Sharnoubi 2012).

Morsi had likely sought to avoid such condemnations from Ultras, since he made several statements supportive of them following the Port Said massacre (Dorsey 2012b). Notwithstanding this earlier support, paramilitaries with ties to Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood surfaced during these demonstrations to antagonize Ultras and secular protesters—often with intimidating violence (Eleiba 2013). However, during some of these skirmishes, police and military forces refrained from intervening. Thus, in these intense cycles of pro- and anti-Morsi demonstrations, Ultras did have some independence from the state, but faced harassment from a non-state foe in pro-Morsi paramilitaries ("Egypt: Investigate," 2012). Since these late 2012 clashes, pro-Morsi militias have been less visible, but Ultra members have continued to clash with police forces ("Ahly's Ultras," 2013). However, as Zeinab Abul-Magd (2013) has suggested, these clashes take place in a very different context than those under Mubarak. That is, Morsi's emerging authoritarian regime has continued to rely on police brutality, but is no longer able to generate fear.

While Ultras continue to struggle for autonomy, their future role in public space is, at this juncture, difficult to determine. Some commentators have argued that Ultras should become even more involved in politics to challenge the hegemony of the Muslim Brotherhood, FJP, and other Islamist parties (El-Mahdi 2012). However, Ultra leaders have resisted such calls, likely for two main reasons. First, Ultra members are young men who focus on soccer, and, as a result, it would be difficult to expect that Egyptian leaders would take Ultras seriously in political debates. Second, Ultras' greatest asset lies in their flexibility: Ultras do not have the burden of creating contentious political platforms but can nevertheless shape Egyptian politics through selective interventions. Accordingly, Ultra leaders have refused to meet with parties and politically affiliated organizations (Parker 2012). Indeed, it is important to recognize that Ultras remain, above all else, organizations focused and centered on soccer. This is not to imply that Ultras' political interventions will cease—to the contrary, some of these organizations have continued to clash with police into 2013. However, for the foreseeable future, it is most probable that the trajectory of Ultra groups will resemble the pattern that these groups followed prior to the Egyptian Revolution, where some members were active in political demonstrations, but the majority concentrated more exclusively on soccer.

In sum, Ultras' team pride and rebellious spirit first enabled them to challenge state control of public space. During the Egyptian Revolution, Ultras' demands grew as they undermined the legitimacy of the authoritarian state through large-scale protests and demonstrations. Ultra membership swelled and their visibility increased following the Revolution, leaving leaders occasionally unable to maintain organizational unity and discipline. Despite this difficulty, some Ultras have remained highly politicized, especially in reaction to the Port Said massacre. These Ultras continue to challenge state attempts to control civic spaces and expressions. For some Egyptians and secular activists, Egypt's Ultras thus embody the enthusiasm and original ideals of Egyptian Revolution (El-Mahdi, Rabab, and Korany 2012).

Afterward: Ultras and the unbearable lightness of democratic politics

To explain the 2011 uprisings in the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe, Slovenian theorist Slavoj Žižek (2012) offered an arresting interpretation of the unpredictable emergence of democratic movements. Žižek explains how such movements often appear "out of joint" with their historical and social context. Democratic openings and emancipatory events, he argues, do not fit with preceding models and narratives. He writes,

We should turn around the usual historicist perspective of understanding an event out of its context and genesis... Emancipatory outbursts cannot be understood in this way: instead of analyzing them as a part of the continuum of past/present, we should bring in the perspective of the future, i.e., we should analyze them as limited, distorted (sometimes even perverted) fragments of a utopian future which lies dormant in the present as its hidden potential. (p. 128)

For Žižek, socio-historical context cannot fully account for truly new forms of democratic politics. Such events restructure the conceptual and political context from which they emerge and, as a result, do not fit with preceding narratives and conceptual categories.

Applying this insight to the experience of Ultras in the Egyptian Revolution is an unexpectedly productive approach. Indeed, Ultra groups defy at least three dominant narratives and stereotypes, offering observers an opening to rethink the central categories that underlie perceptions of Egyptian society.

First, Ultras are comprised of young Egyptian men, but these organizations have neither a fundamentalist nor Islamist ideology, defying tropes of Arab youths. Indeed, for Ultras members, soccer itself takes on a quasi-sacred dimension. Second, several Western observers (and Mubarak himself) argued that Ultras are primarily anarchical and destructive. For example, in a 2012 article for the *Los Angeles Times*, Ned Parker stated that the Ultras combine "the aggression of the hoodlums in a 'Clockwork Orange' and the anarchy of the Sex

Pistons...The Ultras have since cast a chill over Egyptian Society." However, Ultras defy this stereotype because they rely on discipline and organizational unity to coordinate Ultra clubs that span across Egypt. Furthermore, Ultras played a key role in the democratic movement of 2011 and anti-authoritarian struggles since, again illustrating how Ultras do not fit the label of "hooliganism" used to describe them. Lastly, even though Ultras continue to fight authoritarian elements of the Egyptian state, these groups are unconcerned with the West and focus almost exclusively on Egyptian soccer and politics. In this way, Ultras defy a dominant narrative that Western observers sometimes construct when they explain Middle Eastern politics as a struggle between pro-Western liberals and anti-Western fundamentalists.

Overall, then, Ultras are a byproduct of Egypt's historical experience, but in practice, they clash with dominant conceptions of Egyptian society. As a result, they offer us, as observers, an opportunity to confront these dominant narratives and interrogate the biases that may underlie our perceptions. In short, the role of Ultras in the Egyptian Revolution gives us a glimpse into the diverse possibilities and unexpected political subjectivities that can emerge within democratic risings.

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About the Author

Connor T. Jerzak is a John Frederick Oberlin Scholar at Oberlin College. His research encompasses three areas: the theory and practice of social movements, the impact of globalization on democracy, and the dynamics of conflict resolution. He has received grants from the US-UK Fulbright Commission and the National Science Foundation. He can be reached at cjerzak AT oberlin.edu.

The influence of threat on tactical choices of militant anti-fascist activists

Stanislav Vysotsky

Abstract

The rationale for social movement tactical choices is rarely discussed in social science literature. This article presents the impact of perceived threat from a countermovement on the rationale of militant anti-fascist activists for their tactical choices. Threat is described as physical, political, and spatial. Physical threat involves the fear of violent attacks by opponents, political threat involves the fear of being politically undermined by the activity of its opponents, and spatial threat refers to fear of losing literal and metaphorical subcultural space to opponents. Militant anti-fascists reported facing physical threats, political threats, and spatial threats from white supremacists who operated in similar subcultures and have frequent contact.

Introduction

White supremacist movements in the United States are often identified as a relatively marginal threat; the average American is unlikely to have an interaction with an individual who is a white supremacist, and even hate crime experts assert that only a small proportion of such crimes are committed by hardcore movement members (Levin 2007). However, despite the lack of public consciousness regarding this movement and its activities, there is a distinct conflict between opposing movements of white supremacists and anti-fascists that occurs outside of the boundaries of mainstream culture and political discourse. This conflict is most evident within subcultures such as Punk and Skinhead where distinct factions organize in support of or opposition to white supremacy (Moore and Roberts 2009; Roberts and Moore 2009; Sarabia and Shriver 2004; Wood 1999). The conflict between these two movements serves as a unique opportunity to understand the nature of threats perceived by members of opposing movements as well as a means of understanding the rationale behind the choice of engaging in militant tactics as a response to such threats.

Scholars of social movements have developed several explanations for how tactical choices are determined, but these models have largely avoided discussions of the role that threat plays in the deployment of tactics; although the concept of threat is crucial to the understanding of movement-countermovement dynamics. This dynamic has largely been understood in relation to movements mobilizing on opposing sides of an issue of state policy (e.g. abortion, the death penalty, immigration, etc.). However, many contemporary "new social movements" and

"lifestyle movements" are not oriented toward the instrumental goals of policy development or change, but are seeking non-state social transformation through the construction of prefigurative social spaces or subcultures. The construction of "alternative" culture and change through individual transformation in such movements often generates intentionally diffuse and decentralized action, which produces a distinct movement-counter movement dynamic of face-to-face conflict. Such a dynamic produces a unique interplay between opposing movements that makes them especially susceptible to threats that necessitate a direct response.

The choice of anti-fascists to engage in militant tactics may be explained by analyzing the perceived level of threat that white supremacists pose. It is my contention that anti-fascists who prefer confrontational and violent tactics justify their tactical choices as not only strategic, but necessary to maintain what Jasper (1997, 122) refers to as "ontological security" which he defines as "*an autonomy of bodily control within predictable routines*" (Giddens quoted in Jasper 1997, 123, italics in original). These activists generally face a greater threat from white supremacists than their counterparts, who prefer non-confrontational and nonviolent tactics, and the general public as a whole. This threat may come in three distinct forms: 1) physical; 2) political; and 3) spatial. Physical threat is the fear of physical harm or danger at the hands of white supremacists that is often the result of individuals being specifically targeted for violence. Political threat involves a threat to the political activity of anti-fascists as a result of their adherence to an ideology that is directly contradictory to that of white supremacists. Spatial threat manifests itself when white supremacists engage in political activity within a subculture, which is perceived as a threat to the integrity of the subculture by other participants who view the subculture as a "safe space." While these three types of threat are distinct, they are not mutually exclusive and may overlap for militant anti-fascists which may in fact increase the intensity of the threat felt by militants.

Tactics, threats, and movement types

A variety of models have been developed in order to understand social movement tactical choices such as strategy, repertoires, ideology, identity, and culture. Models that emphasize strategy suggest that social movement participants make rational decisions regarding the tactics that they deploy in order to be most effective in achieving a desired goal (Gamson [1975] 1990). Countermovements especially devise tactics strategically because of their focus on opposing and reversing other movements' mobilization and achievements (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Mottl 1980; Peleg 2000; Zald and Useem 1987). This rational model of strategic thinking in relation to tactical choice requires social movements to devise tactics that open new or seize upon existing political opportunities (McAdam 1982; Meyer and Minkoff 2004) which is often achieved by developing access to power through

constructing alliances with political parties and/or economic and social elites (Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Tarrow 1996; 1998). Such models portray tactical choice as a rational decision made in the service of specific movement goals in a policy arena controlled by the state.

Social movement tactics may also be described using a dramaturgical metaphor that focuses on the performative aspects of tactics. In this case, tactics are viewed as part of a distinct “repertoire” of social action that involves the social movement and a number of other key actors (Tilly 2006). Theoretically there is an infinite continuum of repertoires available to use by any social movement actor or group of actors. However, at any point in time the number of available repertoires becomes bound by cultural history and opportunity. The variation in repertoires can ultimately be explained by changes in the political opportunity structure (POS) of a given society. When changes in the POS occur rapidly, repertoires of contention involve a great deal of innovation on the part of both power holders and challengers. As this cycle comes to an end, there is a demobilization and shift in innovations and available repertoires. Implicit in this definition of repertoires is that they are “interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else’s interests... in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties” (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 4). While this definition leaves a space for countermovements, it focuses almost entirely on actions where the state becomes one of the primary actors in social movement activity.

Some analysts see tactical choice as tied to ideological orientation. This focus on the state as the primary locus and target of social movement tactics is often the product of the ideological orientation of the social movement organization under analysis. Kathleen Fitzgerald and Diane Rodgers (2000) demonstrate the differences in tactical choices between traditional, reform-oriented social movement organizations that seek policy action on the part of the state and radical social movement organizations (RSMOs) that emphasize structural changes.

Because they do not rely upon the state, RSMOs engage in non-legalistic, direct action to affect change. They are also more likely to innovate their tactical repertoire because RSMOs possess “the freedom of being not constrained by moderate financial supporters” (Fitzgerald and Rodgers 2000, 584) or a desire to not alienate the state and other potential allies within the system. RSMOs often rely on alternative forms of communication that are both part of their tactical repertoire and the culture of the organization – music, street theater, pamphlets, newsletters, and more recently, the internet as means of communication (Fitzgerald and Rodgers 2000) – which generates prefigurative practices and subcultures associated with movement participation. In this model, ideological orientation is seen as either constraining or expanding the tactical repertoires of social movement organizations.

Tactical repertoires have also been explained by understanding them in relation to identity. Repertoires are significantly impacted by the collective and individual

identities of movement participants. Identities are constructed as part of an interactional process where of negotiation of "imagined community" by individuals who share a common characteristic, often involving "boundary formation" that designates group membership. This process may be internal (individuals coalesce around an identity), external (individuals with power, structures, or systems may construct identity for groups), or a combination of both (Tilly 2005). Tactical choices often reflect the collective identity of the movement creating limitations and innovations as they are mobilized in social movement activity. Factors such as class, gender, race, and sexual orientation often inform individual and collective tactical choices on strategic and personal grounds (Polletta and Jasper 2001; Smithey 2009; Wood 2007). At the individual level, movement members may identify with a particular tactic or embed the use of the tactic in an individual, "activist" or "tactical" identity (Jasper 1997; Polletta and Jasper 2001, 293). As tactics become part of and reflect individual identity, they may move into the sphere of individual action as part of collective "lifestyle movements" where individual choices are viewed as contributing to larger social change by altering cultural practices and expectations (Haenfler, Johnson, and Jones 2012). Tactical repertoires, therefore, reflect the identity of movement participants and also serve to construct identity.

Repertoires are reflections of and central to culture, just as they are to identity. Cultural expectations serve to establish which tactics are appropriate for any given historical period or society (Tilly 2006). Movements often choose tactics because of their "symbolic capacities to convey shared ideology and values" (Smithey 2009, 664). Similarly, tactics may be employed that challenge culturally appropriate themes and expectations for action in order to spur social change (Jasper 1997; Smithey 2009). "Unconventional" tactics, including the use of confrontation and violence, are included in the repertoires of "countercultural" new social movements which seek systemic change through cultural practice and the construction of "prefigurative spaces" where ideals may be practiced outside of the structures of conventional society (Kreisi, et al. 1995; Polletta 1999). The practice of cultural construction and change typical of new social movements is reflected in the individual actions of "lifestyle movement" participants who often engage in prefigurative activities at the individual level in a belief that such acts are contributing to social change. This belief stems from an understanding that others who share this collective identity are also engaging in such practices out of a similar motivation for cultural, economic, or political change (Haenfler, Johnson and Jones 2012). Movement tactics, like identity, produce and are products of culture.

Despite the attention paid to social movement tactical choices and practices, there has been a limited analysis of the impact of threat, defined as "as a set of actual or potential environmental conditions perceived as jeopardizing, or likely to

jeopardize, groups' 'interests, values, and, at times, survival'¹ (Tarrow 1998: 86, in Reese, Geidraitis and Vega 2005, 289). Jasper (1997, 116) suggests that "anything can be seen as threatening, and any perceived threat can become the target of protest," especially when human activity, rather than nature, is understood as the cause of the threat. Threat is generally seen as a motivating factor for social movement mobilization (Tilly 1978) in response to economic loss, physical danger of fear of death, or political disempowerment (Gould 2002; Reese, Geidraitis and Vega 2005; Tester 2004; Van Dyke and Soule 2002). The relationship between threat and tactical choice was studied by M. Kent Jennings and Ellen Andersen (1996) who found that individuals who were infected with HIV or had experienced the loss of someone close to them as a result of AIDS were more supportive of and more willing to engage in confrontational forms of protest. It is this sense of urgency from direct perceptions of threat that inspires the use of confrontational tactics. This model of the relationship between threat and tactical choice is, however, limited to the fear of physical illness and death.

Social movement studies of threat that have been limited to its mobilizing effects are overly simplistic and account only for the interaction between movements and actors who hold power. Yet, the concept of threat is crucial to the understanding of movement-counter movement dynamics, which have largely been understood in relation to movements mobilizing on opposing sides of an issue of state policy (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Mottl 1980; Peleg 2000). "New social movements," however, generally are not seeking to develop or change policy, but are working toward cultural, political, and social transformation through the development of prefigurative social spaces and/or subcultures (Johnston, Laraña and Gusfeld 1994; Kriesi, et al. 1995; Polletta 1999). These movements generally reject participation in the state and civil society, and desire to develop directly democratic societies through internal movement dynamics and culture (Cohen 1985; Johnston Laraña and Gusfield 1994; Melucci 1989). Certain elements of new social movements have turned to subculture and counterculture as a means of creating social change, maintaining movement identity, and building movement participation (Kriesi et al. 1995). The emphasis on identity construction and prefigurative practice (Johnston, Laraña and Gusfeld 1994; Polletta 1999) overlaps greatly with lifestyle movement practices (Haenfler, Johnson and Jones 2012) creating a unique tactical repertoire that focuses on subcultural participation as a core movement practice. As this form of social movement activism has developed, subcultures and countercultures become sites of contestation for opposing movements.

¹ While this definition appears to be similar to the concept of grievance, it differs in regard to the "ontological insecurity" (Jasper 1997) posed by the threat. Threats are understood by those being threatened as effectively endangering or significantly interfering one's ability to engage in everyday activities or expressions of values and beliefs to the degree that their very sense of being is perceived as being under attack.

Unlike the conventional model of opposing movements which positions them on opposite sides of a social issue, opposing movements in the new social movements model engage in contestation over control of culture and prefigurative spaces. This presents a unique set of threats to movement participants that in turn influence movement dynamics. Whereas in the conventional model, opposing movements find themselves competing for the attention of the state and power brokers, the model that I propose places opposing movements in direct contact with one another and in competition for control over prefigurative social space. It is my contention that the unique set of threats – physical, political, and spatial – posed by the white supremacist movement through its participation in prefigurative, lifestyle based social movements generates a distinct set of tactical responses from its anti-fascist opposition. The sense of immediate physical danger stemming from an anti-fascist identity, the ideological threat of neo-Nazism, and the loss of control and security within subcultural spaces necessitates a confrontational and sometimes violent response in order to achieve a sense of security.

White supremacist tactics

Like many social movements, the white supremacist movement engages in public events such as distribution of literature and protest rallies. However, the majority of its activity today takes place within a specific set of youth oriented subcultures, which are used for recruitment and as prefigurative spaces of movement politics. Unlike other social movements, the white supremacist movement is ideologically committed to the use of violence as a movement tactic. Violence is deployed as a means of oppressing individuals targeted for persecution, but also against political opponents. This unique position on the use of violence creates a distinct threat from white supremacists to their political opposition in the anti-fascist movement.

The public face of the white supremacist movement is often its propaganda campaigns, primarily consisting of literature distribution and events such as rallies and concerts held in highly visible locations. White supremacist literature distribution presents much of the ideology of the movement; it is crafted to specifically play on the general public's interests and fears while presenting the white supremacist movement as a legitimate alternative to existing political structures. This is achieved in part by framing the information presented in an intellectual context (Berbrier 1999; Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 2000), or playing on the fears of white Americans by framing the concerns of the movement in populist terms (Berlet and Lyons 2000; Berlet and Vysotsky 2006). The combination of intellectualization and fear mongering gives the propaganda a unique appeal to Americans who may be suffering from economic disempowerment or anomie as a result of changes in the structure of society (Berlet and Lyons; Blazak 2001; Blee 2002; Daniels 1997; Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 2000; Ezekiel 1995; Kimmel and Ferber 2000).

Public events by white supremacists are at their base an example of “demonstrative” social movement behavior (Kriesi, et al. 1995). Rallies in particular are often organized around a specific issue that the white supremacist movement is seeking to make a claim on. The surface level rhetoric of many of these issues reflects the populist concerns of many Americans (Berlet and Lyons 2000) – the deindustrialization of the American economy, the impact of immigration on the cultural, economic, and political landscape of American society, and the death toll in an unpopular war that many believe was started based on fabricated evidence. However, once the surface is scratched, the blame for all of these claims rests solely on Jews and people of color (Berlet and Lyons; Blazak 2001; Daniels 1997; Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 2000; Ezekiel 1995; Ridgeway 1995). The public events serve as not only means of transmitting the message of the movement, but also as a key element in movement membership; attendance at a rally publicly demonstrates one’s commitment to the movement and serves as a bonding experience for those who participate (Ezekiel 1995; Ridgeway 1995). Finally, rallies serve as a means of recruitment because individuals who feel economically, politically, or socially marginalized may be inspired by such displays to become involved in movement activity.

The most significant development in white supremacist culture in recent decades has been the linking of the movement to segments of various youth cultures and the expression of white racist ideology in the lyrical content of musical acts within those subcultures (Berlet and Vysotsky 2004; Burghart 1999; Corte and Edwards 2008; Futrell, Simi and Gottschalk 2006). Since the late 1970s, the subcultures that accompanied certain styles of music have become the primary tools of white supremacist organizing. Although there was some resistance to this type of organizing in its early days (Berbrier 1999; Perry 2000), most white supremacists have generally come to accept and even exalt youth subculture as an integral part of the movement. Subcultures in particular have served as prefigurative spaces where white supremacists can indoctrinate new members, reinforce existing membership commitments, and model a future all white society (Blazak 2001; Futrell and Simi 2004).

The white supremacist movement has become active in three distinct youth subcultures that are represented by distinct musical genres: Punk/Skinhead, Black Metal, and Gothic/Industrial/Noise/ Apocalyptic Folk (Berlet and Vysotsky 2004; Burghart 1999). These are specifically targeted as sites for white supremacist recruitment because participants are seen as more open to movement ideology and messaging as a result of their estrangement from conventional society. White supremacists often find recruits among younger participants or individuals who are new to the subculture and open to supremacist messages about the way in which subcultural values and beliefs are consistent with neo-Nazi ideology (Blazak 2001). As supremacists become engaged in subcultural activity, they work to dominate a local “scene” through violence as part of a strategy of creating an idealized space

that reflects their racist ideology (Blazak 2001; Futrell and Simi 2004). White supremacists, however, do not hold monopoly control over these subcultures; therefore, it is incorrect to associate a particular subculture with the white supremacist movement (Berlet and Vysotsky 2006; Corte and Edwards 2008). Furthermore, because these subcultures are not specifically oriented toward the overt racism and neo-Nazism of contemporary white supremacists, there is a great deal of contention over supremacist participation in them.

The white supremacist movement, like other reactionary social movements on the right, has an ideological commitment to genocide (Berlet 1992; Garner 1996; Lyons 1995; Passmore 2005). Despite attempts to frame the movement as mainstream and nonviolent (Berbrier 1998a; Berbrier 1998b; Berbrier 1999; Perry 2000), there are still numerous members who openly advocate and occasionally commit acts of violence (Ezekiel 1995; Hamm 1993; Levin 2007; Levin and McDevitt 2002). It is hard to gauge the number of acts of hate violence perpetrated by white supremacists because the vast majority of hate crimes are thrill crimes committed by individuals who are not members of any organized group for "fun" or "bragging rights" among friends. Levin and McDevitt (2002) indicate that only a small proportion of all hate violence may be attributed to individuals who are on a mission and therefore likely to be involved with (or *consider* themselves involved with) a white supremacist group.

However, when white supremacists do commit acts of hate violence, they are likely to be more brutal and deadly than bias crimes perpetrated by "dabblers," individuals who are not ideologically committed to genocidal violence. This is largely because white supremacist hate crimes are designed to either send a terrorist message to the community being victimized or to eliminate as many members of the targeted group as possible (Levin 2007; Levin and McDevitt 2002). Even though white supremacists are fundamentally oriented toward engaging in hate violence, the majority of their violent activity is focused on other white males (Bowen 2009; Simi, Smith and Reeser 2008). A portion of this violence is against fellow supremacists in an attempt to maintain discipline and ideological commitment, however the vast majority is deployed against fellow subculturalists in conflict over control of space and subcultural domination (Blazak 2001; Simi, Smith and Reeser 2008). While this may seem counterintuitive given the ideological imperative toward eliminationist violence, research indicates that white supremacists generally avoid conflict outside of the "safe space" of subculture and movement spaces (Futrell and Simi 2004; Simi and Futrell 2009). This focus on conflict with others in mostly white subcultures is also consistent with the movement's ideology, which prioritizes violence and conflict as a means of taking and maintaining power. Violence, therefore, is used against not only targets of racial, religious, and sexual persecution, but also against ideological opponents and internal dissenters (Berlet 1992; Garner 1996; Lyons 1995; Passmore 2005).

The white supremacist movement clearly prioritizes subcultural activity as the key

form of movement activity and organizing. This shift to cultural and prefigurative activism is consistent with other contemporary movements broadly characterized as new social movements (Vysotsky and Dentice 2008). Unlike other social movements which often build subcultures and countercultures that are consistent with their ideology and movement goals, the white supremacist movement seeks to recruit and build within youth cultures that appear to be receptive as a result of their expressions of angst and alienation (Blazak 2001; Futrell and Simi 2004; Hamm 1993). A significant part of this subcultural recruitment and control process involves the use of violence against other members of the subculture who do not fit supremacist prefigurative visions or resist their participation (Blazak 2001; Hamm 1993). This use of violence creates a unique threat to which individuals targeted by supremacists must respond. This article explains the variety of threats supremacists pose in such contexts and the relationship between these threats and the militant response of the anti-fascist opposition.

Methodology

This study presents results of a 7-year ethnographic study of militant anti-fascist organizations. The research was conducted in two phases in 2001-2005 in an Eastern U.S. city and 2007-2010 in a Western U.S. city. As a participant observer I attended confrontational and non-confrontational protests against white supremacist groups, one regional and two national gatherings of militant anti-fascists, as well as numerous social events².

In addition to observation, formal interviews were conducted with 14 individuals in key organizing positions within the anti-fascist movement. Because of the difficulties in estimating the population of anti-fascist activists, a probability sample was unattainable. In order to obtain a national sample of participants, the formal interviews were conducted in one Eastern city, one Mid-Western city, and two Western cities. The formal interview process began with the participant answering a series of survey questions that was followed by a semi-structured interview. In addition to the formal interviews, informal interviews were conducted as part of the participant observation process with 30 additional individuals involved in militant opposition to white supremacists. Interviews were conducted with anti-fascist activists who reside in all regions of the United States. A pseudonym was also randomly assigned to each participant for purposes of quotation.

² The social events included, but were not limited to, Punk, Oi!, and Hardcore shows; DJ nights; film screenings; house parties; and informal gatherings in bars, homes, and other social spaces.

The militant anti-fascist movement

The North American anti-fascist movement was in many ways modeled after its European counterpart that developed out of historical and cultural struggles between left- and right-wing working class and activist youth. The contemporary version of these movements developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s in England, France, and Germany in response to increased activity by extreme nationalist and fascist parties who sought to bring in recruits by aligning themselves with developing youth subcultures (Goodyer 2003; Katsiaficas 2006; 2012; Moore and Roberts 2009; Roberts and Moore 2009). These anti-fascist movements were often associated with the Autonomist movement, which positioned itself as anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist, feminist, and anti-statist. Such a movement found itself in direct political opposition to the growing neo-fascist movements in Europe. Because it stressed direct action rather than state based reform, the Autonomist movement often inspired confrontational political actions. In the case of anti-fascism, Autonomists directly confronted demonstrations by right-wing parties and racist violence against immigrants with acts of violence; often putting them in direct conflict with police as well. Their anti-state stance placed the police as allies of fascism and racism in such confrontations (Katsiaficas 2006; 2012). The politics and tactics of European anti-fascism were translated into the North American context through punk and skinhead subcultures via the circulation of fanzines and music. North American anti-fascists often model themselves after their European counterparts and borrow heavily from their innovative cultural aesthetics and practices.

Consistent with the countermovement model, the militant anti-fascist movement is in many ways a direct parallel of the white supremacist movement. The anti-fascists interviewed and observed in this study were overwhelmingly white young adults involved in subcultural activity with a left-wing political orientation. All of the formal interview participants identified themselves racially as white. Additionally, observations of the movement membership at gatherings and events indicated that the majority of individuals presented as white. This, along with the age of the participants, may be the result of their subcultural participation. The anti-fascist movement has extremely strong roots in Punk and Skinhead subcultures (Goodyer 2003; Moore and Roberts 2009; Roberts and Moore 2009; Wood 1999) which, despite their claims to antiracism, are identified with whiteness (Ramirez-Sanchez 2008; Traber 2001).

Additionally, there is a variant on white antiracism that stresses direct opposition of populist white supremacy (O'Brien 1999a; 1999b; 2001). A radical version of white antiracism associated with the "race traitor" movement argues that whites must take an active role in dismantling their power and privilege (Ignatiev and Garvey 1996; Segrest 1994). Many anti-fascists see their oppositional activism as a version of this political position; they are engaging in a struggle with white supremacists as a means of showing solidarity with people of color, LGBTQ people,

Jewish people and others targeted by white supremacists. The struggle against white supremacy is understood as part of the process of rejecting the privileges of a dominant social position. By taking on this struggle, anti-fascists are demonstrating a rejection of the ideology of white supremacy and on some level their complicity in its most populist manifestations. It is therefore unsurprising that the subjects of this study are exclusively white. Militant anti-fascists are also defined by their radical political orientation. The participants in formal interviews all identified as anarchists though the movement maintains a non-sectarian position on opposing white supremacists. This political position serves as an ideal foil to the neo-Nazi ideology of the contemporary white supremacist movement. As white radicals participating in similar subcultures anti-fascists are placed in a unique position in relation to white supremacists.

Militant anti-fascist tactics

The tactics of the militant anti-fascist movement closely follow the countermovement tactics described by Zald and Useem (1990) described above primarily using the tactics Kriesi et al. (1995) characterize as confrontational and violent actions. It is this willingness to engage in direct confrontation and violence that defines this movement as militant as opposed to other movements that choose to oppose white supremacists through non-confrontational demonstrative actions and juridical cooperation with the state (Rabrenovic 2007). The individuals who participated in formal interviews were surveyed in order to gauge their preferences for specific tactics in response to white supremacist tactics and organizing strategies. The initial measure of militancy consisted of a nine item list of potential responses to a white supremacist event³. Participants were asked to rate the effectiveness of each potential response on a five point scale, with one rated as least effective and five rated as most effective. The final index consisted of the coded

³ The items on the questionnaire were listed as follows:

- a. Holding a rally at a different location and/or at a different time
- b. Holding a peaceful counter-rally at the site of the event
- c. Using non-violent tactics (sit-in, blockade, other civil disobedience) to prevent the event from occurring
- d. Using violence against attendees of the event in order to disrupt the event or to prevent the event from occurring
- e. Causing damage or destruction to the location of the event
- f. Verbally confronting potential participants
- g. Using signs, banners, etc. to demonstrate your opposition to the event and its participants
- h. Distributing literature (flyers, anti-fascist newspapers or magazines, etc.) to the community in which the event is held
- i. Distributing literature (flyers, anti-fascist newspapers or magazines, etc.) to the participants of the event

responses to items A through F, generating scores ranging from nineteen to twenty-five with a mean score of twenty-one indicating a high preference for confrontational and violent tactics. In formal and informal interviews militant anti-fascists consistently asserted that confrontation and violence are effective methods for pre-empting and dissuading mobilization as well as damage and destruction of the white supremacist movement.

Studying threat

In previous works, threat has been understood as fear of physical harm (Jennings and Andersen 1996; Gould 2002; Tester 2004), fear of a loss of political rights or power (Van Dyke and Soule 2002), and fear of a loss of economic power (Van Dyke and Soule 2002; Reese, Geidraitis, and Vega 2005). For the purpose of this study, I define threat as a fear of physical harm or a loss of control over economic activity, political rights, or social spaces and activities as a result of white supremacist activity. This sense of fear may be felt indirectly or directly. An indirect threat is either not focused on an individual participant or cannot be carried out directly. The individual experiencing the threat feels a general sense of fear regarding white supremacist activity, but also perceives that she/he has a low likelihood of actually experiencing any sort of intimidation or violence at the hands of supremacists. A direct threat is one that is made specifically against the participant with some sense by the recipient that it may be carried out. This threat is felt more intensely and results in greater emotional trauma to the individual.

In order to understand the threat experienced by militant anti-fascists participants were asked a series of simple, direct questions and gleaned indirectly as part of a question about the participant's history of anti-fascist activism. The participant was simply asked if she/he had ever felt threatened by white supremacists. If the participant answered no, then a follow-up question inquired as to why. In the event of an affirmative answer, the participant was asked a series of follow-up questions designed to illuminate the nature of the threat and the effect that threat had on the participant. In addition, some participants discussed receiving threats from and/or being victims of incidents of violence committed by white supremacists as part of their biography of anti-fascist activism.

Threat and the motivation for action

Given that white supremacists possess an ideological motivation to violently eliminate their opposition (Berlet 1992; Berlet and Lyons 2000; Garner 1996; Lyons 1995; Passmore 2002), it is not surprising that the anti-fascists in this study consistently reported that they had somehow felt threatened by white supremacists. An overwhelming majority of the respondents in the sample of formal interviews answered that they felt threatened by white supremacists. Two

of the anti-fascists who indicated that they felt threatened had not been directly threatened by white supremacists, but both indicated that they were indirectly threatened verbally. Of the remaining participants who received direct threats, only one received verbal threats exclusively. It was not uncommon for anti-fascists to be the victims of violence at the hands of white supremacists, and of those who experienced violence four had received verbal or written threats that preceded that violence. As Darby, an anti-racist Skinhead, pointed out, "I've been beaten by them, too, so they've followed through on those threats."

Militant anti-fascists were much more likely to be traumatized by the threats and violence that they experienced at the hands of white supremacists. Helena, an anarchist Punk and anti-fascist organizer, described her reaction to an extremely violent attack by white supremacists as experiencing post-traumatic stress disorder. Kam, an anarchist Punk, described his reaction to direct threats as follows:

It feels [expletive] cause... if you're threatened, some of the times you can't do [anything] because usually they'll only threaten you if they feel like they can, if they outnumber you or if they're physically larger than you... and if they're physically larger than you, you're feeling threatened by them, you start getting a bunch of adrenaline and you start being scared because you could get hurt, you could get hurt bad because they could stomp you, possibly even kill you so it's scary.

However, all of the respondents felt that such threats also inspired action. Lydia, a queer anarchist organizer, points out that "[they] just make me feel like we need to get organized." Despite her extremely traumatic experience, Helena was motivated to continue with her militant anti-fascist activism:

I think that all sorts of people live in terror all the time all over the world and here in the United States – I think about black people being lynched or something, I think I can take this on.... I think that's what really makes you an ally is when you say like, "no, I'm joining this team." I guess getting your ass kicked by a bunch of white supremacists is when you're on that team. It's like we talk a lot about no race and trying to get rid of your whiteness and blah, blah, blah, I guess that's to me that's what really did it. It's like, it is really renouncing it in that way... it's just too core to who I am to wanna be fighting injustice.

The intense threat felt by anti-fascists is a strong motivating factor for becoming organized against white supremacists activity. Whether it is to maintain their own "ontological security," a means of acting on their ideological position regarding race and racism, or as a means of organizing a broader movement, militants believe it

essential to work to stop white supremacist organizing through a variety of tactics in order to protect themselves from white supremacists.

The militant anti-fascists clearly faced strong, immediate, and direct threats from white supremacists. In their discussions of the nature of the threat that they face, militants not only indicate the interplay of different threats, but also point to the importance of taking an uncompromising stand against white supremacist groups as a matter of necessity.

Physical threat

The intensity of the threat faced by most militant anti-fascists is manifested in direct threats to their physical well-being. With the vast majority of militants having experienced some form of violence at the hands of white supremacists, their sense of personal physical security is violated. The anti-fascists in this sample were extremely cognizant of the physical threat that they faced from white supremacists. In part this is the result of them being directly targeted as members of specific categories designated by white supremacists as enemies.

As white anti-fascists all of the participants face a threat of violence as "race traitors" in the eyes of white supremacists because of their rejection of beliefs in racial domination and white superiority. Eowyn, an anarchist Punk and activist, contextualized her sense of physical threat in relation to her Jewish partner and activist friends. When asked, "do you feel threatened by white supremacists?" she responded with the following statement:

Yes. Maybe not so much for myself by myself, but my partner is Jewish and we are both active in anti-racist politics and ultra-left or anarchist organizing, and we live with each other and near other activists. I do not think this is the same threat that a person of color feels every day of their life and I am not trying to make that comparison for myself, but yes, I do feel that they would do me or my partner or my friends or my neighbors harm.

She is cognizant of the fact that her relationship with a Jewish partner makes her the target of white supremacist derision and potential violence (Daniels 1997; Ferber 2000) and adds that her own activist work places her at risk for white supremacist retaliation. Damon, a long-time leftist and anarchist organizer, explains the severity of the threat that militants face with two anecdotes in response to the same question regarding his experiences with threat:

when the head of the <state> KKK had his hands around my throat trying to strangle me at that point, yes, I felt threatened.... When the police report on the small group

of <city> boneheads⁴ who were pulled over by the cops was turned over to us... they listed what they found in the car. So here's 4 young boneheads and they had 6 guns: 1 revolver, 3 semi-automatics, 1 shotgun, 1 rifle, I think it was Winchester 30 caliber, but I can't remember exactly, 3 baseball bats, a crow bar, every one of them had at least one knife maybe a couple of them had 2 knives and they were looking for us. They weren't looking for unnamed individuals. They named who they were looking for because a lot of the boneheads weren't very smart.... But yeah, they've said they're going to kill me in particular and people that I hang out with a number of times and they've made those attempts in great seriousness so I think I have to at least respect their intentions.

Helena indicated that when she faced a potentially deadly attack from white supremacist Skinheads they had specifically targeted her friend for being a former white supremacist turned anti-racist, "my friend was a former Nazi in England who had turned Redskin⁵ so they were, you know, they wanted to murder him, basically. So, they knew who we were at the time." Helena's friend was viewed as particularly traitorous by the white supremacists for leaving the movement and siding with its anti-fascist opposition and his associates were similarly vilified. As known "race traitors," militant anti-fascists face an extremely direct threat of violence from white supremacists.

The anti-fascists in this sample were often directly targeted by white supremacists as a result of the physical threat that is often derived from their status in the eyes of white supremacists. The intensity of the threat faced by anti-fascists makes the potential for violence an everyday reality for participants in this study. As activists who engage in radical responses to white supremacist organizing, anti-fascists often cannot turn to the police who often view them as a rival gang to white supremacist skinheads (Griffith 2010). Many anti-fascists view police as ineffective (often arriving after the fact when violence does occur) at best or sympathetic to the white supremacists at worst. Additionally, the militants' belief in the necessity to take "direct action" against white supremacists often stimulates the willingness to use more confrontational tactics. For militant anti-fascists, the use of

⁴ This is a common term of derision used by anti-fascists against white supremacist skinheads. Because the skinhead subculture has its origins in the culture of Jamaican immigrants to England in the late 1960s and was multi-racial, traditional skinheads consider themselves non-racist or actively anti-racist (Wood 1999). The term is therefore used to delineate true, anti-racist skinheads from individuals who may look the part but do not properly represent the subculture.

⁵ This term, shorthand for Red Skinhead, applies to skinheads who openly identify with leftist politics, specifically socialism, communism, and anarchism. The Redskin moniker is designed to distinguish leftist, anti-racist skinheads from other anti-racist skinheads who may adhere to politically conservative beliefs (especially nationalism) or identify themselves as non-political on issues other than racism. It is not meant to imply any derision of Native Americans or support for the Football team from Washington, DC.

confrontational and violent tactics becomes a necessity for maintaining their own personal safety and ensuring the safety of others in their community. This becomes clear in Damon's response to the violent attack that he faced from a Klan leader discussed above, "After I knocked him down and attempted to break his nose, no, I did not feel threatened." From a strategic standpoint, anti-fascist militancy ensures that the white supremacist threat is neutralized. When Damon managed to turn the tide against his aggressor, he also gave himself a sense of protection and empowerment.

The efficacy of violence on the part of militant anti-fascists becomes evident in the context of sustained threats to the personal safety of militants. If the consistent acts of damage or disruption to the white supremacist movement have the effect of limiting its activity, then white supremacists are unable to engage in acts of violence against individuals that they would normally target. This ultimately serves the immediate goal of maintaining the physical safety and security of militant activists and others who may be targeted by white supremacists for violence.

Political threat

The physical threat posed by white supremacists occurs within the context of a larger political struggle. Despite the characterizations of white supremacists as violent thugs by the media and criminal justice professionals, they are a highly organized social movement. As such, they have a clearly defined ideology and a set of specific social and political goals that they wish to achieve and a series of strategies for how to achieve them. Consistent with Meyer and Staggenborg's (1996) and Peleg's (2000) concept of opposing movement activities, the dynamic between white supremacists and anti-fascists is largely defined by the political ideology and activity of white supremacists and their opposition. The threat of white supremacists is therefore much greater than the simple physical security at the heart of the struggle between movements; it is a threat born of a struggle by movements on two clearly different ideological sides who view each other as direct political opponents. Anti-fascists recognize this political threat posed by white supremacists, but also see them as a distinct threat to their more transformative, revolutionary agenda. For militants, white supremacists pose a direct political threat because they present a reactionary critique of the existing system that may appeal to a similar political base and are willing to use violence to maintain their political domination of the public sphere.

While anti-fascists understand the potential of white supremacists to undermine liberal values of freedom and legal equality, they attribute a much greater level of political threat to the white supremacist movement because they view it as direct political opposition and recruiting within the same political base (Hamerquist 2002). The white supremacist movement also has a long history of suppressing the political activity of the radical left, and militant anti-fascists clearly understand that

white supremacists have specifically targeted them for violence rather than petty harassment because of their radical political affiliations.

The political threat that white supremacists pose to anti-fascists lies in their ability to appeal to and recruit from a similar political base. Darby points out that white supremacist ideals “are typically some form of cultural trapping that... are a window dressing for routing people away from really addressing more fundamental, structural grievances that are typically oriented around economy, community, culture, and over who has a right to determine power relationships and dynamics within those spheres of existence.” In an influential text for the militant anti-fascist movement, Don Hamerquist (2002) and J. Sakai (2002) both point out the dilemma that white supremacist movements in contemporary American society pose for anti-fascists – as the white supremacist movement adapts to contemporary concerns, it moves into a political territory that has long been the preserve of the left: globalization and capitalism. The critiques that the movement proposes under a variety of ideological banners address issues that are of primary concern to many working people in the United States. The white supremacists, therefore, become a strong political competitor for supporters of radical social change with the anarchists that make up much of the militant movement. Helena’s experience in becoming involved in militant anti-racism reflects this “battle of ideas” in her working class community:

In the town where I grew up there was definitely a pretty big Nazi population in the city across the river. It was very like ‘the other side of the tracks,’ you know, and it was basically because of the loss of blue collar jobs like a bunch of industry had moved out so there’s all these white men who were angry because they couldn’t get the same kinds of jobs that their dad did and the property value there declined and also black people started moving there because it was cheaper to buy a house there and so they equated that and it was like really ripe for recruiters and there would be these creepy, middle-aged men that would come in and start hanging out with the teenagers. It was very much like the stereotype. So there was kind of a lot of them. There was a real fascist presence there and so they were intermingled.... And for me, always I felt like there was this real ideological war, like it was all these working class people were being recruited into fascism and those were the same people that could be potential revolutionaries and just got totally derailed into this asinine world view. So I felt like it was this ideological war, like they were taking all of our potential anarchist army and turning it into boneheads.

This experience was also reflected in the experiences of other anti-fascists. Most had come to anti-fascism as part of their work in other political organizations and found that they had to address the political activity of white supremacists as part of

that action⁶. Militant anti-fascists recognize the political threat that white supremacists pose to their own organizing efforts. As the quote from Helena suggests and scholarly research verifies, white supremacists specifically target communities that are experiencing economic hardship for recruitment⁷. Since the white supremacist movement engages in direct, often physical conflict with its political opponents, the recruits in these communities then become foot soldiers in a political struggle with the left.

Militancy becomes a practical stand against an opposing movement that has an ideological imperative to use violence against it. For anti-fascists, the use of confrontational tactics is an important political tool because it demonstrates to a movement that highly values violence that its opponents will not simply acquiesce to their demands, but will resist. If white supremacists rely on intimidation to achieve their goals, the confrontational and violent actions of anti-fascists serve to undermine the effectiveness of these threats. When faced with the political threat of white supremacist organizing, militants take the stand that they have acted to respond directly to that threat rather than insulating themselves against it.

Spatial threats

Political activity occurs within specific physical spaces (Martin and Miller 2003; Tilly 2000). The threat that white supremacists pose to anti-fascists is bound to the physical spaces each movement operates within; space becomes fundamental to the perception of threat that white supremacists can pose to an individual. This is true not only in terms of physical proximity, but in terms of the everyday activities and use of space by members of the differing opposing movements. For militant anti-fascists the threat of white supremacist violence was described as being much "closer to home." Militants were much more likely to be involved in subcultures where white supremacists were active in recruitment and "prefigurative" political activity (Blazak 2001; Futrell and Simi 2004). They are therefore more likely to have day-to-day experiences that bring them into contact with white supremacists and vice-versa. White supremacists also pose a much greater threat to a more immediate sense of space for militants as their activities alter the fundamental

⁶ The activists in this study were members of formal anti-fascist organizations and networks, often with several years (and in one case, decades) of activist experience. The organizations that they formed largely stemmed from existing political, rather than subcultural networks. For example, in Eastern City, the anti-fascist group was started as an off-shoot of an existing anarchist organization. However, there is significant overlap between the anti-fascist movement and subcultural participation. In many cases, anti-fascist activism has its origins in subcultural participation, but requires a level of politicization on the part of participants to recognize the threat posed by white supremacists (Goodyer 2002; Meynard 1990; Moore and Roberts 2009; Roberts and Moore 2009; Snyders; 2008).

⁷ See for example: Blazak (2001), Daniels (1997), Ezekiel (1995), and Ferber (2000).

meaning of subculture for its participants.

Militant anti-fascists possess no delusions about the threat that white supremacists pose to them as the result of a much greater amount of contact, which occurs as a result of subcultural activity on the part of both groups. Because much of the activity of contemporary white supremacists occurs within the context of youth-oriented subcultures which they view as prefigurative spaces for social movement activity (Berlet and Vysotsky 2006; Blazak 2001; Futrell and Simi 2004), they are much more likely to face opposition from members of the subculture who do not share their political orientation. This is particularly true in the context of the Punk and Skinhead subcultures (Goodyer 2001; Moore and Roberts 2009; Roberts and Moore 2009; Sarabia and Shriver 2004; Wood 1999). By playing off of existing themes and aesthetics, white supremacists have managed to develop a foothold within these subcultures (Berlet and Vysotsky 2006; Blazak 2001; Hamm 1993; O'Hara 2001; Wood 1999). However, these attempts at recruitment have been met with strong resistance from within the subcultures themselves (Berlet and Vysotsky 2006; Goodyer 2001; Moore and Roberts 2009; O'Hara 2001; Roberts and Moore 2009; Sarabia and Shriver 2004). Punks and Skinheads have been at the forefront of developing a strong opposition to white supremacists because they pose an immediate threat to the subculture broadly and to the physical safety of its members. The physical spaces that are crucial for subcultural activity — bars and other music venues, music stores, and other locations where Punks and Skinheads “hang out”— become the literal battlegrounds for a conflict over the ideological orientation of the subculture.

Militant anti-fascists are often at the forefront of this conflict because they have taken the strongest stances in response to white supremacist organizing efforts within their communities. As activists within the subculture, they are actively targeted by white supremacists for their involvement not only in anti-fascist activity, as in the case of Helena discussed above, but also for their subcultural activities as organizers of events. Darby, an anti-racist skinhead, described the context of threats and violence direct toward him, “I’ve hosted or been a part of events that have been threatened.” Anti-fascists’ participation in subcultural activities places them in spaces that facilitate direct, physical contact between them and white supremacists. Unlike the average American, militants are not sheltered from the everyday activities of white supremacists. Helena explains how the context of violence within her local Punk scene led to her involvement in militant anti-fascist activism:

[The white supremacists] would come to Punk shows and no one would really know what to do and we sort of figured it out as we went along. We started out just kind of, no one had a really great idea of what to do what to do, but they were extremely violent, they would cause fights, they would start fights with Punks all the time or would prey upon us and beat us up while we’re walking home and stuff and so we got

kind of militant and had to be organized, and that's kind of how I got involved with it. And then it slowly got more sophisticated I guess [unintelligible], "there are other people that do this too" and there's more sophisticated things we can do than just be like "get out of here" and beat them up.

The consistent interaction with white supremacists in subcultural spaces made Helena and her fellow activists within the subculture legitimate targets for the violence that she faced. Eowyn also noted that white supremacists target known anti-fascists when she listed an attack on a local anti-racist Skinhead bar as one of her reasons for becoming involved in militant anti-fascist activity. It is clear from these responses that anti-fascists have a greater likelihood of being in the same physical space as white supremacists because of their interest in similar subcultures.

In addition to the increased likelihood of violence because of confrontation within specific spaces, anti-fascists also recognize the danger that white supremacists pose to the subculture itself. White supremacist activity within the Punk and Skinhead subcultures creates a situation where subcultural space becomes the focal point of contention. The spaces within which subcultural activity takes place become marked as "safe spaces" for anti-fascists or the "prefigurative spaces" of white supremacist activity. Brock makes such a distinction when discussing the context of his response to white supremacists hanging out at a local music store:

it's usually apparent, depending on the situation, it depends on whether the place that he's hanging out is particularly sympathetic towards anti-fascism or whether they tend to be a little more sketchy, if it's like a Doc store run by like fence-walker Skinheads, I'm not gonna be that brash to like, you know, but if it's like the kind of place that I'll hang out in comfortably and everything, I would probably just confront him, get him to basically admit what he is or at least refuse to admit that he isn't 'cause usually a lot of times kids won't come out and say it, but at that point is basically tell them that they're not welcome and everything. You know, it becomes a thing where if they want to hang out there, they're basically gonna have to fight for it and at that point it's just not usually worth it to them so they'll move on.

Like many anti-fascists, Brock recognizes that there are subcultural spaces that are identified as being friendly or receptive to white supremacists and is unlikely to individually challenge them. However, he is willing to confront white supremacists over control of neutral spaces or spaces identified as anti-fascist. Spaces that are identified as white supremacist are also legitimate targets for militant activity because they serve as a base from which the movement may safely operate (Futrell and Simi 2004). Therefore, anti-fascists will often also target these for collective confrontational activity because they pose a distinct threat.

The threat of a loss of space moves beyond basic resource mobilization concerns over having a “base of operations” from which the social movement can operate or the symbolic meaning that the space may provide for a movement (Tilly 2000). For many subcultural participants, the loss of space to white supremacists also provides a distinct physical threat. Marika pointed out that white supremacist activity increased the level of violence within her local Punk scene. This is consistent with Blazak’s (2001) observation that white supremacists use violence within subcultures as a means of recruitment and of establishing dominance. Helena confirms this in the quote above— as white supremacists become involved within the Punk and Skinhead scene, the level of overall violence increases. The ideological imperative toward violent action coupled with a subcultural norm of violence (Hamm 1993) transforms Punk and Skinhead spaces into places that are dangerous for all but a small percentage of racist thugs who may ultimately control them. Anti-fascists have little recourse but to turn to violence as a means of self-defense against white supremacists and of wresting control of these spaces away from them.

The use of confrontational and violent tactics by militant anti-fascists becomes a “necessary evil” in defending a subcultural space against white supremacist incursion. White supremacists have often focused on Punk and Skinhead subcultures as distinct places where they may successfully recruit potential members. The spaces wherein subcultural activity occurs become contested by opposing movements in the struggle against white supremacy. White supremacists often engage in violence as a means of establishing dominance within these spaces which leaves their opponents little recourse but to fight back or leave the subculture altogether. Those who choose to confront the supremacists often become involved in militant anti-fascism as a result of their subcultural activity. As members of the subculture, they face a much greater likelihood of contact with white supremacists who, to paraphrase Darby from earlier in this article, have not only made threats, but carried them out. The importance of the subculture as a “free space” (Polletta 1999) for both white supremacists and anti-fascists makes it an important locus for contention between the two movements.

Threat and tactical choice

The confrontational and violent tactics employed by militant anti-fascists serve as a strategic response to the threats described in this article. These threats occur at both the individual (physical) and collective (political and spatial) level in that the interviewees explain both a threat to themselves and their political and subcultural activities. This is not to imply that the threats are purely the product of collective narratives produced by anti-fascists as justification for their own use of confrontational and violent tactics. The threats described above reflect genuine interactions between activists and white supremacists consistent with supremacist

goals and strategies of recruitment in subcultures through violent intimidation. Once militancy is initiated it may take on a life of its own; however, it originates in white supremacist activity.

The threat experienced by militant anti-fascists can be understood as the product of the interactional dynamic between them and white supremacists. Conflicts with white supremacists generate and reinforce "interactive political identities" (Tilly 2005: 60) at the individual and collective level. The physical threat experienced by militant anti-fascists is based largely on an interactive dynamic between them and white supremacists. As white activists who organize against supremacists, anti-fascists are identified as "race traitors" because of their refusal to adopt racist beliefs and ideals. The anti-fascist identity is therefore constructed in this dynamic as an anti-racist one in direct opposition to white supremacists (Ignatiev and Garver 1996; O'Brien 1999a; 1999b; 2001). Whites who oppose supremacists are automatically branded with the race traitor identity and made legitimate targets for violence (Blazak 2001; Bowen 2009). The threat of violence against such individuals further activates the anti-fascist identity as a response to the physical threat posed by white supremacists.

A collective sense of threat is similarly produced in the cases of political and spatial threat. In the case of the activists interviewed for this study, the anti-fascist identity is the product of interplay between the collective political identity of anarchist and the individual anti-racist identity discussed above. Identities are considered political when "they involve relations to government" (Tilly 2005, 62); which may seem ironic for anarchists, but their opposition to the state is such a relation, nonetheless. Both anti-fascists and white supremacists claim an oppositional identity in relation to the existing state, anarchist and fascist respectively. As stated previously, these political ideologies and the identities that are associated with them propose starkly oppositional visions of social order following the overthrow of the state. However, both sides are vying for a similar constituency and attempt to align their political identity with elements of the working class and the disenfranchised. This places the two groups in direct political opposition to one another and generates a political conflict that manifests in physical confrontation.

This collective identity is further enhanced by the subcultural identities of the activists. White supremacists have been active in youth subcultures since the late 1970s, engaging in active recruitment and collective domination of subcultural spaces (Berlet and Vysotsky 2006; Blazak 2001; Bowen 2009; Burghart 1999; Corte and Edwards 2008; Futrell, Simi and Gottschalk 2006; Hamm 1993; Roberts and Moore 2009). This process generates a conflict between white supremacists and anti-fascists over the definition of "true" subcultural identity. White supremacists make claims on Punk and Skinhead identity on the basis of representing genuine rebelliousness and working-class status (Berlet and Vysotsky 2006; Blazak 2001; Bowen 2009; Burghart 1999; Hamm 1993), linking political and subcultural

identities. This presents a threat to anti-fascists who view subcultural identity as being linked to a left-wing political orientation⁸. Therefore, the presence of white supremacists in such subcultures represents not only a threat to the physical safety of participants (Blazak 2001; Bowen 2009), but to the very core of subcultural identity.

The link between identity and threat described above, however, should not imply that the threat faced by anti-fascists is the product of a narrative regarding collective identity. This is evident in the chronology of anti-fascist militancy in relation to white supremacist activity. In true countermovement form, the militant response of anti-fascists follows violent incidents by white supremacists (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Mottl 1980; Peleg 2000; Zald and Useem 1990). Interviewees consistently stated that their anti-fascist activism followed increased incidents of supremacist activity and violence. These statements are validated by ethnographic observation in this study.

In the Eastern city, anti-fascist activity was initiated after white supremacist activists began organizing among punks and skinheads at a local hangout, which led to a vandalism attack on a local leftist bookstore. The anti-fascists were further reinvigorated when racist skinheads attacked a punk house late one night after a party, injuring several people and sending at least one to the hospital with serious injuries. In the Western city, anti-fascists organized after a resurgent racist skinhead organization announced plans to hold a large white supremacist gathering. In the days preceding the gathering, three supremacists attacked an African-American man, which for anti-fascists signaled a return of the racist violence the city experienced in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. The perception of threat by participants is further legitimized by scholarly data that indicates that supremacist violence often targets anti-racists and subcultural peers (Blazak 2001; Bowen 2009). It is therefore reasonable to believe that the interviewees' narratives of the chronology of white supremacist threat and anti-fascist response are not the product of a collective identity narrative, but reflect a genuine countermovement dynamic.

⁸ The political orientation of punk subculture is a point of some contention with some claiming that it has a more generalized anti-authoritarian tendency or what Hamm (1993, 28) describes as "the ideology of fuckyouism" which was highly influential on the nihilistic violence of early racist skinheads as well as non-racist punks. However, Craig O'Hara (2001) outlines a series of distinctly left-wing ideological influences on punk including anarchism, feminism, and environmentalism. Also, punk's subcultural longevity is due in large part to the do-it-yourself practices that are the result of anarchist ideological influence (Clark 2001; Culton and Holtzman 2010; Donaghey 2013). Finally, the anti-fascist tendency punk is largely rooted in the activism of Rock Against Racism, a project of the English Socialist Workers Party (Goodyer 2001; Moore and Roberts 2009; Roberts and Moore 2009). While punk subculture may not be defined by a distinct ideological position, it is safe to assert that there is a strong left-wing influence on the subculture as a whole.

The militancy of anti-fascists, therefore, is an intentional response to the threat posed by white supremacists. Supremacist ideology and action prioritizes the use of violence against individuals who are deemed to be their opposition (Berlet 1992; Blazak 2001; Bowen 2009; Garner 1996; Hamm 1993; Lyons 1995; Passmore 2002). The anti-fascists in this study engage in confrontational and violent action because non-militant responses are largely ineffective against the white supremacists that they encounter. Supremacists who value strength and violence often do not respond to shunning or negotiation; they see such acts as either tacit acceptance or cowardice, and either continue their organizing efforts or seek to escalate negotiation into conflict. In order to eliminate the threat posed by white supremacists, anti-fascists seek to achieve the strategic countermovement goals outlined by Zald and Useem (1990); specifically, damage or destruction of the other group and pre-emption or dissuasion of group mobilization. In this case, these goals can only be achieved through confrontation and violent action. Anti-fascist militancy achieves these goals in a way that non-militant action cannot. Confrontations with white supremacists, especially violent ones, not only physically damage the individuals involved, but also their reputations for violence which are crucial to supremacist collective identity (Blazak 2001; Bowen 2009; Hamm 1993). Supremacists who find themselves on the losing end of such confrontations often leave the movement after tiring of such violence (Bowen 2009). This ultimately results in dissuasion of white supremacist mobilization as individuals move away from public displays of supremacist identity. The goals of anti-fascists are therefore achieved because the threat posed by white supremacists is reduced as a consequence of demobilization.

Discussion

The research presented makes several key contributions to the study of social movement activity and movement-countermovement dynamics in light of the development of "post-materialist" new social movements and lifestyle movements.

Because such movements focus on identity construction and orient their actions and tactical repertoires toward the construction of prefigurative space and lifestyle-based activities, they generate a unique dynamic between opposing movements.

Movement-countermovement interaction occurs primarily in contests over prefigurative and subcultural space rather than the traditional policy issues of conventional politics. This type of interaction generates a unique set of threats for countermovement participants to respond to: physical, political, and spatial. A tactical repertoire that prioritizes confrontational and violent tactics is relied upon to reduce movement effectiveness through "damage or destruction of the other group" and "pre-emption or dissuasion of group mobilization" (Zald and Useem 1987, 260 & 264). In the case explored, the movement-countermovement dynamic between white supremacists and anti-fascists generates a unique set of threats that are responded to with a specific set of tactics.

Typical of new social movements and lifestyle movements, white supremacist activity takes the form of subcultural practices that place them in direct contact with their anti-fascist opposition. This contact creates a more direct sense of threat for the countermovement because it exists in the everyday lifestyle of subculturalists, as opposed to the arenas of policy construction and decision making typical of opposing movements in conventional politics. These findings confirm Jennings and Andersen's (1996) research linking intensity of threat to confrontational tactics. They also present threat as a multi-faceted concept that moves beyond Jasper's (1997) notion of "ontological security" by presenting it as a process of interaction between opposing "interactive political identities" (Tilly, 2005, 61) manifesting in physical, political, and spatial forms. The concept of spatial threat is identified as an original form that influences movement mobilization and tactical repertoires. In the case of this study, spatial threats took on both literal and metaphorical terms in relation to the prefigurative spaces occupied by both white supremacists and anti-fascists.

It is important to understand that the threats outlined in this study operate in relation to one another rather than as independent factors. The physical threat that white supremacists pose to anti-fascists is the direct product of the performance of their political ideology through the use of violence in subcultural spaces and "subcultural others" (Blazak 2001; Bowen 2009). Thus, physical threat involves some degree of political and spatial threat. Similarly, the political threat of racist and neo-Nazi orientations held by white supremacists generates a physical threat because of an ideological imperative to use violence (Berlet 1992; Garner 1996; Lyons 1995; Passmore 2005) and a spatial threat because of their ability to define the identity of spaces and the subculture as a whole. Finally, a spatial threat is linked to the physical threat of violence by simply being present in subcultural spaces where white supremacists engage in violence (Blazak 2001; Bowen 2009), which ultimately defines the subcultures and the spaces that they occupy as prefigurative spaces of white power (Futrell and Simi 2004).

The threats created by white supremacists in this dynamic generate a specific set of confrontational and violent tactics designed to respond to supremacist activity. Such tactics are chosen because of their effectiveness as a response to supremacist use of violence that seeks to intimidate targeted groups into submission and political opponents into demobilization. By increasing the costs of participation in prefigurative spaces and subcultural lifestyle activities, anti-fascists force white supremacists to demobilize and retreat from their current primary activity. As confrontational and violent tactics succeed, the level of all threats identified in this study decreases significantly. Facing consistent confrontation and violence forces white supremacists to drop out of subcultural participation and leaves those who remain less emboldened to physically threaten other subculturalists (Bowen 2009). Lack of active participation by white supremacists similarly reduces political and spatial threats as they are relegated to "transmovement" prefigurative spaces online

or in the safety of movement only spaces such as homes of other supremacists or supremacist compounds. Ultimately, in a cycle similar to conventional movement-counter-movement dynamics, anti-fascist activists can demobilize as successful mobilization reduces threats (Peleg 2000).

The dynamics, threats, and tactics described in this study are specific to the time and place in which they are practiced, but not limited to them. The white supremacist movement in North America is currently in abeyance because it has little public support and a relatively small membership; however, it is able to rely on prefigurative spaces and subcultural lifestyles as “abeyance structures” which can sustain the movement at this stage in its mobilization cycle (Futrell and Simi 2004; Haenfler, Johnson and Jones 2012; Taylor 1989). This has, of course, not historically been the case, nor does it describe such movements globally⁹ or even regionally in North America. Threat must be perceived in order to be confronted; and in many locations, white supremacists have local support which preempts anti-fascist organizing. Conversely, regions, cities, and “scenes” with stronger and/or more committed anti-racist traditions or orientations are likely to develop strong anti-fascist counter-movements. The study does indicate that the understanding of threat and tactical repertoires of contemporary anti-fascists are diffused via the political and subcultural networks that they participate in. Groups engaging in anti-fascist activism communicate with one another and promote effective tactics in the conflict with supremacists. North American anti-fascists have adopted many of the tactics of their European counterparts, especially the use of the “black block” where participants dress in black with faces covered in counter-protests against white supremacists (Katsifiacas 2006; Katsifiacas 2012). This indicates that a general movement repertoire exists which is diffused through interactions by anti-fascists in a global movement that manifests in local struggles over prefigurative spaces and subcultures.

The research presented in this study may be useful in explaining conflicts that appear on the surface to be “culture wars” between or within sub-groups in contemporary society. As social movement activity has intersected with lifestyle and identity formation, the politicization of everyday practices generates unique movement-counter-movement dynamics in response to movement specific threats. Future research may need to establish the generalizability of the current findings beyond the conflict described to other lifestyle based social movements (e.g. animal rights, environmentalism, queer rights, etc.). The impact of threat may be much greater in the anti-fascist movement because its opposition is ideologically driven to violent action, because it is a political movement that is highly marginalized in contemporary American society, or because there is simply greater contact between individual members of the opposing movements in everyday social contexts.

⁹ This is especially true in nations such as England, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Russia where fascist and white supremacist movements have seen major resurgences in recent years.

Additional research into the relationship between threat and tactical choice would resolve many of these issues.

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About the author

Stanislav Vysotsky is currently an assistant professor of sociology at Willamette University in Salem, OR, USA. His research has focused on the conflict between supremacist groups in contemporary American society and their militant anti-fascist opposition in order to understand the relationship between threat, space, subculture, and social movement activism. He is currently pursuing research on non-hierarchical community alternatives to policing and other criminal justice institutions. He can be contacted at svysotsk AT willamette.edu.

The 'Autonomous Nationalists': new developments and contradictions in the German neo-Nazi movement

Raphael Schlembach

Abstract

This article examines the action repertoires, symbolism and political ideology of the 'Autonomous Nationalists' (Autonome Nationalisten in German) that have emerged as a sub-cultural youth trend within the German extreme right. Agitating within a landscape of networked, extra-parliamentary neo-Nazi organisations, Autonomous Nationalist activism forms a specific subsection within the German extreme right that copies the styles, codes and militancy of anarchist and radical left activists. A political analysis of its texts and slogans reveals a self-definition as 'anti-capitalist' and 'national socialist'. A particular mobilisation potential beyond the traditional and party-political forms of extreme nationalism is fuelled by an openly displayed confrontational militancy, mostly directed at anti-fascist and left-wing groups and individuals, and by strong counter-cultural aspects. The article analyses how this emphasis on individual forms of expressions and rebellion appears to stand in contradiction with fascist understandings of organisation and has put the movement at odds with the established neo-Nazi scene in Germany.

Introduction

When the first Autonomous Nationalists began adopting the stylistic elements of left-wing and anarchist counter-culture, many organised fascists rejected this as a temporary sub-cultural fad. However, the social phenomenon of young people, mostly men, forming black blocs and engaging in violent and militant street demonstrations against 'global capitalism' has taken a foothold within the neo-Nazi spectrums in Germany, Belgium and Holland as well as in Central and Eastern Europe. Certainly, more traditional and populist politics remain central to the extreme right movement in Europe. The Autonomous Nationalists present more of a fringe phenomenon, yet they make for a particularly rich case study due to the strategic and conscious use of symbolic codes, its elements appealing to youth culture, and the reactions they have provoked both within the traditional organised fascist movement, and amongst anti-fascists and the democratic public discourse. What is more, noting their networked and horizontal appearance, their focus on DIY and counter-culture, and their anti-capitalist sloganeering allows for a particular and critical angle from which to examine the contradictory nature of such themes and methods in the neo-Nazi movement.

We can situate the emergence of the Autonomous Nationalists as resulting from within organised militant fascist groups in some urban centres, especially in

Berlin, at around the beginning of the 2000s. It is thus important to note the specific situation of post-reunification, which in Germany had led to new forms of organisation within the neo-Nazi scene. Whereas in the early years after reunification disorganised networks of fascists dominated the headlines, soon new forms of militant street organisation appeared, especially the network of the *Freie Kameradschaften* (the free fellowships). These are groups of extra-parliamentary significance that seek to establish themselves as political actors outside of the more traditional political party approach coming from the main far right parties, especially the NPD (*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschland*). The less rigid structures and the tendency towards avant-garde and disestablishment politics allowed for a situation where new trends, analysis and symbolic codes could develop unchecked by the established channels of fascist agitation and free of the structures of party politics.

The Autonomous Nationalists thus provide a greater appeal to nationalist youth, especially around the topic of globalisation. They mirror the internationalist language of the global justice movements with their own nationalist rejection of globalisation. However, as we will see, they employ a particular 'globalist' approach to their mobilisation and political expression – one that makes ample use of imagery and rhetoric borrowed from radical left and alternative subcultures; a fact that undermines their claims to give expression to the 'no global' and anti-multicultural perspectives of nationalist and neo-Nazi youths. The internet here proves vital for propaganda and recruitment purposes, with many Autonomous Nationalist groups using social media, blogs and youtube videos to promote their activities to potential supporters.

This article is based around a content analysis of several such websites. It detects a self-understanding that is deeply contradictory, for example in terms of the opposition of nationalism and globalisation, movement and party, rebellion and *realpolitik*. In terms of primary sources, the paper takes accounts of Autonomous Nationalist events from the German media as well as from anti-fascist and educational resources. This is combined with an analysis of the self-presentation by Autonomous Nationalist groups on internet platforms, and content analysis of their banners and slogans. Secondary analysis is taken from the few scholarly accounts of the movement in German language, as well as further studies of recent developments in German extreme nationalist discourse and action repertoire.

After a descriptive and illustrative account of several demonstrations and actions that involved Autonomous Nationalists, the article looks at three aspects: first, it accounts for the stylistic and symbolic elements of Autonomous Nationalist action repertoires, describing them as a response to, and adaption of, alter-globalisation and anarchist militancy on demonstrations. Second, it investigates the movement's ideologically-justified perspective on violence against 'political enemies'. Third, the article offers an assessment of the political ideology of Autonomous Nationalist mobilisation as driven by the concern over anti-globalist and anti-multicultural themes, which are being approached from a distinct ethno-pluralist and sometimes antisemitic angle. This allows us to

return to the question of contradiction of organisational form and political content in our conclusions.

Locating the Autonomous Nationalists

It is certainly the case that in terms of numbers of supporters and active organisers, the Autonomous Nationalists remain a fringe phenomenon on the German extreme right. Nonetheless, their influence has slowly grown. While in 2007 the Federal Agency for the Protection of the Constitution still counted only about 200 individuals as belonging to the Autonomous Nationalist scene (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz 2007), in 2009 the figure was estimated to lie around the 400-500 mark, making roughly 10 percent of the organised neo-Nazi movement (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz 2009). The agency's first report was titled "a militant fringe phenomenon", whereas the 2009 report no longer made such mentions of a fringe, instead focusing on increasing militancy. In one of the latest reports in 2011, for the state of Brandenburg alone, police estimates counted some 320 individuals as belonging to the militant organised neo-Nazi spectrum, with 160 of them belonging to the Autonomous Nationalist scene (Scharf 2011: 79).

Beyond simple capacities and numbers, however, the Autonomous Nationalists matter politically. Their appearance and rebellious attitude raise questions beyond the specific contexts of the German far right, and can even help us rethink themes of rebellion and resistance that we identify as progressive and as belonging to the left. Firstly, autonomous nationalism as a political tendency certainly punches above its weight. It has influenced and sparked debates within the German far right, as well as within fascist youth movements in other European countries. As such it opens up questions over the future of fascist organisation in Europe, at a time when network politics appears to exert stronger mobilising factors than traditional organisational structures. Second, it highlights the importance of rebellion, counter-culture and globalisation-critical attitude for an ultra-nationalist perspective.

The latter also impels us to question certain presuppositions held about the autonomous left and alter-globalisation movement. For example, to what extent are DIY attitudes, horizontal organisation and rebellious counter-culture necessarily defining characteristics of New Left-style politics? Is the endorsement of such principles by youth movements of the far right an example of simple imitation, or are more fundamental connections to be made? I will return to these questions as I discuss the Autonomous Nationalists' use of symbolic codes, street-based violence and political ideology.

Stolberg, 12 April 2008

450 neo-Nazis march through the town of Stolberg, close to the Dutch border. Many are masked, provoke scuffles with the police, and attempt to reach the neighbourhoods where most of the small migrant population lives. They are

running five hours late, after advance stop and searches by police led to confiscations of dangerous objects, amongst them sling shots and an axe. Scuffles also break out between the demonstration stewards, mostly members of the NPD, and several of the 'autonomous' protesters. At the end of the day, according to anti-fascist sources (Blockieren 2012), there are 31 injured and several dozen arrests. The demonstration came just one week after a group of German men clashed with a group of 'migrant youths' in Stolberg after a night out. A German was killed in the fight. Nationalists in the area accused the attackers of 'anti-German racism'. This is also the theme of the demonstration ("Murder, Mourning, Resistance"). A spontaneous march had already attracted 160 neo-Nazis on the day after the incident.

The Stolberg marches are now annual events, organised by the NPD. They count amongst the larger regular neo-Nazi events drawing participants not only from Germany but also from neighbouring countries such as France, Belgium and the Netherlands. And they have become important events for Autonomous Nationalists who form a large section of the demonstrations. While the demonstrations are now tightly regulated, both by the NPD organisers and the police, Autonomous Nationalists use the mobilisation for activities before and after, in Stolberg and in nearby towns. Anti-fascist reports mention attacks on social centres in the area as well as physical assaults on counter-protesters.

Dortmund, 6 September 2008

More than 1,000 Autonomous Nationalists assemble in the Ruhr Region town of Dortmund for the fourth annual National Anti-War Day. Many of the banners are in English. In speeches, nationalists decry the attempt of 'speculators and globalists' to take control of world affairs, while the 'peoples of Europe' and the world suffer. They declare opposition to 'war and capitalism', to American global hegemony and cultural imperialism. Their chants demand 'National Socialism Now' and they pride themselves as being free and autonomous from nationalist membership organisations. The day is specially targeted at non-German nationalists who participate from various countries. There are groups from Belgium, the Netherlands, France and the Czech Republic. Some of the speakers have come from as far away as Russia and Bulgaria, and a message by a Palestinian activist is read out, condemning the Israeli occupation.

Hamburg, 1 May 2008

The NPD has organised one of its regional Labour Day marches in Hamburg. 1,500 neo-Nazis take part, many of them belonging to the militant spectrum of the *Freie Kameradschaften*. Amongst them are between 300 and 500 Autonomous Nationalists. Repeatedly they form blocs to break away from the official demonstration route, attacking counter-protesters and bystanders. Several journalists are assaulted and their equipment targeted. Police later release a statement declaring that they regarded 80 percent of the marchers as 'prepared to use violence' (Zand-Vakili 2008). Journalists report the attacks on

them as ranging from spitting, kicking and throwing punches to attempts to grab camera equipment and verbal (death) threats. Photos, names and addresses of journalists appear on neo-Nazi websites in the days after with calls to further intimidate them. While this is not a new development within the violent-prone extreme right scene, what is reportedly new is the co-ordinated attack on individual journalists by groups of up to 30-40 activists, dressed in black and masked to hide their identity. Moreover, in Hamburg this was carried out within view of NPD politicians and other leading neo-Nazi organisers.

These examples of Autonomous Nationalist agitation and street presence indicate that the movement has succeeded at questioning and undermining the established action repertoires of the extreme right that had stressed discipline and order as priorities for public appearances. This has led to tense relationships with other spectrums of the neo-Nazi movement. The Autonomous Nationalists did not emerge within a vacuum or even a lull of extreme right organisation in Germany. They entered a political milieu that was dominated, on the one hand, by the political party formation of the NPD, and on the other, by the extra-parliamentary organisations of the *Freie Kameradschaften*.

The relationship to these established groups has been incredibly volatile, at times marked by open hostility from both sides and especially from within the party, and at other times mutual tolerance and acceptance (see Sager 2011). References to youth rebellion and counter-culture puts the Autonomous Nationalists much at odds with otherwise organised fascism, the latter often putting emphasis on internal discipline, hierarchy and orderly appearance. No appeal is made to the broader public, to public opinion, or to national electorates. In contrast, there is a marked contempt for the 'ordinary public' that follows the 'inauthentic' and 'mind-numbing' leads of elite culture. This brand of fascism, then, appears as a social movement not so much in a populist sense but as a minoritarian and elitist strand that challenges liberal democracy as much as it rejects traditional nationalist politics.

Accordingly, some groups within this movement assert their 'autonomy' from the existing, established structures and organisations. The group Autonome Nationalisten Salzgitter, for example, writes:

Autonomous activism is a promising new strategy of offering active political resistance. The stiff structures of parties, fellowships or associations are far too vulnerable to state repressions and attacks by the political enemy (Autonome Nationalisten Salzgitter 2012).

They explain that in their immediate past, leading activists were repeatedly arrested, propaganda material confiscated, and concerts and other events prevented from going ahead. They complain that this could result in a drastic quieting down of nationalist activities in certain local areas.

As a loose/independent grouping of activists we try to avoid such ramifications. There are no leading political figureheads whose arrest could jeopardise the group, there are no membership lists which could make us vulnerable to repression – as we are no association or similar you cannot simply ban us like certain *Kameradschaften*, we aren't easy targets for the political enemy and yet we are always present through our Autonomous Activism (which has many forms)! (Autonome Nationalisten Salzgitter 2012).

For the politicians of the NPD as well as many within the skinhead scene, the Autonomous Nationalists posed the question of strategy for the success of extreme right ideas within the general population. Do black blocs on demonstrations against welfare cuts attract or repel potential supporters? Initially the reaction from both the spectrum of the parliamentary party and the *Freie Kameradschaften* was one of complete opposition. With the success of the Autonomous Nationalists to attract young people to the cause, and continuous scandals that rocked the NPD (suspicions of widespread infiltration by security services, fraud and financial misdemeanours), an increasing number of activists and groups belonging to the extra-parliamentary milieu of the neo-Nazi right implicitly or explicitly changed from opposition towards tacit support. Eventually, changes within the leadership of the NPD allowed for a more ambivalent relationship with the black blocs of the Autonomous Nationalists, to the extent that even within the NPD certain factions and individuals called for the acceptance of black blocs on demonstrations.

Style and symbolism

We aren't simple-minded thugs with skinhead, bomber jackets and combat boots up to the knee. We are young people like you, from the heart of our country. We carry pride in our hearts and hope in our eyes. We fight to ensure that the future will be better than the conditions that we have now. Germany will sparkle like fresh dew in the morning (Autonome Nationalisten Haltern am See 2012).

This self-description on the website of one Autonomous Nationalist group, with similar statements on many others, nicely sums up a rationale for the new style as well as its contradictory nature. While it is described as an attempt to escape the traditionally alienating image of a previous generation of neo-Nazis, it nonetheless promotes a new counter-culture that is explicitly posited against the mainstream. Younger activists claim that they feel alienated by the sub-cultural attire donned by a previous generation of neo-Nazis. The looks, music and behavioural attitudes associated with skinhead culture no longer speak to them. On the other hand, activists also make the claim that the rejection of skinhead fascism is tactical. It is an attempt to blend in, to be approachable as young people like all others. They see themselves as belonging to the 'middle of society', at least in terms of backgrounds and style. The following paragraphs

that describe the conscious building of a sub-cultural milieu and identity, ranging from music to fashion, certainly contradict such claims. Autonomous nationalism gains credibility with certain sections of young Germans not because of its image as stemming from 'the heart of the country', but through its antagonistic and rebellious attitude at the fringe of the extreme nationalist movement. Its public presentation on demonstrations and other activities that are portrayed frequently via websites, blogs and youtube videos clearly mark them out for their attempts to form a scene with its distinct codes and practices.

Black blocs of Autonomous Nationalists first publicly appeared on neo-Nazi demonstrations in Berlin around 2003/2004. Since then they have built networks of activists and groups that combine aspects of rebellious youth culture with extreme nationalist and National Socialist ideology and street presence. There are dozens such groups represented on the internet, with most describing themselves as part of a youth movement, and sometimes stating their activists' ages as ranging somewhere from between 16 to 26. Nationally within Germany they have built a coherent and homogenous identity mostly through the use of counter-cultural symbolism and action repertoires. They are thus part of what Roger Griffin has termed the 'groupuscular right', the post-1945 phenomenon of a myriad of small and often short-lived assemblages which constitute networks of political ideology and social and cultural identity where 'revolutionary' (or palingenetic, to use Griffin's term) variants of fascism and National Socialism continue to thrive. Maintaining its distance from the 'official' and populist far right, "the groupuscle has the Janus-headed property of combining organizational autonomy with the ability to create informal linkages with, or reinforce the influence of, other such formations" (Griffin 2003b: 30, see also Virchow 2004, Sommer 2008: 310).

The emergence of the groupuscular movement of autonomous nationalism is related to the particular context of the neo-Nazi scene in re-unified Germany. The 1990s saw a rise not only of neo-fascist organisation, primarily through the party political platform of the *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschland* (NPD), but also of more militant and movement-political expressions of extreme nationalism, xenophobia and antisemitism. Where we can witness the (re-)emergence of a self-proclaimed 'national-revolutionary' movement, this has helped to put renewed emphasis on 'social-revolutionary' politics in some neo-Nazi scenes. German militant neo-Nazis are often organised in so called *Freie Kameradschaften* (free fellowships). We find here an 'anti-capitalist' self-understanding (Schlembach 2008) that can be traced back to the 'left wing' of Hitler's NSDAP party and in particular to the ideas of Gregor and Otto Strasser and to the leader of the SA, Ernst Röhm. From the 'national-revolutionary' perspective, those men formed part of a revolutionary, anti-capitalist wing within the NSDAP, with the aim to replace a class-based society with a socialist and 'culturalist' (*völkisch*) economic system. While connections to the NPD exist, the *Freie Kameradschaften* employ more militaristic, street-based methods (see for example Röpke and Speit 2004, Virchow 2004).

In Germany, the Autonomous Nationalists form a sub-section within this milieu. Within it, they seek a more alternative lifestyle and counter-cultural political expression. The most obvious and apparent feature of the Autonomous Nationalists is manifested in the aesthetics of its street presence (see for example Schedler 2011a). While the post-reunification neo-Nazi scene in Germany at the beginning of the 1990s was dominated by skinhead culture, the 2000s saw a diversification of styles, brands and clothing labels.

Most strikingly, the movement has adopted and appropriated the stylistic approach of left-wing counter-culture, especially the look of the black blocs of the *Autonomen*, anti-fascist and radical alter-globalisation movements. A typical demonstration of Autonomous Nationalists will see activists dress in black hoodies or windbreakers, black baseball caps, leather gloves and sunglasses, similar in style to many anti-fascist activists. Political banners and slogans give similar impressions of sub-cultural rebelliousness. Often they are written and chanted in English. The fonts sometimes resemble those of graffiti art known originally from the American Hip Hop scene. Gone are the letters of the traditional German fonts that are widely used in the European and North American skinhead movements.

The Autonomous Nationalists' representation on the internet and in user-controlled social media is no different. Music that underlies myspace pages or youtube clips is often sung in English. Yet, their lyrics betray them to be part of international fascist music networks, such as Blood and Honour. The typical politics of these songs would treat topics such as honour and patriotism, the defence of European civilisation, or the unity of nationalist movements. But music genres that act as bonding and identity-forming within the extreme nationalist youth culture have equally undergone adaptation (see Raabe and Langebach 2011). In the early 1990s this was predominantly rock music. In the late 1990s and early 2000s the repertoire of fascist bands diversified markedly. In part, youth culture accepted a return to more traditional German folk music, while on the other hand American influences of heavy metal bands created a new fascist metal genre, the NS-Black-Metal. This diversification not only allowed for new styles and genres to emerge, but also for the acceptance of a non-commercial DIY music scene and a more sceptical view of personality cult and stardom. Here, this shift was already characterised by the appropriation and reinterpretation of music and lyrics associated with left-wing anti-establishment bands and labels.

All internet sites run by Autonomous Nationalist groups stress the aspects of DIY and autonomy from commercial music labels, from profitable clothing brands or from established political organisations. They include links and thematic sections on topics ranging from 'anti-capitalism' to 'autonomy', and often redirect to sub-cultural sites with explicit National Socialist content. They might feature pictures of graffiti and street art, stencil kits to download, stickers to print and order, or nationalist music to download and to buy online. The website of the Autonomous Nationalists North Thuringia, as just one example, entails such links and references. Under the entry 'activism' we find solidarity

campaigns with fascist groups and movements in other countries, self-shot videos of the group's activities, as well as other campaign and boycott materials. The entry 'do it yourself' has information on organising demonstrations, computer and internet security (remaining anonymous when posting online and protecting computers against hackers), as well as guides on making stencils, poster and banners. The section called 'scene' has links to other nationalist groups, related blogs and recommended music (Autonome Nationalisten Nordthüringen 2012). Such focus on DIY, autonomy and modern youth culture is repeated on dozens of websites by Autonomous Nationalist weblogs and websites. They give clear hints and advice on which aesthetics are admissible in the scene. Some go so far as to call for boycotts of well known neo-Nazi clothing brands that produce clothing abroad. They attack them for selling out and turning into 'capitalist companies' that sell overpriced clothing and abandon the German youth into debt and into 'interest-rate slavery'.

Other than the visual and aesthetic elements that characterise the Autonomous Nationalists on public demonstrations, there is also a level of militancy and often a conscious display of 'machismo' or aggression that separates it clearly from the rest of the neo-Nazi spectrum, at least in terms of public appearance and enforced discipline on demonstrations and rallies. The Autonomous Nationalists display a level of spontaneous aggressiveness that is expressed by black bloc participants in attempts to provoke at least a symbolic confrontation with the police or left-wing counter-protesters. Black blocs remain clearly demarcated from other extreme right marchers by banners, slogans and stylistic attire (at times this can lead to clashes within fascist demonstrations themselves). To understand why Autonomous Nationalists rather cherish this separation, it helps, perhaps, to understand the term autonomy/autonomous as signalling independence not only from state and party-focused politics but also from other organised sections of the fascist movement. It is an attitude mainly of rebellion against what are perceived as established and establishment channels of political expression. In the following section I look more closely at the ideological justifications for the Autonomous Nationalists' rebellious, militant and often violent repertoires.

Violence as political ideology

The recent discovery of an underground cell of armed extreme right activists in Germany (the National Socialist Underground), and its high profile trial for a number of murders, has reinvigorated discussion about neo-Nazi violence. While neo-fascist political parties are struggling to establish themselves more prominently in Germany's political landscape beyond the *Länderebene* (regional level) due partly to the hurdles presented by Germany's electoral model and failed modernisation strategies (see for example Rensmann 2006), militant organisations of the extreme right continue to pose a threat in their role of street-level militants.

Since reunification, there has been a wealth of research about racist street violence perpetrated by Germany's extreme right. Here, most research and media attention has focused on anti-foreigner violence triggered by high-profile attacks, riots and murders of asylum seekers and other foreigners such as those in Rostock, Mölln or Hoyerswerda in the 1990s (for example Atkinson 1993, Heitmeyer 1993, Kurthen et al. 1997). These were characterised by a passive tolerance, and in some cases participation, by bystanders, and thus a blurring of the boundaries between organised extreme right activists and nationalist locals and youths. Violence here became more generalised than that perpetrated by 'activists' with connections to the resurgent fascist movement. There have been convincing attempts to explain these events of the 1990s as caused by psychological, social or opportunity factors (for example Willems 1995, Koopmans and Olzak 2004, Koopmans 2006). In particular, the concurrent changes to the right to claim asylum in the Federal Republic, perceived as political concessions to the street violence, contributed to boost the confidence of the extreme right. With an increasing state awareness and repression of extreme right activists and organisations, racist violence in Germany has been conceptualised as a result of grievances or opportunities, mainly perpetrated by nationalist youth gangs with spontaneous attacks against foreigners.

The case of the Autonomous Nationalists is different. Violence is justified ideologically. More often than not it is directed not against foreigners but against political adversaries and pre-organised, combined with political propaganda and a presence on street demonstrations and in cyberspace. Anti-fascist documentation tells of large numbers of pre-meditated attacks on left-wing social centres, party headquarters or demonstrations. As a particularly striking example, an anti-fascist group in Dortmund, Westphalia, has registered a number of attacks on a bar known for its alternative audience (*Autonome Antifaschisten Dortmund* 2008). They include at least ten separate incidents associated with this bar in the years 2006-2008. The attacks ranged from physical assault on customers, some of them using weapons such as batons and pepperspray, vandalism with graffiti, or window-breaking. The majority of these were associated with activists from the Autonomous Nationalist spectrum and at times coincided with the mobilisation to larger neo-Nazi events in the area.

To understand the portrayed militancy and forms of violence perpetrated by activists organised in these autonomous neo-Nazi networks, analytical frameworks that stipulate the importance of causes such as (youth-)cultural and social context, grievances or opportunity structures are insufficient. The forms of extreme right organisation that we focus on here present a different picture. This is not to say that anti-foreigner violence is not persistent; however there has also been a 'specialisation' of violence, one that is politically mediated and justified with reference to National Socialist political ideology, anti-capitalism, self-sacrifice or discipline (see for example Griffin 1999, 2003a, Virchow 2007, Sommer 2008, Funke 2009). On closer examination, this form of militancy is also distinct and functions on a different level from the organisational forms adopted by anarchist and radical left *Autonome* where they use black bloc tactics on demonstrations. The critical and self-critical movement-internal

debates around the topics of violence, gender roles and equality that are a persistent feature of the latter are almost entirely absent from the counter-cultural scene of the Autonomous Nationalists. It is in this context that much of the German scholarship attached to 'extremism studies' problematises the comparison (e.g. by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) of neo-Nazi violence and militant anti-fascism (see Häusler 2011).

Violence on street demonstrations, but also outside of those, is thus a central and politicised aspect of the Autonomous Nationalists agitation. It directs itself against the police (as forces of the liberal-democratic state), against those that think or look differently (punks, the left and trade unionists) and against foreigners or immigrants. Much of the more organised and targeted violence however is directed at anti-fascists, especially socialist and anti-fascist youth organisations. Here the Autonomous Nationalists organise around the label of 'Anti-Antifa' to reveal and publicise names and addresses of socialist and anti-fascist youth members who can subsequently become targets of personal attacks or attacks on their property.

This change of focus has an impact on the analysis of both actors and action repertoires. First, the extreme right actors are considered distinctly ideological *and* sub-cultural. The Autonomous Nationalists see themselves as part of a 'national resistance' movement with political motivations that go much further than anti-foreigner sentiments, moving towards engagement and/or endorsement of Nationalist Socialist thought. Second, the types of violence are different and diverse: more than the attacks on foreigners and asylum-seekers, violence typical of the contemporary neo-Nazi movements include attacks on political opponents, football fan clubs, and even rival far right activists.

The style and militancy of such political activity are not accidental. References to anarchist or autonomist politics have become commonplace, as have Che Guevara t-shirts and Palestinian symbols such as the *keffiyeh* scarf or the national flag. They do not simply champion the ideas of national liberation and the 'self-determination of peoples' but express an aggressive rebelliousness directed against the state and democratic politics. Displayed acts of violence, especially against political opponents, are justified politically. In what follows we will see how autonomous nationalism makes no or only rare reference to notions of popular racism but rather seeks forms of expressions that are deliberately targeted at a young nationalist audience.

Political ideology

On one level, the Autonomous Nationalists subscribe to an imitation of autonomous and anarchist lifestyle and repertoires without giving up the traditional extreme right focus on immigration and national identity. More than that however, they have constructed a political framework within which ultra-nationalism and a hatred of multiculturalism goes hand in hand with agitation against globalisation and capitalism. The political content of banners, flyers,

websites or chants reveal a number of 'enemies' that range from American foreign policy to Islam and the anti-fascist movement.

As such, while their focus on action and activism as well as the adoption of rebellious codes and rhetoric appear 'modern', what passes as political theory propagated by the movement remains decidedly 'traditional' in its references to National Socialist ideology and the far right concerns with immigration and multiculturalism. Where Autonomous Nationalists do use a more 'radical' rhetoric than that espoused by the NPD and many organisations of the extra-parliamentary extreme right, this is often summed up in their anti-systemic slogans against capitalism and imperialism. Most activist websites describe their adherence to stylistic codes and autonomy as primarily tactical, rather than ideological. For example, on their website the Autonomous Nationalists Wetzlar state that:

Autonomous Nationalism refers to a form of action, which has been developed within the nationalist movement in recent years. It does not denote a distinct worldview. The basic thought behind it is a kind of 'Do it yourself' activist; so somebody who is politically active and creative, without having to be tied to a specific organisation (Autonome Nationalisten Wetzlar 2012).

The statement goes on to explain the black bloc as a tactic against police surveillance allowing for anonymity and insists that the movement is an attempt to break out of the sub-cultural politics of the neo-Nazi scene.

Despite this insistence that references to the politics of autonomy are only tactical, rather than ideological, the form, style and methods of autonomous nationalism clearly stand in an ambivalent relationship to its political content. Many activist websites and blogs list a number of 'concrete demands', linked to a distinct worldview, which we could categorise as (a) populism, (b) 'anti-imperialism', and (c) 'anti-capitalism':

Populist anti-foreigner positions

Amongst these, Autonomous Nationalist demands include the death penalty for paedophiles, an immediate end to all immigration, a tightening of asylum legislations, and the removal of 'criminal' foreigners from Germany. These certainly are shared by the broader extreme nationalist movement.

"Anti-imperialism"

Autonomous Nationalists demand 'freedom and sovereignty' for all 'nations' or 'peoples'. Here the German term *Volk* is used to describe an ethno-pluralist vision of the world. In the German context, ethno-pluralism expresses itself as a demand for the promotion and 'safeguarding' of national culture and hence a clear opposition to multiculturalism. One group clarifies:

...in nationalism we do not only see sovereignty for the Germans – but also that of all peoples! Thus we would never take the liberty to deny the equal status of other nations, and we distance ourselves clearly from chauvinistic ideas, because only strong nations can set boundaries for capitalist globalisation (Autonome Nationalisten Wolfenbüttel & Salzgitter 2012).

If 'authenticity' is the marker of a nation, then 'inauthentic' nations are denied the 'right to self-determination'. Here, the ethno-pluralist position is focused especially on the United States and on Israel. Feeding on the antisemitism of fascist ideology, Israel is singled out as a state that should not have the right to exist. Accordingly, all independent nations must liberate themselves from the secretive and ubiquitous (read Jewish) influence of America, Israel and its Jews.

The specific anti-imperialist conception of Germany is one that seeks a revisionist understanding of WWII history, or a rejection of the 'cult of guilt' where the German nation is understood as the victim of war. As an example, Autonomous Nationalists support and organise commemorations of allied bombings on German towns and seek to make connections with local populations by 'mourning' for the fallen German soldiers and 'civilian' victims. The largest one of the commemorative events takes place annually in Dresden (the myth of Dresden), where Autonomous Nationalists participate in one of the largest neo-fascist marches in Europe.

"Anti-capitalism"

Autonomous Nationalists seek to abolish what they call the 'capitalist market economy'. Capitalism is here understood simply in terms of the market and the exploitation of the 'national working class' by 'speculators'. Their demands somewhat echo that of social-democratic parties, with the protection of the welfare for children and pensioners high on the agenda, as well as the guarantee of employment for every German. This does not signal the complete abandonment of an anti-communist platform, however. Rather, Autonomous Nationalists subscribe to a 'third position' platform, wanting to see National Socialism in the place of the capitalist market.

What is usually perceived to be a left-wing progressive or even revolutionary agenda needs explanation when it is taken up by actors of the extreme right, especially in the context of the re-emergence of capitalism and globalisation as central themes within the neo-Nazi discourse (see Sommer 2008). Rather than seeing this approach as simply a right-wing tactic to engage with 'topical' concerns, Bernd Sommer explains this as both a shift towards answering the 'social question' as well as a return to the Nationalist Socialist agenda of the NSDAP's Strasser faction (see also Armin Pfahl-Traugher 2006, Schlembach 2011).

Sommer mentions recent far right efforts, by the NPD and violence-prone neo-Nazi groups including the *Freie Kameradschaften*, to incorporate environmental, anti-war and anti-globalisation themes into their activities – for example during NPD-organised demonstrations against the G8 summit that took place in Germany in 2007. These, he writes, should not be seen as isolated or one-off incidents. Rather, they signify a move “by extreme-right organizations in Germany to establish anti-capitalist and anti-globalist issues at the centre of their political agendas” (Sommer 2008: 306), and thus to shed the image of a single-issue movement with a sole focus on immigration and race. This strategy has attracted new supporters and voters, especially in regional elections to state parliaments in the East. Sommer describes a shift in the NPD’s political agenda during the past 30 years as one from anti-communism to anti-capitalism. This programme of modernisation has become manifest in the party’s political activities with a focus of propaganda directed at Eastern areas of high unemployment and attempts to establish welfare and labour movement themes as right-wing issues. The 2004 federal laws (Hartz IV) to liberalise the national labour market and cut welfare spending provided a fertile platform from which to approach voters who had become alienated from centre-left and centre-right parties alike. The success – if moderate – of this strategy has given the NPD impetus to continue making forays into tackling ‘the social question’.

Other than the NPD, the *Freie Kameradschaften* themselves operate along an anti-globalisation logic. Sommer describes campaigns, some of them supported by the NPD’s youth wing, that posit the national community against the exploitation by the free markets. In their style, too, these campaigns and loose organisations have departed from the Old Nazi looks that used to characterise the scene during the 1990s. Yet, in contrast to the positions of the Autonomous Nationalists, their texts still speak of strict discipline and honour codes, and make no mention of DIY or autonomy. Importantly, fascist and antisemitic perspectives are incorporated, not abandoned, in this analysis. In fact, for Sommer (2008: 312), “we soon find evidence that, under the surface, racist antisemitic and xenophobic sentiments are still at its [the extreme right critique of globalisation’s] heart.” More than that, they are actually intrinsically linked.

It would be a mistake, thus, to regard the adoption of left-wing positions as simple attempts at imitation. It is certainly true that strategic concerns will play a role, especially where elections are concerned and where traditional racism and prejudices have little appeal. However, the significance of ‘anti-capitalism’ for neo-Nazis is real (see also Schlembach 2008). It is true that the lists of demands and policy suggestions put forward by Autonomous Nationalists on their websites do not represent a political programme in the sense of presenting a set of policy proposals like that of the NPD. Rather their agenda may be reduced to a ‘meta-political’ reference to the themes of nation, race and community. It incorporates an uneasy mix of xenophobia and antisemitism, albeit one that expresses itself primarily as ethno-pluralist.

It would be beyond the scope of this article to attempt a discussion of neo-Nazism as a movement that provides a challenge to globalisation and

capitalism. However, we can characterise the extreme nationalist position as tied to romantic forms of 'anti-capitalism', for which capitalist globalisation is perceived as the destroyer of national community. But more than simply on uneven globalisation, a message which is also promoted by more established far right groups (such as the NPD), the Autonomous Nationalists focus on capitalism (Virchow 2011). This extract from a group's website is an example of how this 'critique of capitalism' presents itself:

In a rotten age where capitalism has become synonymous with the enemy of the people, anti-capitalism has become one of the most important aspects of our resistance... Our economy does not serve the people; it serves an absolute minority, at the people's cost...

Unemployment and the flight of jobs are only the beginning, the environment already suffers from eco-damaging effects of the economy of profit, values and traditions become abolished by Americanisation, wars are fought – under pretence of democratisation – to increase the influence of capital over free nations – until only 'fast-food-chewing' consumers are left – a nation directed by consumption, which abandons its protection and thus throws its people under the bus of international capital (Autonome Nationalisten Wolfenbüttel & Salzgitter 2012).

It is true, of course, that the adoption of left-wing and Marxist symbolism is not a new ploy by fascist movements (Wamper et al. 2011). Italian fascism, for example, made use of the songs and myths of the labour movement and gave them a national twist. Against the orthodox Marxist interpretation of fascism as the mere reactionary agent of finance capital and bourgeois interests, a "consensus" (see for example Griffin 2012) in fascism studies now stresses the revolutionary aspect of – at least parts of – the NSDAP, Italian fascism, and fascist movements elsewhere.

This is not necessarily an anti-Marxist position. Moishe Postone's analysis of reactionary anti-capitalism as a 'foreshortened' critique, for example, is firmly rooted within an analysis of capital valorisation and the critique of commodity fetishism (see Postone 1986). His argument points to the anti-modern character of German antisemitism and National Socialism, which brought Jewish banks and businesses into a connection with technological rationalisation and a conspiratorial understanding of international finance capitalism. However, Postone also acknowledges the factual alliance of fascism and German industrial capitalism. His argument somewhat follows that of Horkheimer and Adorno who write that Jews "are the scapegoats not only for individual manoeuvres and machinations but in a broader sense, inasmuch as the economic injustice of the whole class is attributed to them" (Adorno and Horkheimer 1997: 174). The national socialist positions of the Autonomous Nationalists thus betray a continuing underlying antisemitism, one that upholds a romantic image of national communities and juxtaposes this to an allegedly intangible, global and

opaque sphere of Jewish interest in international business and government, with a prime focus on the United States.

It is certainly the case, as Sommer states, that the fundamental difference between the extreme right critique of globalisation and the progressive critique lies in the concept of the national. Fascist critiques invariably return to the question of the nation, whether in abstract – such as in romantic conceptions of national communities or ‘nationally-liberated zones’ – or in concrete proposals on immigration or employment rights for foreign nationals. However, looking back at the ethno-pluralist positions outlined above, this nationalism is not simply one of domination over others.

In its rhetoric, the Autonomous Nationalist opposition to globalisation is very similar to that found by Sommer in the NPD and the *Kameradschaften*. If anything, it is even more extreme in its rejection of ‘the system’ and established institutions. According to its own logic, nothing is gained by taking control or winning votes in parliament. The German state itself is so corrupt that only a revolutionary movement can overcome it and put in place a new national order. For Sommer thus, resistance to globalisation by the far right is not just a question of tactics but reflects the opposition of the national to the global. He concludes:

Although it formulates its opposition to globalization in different ideological terms to those used by radical left groups, its resistance to attempts to dismantle the welfare state and to globalized capitalism is still *not simply* a political strategy but something that genuinely forms part of its core agenda (Sommer 2008: 316, emphasis on the original).

This understanding of anti-globalisation themes as embedded within far right thought and practice offers opportunities to rethink and reformulate the critiques of globalisation as offered by left-wing, progressive movements. Few studies of the latter even acknowledge the presence of nationalist and extreme-right discourses on globalisation. Many put a focus on progressive activism, on an ‘alter-’globalisation movement, that presents solutions which are non-hierarchical and internationalist. They point to the networked structure of global anti-corporate movements and would see them as spearheaded by bottom-up and grassroots activists who have rejected the traditional faultlines that underlined orthodox Marxist understandings of capital. Despite the stated heterogeneity of local experiences, most accounts of alter-globalisation make such movements appear remarkably characterised by commonalities.

The typology used by Amory Starr in her book *Naming the Enemy* was an early, notable exception to this trend of excluding nationalist tendencies from the anti-corporate movements. Summarised in the descriptor ‘delinking, relocalisation, sovereignty’ she includes authoritarian and religious nationalisms. This category should then be able to hold extreme right-wing and fascist critiques of globalisation. Yet, it is precisely on the grounds of their non-populist anti-

authoritarianism and horizontally-networked appearance that the Autonomous Nationalists do not fit into a stream of religio-nationalist authoritarianism that opposes globalisation through localism and conservative ecology. Their 'horizontal' and 'autonomous' ways of organising show that such methods are not necessarily unique reserves of the progressive left. And the connection of such methods of organising with their political outlook upon a radical nationalism also insinuates that we need a more sceptical treatment of nation and community sovereignty than that put forward in Starr's account. The notions of autonomy and sovereignty that Starr (and many others in the movement) attempt to rescue from the allegations of essentialism and fascist nationalism (Starr 2000: 200-222) would need a reassessment. The positive aspects of autonomy movements can no longer unequivocally include such forms of activism that direct themselves against 'their' state and official nationhood. The Autonomous Nationalists in Germany remind us that essentialist nationalisms do not necessarily come in the form of being affirmative to state and capital. The claims to sovereignty, community and nation against neo-liberal globalisation can be genuinely fascist and national-socialist.

Outlook and conclusions

After its initial 'avant-garde' status in Germany's bigger cities, autonomous nationalism now appears to have a mobilisation problem. The Berlin group that began the trend has reduced its activities to Anti-Antifa actions, unable to set the agenda in the local neo-Nazi scene. With the NPD campaigning against globalisation and the excesses of capitalism, and militant fascist organisations engaged in historical revisionist campaigning, the initial spheres of action have closed.

While racist violence is sometimes seen as an East German problem, the Autonomous Nationalists' strongholds now are in the West, especially the region of Westphalia. Estimates are of about 200-250 active individuals regionally, with most activities around the conurbation of Dortmund. In 2008, 21 active groups could be counted, in addition to 15 less active ones in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia (Schedler 2011b: 195-97). Activist groups here are networked both regionally and with other groups in Germany and abroad. The strength in number is due in part thanks to the conversion of former NPD activists (especially those coming from its youth section). Autonomous Nationalists here have become leading actors in the regional neo-Nazi scene with black blocs forming the front rows of most nationalist demonstrations. The neo-Nazi scene of North Rhine-Westphalia maintains close contacts to their equivalents in Belgium and the Netherlands, which explains why autonomous nationalism has resonated most clearly in these countries.

There are even small groups and individuals in England that have flirted with the ideas and action repertoires coming from Germany, albeit entirely unsuccessfully. The 'English National Resistance' existed around 2009-10. A

video, very much filmed in the style of those by German nationalist action groups, shows them handing out DIY music CDs outside schools ('Sounds of Revolution'), stickering lampposts and flyposting. It ends with the slogan 'Support your local Autonomous Nationalists, because actions speak louder than words' (englisharebest 2010).

A more recent outfit, the Autonomous Nationalists UK state on their website that "We want a new world; a world without Capitalist exploitation, government oppression, wars for oil, racial conflict and environmental desecration" (ANUK 2010), where they pose with complete 'black bloc' outfit including Palestinian scarves to hide their faces. They currently link to seven (seemingly inactive) local groups, primarily in the North and North West of England.

Autonomous Nationalists as a new generation of National Socialists see their own role as giving a political direction to young people and newcomers to the militant neo-Nazi scene in Germany. For this purpose, the dusty image of the brown-uniformed SS men is regarded as an obstacle. The new extreme right offers an image that is cool and modern, its political heritage of fascism hidden behind – or rather expressed through – contemporary rhetoric against globalisation, and it even borrows freely from the realm of radical left symbolism. Fewer and fewer young radical nationalists want to be forced into combat boots and bomber jackets or similar clothing that clearly out them as adherents to fascist ideology. It is this presentation and reinvention of sections of the radical right in Germany and elsewhere that has been successful in attracting a number of new youth activists to the ideology and at times to violent activism.

The Autonomous Nationalists make special efforts to integrate foreign activists into their activities in Germany. This, together with the use of new social media and the English language, results in a fast dissemination of ideas and repertoires to other European countries. Also, while the early strongholds of activism in Berlin and other major cities have seen activities decline, today the strength and focus of the movement lies on more provincial agitation, especially in the Ruhr Region where they have built strong and active groups. Again, the use of social media has allowed them to reach youths in more remote areas who would otherwise not have been confronted with neo-Nazi ideology.

The Autonomous Nationalist scene remains largely isolated from the more classical power structures within the extreme right, dominated by the NPD and the *Kameradschaften*. They are tolerated more than accepted within the mobilisations. Yet, they do give an impetus for traditional party politics to modernise itself and have had influence beyond the German extreme right in other European countries. They have fostered an autonomous sub-culture from within which they can act without the need for NPD support, showing they are capable of organising their own actions and demonstrations, or to act at the periphery of larger neo-Nazi mobilisations. However, while certain groups still attract newcomers and several Autonomous Nationalist events continue to attract large numbers of participants, there are certainly shifts. Some of the formerly leading individuals within the scene are dropping out. Several of them

publicly denounce or ridicule the autonomous appearance and activism, and instead seek realignment with more established channels of the extreme right. As such it is to be expected that the milieu will further retreat into counter-cultural politics where its identity can be maintained, while numbers and capacity would shrink.

The clashes with established extreme nationalist tendencies and organisations are in part due to the problematic of mobilising around a contradictory logic, revolving around a largely individualising and networked form of organisation whilst advocating a fascist politics of national community and order. A key theme that emerges out of our emphasis on this contradiction is the question of modernisation. The phenomenon of the Autonomous Nationalists could be read as an attempt to modernise the neo-Nazi movement in Germany and elsewhere and to make it more appealing to rebellious youth cultures. However, while it is clear that this process is part of a move towards a more pronounced differentiation of fascist organisational methods – certainly in the sense of technological, stylistic, and cultural change – politically neo-Nazism entails various anti-modern elements. Schedler and Häusler (2011: 316) offer this table to show the limits of neo-Nazi ‘modernisation’:

Element	Autonomous Nationalists	Fascism
Autonomy	Individual self-determination	<i>Volkish</i> community
Lifestyle	Pluralisation of lifestyles	Organic unity of the <i>Volk</i>
Identity	Disintegration of static identity patterns	Unity of <i>Volk</i> and individual
Individualisation	Hedonism	Asceticism
Aesthetic and symbolism	Bricolage	Unity of form and ideology
Modernity	Contemporary orientation	Rejection of ‘bourgeois decadence’
Corporeal performance	Post-modernity	Military uniformity
Positioning	Anti-bourgeois habitus	Representation of the ‘ <i>Volk</i> ’s Will’

We might analyse the stylistic elements of the Autonomous Nationalists as an aspect of social-cultural identity construction that does not follow any homogenous pattern but is rather influenced by a society of rapid information flows (use of social media, blogs, video), dynamic cultural trends (music and clothing brands) and the individualisation of expression and organisation

(networks, autonomy and DIY). This 'postmodern' aspect of the Autonomous Nationalists' appearance is markedly at odds with their ideals for fascist organisation: the organic unity of a national community and the de-individualisation of society through discipline and leadership (*Führerprinzip*).

With this in mind, we can also reflect more critically on the meaning of 'autonomy' for the Autonomous Nationalists. Unlike the radical left-wing connotations of the term that implies emancipation both from market logic and from forced participation in a national collective, autonomous nationalism seeks nationalist independence from globalisation. However, the principles of networked, decentralised and individualistic organisation stand in complete opposition to the stated aim of a national organic order. Whereas for parts of the radical and anarchist left autonomous organisational forms are inherently connected to the construction of a participatory and non-authoritarian society – a congruence of means and ends – the form and content of autonomous nationalism are in obvious conflict. This gives us further indication that a possible future avenue for many Autonomous Nationalists could be the return to a more hierarchical and party-political formation.

One way of analysing the Autonomous Nationalists would of course be as an imitation of forms of action and representation that we know from Western global justice movements. It would suggest that such progressive movements have had impacts beyond their immediate audiences and have provoked right-wing imitations, alluding to a success of counter-cultural strategies within such movements. On the other hand, the relative ineffectiveness of the Autonomous Nationalists at building a movement of the scale of what we have seen on the left shows that the relative success of global justice activism was not down to the styles it adopted. Many of those that have stressed the bottom-up and grassroots nature of the global justice movement have implicitly or explicitly celebrated this as inherently progressive. The horizontal, autonomous and 'transnational' politics of the Autonomous Nationalists puts this into question. More importantly, however, we have made the case that this is not just a matter of imitation. This is not to say that imitation does not play a role. However, anti-globalisation themes are genuinely represented within the spectrum of the far right. To some extent, the styles and codes are a contradictory reflection of such political stances. More than assessing the effects of style within the progressive global justice movements, we have taken this as a cue to reopen questions over the progressiveness of alter-globalisation themes. Notions of nation, sovereignty and community, as well as of rebelliousness, need to be re-examined in the light of right-wing versions of the same.

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About the author

Raphael Schlembach is a sociologist and post-doctoral teaching fellow at Liverpool Hope University, having previously taught at the universities of Manchester, Salford and Central Lancashire. He has published, in activist and in academic journals, on critical social theory and on European social movements. He was also a founder and editor of the UK activist journal *Shift Magazine*. He can be contacted at r_schlembach AT yahoo.com

The trouble with eco-politics of localism: too close to the far right? Debates on ecology and globalization Mi Park

Abstract

This article critically examines the intersection between the right-wing anti-globalization movement and the pro-local campaign in the Global North. It discusses ways in which the far-right movement justifies anti-immigration policies on the ground of cultural diversity, environmental protection and local autonomy. Comparatively examining the right-wing discourse and the ideas of progressive ecological groups, it discusses to what extent the right-wing eco-politics are different from or similar to pro-local platforms of progressive environmental groups in the North.

Introduction

Traditionally regarded as left-wing¹ or progressive, ideas such as cultural diversity, environmental protection, and local autonomy now feature prominently in the anti-immigration discourse of far-right political parties such as the British National Party (BNP) and the Austrian Freedom Party. As far-right political groups deploy seemingly progressive ideas to attract a broader populace, their justification for immigration control is made on the following grounds:

- * Cultural diversity should be preserved.
- * The environment must be protected.
- * Localism is a desirable alternative to globalization.

Although not as a crude justification for immigration control, the three identical themes also frequently appear in the publications of many progressive groups such as Green parties and social justice oriented research institutes. This troubling overlap between the progressive social justice groups and the far-right groups urgently requires our attention and a critical examination of its implications for social justice movements.

¹ I depict the positions of the right and the left on the political spectrum according to their stance on social justice and redistributive solidarity. The left emphasizes a positive right (access to resources to exercise full citizenship rights) and the need to reduce social inequality through redistribution of the wealth, while the right stresses a negative right (non-interference from the state and external forces) and individual freedom.

This paper examines a potentially exclusionary politics of eco-localism in the anti-globalization movements of the Global North with a focus on the ecological groups (see the table below for details of organizations studied in this paper)². The primary research method used in this paper is discourse analysis. A discourse is a version of social reality that the discourse comes to constitute. With discourse analysis, I examine the ways in which dissenters construct a version of society and how different the competing versions are in relation to others, including the eco-movement version of the world. Additionally, qualitative content analysis (semiotics) has been conducted to examine website contents of the organizations and influential thinkers in the ecological and right-wing groups in the anti-globalization movements. Semiotics, a form of qualitative content analysis, investigates both denotative and connotative meanings that reside in texts. With semiotics content analysis, this paper identifies associational meanings behind certain themes and words. For instance, I examine whether the signifier “globalization” carries similar associational meanings such as the power of transnational corporations (TNCs) and the demise of state sovereignty among dissenters of globalization.

This article is organized as follows. Critically surveying the existent literature on localism and anti-globalization movements, it brings attention to a potentially perilous, exclusionary politics of eco-localism in anti-globalization movements. Using the ecological and the right-wing anti-globalization movements of the Global North as a case study, it examines the ways in which far-right political groups in the North use the above three interrelated ideas to justify an ethno-exclusionary and chauvinistic politics. The summary of the far-right politics is then compared and contrasted with the positions of the left-wing ecological groups. Pointing to problematic implications of localism for immigration and international trade, this paper stresses the need for developing a progressive political strategy that is clearly differentiated from right-wing populism.

Table 1. Far-right and ecological dissenters from globalization

Far-right Political Parties	The French National Front, the Austrian Freedom Party, the Swiss People's Party, the Danish People's Party, Italy's <i>Lega Nord</i> , the British National Party, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), the European New Right (ENR), the <i>National-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands</i> (NPD), the Freedom Party (Holland), the Australians Against Further Immigration Party, Alternative Right (USA),
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² This research excludes social democratic parties, communist or Marxist organizations since their political platforms do not predominantly feature eco-localization measures.

	the Nationalist Party of America
Anti-immigration Lobby Groups	The Carrying Capacity Network, the Coalition for United States Population Stabilization (CUSPS), the Alliance for Stabilizing America's Population (ASAP!), the Population- Environment Balance (BALANCE), Californians for Population Stabilization (CAPS), Numbers USA, the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), the Optimum Population Trust, Comprehensive US Sustainable Population (CUSP), Negative Population Growth, the Population Action International (PAI), the Population Reference Bureau, the Population Research Institute, the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), Zero Population Growth (ZPG)
Ecology groups and Green Parties	The Post Caron Institute (Richard Heinberg), the Sierra Club, Conservation Society, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the Friends of the Earth (FoE), Earth First!, the Earth Resources Research (ERR), the Political Ecology Research Group (PERG), the Intermediate Technology Development Group (E.F. Schumacher), Appropriate Technology (AT-UK), the Foundation for Deep Ecology (Arne Naess, Doug Tompkins), the International Society for Ecology and Culture (Helena Norberg-Hodge), Green Party of England and Wales, Green Party of the United States of America, Green Party of Canada, Green Party of New Zealand
Localist think-tanks and research institutes	The International Forum on Globalization (Helena Norberg-Hodge, David Korten, Michael Shuman), the Global Trade Watch (Mike Dolan), the Public Citizen (Lori Wallach), the New Economics Foundation, the EF Schumacher Society, the Institute for Local Self Reliance, the UK Transition Town

A literature review

Scholars from various disciplines have examined various aspects of anti-neoliberal globalization movements (Bircham and Charlton 2001; Falk, 1999; Seoane and Taddei, 2002; della Porta 2005; Eschle, 2004; Patomaki and Teivainen, 2004; Ayres, 2004; Ancelovici, 2002). The existent literature, however, rarely touch on the intersection between globalization and the contemporary far-right movements, economic nationalism, and localism (Goodwin 2011; Capling 1997; Bar-On 2008; Hess 2008; Schuman 1998; Barry 2012). There is little published research on how

these phenomena (anti-globalization, nationalism, localism, the far-right movement) are inter-connected and might share some common diagnostic and prognostic frames of globalization.

As most scholars exclude the radical right as part of a broader anti-globalization movement, the existent literature on anti-globalization movements predominantly focus on left-leaning civil society groups. There are some exceptions to this trend. Hewison (2001 and 2010) shed new light on anti-globalization movements with his observation that anti-globalization movements are led by heterogeneous political groups including right-wing economic nationalists. Bonefeld also critically examines various perspectives of anti-globalization (e.g., Korten's localism and Panitch's 'progressive nationalism') and cautions potentially regressive implications of left-wing populism or localism as similar ideas are found in far-right groups in Europe (Bonefeld, 2006). In a similar vein, Wall (2003) discusses a problematic phenomenon where some Green critics of globalization draw on the philosophy of social credit and traditions of anti-Semitic populism that tend to equate globalization with the rule of global financial institutions. These critical scholars have paid attention to ways in which right wing anti-globalizers use similar populist discourses of progressive groups in the Global Justice Movement (GJM). In this context, as Zaslove put it, "Resistance to globalization must no longer be perceived as only the domain of 'democratic' social movements." (2008: 187).

Relating to the connection between rightwing populism and anti-globalization, some scholars have examined connection between ecology movements and far-right political parties (Olsen 1999; Biehl and Staudenmaier, 1995). Sferios (1988) discusses political tensions over the issue of immigration within the environmental movement in the United States and notes contentious interactions between anti-immigration lobby groups and the Sierra Club, an ecological organization in the USA. He finds that American anti-immigration lobby groups exploited tensions within the Sierra Club over internal disagreements on the framing population growth as the main ecological threat (Sferios, 1988). Neumayer (2006) cautions that many ideas of eco-fascism can be found in conservative ecology groups such as a US based anti-immigration lobby group, the Carrying Capacity Network (CCN), and a German ecology party, the *Ökologisch-Demokratische Partei* (ÖDP). In a similar vein, social ecologists³ such as Murray Bookchin, Janet Biehl, and Peter Staudenmaier criticized deep ecology for sharing some ideas of eco-fascisms or fascist ecology.

Notwithstanding the previous work on the connection between right-wing populism and anti-globalization, and right wing ecology and far-right exclusionary politics, there has been little published work on a connection between eco-localism

³ Social ecology-inspired anarchists also support economic and political localization measures. See Bookchin's *Social Anarchism vs. Lifestyle Anarchism* (1995).

and right-wing economic nationalism. Pro-local scholars (Cato and Hiller 2011; Smith 2011; Starr and Adams 2003; Curtis, 2003; Stoker 2004; Seyfang and Smith 2007) tend to essentialize local communities as the network of trust and social harmony, and uncritically celebrate (assumed) ecological and political benefits of localism. Some scholars praise localist campaigns such as the Transition Town Movement as a progressive “social innovation” that deals with climate change (Cato and Hiller 2010: 874). Similarly, community centered eco-localization initiatives are positively portrayed as “green niches” (Seyfang and Smith 2007: 589) with “sustainable innovation” (Seyfang and Smith 2007: 587). Recently, some scholars (Bonefeld, 2006; Albo, 2007; Hess 2008; Park 2013) have taken a critical approach to the predominantly pro-localist literature and explored the limits to eco-localism. Drawing on insights from the existent literature on anti-globalization, localism, ecology and the far-right movement, this paper investigates the intersection between cultural diversity, environment, and local autonomy in the anti-immigration discourse of far-right groups in the Global North. Critiquing a pro-local essentialism in the anti-globalization literature, it examines ways in which far-right groups adopt the concepts and ideas of progressive localist and ecology groups in order to further their regressive agenda.

Three frames of anti-immigration: cultural diversity, environmental protection, and localism

Anti-immigration lobby groups and far-right political parties in Europe and North America put forward three interrelated arguments in order to keep immigrants out. The first is to preserve cultural diversity. The second is to preserve environment. The third is to reclaim control over the local economy. On the surface, these objectives are similar (if not identical) to visions espoused by left-wing dissenters of globalization. In what follows, this paper explains details of the three salient frames in the anti-immigration discourse and discusses to what extent it is different from and or similar to the pro-immigration discourse of left-wing dissenters of globalization.

Cultural diversity

Today's far-right groups hide their racism behind the motto of the “right to difference” that was espoused, for example, by Alain de Benoist, the French ideologue of the New Right (*Nouvelle Droite*). de Benoist argues that “all cultures have an inherent ‘right to difference’” and that people should oppose “undifferentiation and uprooting” by defending “clear and strong [ethnic/cultural] identities” (Zaslove, 2008: 179). Thus, the French New Right or European New Right (ENR) supports “radical ethnic pluralism” that celebrates “particular cultures worldwide” (Bar-On, 2008: 328). To this end, the New Right demands restrictive

immigration policies to “protect” indigenous cultural communities in their homelands. Likewise, many ethno-exclusionary right-wing political parties in Europe try to frame their anti-immigration stance as a matter of cultural protection. Celebrating cultural diversity, they can justify the restrictive movement of people as a means to preserve ethnic or cultural diversity (Olsen, 2000: 76). For instance, as the British National Party (BNP) claims, “We accept that Britain always will have ethnic minorities and have no problem with this as long as they remain minorities and do not change nor seek to change the fundamental culture and identity of the indigenous peoples of the British Isles”. (BNP, May 15, 2010)

To stop “the overwhelming and extinguishing of Britain and British identity under a tsunami of immigration” (BNP, May 15, 2010), BNP argues, a strict immigration control is necessary. In all cases, they claim that they are not racist since they don’t believe in the doctrine of racial hierarchy. What they cherish is supposedly people’s right to cultural difference (Auster, 1990). BNP reasons that each nation has the right to maintain its own identity without hating other cultures (BNP, May 15, 2010). Likewise, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)⁴ calls for a stop to permanent immigration on the ground that British “traditional values” have been undermined (UKIP 28 November, 2011). Concerns about the erosion of national cultures and traditional values have been expressed by other right-wing parties across Europe. The Austrian Freedom Party, the French National Front, and the Italian *Lega Nord* all claim that globalization destroys local indigenous cultures and replace them with the Americanized, homogenous, consumerist culture (Zaslove, 2008).

Some ecologists and far-right groups in Europe draw on the concept of bio-cultural diversity in order to provide an eco-scientific justification for their ethno-exclusionary politics. For instance, the Independent Ecologists of Germany (UÖD) holds that “each human community or culture is unique, because each is shaped and determined by the distinctive features of its particular ecosystem” (Olsen, 2000:75). Adopting the language of deep ecology, the White Aryan Resistance (a neo-Nazi group) argues that “within an ecosystem, the defense of native species from foreign intruders also applies to human beings and their societies” (Olsen, 2000:74). Likewise, treating “the indigenous British people” (BNP, May 15, 2010) as a discreet ethnic group, the BNP calls for the protection of the British ethnic group for the sanctity of biological and ethnic diversity.

In contrast to the far-right groups, left-wing ecology groups such as Green Parties emphasize immigrants’ contributions to the cultural enrichment of society. When they call for immigration control on a cultural ground, they mean restrictions on migrant settlements in communities of disempowered ethnic minorities such as Australian aboriginal people (Green Party UK, 2009). In clear contrast to the BNP’s

⁴ UKIP was founded in 1993. The BNP and UKIP adopt similar discourses on issues of immigration and national identity (Ford et.al, 2012).

British nationalism, the Green Party of England and Wales stresses that "Richer regions and communities do not have the right to use migration controls to protect their privileges from others" (Green Party UK, 2009). This position of the Green Party of England and Wales echoes Habermas' argument that former colonial power countries should compensate the Third World for the wrongs of colonialism by absorbing immigrants from the Global South. According to Habermas' cosmopolitan approach,⁵ distributive justice must be global beyond national jurisdiction (Habermas, 1994). The European Greens' call for global social justice, however, falls short of addressing the tension between democratic sovereignty within nation states and the exercise of universal human rights beyond national jurisdictions. Except left-wing libertarian, eco-anarchists who argue for open borders, the mainstream environmental groups and green parties uphold the right of nation states to control migration. European Greens would rather emphasize the need for harmonization of immigration policies between states in order to ensure migration more safe and manageable.

Notwithstanding the limited scope of social justice concerning migration, the Green Party in the UK clearly rejects xenophobic anti-immigration policies. It opposes "all attempts to introduce a 'barrier round Europe' shutting out non-Europeans or giving them more restricted rights of movement within Europe than European Nationals." At the same time, the Green Party UK advocates measures to restrict the movement of rich people. As it put it, migration should be restricted in cases involving the prospective migrants who "have, on average, equal or greater economic power than the residents of the recipient area." (Green Party UK, 2009) It calls for a complete overhaul of the existing immigration system in many countries that give preferential treatments for people with resources and desirable skills. In contrast to the far-right groups of anti-globalization that call for a radical segregation of ethnic groups to preserve cultural diversity, the left-wing greens of anti-globalization advocate inclusion and solidarity instead. The European Green Party frequently criticizes surging nationalism and right-wing populism in the midst of the Euro-zone crisis and has recently organized an international conference to combat rampant racism and neo-fascism in some Balkan countries.

From the analysis above, it is clear that despite the proclaimed objective (i.e., cultural diversity) of the two opposing camps, the far-right and the left dissenters of globalization differ on their stance on immigration. The far-right groups use the cultural discourse to preserve privileges of white, while the progressive greens channel their efforts toward reducing inequality. This clear difference becomes somewhat less pronounced when ecological considerations come into play.

⁵ Habermas' cosmopolitan approach (Habermas, 2003), however, is confined to the framework of a federated state of Europe based on an ambiguous European identity.

Ecology and the carrying capacity of the earth

Today's anti-immigration lobby groups draw on the ideas of environmental Malthusians (Edward Goldsmith, Jonathon Porritt, Antoine Waechter, David Brower, Diana Hull, Norman Myers, and Paul Watson)⁶ who consider human population growth as a major source of environmental degradation. According to environmental Malthusians, the relationship between population and resources is strained by increasing numbers of immigrants beyond "the carrying capacity of regions" (Bandarage, 2008). In order to build an ecologically sustainable society, they argue that we must first control our population by reducing birth rates and maintaining zero-net immigration.

Anti-immigration lobby groups that are eager to adopt this environmental Malthusian policy include: the Alliance for Stabilizing America's Population (ASAP!), Population- Environment Balance (BALANCE), Californians for Population Stabilization, Numbers USA, the Federation for American Immigration Reform, the Carrying Capacity Network (CCN), Optimum Population Trust, the Foundation for Deep Ecology. The Alliance for Stabilizing America's Population (ASAP!), a US coalition of over forty environmental and anti-immigration groups, argues that unsustainable population growth through immigration puts a great strain on the caring capacity of the USA. The Carrying Capacity Network (CCN) in the USA makes the same argument that a radical reduction of immigrants is absolutely necessary in order to ensure "economic sustainability and resource conservation" (CCN, 2 April, 2011: 1). With a pretence to preserve the caring capacity of the earth, BALANCE demands immediate deportation of all illegal immigrants and the denial of citizenship to children of illegal immigrants (Beale, 1997).

Given the negative implication of environmental Malthusian philosophy for migration, it is not surprising to see that far-right parties selectively adopt some ideas from deep ecology. The British National Party (BNP), posing itself as Britain's

⁶ Many prominent ecologists are found in anti-immigration lobby groups. They include: Norman Myers, David Brower, Diana Hull, Paul Watson, Jonathon Porritt, Edward Goldsmith and Antoine Waechter. Norman Myers, former Sierra Club treasurer (1999-2000), is a patron of the Optimum Population Trust (an anti-immigration lobby group). David Brower (1912-2000) is a former member of the advisory board for Californians for Population Stabilization. Diana Hull, current president of Californians for Population Stabilization, serves on the advisory board of Numbers USA and Federation for American Immigration Reform. Paul Watson, a board member of the Sierra Club from 2003 until 2006, was a main leader of anti-immigration body, Sierrans United for US Population Stability (Baker, 2009). Jonathon Porritt (former Director of Friends of the Earth in Britain and a founding member of the Forum for a Sustainable Future) is a patron of Optimum Population Trust (OPT). Goldsmith was a founder of the Green Party UK and former chief editor of the journal *Ecologist*. Antoine Waechter founded the party *Mouvement Écologiste Indépendant* (Independent Ecology Movement) that opposes immigration (Mercier, 1994: 349).

"only true Green party" (BNP, December 5, 2010b), claims that overpopulation caused by immigration is responsible for a host of social and ecological problems⁷. The problems, according to BNP, range from "severe extra strain on the environment, traffic congestion, longer hospital waiting lists, lower educational standards, higher income taxes, lower wages, higher unemployment, [...], a shortage of council homes" (BNP, May 15, 2010). Likewise, far-right parties such as the *National-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands* (NPD) call for strict immigration limits on environmental grounds.

Some environmental Malthusian groups collaborate with progressive groups in the global justice movement. The Foundation for Deep Ecology (FDE)⁸ is a case in point (Baker, 2009). Advocating a reduction to immigration and birth rates, FDE has financially sponsored NGOs such as the Caring Capacity Network (a US based anti-immigration lobby group) and the International Forum on Globalization (a progressive social justice think-tank). Identifying overpopulation as one of main contributing factors to environmental degradation, some ecologists and progressive groups on the left also argue for migration control. For instance, Rick Shea, a member of the Green Party of Canada, argues for immigration control on an ecological ground (although this is not the official position of the Green Party). He notes that "negative effects of an increasing population on Canada" include "quotas on access to parks, dwindling populations of a variety of species, more pressure on natural areas". His solution to lowering Canada's total ecological footprint is then a reduction of the number of immigrants to Canada (Shea, 2013). It should be noted that Green Parties around the world do not have a uniformed position on immigration. Disagreements over immigration policy among Green Party members are commonly seen. Some advocate immigration reduction on ecological grounds while others support the status quo or even an increase on humanitarian grounds.

Green parties propose to introduce the category of environmental refugees to immigration and refugee laws. Linking migration to global inequality, as the Green Party of the USA states, "There are many countries in the world where the economic policies and military actions of the U.S. government or U.S. based

⁷ Not all far-right parties are self-proclaimed "green" parties. For instance, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) is notoriously anti-environmentalist. As UKIP states, "Global warming is not proven - wind power is futile. Scrap all green taxes, wind turbine subsidies and adopt nuclear power to free us from dependence on fossil fuels and foreign oil and gas." (UKIP 28 November, 2011)

⁸ Foundation for Deep Ecology (FDE) sponsored many ecology groups as follows: Public Citizen (\$645,500.00 between 1991 – 2002), Rainforest Action Network (\$464,080.00 between 1997 – 2001), Friends of the Earth (\$182,000.00 between 1998 – 2001), Sierra Club (\$160,000.00 between 1994 – 2001), SEED (\$155,630.00 between 1997 – 2001), Council of Canadians (\$58,500.00 between 1997 – 2001), Alliance for Global Justice (\$30,000.00 between 1999 – 2001), Greenpeace (\$15,000.00 between 1992 – 1992). FDE also sponsored an anti-immigration lobby group, the Caring Capacity Network (Baker, 2009).

corporations have caused extreme hardships. The peoples of these countries deserve special consideration if they wish to come to the U.S. to escape intolerable conditions created by our government or U.S. corporations" (Green Party of the US, 2012). The root causes of ecological crisis, according to many progressive ecological groups, lie in the systematic overproduction and over-consumption of the industrialized world as well as the unequal resource distribution (Smith, 2003). As long as resources are unevenly distributed among the global population, they argue, migration will continue. As the Green Party of England and Wales put it, "The existing economic order and colonialism have both been major causes of migration through direct and indirect violence, disruption of traditional economies, the use of migrants as cheap labour, uneven patterns of development and global division of labour" (Green Party of England and Wales, March 2009). Echoing this view, Public Citizen (a US based localisation think-tank) also holds that the root cause of immigration is neoliberal globalization that failed to provide sustainable livelihoods for Mexican workers (Public Citizen 2012).

This linking of migration to neoliberal globalization, however, is not alien to far-right political parties and anti-immigration ecology groups. Right-wing parties also lay the blame on neoliberal globalization as the root cause of migration. For instance, the French New Right argues, "Europe and the Third World are common partners in their struggle against global capitalism" (Spektorowski, 2003:59) because the development model of the World Bank and the IMF precipitates "economic refugees from Third World economies" (Zaslove, 2008: 173) and thus inevitably uprooting people from their natural cultural habitats. The French New Right claims that they are against neoliberal globalization that exploits cheap labour from the Third World countries while fostering unsustainable development as it leads to increasing mass production for metropolitan urban population. Opposing this, the New Right advocates cooperation between the Global South and the North to stop human migration (De Benoist and Champetier, 2000: 17).

As shown above, right wing political groups use ecological rhetoric similar to those of progressive groups of anti-globalization movements. This overlap, however, does not extend to the official policies and practices of green parties, except some minority positions within. In sharp contrast to the far-right groups that attack immigrants for ecological degradation, progressive green actors focus on the exploitative, growth oriented global economic order while stressing the need to help immigrants and refugees gain full citizenship rights. Notwithstanding this difference in immigration policy, both the right wing and Green Parties support immigration control at a national or regional level. The point of contention and disagreement between the two camps is their targets of social control. Using ecological rhetoric, the far-right groups seek to build walls around the developed countries against the influx of poor migrants, while the progressive greens focus on economic policies of developed countries.

Localism

As shown above, anti-neoliberal economic globalization is said to be linked to the growing transnational migration. On the flip side of the same coin, localism then appears to mitigate the problem of migration. In this context, it is not surprising to see that many anti-immigration lobby groups and far-right parties use the discourse of localism to justify anti-immigrant, nationalist agenda. Localism (or localization used here interchangeably) here refers to economic and political measures to prioritize a local place as the site for production, consumption, employment, cultural identity and political governance. Localism has two dimensions, economic localization and political localization. Economic localization is often accompanied by measures to reduce the scales of economy and political localism seeks to devolve decision making power back to local communities, towns and cities.

It should be stressed that localism is not necessarily a right-wing political campaign. In many cases, the opposite case is true. Localisation is advocated by left-wing libertarians (eco-socialists/eco-anarchists/eco-feminists), social justice advocacy groups, Green Parties and environmental think-tanks such as the Institute for Local Self Reliance, the Post Carbon Institute, the International Forum on Globalization (IFG), the Friends of the Earth, the Transition Movement, and the Worldwide Fund for Nature. Critiquing the export-oriented global economy, the IFG envisages an alternative society based on a “non-global, powered-down, pro-local” economy (Mander, 2007:11). This goal can be achieved, IFG argues, if we adopt an economic model geared toward local production (using local resources) for local consumption (local markets). Some eco-fundamentalists criticize not only neoliberal capitalism but also all variants of industrialism including green Keynesianism and State socialism.

For instance, Sakar⁹, an eco-socialist, believes that to build a better world, people must adopt a “*limits to growth paradigm*” that stresses “the limitedness of natural resources” (2011: 179). He asserts that in order to avoid ecological crisis, our current economies must contract to a point where preindustrial, labour intensive, subsistence economies replace the current system of production and distribution (Sakar, 1999). Similarly, Bahro (a founder of the German Green Party) advocated a complete withdrawal from the world market (Bahro, 1986: 18) as a desirable economic alternative. Bahro argued that eco-communes should have a “mode of simple, non-expanded reproduction of their material basis” enough for the reproduction of basic necessities of daily life (Bahro, 1986: 14). Notwithstanding internal disagreements with regard to the degree of localization or

⁹ Eco-fundamentalists dogmatically reject any green growth potential of eco-technology. For instance, brushing off the potential gains of existing eco-technologies, Sakar fails to tackle arguments from eco-modernizers such as Hawken and Lovins (1999).

deglobalization¹⁰, almost all localizers agree on some immediate measures of localization. Pro-local action can range from buying from local shops (including farmers' markets and local food co-ops instead of shopping at transnational food and retail outlets such as Wal-Mart) to the use of local gardens (Moore, 2010). It also includes the use of community banks, local currencies and alternative non-monetary forms of economic exchange such as Local Exchange and Trading Systems (LETS) in which people use community tokens instead of the official state currency for all types of service exchange¹¹.

A major benefit of localism is argued to be ecological. Local production for local consumption is said to require less transportation and thus less greenhouse gas emissions (Curtis, 2003: 94). Food localism is a case in point. Emphasizing ecological benefits of localism, food localist organizations such as Beyond Factory Farming, a national organization in Canada, seek to minimize food mileages. Opposing neoliberal globalisation that fosters export-oriented growth, localisers call for import substitute strategies, self-reliance, and meeting local needs as a priority (North, 2010: 587). Another benefit of localism is arguably to foster social networks of mutual care ("social capital") and to preserve unique local cultures. In this regard, Richard Heinberg, board secretary of the Post Carbon Institute, argues that "Local economic organization tends to yield art, music, stories, and literature that reflect the ecological uniqueness of place—and local culture in turn binds together individuals, families, and communities, fostering a sense of responsibility to care for one another and for the land" (Heinberg, November 17, 2011).

Localism is also advocated by many as a means to regain popular control over local resources and local economies. Critiquing "the loss of local control associated with neoliberal globalisation" (North, 2010: 587), localizers argue that economies must be "locally or communally-owned and controlled" through institutions like worker-owned and run co-operatives (North, 2010: 591). Additionally, localizers argue that the state should implement a mandatory "site-here-to-sell here" policy (Cavanagh and Mander, 2004: 83) or "performance requirements" rules that force foreign companies to use locally produced goods and employ local workers (Hines, 2000:131). International trade is to be reduced to only those items unavailable in locals including "some cash crops and minerals" (Hines, 2000: 242).

Despite the best intention of social activists, economic localism has problematic implications for global social justice. First, by prioritizing jobs and exports of one's

¹⁰ Their main disagreement is over the scale of localization such the scale of economic production and consumption, the use of technology appropriate to a desirable scale of economy, and the form of political governance appropriate to a new economy.

¹¹ Examples of the Local Exchange and Trading System (LETS) include the Bobbins and the Beacons in the UK as well as the Auckland Green Dollars, New Zealand. The Auckland Green Dollars was argued to be the largest LETS (with about 2000 members) in the world. See North (2005) and Barry and Proops (2000) for details of LETS.

own local communities or nation (all done in the name of eco-localism), wealthy countries may selectively limit imports and immigration in a manner to benefit their own business communities against others. In other words, economic localism in the wealthy part of the globe may function as disguised trade protectionism of the North. Especially in the climate of economic insecurity, anti-trade and anti-immigration policy suggestions gain ground among people as trade liberalization (via off-shore outsourcing) is perceived to put downward pressure on local wages and to take away local employments. Against such a backdrop, nationalist demands such as 'British jobs for British workers' or "buy American made" become popular as they appeal to the populace by making a patriotic prioritization of employment for local citizens.

With this obvious nationalist appeal of localism, it is not surprising to see that supporters of localism also include conservative right-wing parties and organizations in Europe and North America (Dentice, 2011). Similar to progressive localizers, right-wing localists also blame transnational corporations (but not the free market and capitalism per se) and neoliberal globalization for undermining local economies and popular sovereignty. As an alternative to globalization, they also advocate social policies oriented toward empowering the local. For instance, the National Front (France) and the Freedom Party (Austria) claim that globalization is "an elitist project precipitated by the actions of banks, large financial interests, and multinationals" (Zaslove, 2008) and that it is responsible for the decline of economies in Europe. A fascist organization, the Vanguard News Network, defends localism as it diagnoses that European "economic problems stem from internationalist baloney, e.g., cheap imports, EU mandates, WTO (World Trade Organization) rules, global financial trickery" (Vanguard News Network, 2011).

Similarly, blaming transnational corporation for economic exploitation, the British National Party (BNP), a far-right wing political party in Britain, calls for the protection of the local economy by ensuring local ownership (British ownership), the use of local resources (British workers instead of foreign workers), and the reduction of foreign imports (BNP, December 5, 2010a). The BNP also suggests tax measures to penalize off-shore outsourcing companies (BNP, December 5, 2010a) and to give incentives to big supermarkets that "supply more local and seasonal produce" (BNP, December 5, 2010b). The French National Front proposes "national and popular ownership" (Zaslove, 2008: 175) while the *Lega Nord*, a right-wing populist party in Italy, advocates an establishment of trade barriers "to protect domestic industries from global markets" and to "protect Italian products from markets in China and India" (Zaslove, 2008: 175). The *Lega Nord* demands that "locals, Italians (or Europeans) should be given work over immigrants" (Zaslove, 2008: 177) and that "foreigners must only be given work that citizens of each community clearly do not want" (Zaslove, 2008: 180). Blaming immigrants for domestic job loss, CCN (an anti-immigration lobby group) claims that

"American workers suffer \$133 billion in wage losses resulting from immigrant competition" (CCN, 2011b: 1) and that "mass immigration results in the displacement of almost 2 million U.S. workers from their jobs annually" (CCN, 2011c:1).

As mentioned, political decentralization is arguably to strengthen popular control over the political decision-making processes. However, it should be noted that right-wing libertarians and conservative groups also advocate devolution as they oppose any redistributive justice through government taxations. The idea of dismantling a welfare state and decentralizing political power resonates well with most right-wing groups. As the prominent ecologist, Goldsmith, argued even four decades ago, "Among those activities which must be radically decentralised is welfare. At the moment the State, by usurping those responsibilities that should be fulfilled at the communal and family levels, is contributing to their disintegration by rendering them largely redundant". (Goldsmith, 1973) Echoing this right-wing libertarian argument but framing it as giving more power to local communities, the BNP asserts, "Power should be devolved to the lowest level possible so that local communities can make decisions which affect them' " (BNP, May 12, 2010).

Right-wing libertarians reject a strong welfare state and instead advocate the cultivation of new cooperative forms of labour (De Benoist and Champetier, 2000: 17). For instance, the *Lega Nord* supports social policies "with as little state involvement as possible and with as low a rate of taxation as possible" (Spektorowski, 2003:63). The *Lega Nord* also advocates a 'diffuse economy' of pre-industrial social environment in which people are either "self-employed or employed in small-sized firms (like artisans and shopkeepers living in medium-sized towns)" (ibid.: 63). It considers the "diffuse economy" as an "alternative both to traditional big business capitalism and to an underground economy of cheap immigrant labor" (ibid.:63). Likewise, opposing a centralized welfare state and "hypercompetitive market-oriented economies", de Benoist proposes that society should strengthen "a third sector (partnerships, mutual societies, and cooperatives) as well as autonomous organizations of mutual aid based on shared responsibility, voluntary membership, and non-profit organizations" (de Benoist and Champetier, 2000: 18).

A decentralized structure of political governance may undermine national or state efforts to provide some minimum support for marginalized social groups. Thus, it is not surprising to see that BNP sees political opportunities in the Localism Bill¹² of 2011 in the UK. A BNP Councillor James North argues that the localism bill "offers an unprecedented opportunity to impact upon society in favour of the

¹² The bill includes measures to allow councils to terminate the right to a council house for life and to decide who is eligible for housing supports. The bill also allows people to hold local referendums on any local issues (BBC, 13 December 2010).

indigenous population" (i.e., white English according to BNP's definition) (BNP, no date). BNP leaders consider using the new power that local councils have, such as calling for a referendum on any local issue or deciding who gets into social housing, to their advantage. For instance, BNP proposes to use the bill to stop culturally accommodating practices such as serving halal meat in schools (BNP, no date). Like BNP, UKIP advocates greater use of referenda and decentralisation (UKIP 2010).

Not surprisingly, this libertarian principle of political localism (devolution) is a rallying cry for many conservatives. The Republican Liberty Caucus, whose aim is to advance the principles of minimal government within the Republic Party, advocates localism (Canfield, 2011). Emphasising "local independence", the platform of the Tea Party movement in the USA states, "The strength and resilience of a grassroots movement is the ability of citizens at the local level to determine their own platforms, agendas and priorities free of an overriding central leadership" (Tea Party, no date). The Alternative Right, a White-Supremacist organization in the USA, advocates localism as a necessary starting point for disseminating "radical traditionalism". As it put it, "It is where we stand the best chance of winning a battle. A tribe is easier to convert than a metropolis. A return to independent small towns that exist outside the polluting streams of multicultural slogans and pernicious bureaucratic interventions is the only foreseeable opportunity to make our ideas matter" (Casey, 2010).

As shown above, localism can turn out to be a regressive strategy, "as pursuing local control is not the same as pursuing social justice" (Pendras 2002: 823). Regulation at the local scale can also present "a new barrier to progressive development" (2002: 825) since without conscious efforts to make social justice a top priority, as Pendras put it, "the local scale can easily become a platform for insular, exclusionary practices, rather than an accessible arena in which to build effective social justice strategies" (2002: 830). Furthermore, in the absence of social justice activism, the local can be the arena where xenophobic groups proliferate and thrive. As discussed above, ecology, cultural diversity, and localism may mean different things to different people. Political localism, contrary to the wishes of some left-wing groups, can undermine the ability of the state to redistribute resources to benefit economically marginalized and poor regions.

Converging on economic nationalism?

As discussed, Green parties and progressive pro-local groups support economic localization in the name of "green economics" (also labelled as "local economics" or "community economics"). However, economic measures of localism, despite best intentions of Greens and progressive groups, may function as a Trojan horse for trade protectionist policies of the rich countries. The logic of economic localization, when applied to all areas of goods and services in the Global North, may serve to

justify policies of anti-immigration (by hiring local people instead of foreigners) and trade protectionism (by buying 'local' goods instead of imported ones). Some current trade disputes between nations as well as some anti-free trade movements clearly show this ambiguous nature of localism. Equating imports with exporting jobs, the Green Party of New Zealand led the "Buy Kiwi Made" campaign as a means to keep domestic jobs (NZ Greens 28 October, 2005). As the Green Party of NZ put it, "buying locally helps keep New Zealanders in jobs and supports our economy" (Green Party of New Zealand, no date). Likewise, Canadian and American eco-localist groups also support the "Buy American" or "Buy Canadian" campaigns.

A recent controversy over the sale of New Zealand farms to a Chinese company also underscores this problematic intersection between economic localism and economic nationalism. The Labour Party, Greens, and some right wing nationalists such as the New Zealand First Party, led the "New Zealand Not for Sale" campaign to oppose Chinese purchase of New Zealand farms. Although the campaign can be regarded as part of the growing movements against land-grabbing practices of transnational agro-corporations in some parts of the globe, this particular opposition has been criticized for fanning Sinophobic nationalism. The Green Party of NZ also opposed a business contract with Huawei, a Chinese corporation, on the ground that the company has a close tie with "the authoritarian Chinese government" that "kills and imprisons Tibetans" (Hughes, 2012). Opposing trade liberalization with China, the Green Party further argues that the manufacturing sector of New Zealand will be hollowed out and that China with its large trade surplus money will take over New Zealand firms. Some political analysts argue that in the absence of similar campaigns against Australian and American firms, the two major sources of foreign direct investment (FDI) in NZ, such a high profile public campaign against Chinese FDI is suspected of being motivated by sinophobic economic nationalism (Moore, 2012).

Against the backdrop of economic troubles in the Euro-zone area and the United States, trade sanctions such as anti-dumping measures are often called upon by the governments of the developed countries against their economic rivals. Both right-wing conservatives and progressive environmental groups in the Global North uncritically support selective trade barriers either on a "humanitarian" ground or on the ground of "national security". The Green Party of New Zealand, for instance, has joined such a China-bashing anti-trade campaign. Quoting China's poor human rights record, Greens oppose trade liberalization with China (Green Party of New Zealand, 2008). They suggest that trade sanctions against countries with poor human rights records are necessary in order to prevent the global race to the bottom. Surely, to be consistent with linking trade with human rights, they should also oppose trade with colonial settler countries (the USA, Canada, and Australia) and most Asia Pacific countries on humanitarian grounds.

After all, the US government is responsible for violation of human rights on a massive scale, through illegal military occupations of countries in the Middle East and the continuing inhumane treatment of prisoners at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp. Despite the official apology for Canada's policy of cultural genocide against indigenous peoples through forced residential schooling, Canada, together with the USA and Australia, undermine efforts for empowering aboriginals by opposing the United Nation's resolution on the rights of indigenous peoples. While making vociferous condemnations of China's occupation of Tibet and suppression of rights of ethnic minorities in China, those same human rights campaigners hardly ever question similar human rights violations in other trade partners from the developed countries. For instance, Japan, despite Okinawans' aspiration for national liberation, continues to occupy Okinawa, a Japanese colony since the late 19 century. Additionally, Japan can be also criticized for its continuous discrimination against Koreans in Japan. The point here is that progressive groups of global social justice should be mindful about real (nationalist) political motives behind such a "humanitarian" imperialist discourse.

Other environmentalists add 'social security' to the list of reasons for immigration control. Meyerson, a member of the Sierra Club¹³, argues that "unregulated movement of people poses serious security risks" (Meyerson, 2004: 65) and that "in the absence of any immigration restrictions, it is estimated that several million people would migrate to the United States each year" (Meyerson, 2004: 64). This position is not fundamentally different from the view of economic nationalists who prioritize national citizens' access to employment and public services. Economic nationalists would argue that "immigration should be controlled to deliver the best possible economic, social and welfare conditions for citizens," if not, "uncontrolled immigration poses a threat to public order and social stability" (Balabanova and Balch, 2010: 384). As in the case with the 'humanitarian' sanction approach, progressive greens should be mindful about a potential association between national security and economic nationalism.

Relating to eco-localization, progressive environmentalists propose to build a green economy. At the national policy level, Greens and trade unions in OECD countries seek to pressure their governments to implement policies geared toward a sustainable development. The emergence of Blue-Green alliances is a case in point. Spring Alliance in Europe, the Apollo Alliance (the USA), the Blue Green Alliance (the USA), the Green Economy Network (Canada), and the Blue Green Canada are notable examples of the labour-environment coalition. They press for two major policy changes: public investment in the green economy and a fair trade, a global

¹³ Ecological groups such as the Sierra Club have internal disagreements over immigration control. Currently, it holds a "neutral" stand on immigration (Meyerson, 2004). A chronological list of Sierra Club resolutions related to population policy from 1965 through 2003 can be found at <http://www.sierraclub.org/policy/conservation/population.asp>. (cited in Meyerson, 2004)

framework that can ethically and ecologically regulate a global capitalist economy (Park, 2013). For a fair trade, they propose that all trade agreements should include labour and environmental standards in the form of enforceable social clauses (van Roozendaal, 2009; Krueger 1998; Blair 2008). In actual practices, however, these measures are either rarely enforced (Blair 2008) or used very selectively, against economic rivals for geo-political reasons. Developed countries put up trade barriers to developing countries by selectively using labor or environmental standards as a geo-economic and geo-political tool to discipline them (Krueger 1998). Against this backdrop, it should be noted that many trade unions and civil society groups in the global South oppose the proposal for linking trade with labour and environmental standards (Park, forthcoming). As Bonefeld reminds us, "The global economy, whether governed 'justly' or 'unjustly', does not represent universal human values but particular domestic class interests." (2006: 54).

As demonstrated throughout the paper, eco-localism in practice is often indistinguishable from economic nationalism of the Global North. What are the implications for progressive social justice movements? I argue that the ambiguity of localism stems from their flawed analysis of globalization and that they should revise their foci on localism. Dissenters of globalization across the broader political spectrum tend to frame globalization as predominantly the power of transnational corporations and banks while perceiving the locality as the victim of globalization as well as the primary site for resistance to globalization. As in the case of the far-right anti-globalizers, the left-wing green dissenters of globalization also frame globalization as the corporate power that undermines "the public interest" and local communities. Just like the right-wing counterpart, by embracing the myth of innocent, harmonious local community of small commodity producers and small farmers, the left-green actors also propose "the localisation of the world economy" as a key strategy against globalization (Bonefeld, 2006: 40). This localisation perspective is, to borrow Bonefeld's words, reactionary and "creepy" (2006: 40). As he put it,

(The) rejection of border-jumping capitalism that ruins local economies presumes that local disharmonies are merely imported from outside, uprooting the organic self of communal enterprise and its livelihood. (Their) myth of the organic society belongs to those same neo-nationalist conceptions of anti-globalisation that gained electoral success in Austria (Haider), France (Le Pen) and Italy (Fini), to name but a few. (2006: 43-44)

As shown above, despite differences in immigration policies and actual practices, both the far-right and the left ecology movements share the same diagnostic (globalization as the root cause of ecological and economic crises) and prognostic frames (localization). As a result, progressive localism is very likely to be

manipulated by domestic capital interests and the nation-state that seeks to enhance national competitiveness in the world markets and to perpetuate inequality in the international relations. As Bonefeld succinctly put it,

the critique of globalisation fails if it is merely a critique of speculative capital and that is, a critique for productive accumulation. The critique of speculation has to be a critique of the capitalist form of social reproduction. Without such a critique of capital, the critique of speculation is reactionary. It summons the idea of finance and banks and speculators as mere merchants of greed. In the past, such views underpinned modern anti-Semitism and its idea of a community of blood and soil. The fact that Nazism espoused 'industry' and rejected what it saw as vampire-like finance, should be sufficient to highlight the rotten character of such a critique of globalisation. (Bonefeld, 2006: 55).

In short, the critique of globalization should go beyond the critique of merely some aspects (speculative and transnational) of capitalism but touch directly on disharmonious exploitative relations of capital and labor in local economies that exist not outside or against the world market but rather function as an integral part of international division of labor *within* the world market. Green activists claim that the main enemy is "the 'way of life' addicted to capitalist consumer culture" (Barry, 2012: 113). Notwithstanding their criticisms of consumerist capitalism, environmentalists are less concerned about foreseeable consequences of "eco-localist" practices of the North and adverse impacts on the South by inadvertently legitimating domestic capital interests in their own countries.

Conclusion

This paper examined three salient themes (cultural diversity, ecology and local autonomy) in the anti-immigration discourse of far-right political parties and civil society groups in the North. What is salient in the chauvinistic discourse of the far right is that they adopt the mantle of environmentalism and popular democracy. In this context, this paper sought to investigate whether the chauvinistic agendas of right-wing groups are indeed similar to those of progressive ecological groups. It found that despite similar concepts, their objectives are fundamentally different. At the same time, however, it also found some troubling signs pointing to a potential conversion of the two forces on policies of economic and political localism.

Challenging the prevailing assumption in the anti-globalization literature that local centered, eco-friendly alternatives are inherently progressive, this paper discussed problematic implications of eco-localism for international trade, development, and global justice. The fact that the far-right groups jump on the bandwagon of localization campaign in the global North shows that seemingly progressive eco-

localism is almost indistinguishable from economic nationalism of industrialized countries. This problematic conversion of localist ideas urgently requires progressive Greens to pay attention to limits to ecological and social justice solutions based on a localist strategy. Territorial power, especially stressing the local, should not be automatically viewed as a progressive alternative to neoliberal globalization. As Pendras put it, "no strategy is in itself 'progressive' or 'socially just' " (Pendras 2002: 830) especially when we fail to consider its impact on peoples and societies in other parts of the world. The role of critical scholars is then to question real implications of localist policies for peoples and countries whose relations and capabilities are unequally shaped by uneven access to power and resources.

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About the author

Mi Park is the author of *Democracy and Social Change: A History of Student Movements in South Korea* (2009) and the co-author of *Student Activism in Asia: Between Protest and Powerlessness* (edited by M. Weiss and E. Aspinall, 2012). Her works on social movements, international political economy and contentious politics in Asia have appeared in international journals such as *Globalizations*, *Critical Sociology*, *Korea Journal* and the *Asia Europe Journal*. She is currently a guest professor at Reutlingen University in Germany. She can be reached at mipark AT alumni.lse.ac.uk

The Anonymous movement in the context of liberalism and socialism

Christian Fuchs

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to analyze the political worldviews of the Anonymous movement and the role that socialism and liberalism play in it. The paper seeks to analyse the worldviews represented in public video announcements posted by Anonymous activists on the Internet. The sample consists of 67 videos. With the help of political philosophy, differences between liberal and socialist worldviews are outlined. The results of the empirical study show that liberalism and socialism are both articulated within Anonymous in complex ways so that these two worldviews co-exist, complement each other, and also conflict to certain degrees.

1. Introduction

The wider public has gained knowledge of Anonymous especially because of the latter's support of WikiLeaks in December 2010. Distributed denial of server (DDoS) attacks were used for shutting down the websites of PayPal, PostFinance, Visa, Mastercard, and the Bank of America that disabled donation possibilities to WikiLeaks.

The task of this paper is to analyse the political worldviews of Anonymous and the role of socialism and liberalism in it. Anonymous describes its own political views as fluid and heterogeneous:

Anonymous is not a political current, nor is it based on a political current. Some may say that it's anarchism, liberalism, communism, libertarianism, etc. – others say it's nothing but a bunch of twelve-year olds from 4chan having fun on the Internet. Anonymous is none of those – yet it encompasses elements of all these things and many, many more¹.

Although Anonymous is pluralistic, we can see it as a collective, in which certain political worldviews co-exist, complement, and/or contradict each other, and are represented to varying degrees at different times. This paper presents an analysis of the worldviews represented in public video announcements posted by Anonymous activists on the Internet.

The paper analyses both quantitative and qualitative dimensions of Anonymous worldviews and therefore tries to answer two specific research questions:

¹ <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7cqP8qqgfIO> (accessed on September 29, 2013).

- To what degree are there elements of liberal ideology and a socialist worldview in Anonymous' public discourse?
- How are elements of liberalism and socialism expressed in Anonymous' public discourse?

Anonymous has like the Occupy movement emerged in a political situation of global crisis that resulted in new articulations of discontent (Fuchs 2014a). The crisis that started in 2008 is on the one hand an economic crisis of capitalism and on the other hand a crisis of the state and of neoliberal ideology. The economic, political and ideological levels of the crisis are articulated with each other. The crisis has questioned the dominance of neoliberalism and is therefore also a crisis of the contemporary form of liberalism. The Occupy movement can be described as a new socialist and working class movement that aims at reclaiming the commons that are produced by the collective worker of all citizens and that have been privatized by neoliberal class politics that benefit corporations and the rich (Fuchs 2014a).

Although Occupy is by many perceived as being made up of what non-Marxist, liberal theories of class describe as middle-class, the social composition analysed in the Occupy General Survey (N=5074) shows that more than half of the respondents were students, irregularly or informally employed or unemployed and only 31.6% had a full-time job. 59.3% of the respondents (N=3341) had a household income below the median income. The question what kind of movement Anonymous is and how it relates to liberalism and socialism matters especially in this conjuncture that is a crisis of liberalism that poses potentials for a new socialism. The question if Anonymous is a movement that is associated with left-wing socialist values, liberal values or a hybrid mixture is therefore relevant for both activists, who are looking for support of their activities, and social movement researchers (Fuchs 2014a).

I first ask what kind of movement Anonymous is (section 2), describe differences between liberalism and socialism in general and in Internet politics (section 3), introduce the employed research method (section 4), present and interpret the main results (sections 5, 6), and draw some conclusions (section 6).

2. What kind of social movement is Anonymous?

Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani define social movements as "(1) informal networks, based (2) on shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilize about (3) conflictual issues, through (4) the frequent use of various forms of protest" (della Porta and Diani 1999: 16). Diani in another definition says social movements are "networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in political or cultural conflicts, on the basis of shared collective identities" (Diani 1992: 13). Based on these and other definitions, one can identify important aspects of social movements (Fuchs 2006):

- societal problems;
- the negation of dominant values, institutions, and structures;
- dissatisfaction;
- adversaries;
- shared collective identities;
- orientation toward social change;
- triggers of protest, contagion effects;
- mobilization, protest practices and collective action;
- protest methods;
- and extra-parliamentary politics.

A specific characteristic of Anonymous is that it is at the same time social movement and anti-movement; it is collective political action based on a shared identification with some basic values (such civil liberties and freedom of the Internet) that results in protest practices online and offline against adversaries, and at the same time for many of those engaging on Anonymous platforms individual play and entertainment. For most of the time, Anonymous exists “for the lulz”, as fun for the users, but from time to time – and in the past years the frequency has increased – individual action turns into collective political action. Many people joining Anonymous’ political actions share some basic political values that have been expressed in the text “5 Principles: An Anonymous Manifesto”². These values include struggle for an “open, fair, transparent, accountable and just society”, in which information is “unrestricted and uncensored”, the upholding of citizens’ “rights and liberties”. Also, there is a guarantee of the “privacy of citizens” so that “citizens shall not be the target of any undue surveillance”.

Anonymous says that it is based on three principles:

- 1) The media should not be attacked;
- 2) critical infrastructure should not be attacked; and
- 3) one should work for justice and freedom³.

Activists have their own interpretations of these basic values of freedom and justice. The overall principles are very loose, unlike a political party’s programme that is much more formalized. This looseness is also characteristic of social movements, but Anonymous differs from them by keeping a high level of anonymity of its activists and practices.

² <http://anonnews.org/press/item/199/> (accessed on September 29, 2013).

³ <http://occupywallst.org/article/anonymous-joins-occupywallstreet/> (accessed on September 29, 2013).

The chosen protest methods are unconventional and take place online (hacking websites, publishing personal data, DDoS) and/or offline (street protests). Anonymous like other social movements has different “logics of action” (della Porta and Diani 2006: 192) that can be combined in different ways. The first logic requires temporal synchronicity but there are distributed actions conducted over the Internet from a spatial distance. It is a logic of collective online action at a distance. The second logic of protest action is coordinated and planned online but makes use of temporal and spatial co-presence. Traditional social movements (just like political parties) tend to encourage and be based on personal relations, face-to-face meetings, discussions, and actions. In contrast, anybody who shares some basic values can declare an action to be part of Anonymous. In conventional social movements, campaigns are often focused on strategic adversaries. The highly decentralized and informal character of Anonymous in contrast often results in multiple independent and parallel campaigns that can become networked and coordinated but can also exist independently.

Anonymous activists often do not know each other and have not met but act in concert as a collective. Anonymous is easier to join and leave than other movements. According to Anonymous, “Anonymous is everyone. Anonymous is no one. Anonymous exists as an idea. You can also be Anonymous. Becoming Anonymous is simple. Just take action”⁴. So one specific quality of Anonymous is that it has no clearly defined membership – anybody can join it. Anonymous therefore defines itself as open idea:

Now first and foremost, it is important to realize that ANONYMOUS – in fact – does not exist. It is just an idea – an internet meme – that can be appropriated by anyone, anytime to rally for a common cause that’s in the benefit of humankind. [...] This means anyone can launch a new ideological message or campaign under the banner of ANONYMOUS. Anyone can take up a leading role in the spreading of the ANON-consciousness. [...] ANYONE anywhere can initiate an Anonymous operation, action, or group – and so long as they adhere to these 3 basic principles they are as much Anonymous as anyone. EVERYONE is Anonymous⁵.

At the same time, this high level of informality can also result in a lack of trust, stability, and cohesion and can result in problems once the movement faces state repression or other problems.

Is Anonymous is a distributed intelligence that makes use of the wisdom of the crowd (Surowiecki 2005)? Anonymous on the one hand is a distributed and networked form of intelligence and collective action. On the other hand there are hubs of knowledge and action in this network. There seem to be, just like in most organisations that are embedded into modern society, contradictions of

⁴ <http://anonnews.org/press/item/199/> (accessed on September 29, 2013).

⁵ <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7cqP8qqqfIO> (accessed on September 29, 2013).

power. There are power asymmetries immanent in modern society that allow powerful organisations such as state institutions (the FBI in the case of Anonymous) to monitor and try to control networked structures.

One should not be mistaken: although everyone can join, Anonymous is not a pure leaderless, decentralized network. There are core activists with specific technical skills, media skills, and organisational skills who carry out the core of hacking activities (Olson 2012). According to Parmy Olson (2012), they often meet in secret IRC channels, in which they plan campaigns. Olson (2012: 9) argues that in many actions, there were several hundred activists, but a group of about ten who “managed most of the decisions”. Olson (2012: 74f, 113-122) argues that in many DDoS attacks carried out by Anonymous, only a minor share of the participating computers was made up by the thousands of activists that simultaneously used the LOIC or other software tools (such as Gigaloader, JMeter), but that rather around 90% (e.g. in the attack on PayPal.com) of the “firepower” came from botnets, which are large networks of ten or hundred thousands of “zombie” computers that are controlled by single activists (such as Civil and Switch) with the help of malware that was injected into the computers of users without their knowledge in the form of downloads or viruses so that temporary remote control over these computers is enabled. Anonymous is a rhizomatic network of distributed activists (Coleman 2011), but this network is neither hierarchyless nor without internal conflicts and power structures. There are activists that have strategic skills and roles and form hubs in the activist network.

The employment of symbolic means of expression is particularly important for Anonymous. When Anonymous activists join or organise street protests, they wear Guy Fawkes masks. Guy Fawkes was involved in the Gunpowder Plot in 1605, in which activists tried to bomb the British House of Lords. The Fawkes mask became popular in Alan Moore’s comic “V for Vendetta”, in which the revolutionary V struggles against a fascist regime. The use of the masks is a media strategy itself because it aims at directing the media and the public’s attention on Anonymous. Given the importance of symbolic expression for Anonymous as well as videos that are created in a crafty manner and often an expression of artistic creativity are important means of expression for Anonymous. They contain political messages, announcements of campaigns, statements about broader goals, etc., and are spread on user-generated content platforms like YouTube or Vimeo.

For example, Project Chanology against Scientology started with the YouTube video “Message to Scientology” (Coleman 2012). An IRC channel called #press was set up, in which activists co-ordinated the production of the video and press releases (Olson 2012: 70-72). The video was based on a leaked Scientology video that featured Tom Cruise and Scientology tried to (unsuccessfully) stop its spread (Norton 2012). Videos have had a special relevance for Anonymous, which is the reason why specific methodological attention is given to such content in this paper. The use of video platforms and other social media attracts “media attention while simultaneously binding together and rejuvenating” the

movement's spirit (Coleman 2012). Videos and social media are just like the Fawkes masks and a peculiar and strange kind of humour characteristic for Anonymous' own culture (Norton 2012).

Anonymous makes use of principles of video activism in a specific way:

- *Complementarity*: The videos are part of larger campaigns (Gregory 2012) and complement the politics of hacktivism. The videos are a means, by which Anonymous communicates the meaning of its hacktivism to the public.
- *Digital swarming and spreadability*: Anonymous' videos tend to be uploaded to multiple spaces and copied so that they are manifestations of the digital swarming (Chanan 2011) and spreadable media character (Jenkins, Ford and Green 2013) of political videos on the Internet.
- *Online video declarations and online video mobilizations*: Video activism is often participant reportage shot by activist citizen journalists who upload footage that documents what happened at certain protests to the Internet. Anonymous' videos are qualitatively different from participant reportage: because the activists want to stay completely anonymous, they do not show images of themselves or other Anonymous activists. They use computer voices and masks in order not to reveal their identities. The videos serve the purpose of either explaining why a certain hack attack was undertaken or mobilizing supporters to join protests. The first kind of video resembles anonymous declarations of militant groups that explain their actions and that have due to the kind of activism just like in the case of Anonymous always been anonymous. Traditionally such declarations have been distributed in printed form, e.g. as letters to newspapers, whereas Anonymous makes use of the Internet. The genres of video activism that Anonymous uses could therefore be described as online video declaration on the one hand and online video mobilization on the other hand.
- *Circumventing mainstream media*: YouTube and other online video platforms are means of communication that activists use for attempting to circumvent the lack of representation in mainstream media (Jenkins 2009). Anonymous just like other social movements tries to spread political content to the public by making use of these video channels because it does not control mainstream channels.
- *Digital arts and craft*: Participant video reportage is often de-professionalized, technologically simple, lo-fi and deliberately amateurish because it is footage taken in the midst of action. Examples are the videos that documented the police violence against Rodney King or the Occupy movement. Anonymous' videos in contrast are often small artworks, highly creative and artistic, an artistic manifestation of what can be termed "digital craft work" (Gauntlett 2011: 88)

According to Diani (1992), social movements have collective identities. Group identities are in many social movements formed by personal encounters of activists. Anonymous groups and activists hardly know and meet each other,

they remain anonymous to the public and to other activities. Nonetheless Anonymous is able to act politically. Anonymous' identity is mainly formed by collective action and communication at a distance, joint enemies and collective symbols, but without knowledge of the personal identities of single activists.

Social movements have been characterized as networks of activists (della Porta and Diani 2006, Diani 1992, Diani and McAdam 2003). Anonymous makes use of the Internet as means of communication and protest. But single groups that call themselves Anonymous may not at all be connected to each other. They nonetheless operate under the same name and share basic goals. They are in this respect more like semiotic guerrilla movements that multiply and spread, but remain independent from each other and do not form a network. Anonymous is at the same time a network and anti-network.

Anonymous is a liquid social movement. It expresses the liquefaction of society (Bauman 2000/2012) at the level of social movements. It more than other movements permanently transgresses the boundaries between individual and collective action, online and offline, movement and non-movement, networking and autonomy, spatial distance and presence, anonymity and knowledge, play and protest work, entertainment/fun and politics, presence and absence, appearance and disappearance, the mundane and the uncommon, normality and absurdity, the real and the symbolic, online and offline action, conventional and unconventional behaviour.

3. Liberalism and socialism

The modern use of the term "liberal" goes back to the 18th and 19th century (Williams 1983: 180). Reviewing classical and contemporary concepts of liberalism, Gaus and Courtland (2011) in an encyclopaedic article about liberalism argue that a common characteristic is that "liberals accord liberty primacy as a political value".

John Locke (1690), the founder of classical liberalism, argued that civil liberties and private property are natural laws and rights of human beings. David Hume (1739) made private property a central element of liberal theory, arguing that justice and private property require each other mutually in any society. John Stuart Mill (1859) derived from the assumption of human autonomy the liberties of conscience, thought, feeling, opinion, sentiment, expression, discussion, publication, tastes, pursuits and association. He also propagated an individualism that gives humans the right to pursue their own good in their own way.

Mill (1848) contrasted a system of private property to a socialist/communist system of collective ownership. He argued that communism would result in "uniformity of thoughts, feelings, and actions". Mill (1848) acknowledged that capitalism creates inequality and argued that freedom is preferable to equality. Based on the liberal principles of liberty, individualism and private property, Adam Smith (1759/1790) formulated the doctrine that the rich whom he considered to be naturally selfish "are led by an invisible hand to [...] advance

the interest of the society" (p. 165). He considered private property as fundamental human right and that one of the "most sacred laws of justice" is to "guard his property and possessions" (p. 75).

It becomes evident from this discussion that individual civil liberties are in liberal ideology connected to an individual right of private property that stands above considerations of socio-economic equality, which is not considered as a fundamental right. Socialism is a worldview that contests liberalism's focus on private property as individual right.

Raymond Williams (1983: 287) traces the earliest use of the term "socialist" in English language to 1826. Socialists, in contrast to liberals, think that "the rewards of production [...] are due to society as a whole, and to its members equally, rather than to particular individuals" (Barker 1991: 485). In the realm of property and labour, "means of production are commonly possessed" in a socialist society (Barker 1991: 485). Important values in socialist thought include equality, communal and co-operative production, workers' control of production/self-managed companies (Barker 1991), and socio-political solidarity (Buzby 2010). Socialism maintains that the source of human value is human creativity and co-operation liberated from class power (Thompson 1959).

The notion of socialism is not limited to the economic realm, although the economy is seen as an important foundation of society. Participatory democracy, the political dimension of socialism, involves the "democratisation of authority structures" (Pateman 1970: 35) in all decision-making systems, such as government, the work place, the family, education, housing (Held 2006, Pateman 1970).

Table 1 summarizes some main differences between liberalism and socialism. Freedom is the dominant value in liberal thinking and equality the dominant value in socialist thinking. This does however not mean that these values are not present in both worldviews; the respective value is rather subsumed by the dominant value and takes on another meaning and role in the worldview, in which it is not dominant (Hall 1986). Equality in liberalism means the equal rights and opportunities of all regarding individual freedom (Hayek 1960: 510, 96). For Marx (1857/58: 159, 833; 1867: 171; 1894: 373), a socialist society is based on communal property of the means of economic production. At the same time, freedom is not absent from this vision but takes on the meaning a specific meaning: the freedom to determine one's own activities under conditions of high productivity, high levels of disposable time and well-rounded individuality (Marx 1857/58: 541, 706; 1867: 557; 1894: 958f). For Marx, a socialist society is one in which all people together own and control the economy, a society based on social-economic equality. Freedom is subsumed under this value and does not mean, as in liberal thinking, the individual freedom of ownership, but rather the development of rounded individuals and the maximization of free time under the conditions of socio-economic equality, post-scarcity, and high productivity.

	Liberalism	Socialism
Basic value	Freedom	Equality
View of society	Individualism	Sociality, solidarity
Economy	Private property	Collective ownership
Source of wealth	Capital	Co-operation of creative human beings freed from exploitation
State and politics	Private affairs are not controlled by the state, representative democracy	Participatory democracy
Culture	Plurality of interests and worldviews	Universal rights and interests
Private life	Separation of the private sphere from the public sphere	The private realm as distinct realm that allows individuality, but is not separated from, but connected to politics and public life
Political struggle against:	Regulating state	Capital interests, exploitation, capitalist state, ideology

Table 1: Differences between liberalism and socialism

Socialism and liberalism differ in their basic values, although specific notions of freedom and equality can be found in both. Liberalism is based on the idea of individual freedom, whereas the idea of equal opportunity is subsumed under this value. (Hall 1986: 41; Williams 1983: 181). Socialism is based on the idea of socio-economic equality, whereas the idea of free time and free activity is subsumed under this value (Williams 1983: 287).

Libertarianism is a political worldview that, on an abstract level, “holds that agents are, at least initially, *full self-owners*” (Vallentyne 2010). Raymond Williams (1983: 180f) notes the ambiguous meaning of the term, indicating that the meaning of the notion “libertarian” is sometimes close to the term “liberal”, but has in the 20th century also acquired the meaning of “libertarian socialism” that is not a form of liberalism, but a type of socialism. Different forms of libertarianism interpret self-ownership in different ways. This circumstance has resulted in the existence of both right- and left-wing forms of libertarianism.

Right-libertarianism holds that typically such resources may be appropriated by the first person who discovers them, mixes her labor with them, or merely claims them—without the consent of others, and with little or no payment to them. [...]

Radical right libertarianism [...] holds that that there are no fair share constraints on use or appropriation. Agents may destroy whatever natural resources they want (as long as they violate no one's self-ownership) and they have the power to appropriate whatever natural resources they first claim (Vallentyne 2010).

So right-wing libertarianism interprets self-ownership as meaning the freedom of the individual to own as much property as s/he wants and chooses to. "Left-libertarianism, by contrast, holds that unappropriated natural resources belong to everyone in some egalitarian manner. [...] It holds that natural resources initially belong to everyone in some egalitarian manner" (Vallentyne 2010).

Self-ownership is not interpreted individualistically, but rather as collective characteristic of humans. Right-wing libertarianism is close to classical liberalism and contemporary neoliberalism, left-wing libertarianism to social anarchism. Libertarianism shows that political worldviews are contradictory, overlapping, and ambivalent. No "ideology is ever wholly logical or consistent. All the great organic ideologies bring together discordant elements and have to struggle to make contradictory ideas fit the scheme" (Hall 1986: 36).

Libertarianism is an ambiguous worldview cutting across the distinction between liberalism and socialism displayed in Table 1. There are forms that are more associated with liberalism and forms more associated with socialism. Freedom is a central value in both, but is either interpreted as an individualistic or collectivistic value. This distinction has also been reflected in anarchist thought. Anarchists argue that domination opposes human interests and that all aspects of society should not be ruled by authorities, but can be voluntarily organized based on self-organization, self-management, self-government, bottom-up decision making, grassroots democracy, decentralized networks, free agreements, and free associations. Freedom from domination is a central value of anarchism. This freedom is interpreted differently in individual and social/collective anarchism. The first form has e.g. been represented by Max Stirner, who stressed the necessity of the abolition of social and moral bonds and the creation of an association of egoists. Individualist anarchism

emphasizes individual liberty, the sovereignty of the individual, the importance of private property or possession, and the iniquity of all monopolies. It may be seen as liberalism taken to an extreme conclusion. 'Anarcho-capitalism' is a contemporary variant of this school (Ostergaard 1991: 21).

Social anarchism, as e.g. represented by the thought of Mikhail Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin, Rudolf Rocker, or Murray Bookchin, holds in contrast that the means of production and the structures of decision should be controlled in collective processes of self-organization by communes that freely associate themselves in federations. Socialist anarchism "rejects private property along with the state as a major source of social inequality. Insisting on social equality

as a necessary condition for the maximum individual liberty of all, its ideal may be characterized as 'individuality in community'. It represents a fusion of liberalism with socialism: libertarian socialism" (Ostergaard 1991: 21).

In Internet politics, liberalism and socialism have been expressed in distinct forms as cyberlibertarianism and Internet socialism.

Cyberlibertarianism refers to a perspective (some would say philosophy) which claims that cyberspace and the Internet should be regarded as uncontrolled and unregulated electronic spaces where anyone is free to be whatever they wish and express themselves however they like. It thereby shares many of the same principles as free-market libertarian ideologies which regard individual freedom as the primary political aspiration, the unregulated market as the essential mechanism for distributing goods and services, and a loathing of government which is seen as the main obstacle to the achievement of personal liberty (Bell, Loader, Pleace and Schuler 2004: 35).

Right-wing cyberlibertarianism is an ideology that is based on the liberal idea that state intervention should be minimized and that argues for freedom of information, freedom of speech, and against censorship on the Internet. Individual freedom of expression and to do whatever one wants to do (freedom of action) is a central aspect of right-wing cyberlibertarianism. In addition, it frequently has a pro-business agenda and favours the use of the Internet for the purpose of capital accumulation. Langdon Winner (1997) characterizes the cyberlibertarian ideology as technological determinism (the Internet would automatically result in a better democracy, an "electronic neighbourhood"), radical individualism, the idea of individual rights without social responsibilities, attacks on altruism, social welfare, and government intervention, and oriented on deregulated free-market capitalism – as being close to right-wing political thought. Cyberlibertarianism is an expression of neoliberal thinking (Fisher 2010).

"The combined emphasis upon radical individualism, enthusiasm for free market economy, disdain for the role of government, and enthusiasm for the power of business firms places the cyberlibertarian perspective strongly within the context of right wing political thought" (Winner 1997: 16).

Cyberlibertarianism's main value is profit; it wants to accumulate capital by e-commerce, virtual enterprise, and the Internet economy. Such values have e.g. been expressed by *Wired* magazine, the Progress & Freedom Foundation, and individuals like John Perry Barlow, Stewart Brand, Esther Dyson, George Gilder, Kevin Kelly, George Keyworth, Nicolas Negroponte, or Alvin Toffler. With the rise of social media, cyberlibertarianism has been re-articulated in the form of positions that stress the empowering potentials of platforms like Facebook and Twitter (Dahlberg 2010, Fuchs 2014b).

It should be noted that cyberlibertarianism has been the term used commonly in the literature for this ideology. The employment of the term "libertarianism" shall designate the origins of the Internet in the hippie culture and anarchist counter-culture of the 1960s. The term cyberlibertarianism is, however, confusing because libertarianism has, as argued, has both a right-wing and a left-wing version. It is therefore more correct to characterize the Californian ideology as right-wing cyberlibertarianism, neoliberal cyberlibertarianism, or cyber-neo-liberalism and to maintain that there is also a socialist form of cyberlibertarianism.

An alternative to right-wing cyberlibertarianism is socialist Internet politics that argues for an alternative Internet that is free from corporations and instead controlled and owned by the users. Cybersocialism and cybercommunism have been expressed in various academic works (e.g. Dyer-Witthford 1999) and manifestos like the dotCommunist Manifesto (Moglen 2003), the Telekommunist Manifesto (Kleiner 2010), or the Cyber.com/munist Manifesto (Barbrook 2007): "Now, with the advent of the Net, this gift economy is challenging market competition at the cutting-edge of modernity" (Barbrook 2007). "In overthrowing the system of private property in ideas, we bring into existence a truly just society, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all" (Moglen 2003).

Liberalism and socialism contrast especially in how they stress the importance of freedom/equality, individualism/sociality and individual/collective ownership in society. Libertarianism is a combination of liberal and socialist thought that comes in various versions that more or less take a left- or right-wing direction and are either closer to socialism (as in social libertarianism) or liberalism (as e.g. in anarcho-capitalism). These distinctions are important theoretical foundations for the empirical analysis of contemporary political worldviews, such as the ones held by Anonymous.

4. Research method

To which extent and how does Anonymous express elements of socialism and liberalism in its political discourse? For answering this question, it is best to analyse Anonymous' self-description of its worldviews with the help of discourse analysis (van Dijk 2011) and content analysis (Krippendorff 2004). I employ content analysis for the quantitative part of research in order to identify how often certain worldviews and ideologies (liberalism, socialism) occur in public statements of Anonymous and discourse analysis for identifying arguments and discourses that are typical for liberal and socialist thinking that can be found in these public statements. Content analysis is used for the quantitative part of research, discourse analysis for the qualitative part.

Critical text/document analysis is a general critical analysis technique of texts that encompasses both quantitative content analysis and qualitative discourse analysis (Jupp 2006). It analyses assumptions made in texts in the light of power structures of society (Jupp 2006) One important question that one can

ask when conducting a critical document analysis is: "What public and/or institutional discourses are important in terms of knowledge of what is 'right' and what is 'wrong'?" (Jupp 2006: 279). In the quantitative analysis presented in section 5, I analysed for each video if statements were made that presented elements of liberalism (such as freedom, individualism, private property, representative democracy, individual civil liberties; see table 1) and/or (such as equality, solidarity, collective ownership, participatory democracy, social liberties; see table 1). I coded for each video if it represents liberal values, socialist values, both or something different. The results of the quantitative analysis will be presented in section 5.

Teun van Dijk (1998, chapter 5) classifies the structure of discourses. A discourse defines and presents the membership, activities, goals, values/norms, group relations and resources of a group in a certain way. In conducting a qualitative analysis of Anonymous-videos, I identified typical expressions of answers to questions that according to van Dijk (1998) discourses deal with and that Critical Discourse Analysis analyses:

- "* Goals: Why do we do this? What do we want to realize?
- * Values/norms: What are our main values? How do we evaluate ourselves and others? What should (not) be done?
- * Position and group-relations: What is our social position? Who are our enemies, our opponents? Who are like us, and who are different?" (van Dijk 1998: 69f).

I looked for typical expressions of socialist and liberal goals and values and boundary designations that named political enemies. The results of this qualitative analysis will be presented in section 6.

As argued at the end of section 2, online video, a medium that Anonymous uses for communicating its ideas to the public, are videos posted on the Internet. These videos are, on the one hand, artistic pieces and contain, on the other hand, political messages. They are therefore well-suited material for the analysis of Anonymous' political worldviews.

Everyone who becomes active and uses the name Anonymous for this activism is part of the Anonymous movement. There are low entry- and exit-barriers. The movement's anonymity principle makes it very difficult to distinguish where an Anonymous video posted on the Internet originated. It is common practice that multiple users post videos on multiple platforms and, by making use of multiple profiles, that translations are created, and that based on a basic message, different versions of videos are produced and spread by different people. The fluid and anonymous nature of the movement and the lack of distinctive membership boundaries do not automatically allow mapping certain videos to certain nodes or individuals. They are all an expression of the collective movement Anonymous. Anonymous is a collective political worker.

The multitude of practices and explanations of political practices (as in the form of videos) is unified by overall shared values. The methodological implication is

that analysing the worldviews of Anonymous via public statements (as expressed in videos) means analysis of the political speech used by individuals and groups who claim the Anonymous banner for themselves. There is and can be no guarantee that these are the same people who conduct the actual operations or that the videos and the political actions are part of the same concerted planning effort. Anonymous is a culture and an idea. Therefore what one can analyse is how this idea is expressed in public by whoever claims to be Anonymous. Everyone who acts or speaks on behalf of Anonymous and shares its basic values is Anonymous. Direct action activists that engage in DDoS-attacks are just like people who create, publish, or distribute Anonymous messages part of the movement.

Therefore, the content and discourse analysis of videos conducted in this paper focuses on the one hand on an important part of the public perception and expression of what the culture and ideas of Anonymous stand for, which is part of Anonymous' culture itself.

Searching for the keyword "Anonymous" on YouTube showed that the channels by the users anonopss and TheAnonMessage are two of the most frequently accessed sources of video material that represent Anonymous. AnonOps (<http://www.anonops.org/>) is the name of an IRC chat from which Anonymous operation such as the Operation Payback have emerged. Anonops is, however, also the name of a news blog about Anonymous that is "only dedicated to reporting news about Anonymous" and a connected YouTube channel⁶. The popularity of the videos posted by the anonopss-user on YouTube become clear by the circumstance that e.g. the video "What Are We Capable Of – THIS IS ANONYMOUS!"⁷ had obtained 654,506 views on August 7th, 2012 (06:02 AM, CET) exactly 12 months after it was uploaded. Texts posted below many of anonopss' YouTube videos link to the Anonops blog⁸ (see e.g.). The Anonops IRC website <http://www.anonops.org/> says that it does not run the Anonops blog anonops.blogspot.com⁹. TheAnonMessage is another Anonymous news channel operating a YouTube channel¹⁰. The popularity of this channel becomes clear by the fact that the video "Anonymous: Message to SONY on SOPA" had on August 7th, 2012 (06:01 AM, CET), been accessed 683,539 times¹¹.

Both anonopss and TheAnonMessage portray themselves as messenger channels of the Anonymous movement that publish videos made by various Anonymous activists. They want to communicate to the world meanings that Anonymous activists choose to give to actions and both consider themselves to be part of the Anonymous movement. Given that YouTube is the most-popular

⁶ <http://www.youtube.com/user/anonopss>.

⁷ <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gP9q61Fjlqo&feature=plcp>

⁸ <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gP9q61Fjlqo&feature=plcp>

⁹ <http://www.anonops.org/misc.html>, accessed on August 7th, 2012.

¹⁰ <http://www.youtube.com/user/TheAnonMessage>

¹¹ <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WjOPXpd9PSU>

video platform in the world, that anonopss and TheAnonMessage are highly publicly visible (meaning that people looking for several videos about Anonymous on the Internet are likely to see videos from these two channels), and do transmit content from various sources over their channels, sampling videos from these two channels is feasible because it guarantees both a diversity of video sources as well as reliance of the analysis on videos that are considered by the public as being an expression of what Anonymous stands for.

Commander X is an Anonymous activist who after being charged by the US District Court in San José for cyberattacks revealed his association to Anonymous and the People's Liberation Front (PLF). He operates a Vimeo news channel¹² and the website of the PLF¹³. Commander X is one of the few activists who has publicly revealed his identity, admitted participation in illegal Anonymous actions, and has at the same time operated a public video channel that features videos that express his views of Anonymous. By including videos from his channel in our analysis, we can guarantee that also views of what Anonymous stands for by an activist engaging in illegal protest practices are included in our sample.

The sampling of video material involved all videos posted on these 3 channels until December 1st, 2011 that presented announcements of Anonymous operations to the public. The sample is neither a random sample nor a purposive sampling. In random sampling, due to the inability to analyse all items of analysis, a random selection of items is collected. In purposive sampling, a number of items are selected because they have certain characteristics. I used a complete sample, i.e. I analysed all videos that were available on the three video channels on December 1st, 2011. As Anonymous is a relatively young movement, the amount of published videos was not overwhelmingly large in 2011 and it was therefore possible to use complete sampling.

This method resulted in a sample consisting of a total of 67 videos: 18 videos posted by anonopss, 42 videos posted by TheAnonMessage, and 7 videos posted by Commander X. The sample included all videos posted on the anonopss- and the AnonMessage-channels in the period of analysis. From Commander X's channel, 7 out of a total of 22 videos were selected. The majority of videos posted by Commander X were not Anonymous operation announcements but rather reposts of announcements included on the anonopss or AnonMessage-channel. These included interviews, documentaries, and a press conference. These videos were not included in the sample because they only provided secondary material that interpreted original Anonymous sources, whereas worldviews can best be analyzed based on primary material. The posting date of the oldest sampled video was December 14th, 2010, while the date of the newest one was November 24th, 2011.

¹² <http://vimeo.com/user6433195/videos>

¹³ <http://www.peoplesliberationfront.net>

Sampling videos from different sources that describe themselves as being part of Anonymous reflects section 2's theoretical assumption that Anonymous is a liquid social movement that blends individual and collective action as well as autonomy and networking. Activists and groups of activists act on the one hand are relatively independent, but on the other hand share basic values, symbols and enemies that are articulated in protest actions. This allows treating Anonymous as a collective actor in the conducted analysis.

I coded the videos with the help of two binary variables that determined for each video if liberal and socialist political viewpoints were expressed or not. A second person independently coded 6 of the videos, which is around 10% of the overall sample, and obtained the same coding results, which shows high inter-coder reliability. Given that Anonymous' political self-understanding is heterogeneous, I assumed that the two worldviews are not mutually exclusive but can be simultaneously present. Therefore I used a category that coded videos that contained both socialist and liberal elements. After the coding of all 67 videos, the share of videos with liberal viewpoints (cyberlibertarianism index), the share of videos with socialist viewpoints (cybersocialism index), the share of videos with both viewpoints (social cyberlibertarianism index) and the share of other viewpoints were calculated.

A typically expressed attitude that signified liberal viewpoints was the condemnation of the governments' limitation of freedom of speech and expression, freedom of information, and freedom of the press. A typically expressed viewpoint that was interpreted as socialism was the condemnation of socio-economic inequality and the control of wealth and the economy by companies and banks. This means that the coding was conducted by observing the presence of different political values: freedom in the case of liberalism and equality and justice in the case of socialism.

Section 5 presents the quantitative results of the analysis and section 6 the qualitative ones.

5. Presentation of the quantitative results

Category	Total number	Percentage share
Videos expressing only liberal viewpoints	37	55%
Videos expressing only socialist viewpoints	5	8%
Videos expressing both worldviews	15	22%
Videos expressing other or none of the two viewpoints	10	15%
Total number of postings	67	100%

Videos expressing liberal viewpoints (only liberal or mixed)	52	78%
Videos expressing socialist viewpoints (only socialist or mixed)	20	30%

Table 2: Degree of socialism and liberalism in Anonymous' public video announcements. N=67

Table 2 presents the quantitative results of the study, namely to which extent the totality of all analyzed videos contained liberal and socialist values.

There were 10 announcements that involved clarifications about the originality of messages, messages to other crackers, announcements without expressed worldviews, or in one case an announcement that was neither relating to the liberal nor to the socialist worldview. The latter was the case in video #63 that focused on animal rights ("Animals are our friends and we do not eat our friends", #63), which is a green topic that can be appropriated by all worldviews and ideologies (from the far left to the far right).

The results show that liberalism was the dominant worldview in the analyzed videos. 55% of all videos presented liberal ideology while 8% presented socialist viewpoints. Of all videos, 22% contained both socialist and liberal worldviews. Of the videos, 78% contained liberal elements (including those videos that also expressed socialist views) while 30% contained socialist worldviews. These findings show the heterogeneity of Anonymous, the presence of different worldviews in the movement that to a certain extent co-exist in parallel and to a certain extent form part of one larger worldview. This circumstance points towards the existence of at least three political worldviews in Anonymous: cyberlibertarianism as the dominant position and social cyberlibertarianism as well as cybersocialism as minority positions. Qualitative analysis allows us to characterize how Anonymous expresses these three positions.

6. Qualitative results

This section presents the qualitative results of the analysis of Anonymous' worldviews. It is organized in such a way that it focuses on each of the political worldviews that were introduced in theory section 2 and discusses how Anonymous uses these worldviews. Section 6.1 focuses on libertarianism, 6.2 on social libertarianism, and 6.3 on socialism.

6.1. Anonymous' libertarianism

Cyberlibertarianism is based on the liberal political values of freedom of speech and expression, freedom of information, freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly. It conceives government institutions' attempts at limiting these rights as the main threat for society and either sees capitalist businesses and capitalist media as harbingers and carriers of freedom or does not comment on their role in society. Cyberlibertarian values can be found in the mission statement of

Anonnet that formulates as a main value and goal: "We believe in freedom of expression, and we want to help you make your voice heard"¹⁴. These rights were also explicitly formulated as core values or rights in some of the analyzed videos: "Freedom of Speech. Freedom of Press. Freedom of Expression. These are Our Rights" (#9). In this respect, governments are seen as the main actual or potential violators of freedom: "We stand for freedom, we stand for freedom of speech, the power of the people, the ability of them to protest against their government. [...] No censorship, especially online, but also in real life" (#17).

Cyberlibertarian Anonymous activists tend to think that freedom needs to be defended with attacks against those who restrict freedom. In one video, Abraham Lincoln is quoted in this respect: "Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves" (#1). Similar to the campaign against Scientology, in 2011 Anonymous' "Operation Brotherhood Takedown" attacked the Muslim Brotherhood, about which Anonymous says that it resembles Scientology in limiting by terrorist means the freedom of members to leave the organization (#48).

Cyberlibertarian values are also articulated in Anonymous' struggle against censorship of the Internet and the media by governments. Anonymous therefore says that it does "not forget that knowledge is free" (#5) and struggles for ascertaining "the free flow of information" (#22, #39). Government institutions are therefore attacked if Anonymous perceives them as violating the free flow of information or attempting to censor the Internet. So, for example, Anonymous opposes state censorship of the media by the right-wing Hungarian government:

Your law that restricts independent media is censorship, and with us censorship is to be dealt with harshly. [...] Independent media is the only thing standing in the way between people, and the corrupt lies of government. [...] We will not forgive your denial to free speech (#22).

Anonymous stresses that Obama and Clinton on the one hand spoke out against Internet censorship (#5), but that on the other hand the Protect IP Act and the Stop Online Piracy Act violate freedom of speech:

The United States Congress is trying to pass a bill that will make it a criminal offense to stream copyrighted material without authorization. [...] Uploading a video to YouTube or some other means of multimedia communication can land someone up to 5 years in prison based on the idea of copyright infringement. [...] This is not only a form of censorship; this is the very essence of denying the free flow of information (#39).

In 2011, the United States Government introduced two bills called the "PROTECT IP Act" and the "Stop Online Piracy Act":

¹⁴ <http://site.anonnet.org/>

These controversial laws effectively allow the US government to censor creative thought and Free Speech by making it a criminal offense for any one that "violates" existing copyrights, trademarks, or patents. [...] We will not allow the Government to decide what is 'economic creativity' and 'intellectual property'. If you take away Innovation, Free Speech, Freedom to Access Information, and our Right to Privacy, we are SLAVES to the Government. [...] To the United States government, you should've expected us (#58).

To the American Congress: If you pass this bill, you will pay for it (#56).

Anonymous' position clearly differs from the *Magna Carta of the Knowledge Age* that supported intellectual property rights. Anonymous, however, does not go beyond liberal values. Although it questions intellectual property rights, it defines this issue only as one of government control and addresses the US government and Congress as the main problem.

The analysed Anonymous videos share with right-wing cyberlibertarianism the focus on state control. Topics relating to the market, capitalism, and socio-economic (in)equality are bracketed and ignored. Although Anonymous thereby does not directly share the economic values of right-wing cyberlibertarianism, it ignores economic issues, overstates the role of the states, and thereby keeps the power of neoliberalism ideologically untouched. It finds a common ground with right-wing cyberlibertarianism in the strong focus of critiquing state power. It does not much take into account that intellectual property rights are mechanisms enforced by media corporations, that media companies and industry associations put pressure on governments to enforce intellectual property rights, and that these rights are not only problematic because they limit freedom of information, but also because they make culture a commodity and help media companies derive profit at the expense of the people. Questioning intellectual property rights is also a socialist concern; by reducing the problem to one of government control Anonymous overlooks the political economy of this issue and does not engage with questions relating to the corporate ownership of culture.

Anonymous actively supported the Arab Spring. Therefore, the question arises what the reasons were for this support. For some Anonymous activists, the main reason seems to be the circumstance that the regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and other countries violated the right of their people for free assembly, expression, and speech. Therefore e.g. one analyzed video stated that there were "Tunisian attempts at censorship", that the "Tunisian government" restricted "the freedoms of their own people", and "in doing so, [...] has made itself an enemy of Anonymous" (#6). "We do not forgive the denial of the right to freedom of expression. We do not forget the injustices caused by the removal of this right" (#6). In the course of the Egyptian revolution, Anonymous addressed Mubarak saying that "the use of secret police forces, the torture of innocent citizens and political activists, the repression of the freedoms of speech and assembly, and

the murder of the Egyptian people are all testament to your tyrannic disposition”¹⁵.

Although oppression of the opposition and of freedom of speech were important factors of the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes, there were also other aspects of domination, such as decreasing real wages, repression against trade unions and the political left, a widening gap between the rich and the poor, increasing poverty, mass lay-offs, and food crises as effects of the global economic crisis, increasing prices, or high illiteracy rates. Although Anonymous also mentioned in single instances the importance of “economic security”¹⁶ in the Arab spring, its main focus is on criticizing undemocratic political regimes, not also the class dimension and the political economy of the conflicts, the repression of workers’ protests, the strong wealth gap between the poor south/west/centre and the richer east and north of Tunisia (Ayeb 2011, Björklund 2011, Dixon 2011). The Arab spring was not just a demand for political rights, but also for “social and economic rights”, it was a struggle against “economic, social and political marginalisation” (Ayeb 2011: 478).

The Occupy movement is a new socialist movement struggling against capitalist power (Fuchs 2014a), as can be seen from its self-definition:

#ows is fighting back against the corrosive power of major banks and multinational corporations over the democratic process, and the role of Wall Street in creating an economic collapse that has caused the greatest recession in generations. The movement is inspired by popular uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, and aims to fight back against the richest 1% of people that are writing the rules of an unfair global economy that is foreclosing on our future¹⁷.

It has become a common theme in contemporary political theory that Occupy can be considered as a socialist or communist movement due to its struggle for the re-appropriation of the commons that have been privatized and commodified, but are produced by the global worker of all citizens: Žižek (2012) argues that new social movements had abolished “class-struggle essentialism” by stressing the “plurality of anti-racist, feminist and other struggles”, whereas the Occupy movement sees “capitalism” as “the name of the problem” (Žižek 2012: 77). The activists would be communists because “they care about the commons – the commons of nature, of knowledge – which are threatened by the system” (Žižek 2012: 83). The Occupy movement would be discontent with “capitalism as a system” and with the reduction of democracy to representation (Žižek 2012: 87).

Alain Badiou (2012) argues that the Occupy movement and other contemporary movements (such as the revolutionary Arab spring movements in Egypt and

¹⁵ <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BvgVtcR861k> (accessed on December 3, 2011).

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ <http://occupywallst.org/about/> (accessed on December 3, 2011).

Spain) are communist movements because they call for the realisation of the common interests of all people (the Communist Idea) and transcends class structures in its internal organisation – it constitutes a “movement communism” and stands for the “creation in common of the collective destiny” (Badiou 2012: 111). Jodi Dean (2012) makes an argument similar to the one by Žižek and Badiou, stressing that Occupy as a communist movement asserts the commons and represents the 99%. Occupy is neither an online movement created by individualised online connective action (Bennett and Segerberg 2013) or online networks of outrage and hope (Castells 2012) nor a pure street movement organized on squares, but rather a movement that is based on a dialectic of the occupation of squares and mediated communication (as argued in Fuchs 2014a; for my criticism of techno-deterministic accounts of contemporary revolutions and revolts à la Castells, see: Fuchs 2012; Fuchs 2014b: chapters 8+4).

Why has Anonymous supported this movement? One explanation is that parts of Anonymous supported the movement because police violence threatened the rights of free expression, speech, and assembly of the protestors. This interpretation is supported by a number of the analysed videos. “Occupy protesters peacefully marched, sang, danced, and drummed their way into the soul of their respective cities, but have often been met with hostility and aggression from law enforcement” (#18). “Occupations have been assaulted with armed forces and chemical weapons” (#41). “Let the people protest without shame and threat. Let the people protest with expression and freedom” (#29).

As a result of police brutality, Anonymous started Operation Paparazzi in order to watch the police: “Those we pay to protect and serve us should have nothing to hide from the public while they are on duty”. [...] #OpPaparazzi is a movement in which all film our law enforcement at all times for all reasons” (#24). Anonymous declared a struggle against the Oakland police after one of the Occupy Oakland protestors, Scott Olson, was severely injured by a police bullet that hit his face (#50). It published a video with personal data (address, phone numbers, etc) of Anthony Baloney, a NYPD police officer, who, as Anonymous says, “was responsible for macing peaceful protesters in New York”¹⁸. The Anonymous video was banned on YouTube for “promoting hate speech”¹⁹. Anonymous also published a video with personal data about police officer John Pike, who, as a YouTube video shows, attacked students occupying the UC Davis campus with pepper spray²⁰. Anonymous’ idea is that it wants to act as a watchdog and exert counter-power against police brutality by threatening officers “found to be guilty of these crimes against peaceful protestors” to “their personal information [...] to the public”²¹.

¹⁸ <http://theanonmessage.blogspot.com/2011/09/youtube-bans.html> (accessed on December 3, 2011).

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ <http://vimeo.com/32465309> (accessed on December 3, 2011).

²¹ Ibid.

Figure 1, which shows a screen shot from one of the analysed videos, stresses Anonymous' self-understanding as watchdog that exerts surveillance against those in power. Although these means might seem quite radical, they are an enforcement of the cyberlibertarian value of freedom of assembly, which seems to be the main reason for the support given to the Occupy movement by many Anonymous activists. Some of the analysed Occupy videos released by Anonymous focus on the issue of freedom of assembly, do not express solidarity with the socialist goals of the Occupy movement and thereby remain silent on class issues (#24, #29, #41, #49, #50, #53, #54).



Figure 1: Anonymous as watchdog of the powerful.
Source: screenshot from video #8

The focus on the libertarian values of freedom of speech, expression, assembly, information, and press dominates Anonymous' political communication. Anonymous differs from neoliberal cyberlibertarians like *Wired* magazine or the Progress and Freedom Foundations by not explicitly welcoming corporate control of the media and society, but expressing a strong focus on government censorship and governments' violations of freedom. Anonymous' version of cyberlibertarianism does not embrace corporate power; this type of power's criticism is, however, also not a fundamental topic. Issues relating to socio-economic inequality, social and economic rights, and the limitation of freedom by corporate control of the media are either not mentioned or remain a side note.

6.2. Anonymous' social libertarianism

The second worldview present in Anonymous' videos is a combination of liberal and socialist thought – social cyberlibertarianism. It shares the focus on freedom of information, assembly, and speech with Anonymous' dominant ideology, but other than the dominant ideology stresses that not only governments but also corporations limit these freedoms. Social and economic rights and the values of socio-economic justice and equality are neither foregrounded nor ignored, but rather subsumed under the value of freedom.

Social cyberlibertarianism is for example expressed in an Anonymous video that stresses that "people are the owners of the Internet, not governments, not corporations" (#2). The core value here is a free Internet, but freedom is seen as being both threatened by government and corporate control, which speaks in favour of the demand of an alternative Internet controlled by civil society.

Anonymous' motivations for the support of the Arab Spring are not purely liberal, for some activists rather a combination of liberal and socialist motives is important. A video about the Egyptian revolution stresses e.g. about the protestors: "The courage you demonstrate in you struggle for Freedom, Peace and Justice is a lesson to us all" (#11). In a video about Algeria, not just lack of freedom of speech is stressed, but freedom is rather one topic besides poverty, corruption, and oppression (#10).

In relation to the Occupy movement, for example, one video equally stresses political and economic domination by criticizing the "abuse and corruption of corporations, banks, and governments" (#15). Another video says: "The time has come to say: Enough! The abuse and corruption of corporations, banks, and governments can no longer be tolerated" (#27). It reduces these topics to the value of freedom: "What is our one demand? We want our freedom" (#27). One video stresses economic rights by saying that "the population is being taken advantage of for the sake of profits", but at the same time focuses strongly on government laws and bailouts:

We witness the government enforcing the laws that punish the 99%, while allowing the 1% to escape justice unharmed for their crimes against the people. [...] This government who was willingly ignored the greed at Wall Street has even bailed out the perpetrators that have caused our crisis (#30).

In a message to those not participating in the Occupy movement, Anonymous shows concern for both political and socio-economic rights: "The Empire faces a crisis: a global recession, growing poverty, rampant violence, corruption in politics, and threats to personal freedom" (#35). It stresses the need for "a new age of tolerance and understanding, empathy and respect, an age of unfettered technological development, an age of sharing ideas and co-operation, an age of artistic and personal expression" (#35). At the same time it is foregrounded that "we are fighting for free speech" (#35). Some videos (#15, #16, #27, #30, #35, #67) show that for some Anonymous activists not only the concern for freedom

of assembly and speech of assembly, but also concerns about socio-economic inequality are motivations for supporting the Occupy protests.

Figure 2 visualizes Anonymous' social libertarianism with a screen shot that indicates criticism of the wealth of the rich class ("the top 1%"), but at the same time reduces the class topic of wealth gaps to a government regulation issue ("Why do you not pay taxes?", which implies the assumption that the state can solve the problem).



Figure 2: Anonymous and social libertarianism.
Data source: screen shot from #16

After activists had been imprisoned in Orlando for giving food to homeless people in Lake Eola Park, Anonymous started Operation Orlando. On the one hand, Anonymous shows concerns about the socio-economic issue of poverty by stressing that it stands "with the hungry people"; on the other hand the Orlando case is also considered as an issue of freedom because, as Anonymous reminds the police, "the public space being used to peacefully offer them food is a human right you must not interfere with" (#60).

Social libertarianism is not a dominant political view within Anonymous' public communication but is nonetheless one that is clearly visible. It adds issues relating to socio-economic injustice and inequality, class, poverty, and corporate power to the cyberlibertarian agenda and combines these values with a concern about government intervention that limits freedom. Freedom and socio-economic rights are either viewed as parallel demands or socio-economic issues are presented as an aspect of freedom.

6.3. Anonymous' socialism

The presence of socialist-libertarian messages partly blends into strongly socialist messages. One analyzed video has simultaneously a strong focus on individual liberties and socialism. It on the one hand criticizes the "attack on civil liberties" and defines liberty as "a concept of political philosophy [...] [that] identifies the condition in which an individual has the right to act according to his or her own will". It on the other hand speaks of the existence of an "economic dictatorship" and says that "technological progress has been used [...] to make a tiny minority extremely wealthy" and that "banks should not have the power to create the medium of exchange" (#67).

The third worldview that can be found in Anonymous' videos is cybersocialism. It stresses the critique of class inequality between the rich and the poor, owners and non-owners, capitalists and workers and makes demands for a non-corporate world and a non-corporate Internet that are based on participatory democracy and socio-economic justice and equality. It is not opposed to the value of political freedom, but stresses that companies and the corporate media in capitalist society due to their control of resources always limit the freedom of speech, expression, press, and information and that capitalist states' policies are strongly influenced by corporate interests. Freedom is connected to the topic of socio-economic justice, and a free society is presented as a society that is free from exploitation and capital and based on the free development of all according to their abilities and the free access to all collective resources, which would require the end of private property of the means of production. Freedom of speech, assembly, information, and the press would only be possible in a non-capitalist participatory democracy.

A pure socialist worldview could only be found in a smaller portion of the analysed videos. It is, however, interesting to observe that almost all of these videos were related to the Occupy movement (#31, #34, #36, #40), which is in itself a socialist movement. Although there were also liberal motivations of Anonymous activists in deciding to support the Occupy movement, it looks like the emergence of this movement in September 2011 has changed Anonymous and has created more internal importance of socialist values.

In Anonymous' socialist videos, a clear articulation of the assessment of class inequality as unjust and non-reducible to government power is visible.

For too long the crimes of Wall Street bankers, CEOs, and a corrupt political system have created economic injustice that has gone unchallenged. [...] We are thrown out of our homes, we are denied medical care, we suffer from poverty and pollution. We work long hours just to stay afloat while the 1% reap the benefits we dream of. Our sworn enemy is the corrupted corporation (#31).

Anonymous in these videos stresses the importance of the working class: "The lifeblood of the country is *the working class* and without it our people and our economy will crumble" (#31). It furthermore does not focus on reforming governments, but rather calls for an abolishment of capitalism. One video's title

is therefore called "Global Revolution Day" (#34). It argues that the big Occupy protests on October 15th, 2011, should focus on demanding "a true democracy", should "stand up against corporatism, wars and militarism", "stand up for human rights, worker rights and jobs", and "demand an end to private for profit prisons, fight for affordable healthcare, education, and housing for everyone" (#34). The primary value articulated in these videos is not freedom, but rather equality, fairness, peace, and socio-economic justice in the realms of the economy, the workplace, wealth, welfare, healthcare, and education. The Occupy movement is envisioned as being able to "together [...] make a global revolution" (#34). Anonymous also calls for removing "funds from the major banking institutions to non-profit credit unions" (#36). Figure 3 visualizes socialist worldviews found in Anonymous videos.




Figure 3: *Socialist Anonymous.*
Data source: screen shot from #34

Socialist criticism of socio-economic inequality, exploitation, neoliberalism, and other forms of inequality that are not voiced as being subsumed to liberal demands and the call for the creation of a just and equal participatory democracy that overcomes putting profit over people constitute a minority

position in Anonymous' public communication. The emergence of a new socialist movement, the Occupy movement, seems to have transformed Anonymous to a certain extent so that socialist worldviews have become more present and also blend with liberal demands.

7. Conclusion

The empirical analysis of this paper was based on 67 videos that represent Anonymous' public communication. An analysis of the political discourses found in these videos was conducted. The results confirm the assumption that Anonymous is, due to its open, decentralized, dynamic character, politically heterogeneous and open for change.

Of the analysed videos, 55% expressed pure liberal viewpoints, 8% pure socialist views, 22% blended liberalism and socialism. Cyberlibertarian positions are dominant, but Anonymous' version of this ideology is different from classical right-wing cyberlibertarianism as represented by *Wired*, *the Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age*, or the *Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace*, but shares its focus on the critique of state power, which has ideological implications. Anonymous shares classical right-wing cyberlibertarianism's distrust of governments and its criticism of media and Internet censorship by states, but not its advocacy of intellectual property rights. Anonymous' libertarian faction favours free access to knowledge and culture, does not advance a profound criticism of commodification and inequality, and sees intellectual property not as an ownership conflict related to the capitalist economy, but as a pure governance issue. Anonymous' weak form of cyberlibertarianism opens up actual and potential connections to socialist views, struggles, and demands. Anonymous' worldviews are shaped by the partly conflicting, partly co-existing, and partly complementary existence of cyberlibertarianism, social cyberlibertarianism, and Internet socialism.

Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) argue that the liberal Enlightenment ideology turns into its own opposite that it initially questioned so that "irresistible progress is irresistible regression" (p. 28). "Once harnessed to the dominant mode of production, enlightenment, which strives to undermine any order which has become repressive, nullifies itself" (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 73f). Although "freedom in society is inseparable from enlightenment thinking", the negative dialectic of freedom in capitalism is that the very concepts of enlightenment thinking, such as freedom, "already contain[s] the germ of the regression which is taking place everywhere today" (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: xvi). The freedoms proclaimed by liberal Enlightenment ideology find their actual violation in the practice of capitalism: The ideal of freedom turns into an opposite reality – unfreedom.

Anonymous describes itself as "the 21st century enlightenment" (#35). It is part of the dialectic of the enlightenment of 21st century informational capitalism. It demonstrates and discloses the contradictions of freedom and liberal ideology by demanding the very rights and values that capitalism, its constitutions and

politicians proclaim and that in economic and political reality turn into their opposites. Anonymous shows the difference of proclaimed essence and actual existence of liberalism. If Anonymous, for example, argues in favour of the freedom of assembly and expression of the Occupy movement and criticizes police violence against activists, then it, on the one hand, stays within the categories of liberal thought. At the same time it shows how within the United States, the country in the world that most stresses the liberal value of freedom, freedom is actually limited by state action, which drives liberal values ad absurdum and shows their actual contradictory existence. Anonymous thereby conducts a practical immanent political critique of liberalism. It, however, frequently misses taking this form of critique to the next step and advancing from immanent critique towards a transcendental critique that sees the limits of the realization of liberal values within capitalism and calls for the establishment of an alternative to capitalism, in which individual and collective values can exist through each other. In the case of the Occupy movement, Anonymous has managed to a certain degree formulate transcendent values by taking up issues of socio-economic inequality, class, and capitalism.

One can understand Anonymous not only as immanent critique of liberalism but also as parody and absurd theatre of liberalism. Humour is to a certain degree used as a political weapon. Anonymous makes fun of its political opponents and uses clownery (in the form of Guy Fawkes armies) as symbolic strategy to attain the media's and public's attention. There is also a connection of Anonymous to Brecht's (1967a, b) absurd theatre: by proclaiming liberal values and criticizing how they become violated in capitalist reality, Anonymous shows the contradictory dialectic of liberalism.

The freedoms that capitalism negates can only be realized in a society of equal owners and participants, a participatory democracy. Anonymous is a theatre of liberalism, and in its own political demands complexly articulates the conflict between liberalism and socialism that is expressed in the presence of the three political positions analysed in this paper. Liberal enlightenment ideals negate themselves in turn in capitalism and turn into their opposite. Only negating the negative dialectic of the enlightenment by establishing a new society can overcome the consequences of the negative dialectic.

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About the author

Christian Fuchs is Professor of Social Media at the University of Westminster's Communication and Media Research Institute (CAMRI) and the Centre for Social Media Research. He is author of more than 200 academic publications, including the monographs *OccupyMedia! The Occupy Movement and Social Media in Crisis Capitalism* (ZeroBooks 2014), *Social Media: A Critical Introduction* (Sage 2014), *Digital Labour and Karl Marx* (Routledge 2014), *Foundations of Critical Media and Information Studies* (Routledge 2011) and *Internet and Society: Social Theory in the Information Age* (Routledge 2008). Website: <http://fuchs.uti.at> E-mail [christian.fuchs AT uti.at](mailto:christian.fuchs@uti.at) Twitter @fuchschristian

Waging a war of position on neoliberal terrain: critical reflections on the counter-recruitment movement

Emily Brissette

Abstract

This paper explores the relationship between neoliberalism and the contemporary movement against military recruitment. It focuses on the way that the counter-recruitment movement is constrained by, reproduces, and in some instances challenges the reigning neoliberal common sense. Engaging with the work of Antonio Gramsci on ideological struggle (what he calls a war of position), the paper critically examines three aspects of counter-recruitment discourse for whether or how well they contribute to a war of position against militarism and neoliberalism. While in many instances counter-recruitment discourse is found to be imbricated with neoliberal assumptions, the paper argues that counter-recruitment work around the poverty draft offers a significant challenge, especially if it can be linked to broader struggles of social transformation.

For more than thirty years, a number of peace organizations have waged a (mostly) quiet battle against the presence of military recruiters in American public schools. The war in Iraq brought these efforts to greater public awareness and swelled the ranks of counter-recruitment activists, as many came to see counter-recruitment as a way not only to contest but also to interfere directly with the execution of the war—by disrupting the flow of bodies into the military. While some of this disruption took physical form, as in civil disobedience or guerrilla theater to force the (temporary) closure of recruiting offices, much more of it has been discursive, attempting to counter the narratives the military uses to recruit young people. Indeed, counter-recruitment activists seek to go beyond short-term opposition to this or that particular war and to address the way that war becomes normalized through a culture of militarism, the way that people are acculturated to accept war as a reasonable or inevitable solution to conflicts. In this way, they seek to make future wars less likely. By locating the root causes of war in militarism, a set of beliefs and values legitimating war, the counter-recruitment movement (tacitly) suggests that the struggle against war is largely a cultural one, in which the goal is to alter the common sense around war and militarism in the United States. The counter-recruitment movement is thus engaged in waging what Antonio Gramsci calls a war of position. Focusing their efforts particularly on the public schools, counter-recruitment activists seek to disrupt the socialization of youth into the culture of militarism and thereby erode consent for war.

In this paper I critically examine the movement's attempts to wage a war of position on terrain defined not simply by militarism but by neoliberalism, and their mutual articulation, as well. The contemporary counter-recruitment movement is framed largely as a struggle to preserve individual choice in the face of an intrusive and coercive force. In this it echoes a core neoliberal precept. I thus want to ask: how has the counter-recruitment movement been shaped by, and in what ways does it reproduce, the individualism, privatization, and fetishization of choice that inhere in, or define, the neoliberal project? and what are the implications of this for the movement's struggle against militarism? I explore these questions by focusing on three sites of critique within the counter-recruitment movement: efforts to counter recruiters' "lies," to protect student and family privacy, and to contest what activists call the poverty draft. In each of these efforts the presence of neoliberal sensibilities can be felt, and I will argue, the attack on militarism is constrained as a result. In the discourse around the poverty draft, however, we will find a challenge to neoliberal common sense, and elements with which a movement could forge a weapon to wage a successful war of position against militarism and neoliberalism.

(Re)articulation and the war of position

Gramsci (1971) uses the metaphor of a war of position to underscore the importance of cultural struggle within civil society. Whereas a war of maneuver seeks to mount a direct assault on the state, a war of position decenters the state as a target of struggle, and focuses instead/also on the institutions within civil society (like schools) in which socialization occurs and consent is secured. A war of position is a struggle to change the way people conceive and act in the world; it is a struggle to change the common sense. Gramsci defines common sense as the largely uncritical and unelaborated conception of the world that is common in a particular era. Despite its historical specificity, the common sense of a given moment is nevertheless an amalgamation of disparate elements, including traces from the past which have become sedimented and bits of philosophy, science, or economic theory that have become popularized (326n8). The metaphor of sedimentation here is evocative: ideas sink down, settle, and become incorporated into the unconscious ways we apprehend the world, becoming part of our sensibilities and intuitions (see Jasper 1997, 154-9). The way we evaluate masculinity and heroism, for example, continues to be inflected by the Homeric model of the warrior-hero (Hartsock 1989), even as other elements have become overlaid and exert influence as well. Even as common sense remains uncritical, it, like all thought, serves as a guide for action, influencing "moral conduct and direction of will" (Gramsci 1971, 333).

Gramsci maintained a strong faith in the possibility that common sense could be developed into "good sense," through "renovating and making 'critical'" elements already present, but as yet unelaborated, within the thought of the day (331). This is not a matter of replacing one ideology or set of ideas with another,

nor less about imposing a new way of thinking. It does not create a new set of meanings or a new way of conception of the world out of nothing. Rather, it fashions a new critical conception out of the given elements, out of ideas, beliefs, and values already held amongst the people, only reconfiguring them, articulating them in a different way, emphasizing some over others, creating a new constellation and thus a new set of meanings. This is a process of (re)articulation. The elements in a given way of thinking are disaggregated and re-weighted so that what "was previously secondary and subordinate, or even incidental, is now taken to be primary—becomes the nucleus of a new ideological and theoretical complex" (195). However much a particular configuration of ideas may have seeped into our unconscious ways of apprehending the world, infusing our common sense, it is and remains contestable. A new equilibrium is only momentarily achieved; it is fragile and contingent, and can be superseded through continued struggle.

Social movements are a central site in which this process can occur. In nurturing a certain oppositional knowledge (Woehrle et. al. 2008), in appropriating and delegitimizing dominant discourses (Steinberg 1999; 1998), or even in making certain frames resonant with existing values and understandings (see, e.g., Snow et. al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988), social movements often develop and disseminate a critical conception of the world. Whatever other changes they might seek, social movements are engaged in a struggle over meaning, over whose ways of sense-making will become widespread, accepted, dominant. For the counter-recruitment movement, this struggle is primarily against militarism.

Counter-recruitment as a challenge to militarism

The contemporary counter-recruitment movement has its roots in the peace and anti-draft movements of the mid-twentieth century. Organizations like the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) and the Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors (CCCO), which had provided counseling to GIs and draft registrants during the Vietnam War, persisted in these efforts even after the war and the draft ended in 1973. The threat of conscription was only momentarily suspended, however; in 1980 President Carter reinstated the requirement that all young men register with the Selective Service System upon turning 18, in case a draft should prove necessary. This spurred a new wave of anti-draft activism, linking draft resisters and peace activists from the Vietnam War era with the next generation of youth (e.g., Harris 1982). New organizations formed in this period, most notably the Committee Opposed to Militarism and the Draft (COMD) and the Project on Youth and Non-Military Opportunities (Project YANO), that together with the AFSC and CCCO, would help to define the counter-recruitment movement that emerged during the Iraq War.

Over the past few decades, countering military recruitment has meant countering the image of military life that recruiters propagate, countering their

promises of education, job training, and the relative safety of service with statistics and first-hand accounts to the contrary. But countering recruitment has also meant countering, in a deeper way, the “militaristic values” that underpin war. Counter-recruitment activists suggest that war is a result of the way Americans have been taught to think and the values they have come to assume. War is thus seen to result from a culture of militarism, which, as the COMD defines it, is “a value system that stresses the superiority of some people over others,” “derides cooperation, equality and nonviolence, and instead enforces strict hierarchical relationships.”¹ Although militarism, as a set of beliefs valorizing war, finds expression in a range of institutions and cultural artifacts, from film and music to sporting events and beyond (Lutz 2002; Gonzalez 2010; Sirota 2011), counter-recruitment activists have sought to challenge the spread of militarism by struggling over a key socializing institution: the public schools. Schools are one of the primary sites in civil society in which consent is secured, through the inculcation of a set of norms and values, and thus are an important site of struggle in a war of position. Indeed, counter-recruitment activists maintain that the military has made schools a decisive site of struggle through its encroachment into this space of youth socialization.

Since the shift to the all-volunteer force, the military has directed more resources to reaching students at school, and at increasingly younger ages. Army recruiters, for example, are expected—in the words of their own manual—to “effectively penetrate the school market. The goal is school ownership that can only lead to a greater number of Army enlistments.”² Military recruiters are instructed to find ways to make themselves indispensable to schools, by serving as coaches or chaperones for example; in many schools, they find a place in understaffed guidance offices. Rick Jahnkow (2006), a founding member of Project YANO, thus argues that the “ideal of democratic, civilian control is literally under assault as our schools are increasingly invaded by programs that teach military values, instead of critical thinking, to future generations of voters and government leaders.” He continues:

Teaching military values in civilian schools is not just grooming a few children to become future soldiers. It is...affecting the general public's increased acceptance of war as a valid response to the perception of attack. It is numbing the minds of civilians so that they do not ask even the most obvious questions when the government says we must invade another country.

By restricting recruiter access to school campuses and to students, and through counseling, classroom presentations and posing alternative notions of honor

¹ <http://www.comdsd.org/militarism.htm>, accessed 14 June 2010.

² United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) Pamphlet 350-13, quoted in Allison and Solnit (2007: 7).

and service, the counter-recruitment movement hopes to “defeat the militarism that is a threat to democracy” and to “defuse the most powerful military machine in the history of the world by depriving it of its most vital asset”: youth.³

Mapping the neoliberal terrain

If the counter-recruitment movement is concerned primarily with defeating militarism, it struggles today on terrain defined as much by neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is most widely understood as an economic project of liberating the market from state interference, in which free markets, individual entrepreneurialism, and private property are held to be the key to social order and well-being (Harvey 2005; Foucault 2008). In practice it has been marked by state retrenchment, divestment in social provision and infrastructure, and deregulation of various industries, from finance to telecommunications to energy. This has not, however, meant a decline in overall state capacity; instead, the neoliberal era has been marked by a *shift* in state capacity, with the penal, warfare, and security apparatuses assuming greater prominence. We can see this with the prison boom and the militarization of the police (Parenti 1999; Wacquant 2009; Williams 2011), in the intensification of new technologies of warfare, or in an expanded surveillance apparatus which is increasingly and densely networked (Priest and Arkin 2010). If the prerogative dimension of state power, particularly in the US, has thus expanded and intensified dramatically under neoliberalism, it has also been transformed in important ways. We see this clearly in the way that the logic of military manpower procurement has changed since 1973.

Despite a great deal of worried speculation about a possible draft during the Iraq War, the Bush administration and top military personnel were committed to the all-volunteer force (AVF), as more efficient and effective than a conscript army would be. Writing in an op-ed to make this commitment clear, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (2004) praised the volunteers who comprise today's military and noted that “if it happened that we were to not have enough people to serve, all we would have to do is what any other organization would do — and that is increase the incentives and make military service a more attractive option for the best and brightest young people.” This was the same rationale that neoliberal economist Milton Friedman (1974) gave when he advocated the shift to an all-volunteer force in the late 1960s. Friedman suggested that military manpower procurement be based on market dynamics rather than state compulsion. If wages and benefits were increased to make the military an appealing economic choice for some, Friedman reasoned, the military would then be “manned by people who had chosen a military career rather than at

³ NNOMY, 2009, National Counter-Recruitment and Demilitarization Conference Packet Cover Letter, http://nnomy.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=224&, accessed June 13, 2011.

least partly by reluctant conscripts anxious only to serve out their term." Lower turnover rates would enable more "intensive training" and thus the emergence of a "smaller, but more highly skilled, technically competent, and better armed force" (254). This vision of a small, streamlined, highly specialized, and technologically savvy force was shared by Rumsfeld, a Congressman at the time.

If relying exclusively on volunteers would result in a more effective military through market dynamics, Friedman also advocated the shift on the grounds that it would preserve individual freedom. A volunteer army would eliminate the "arbitrary power" of the Selective Service to "decide how a young man shall spend several of the most important years of his life—let alone whether his life shall be risked in warfare" (ibid.) As General Hershey, director of the Selective Service System during the years of the Vietnam War, had himself indicated, the central purpose of the Selective Service was not to send some young men off to war, but to "channel" a whole generation of young men into pursuits deemed to be in the national interest, through a system of occupational and educational deferments.⁴ For observers like Friedman, then, conscription did not just threaten the freedom of those called for induction, but all young men, whose choices were constrained by the logic of draft classifications and their attending requirements.⁵ Indeed, Friedman argued that the volunteer army (and more to the point, the market principles on which it would be based) would have positive effects throughout society, unburdening institutions of young men who would prefer to pursue some other line of work and quelling the conflict that state manipulation of life courses engendered (255-6).

With the shift to the all-volunteer force, individual choice may have been enhanced, but the military was faced with the problem of how to secure the necessary recruits especially at a time (the early 1970s) when the Army's image was severely tarnished by years of an unpopular war, low troop morale, and rampant drug use, not to mention significant active-duty GI and veteran resistance (Cortright 2005; Moser 1996). The shift to the AVF thus also entailed a new era of military recruiting. The Army began to market itself using consumer research and advertising campaigns that tapped into youthful desires and cast military service in terms of individual opportunity—stressing educational opportunities, job training and advancement, equal pay for women, travel to Europe—rather than in terms of the obligations of citizenship (Bailey 2007; see also Allison and Solnit 2007). Both in the imagination of its most inspired proponents and in the way that the shift was effected in practice, the AVF can thus be understood as a reflection of an emergent neoliberal logic, wherein military service is made subject to market competition and individuals'

⁴ "Channeling Memo," 1965; reproduced in pamphlet form by the Resistance, ca. 1968. Social protest collection, BANC FILM 2757, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

⁵ In suggesting that the draft constrained choices, I do not mean to reify this critique (or common understanding) of conscription, but rather to underscore how the AVF fits the logic of neoliberalism. There were other critiques of the draft made from within the anti-Vietnam War movement that put greater emphasis on conscience and complicity (see Ferber and Lynd 1971).

maximizing calculations, and in which the logic of obligation, service, or sacrifice long associated with the citizen-soldier ideal is displaced.⁶

Counter-recruitment and the neoliberal common sense

It is important to stress that neoliberalism is more than a way of reconfiguring the relationship between state and economy; it is also a set of discourses and beliefs that have wide-ranging implications for how we apprehend the world and make sense of ourselves as subjects. Over the past forty years, neoliberalism has become "hegemonic as a mode of discourse" and thus "incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in, and understand the world" (Harvey 2005, 3). It has achieved this hegemony through a process of rearticulation, taking some of the central themes animating the mid-century critique of American society and articulating them with a celebration of enterprise and the free market. Themes of human dignity, freedom, and personal responsibility that had one meaning in the hands of the New Left (for example) were given an entirely new valence in the process (Harvey 2005, 5; Fraser 2009). Despite the many attacks launched against neoliberal institutions and policies, particularly over the past fifteen years or so, to the extent that neoliberalism has infused our common sense, it shapes how we reason, how we feel, and how we act. This poses challenges for any form of collective action, given neoliberalism's intense individualizing and privatizing pressures, and in the following three sections, I explore what this has meant for the counter-recruitment movement.

That is, I consider how counter-recruitment activists engage, entrench, or challenge neoliberal common sense, by examining three key forms of counter-recruitment work: efforts to expose the fact that "recruiters lie," to preserve privacy rights in the face of state encroachment, and to realize racial justice by challenging the poverty draft. In what ways are some of these approaches more fraught than others, more imbricated with neoliberal assumptions and modes of reasoning? Where might hope for an effective war of position lie, and what would it need to do? These are the questions that animate the following critical reflections on the contemporary counter-recruitment movement.

This discussion is based on a textual analysis of documents produced by the counter-recruitment movement. Treating the internet as an archive, I downloaded or otherwise saved copies of documents found primarily on organizational websites. To identify the organizations doing counter-recruitment work, I used newspaper and scholarly accounts (i.e., Tannock 2005) to compile an initial list and then constructed a snowball sample by following the recommended links on each organizational website. The organizations examined include: the National Network Opposing the Militarization of Youth (NNOMY), American Friends Service Committee

⁶ On the citizen-soldier ideal, see Moser (1996) and Snyder (1999).

(AFSC), the Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors (CCCO), Project YANO, Committee Opposed to Militarism and the Draft (COMD), Code Pink, and Leave My Child Alone!. While other organizations were included in the sample and in the analysis, I draw attention to these by name because they have all been influential in the movement in some way and together represent the range of the movement's different demographics and concerns. In addition to analyzing the documents and other content on these organizational websites, I have also examined published counter-recruitment manuals (Allison and Solnit, 2007; War Resisters League, 2006), as well as pieces in various progressive publications.

Telling the truth about recruiting

The single most recurrent theme in counter-recruitment discourse is that "recruiters lie." In seeking to delegitimize the military in the eyes of the public, and particularly among the youth who might be induced to enlist, counter-recruitment activists paint recruiters, and the military more generally, as dishonest, untrustworthy, and predatory. If military recruiters promise youth money for a college education, counter-recruitment activists point out that there are a number of conditions one must meet to qualify for the money—and few recruits do.⁷ If military recruiters promise that enlistees will receive job training that could open up a promising post-military career, counter-recruitment activists point out that few skills learned in the military are transferrable to civilian jobs, and that rates of unemployment and homelessness are high among veterans.⁸ In addition to countering specific claims recruiters make, counter-recruitment activists have sought to expose the military's marketing campaigns—manifest, for example, in television ads, video games, and Hollywood films—as attempts at "brainwashing," which threaten to "popularize soldiering and war" and erode democratic values and civilian control over the military (COMD 2003, Allison and Solnit 2007, 45-66).

This vein of counter-recruitment organizing thus takes the form of an exposé, revealing the hidden truth behind recruiters' slick claims and memorable slogans.⁹ Lynne Woehrle and her colleagues (2008) define efforts such as these as a particular form of oppositional knowledge which they call "counter-

⁷ According to the figures routinely cited by the counter-recruitment movement, only 35% of recruits receive any money for college and only 15% earn a college degree. See, e.g., Allison and Solnit 2007: 4, 98; NNOMY "Montgomery GI Bill," accessed May 19, 2010, copy in author's possession.

⁸ Project YANO. "The Military's Not Just a Job: What You Should Know Before Joining the Military." Available at: http://www.projectyano.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=22&Itemid=40, last accessed January 8, 2013. See also: Allison and Solnit (2007).

⁹ Since the start of the AVF, the Army's slogans have included "Today's Army Wants to Join You," "Be All You Can Be," and in the last decade, "An Army of One" and "Army Strong."

informative," the goal of which is to share information that usually goes unstated so that the conversation might be broadened. Indeed, counter-recruitment activists see this as critical work: if students only ever hear the military's sales pitch—its self-presentation as a conduit for upward mobility—then they cannot make an informed decision about their future. As Project YANO put it, "Our goal is to help young people see a different side to these issues so that they will have a more balanced picture and be able to make educated decisions about their future. We encourage them to think critically, search for more information, and then make up their own minds."¹⁰ What should be noted here, however, is the way in which these efforts operate securely on terrain defined by neoliberalism. Military service is both presented and contested in terms of individual opportunity. Recruiters suggest that the military represents opportunity for youth and counter-recruitment activists respond that the military exacts a heavy individual cost, threatening not only the lives of youth during the years of their service, but their future prospects as well. Individual opportunity, they suggest, can best be pursued by avoiding the military at all costs.

In arguing against recruiters in their own idiom, counter-recruitment activists are clearly engaged in an attempt to delegitimize the former on its own terms. As social movement scholars, we tend to celebrate the volitional moment of movement activity, to emphasize movements as sites of agency, and movement participants as willful and conscious political subjects. Seen in this light, counter-recruitment activists are doing all that they can, using whatever means available to them, to prevent any more youth from falling into the clutches of the military.¹¹ If they can leverage a clear disjuncture—between the promises of military recruiters and the reality of life for recruits and veterans—to this purpose effectively, they will have scored a victory. At the same time, however, we need to be more cognizant of how those efforts are shaped and constrained. Marc Steinberg (1993, 319) describes this dynamic, and the tension at its heart, in terms of a dialogue between dominant discourses and those who "back talk" in championing another set of meanings and values:

Actors who seek to overturn the dominant ideological formations must seize opportunities where they find them, inflecting new meaning in the discourses of the dominant, and subverting their givenness in doing so. ... In view of the ongoing nature of dialogue [however], subversion from within leaves open the possibility that expropriated signs may be reappropriated, and that those who seek change may be recaptured by the entanglement of dominant meanings.

¹⁰ Project YANO. "About the Project on Youth and Non-Military Opportunities." http://www.projectyano.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=26, June 13, 2010.

¹¹ The imagery used here is intentional: the military is presented as a predatory beast within some counter-recruitment posters and videos, and military recruiters have been likened to child predators. See, e.g., Hagopian and Barker 2011.

Thus, what looks like a smart, strategic attempt to exploit a political opportunity on the part of counter-recruitment activists may well/also be unconsciously inflected by, or entangled with, sedimented neoliberal assumptions, trapped within a neoliberal logic.

Indeed, like the AVF it contests, or the general neoliberal common sense with which it is in dialogic engagement, the counter-recruitment movement places great emphasis on choice. Tamara Nopper (2010), a sociologist and former volunteer with CCCO, in reflecting on how the style of military resistance has changed since the 1960s, notes that today "many counter-military recruiters treat young people like consumers who should make informed decisions based on whether the military is the best deal." As such, they "simply give the other side of the story and, like Nixon, allow people to choose rather than offering a clear and explicit critique against war and the military, which is partially what Nixon sought to quell with his repeal [of the draft]." The work of exposing recruiters' lies sets up this moment of choice, equipping youth with the information they need to make the best choice for their individual futures, but does little more. Indeed, it is entirely consistent with the logic of neoliberal rationality which "convenes a 'free' subject who rationally deliberates about alternative courses of action, makes choices, and bears responsibility for the consequences of these choices" (Brown 2005, 43).

The emphasis on providing the necessary information for youth to make informed choices about their futures, and thus take personal responsibility for what they do, reflects the influence of neoliberalism in another, more subtle way as well. In treating young people as consumers, counter-recruitment activists participate in reproducing market psychology, selling an alternative product to actors in the marketplace who seek to maximize their own individual self-interest. In selling their product—a different future, the importance of counter-recruitment work—counter-recruitment organizers have to be concerned with market share and appeal. They may not see themselves as entrepreneurs,¹² but their attention to framing nevertheless becomes an exercise in marketing. Many counter-recruitment activists are concerned with making their claims palatable and inoffensive, in order to appeal to a broad range of potential supporters. The counter-recruitment organizers interviewed by Harding and Kershner (2011, 101), for example, sought to frame their coalition's work in "non-threatening, inclusive language," and all agreed "that an anti-war or anti-military message [would] end up alienating the coalition from the community whose support it needs to survive." While Harding and Kershner conclude that this approach can be credited with some of the movement's successes, and should thus be

¹² In developing their theory of resource mobilization to explain the conditions giving rise to protest, McCarthy and Zald (1977) imported a number of concepts from economics. In the process they came to refer to movement leaders as entrepreneurs. While there may be good analytical reasons for exploring the strengths and limitations of this entrepreneurial metaphor, it is nevertheless problematic in the way it casts social movements as enterprises (with the attendant assumptions about interest-maximization and competition for market share) and eclipses questions of justice and morality that are at the heart of most movements.

emulated, I would argue that there is a clear disjuncture between activists' stated desire to confront militarism and a framing approach that eschews discussion of war. The next section explores this disjuncture in the context of the contemporary movement's most visible campaign.

Protecting family privacy

One of the central efforts of the contemporary counter-recruitment movement has been the Opt Out campaign, mobilizing high school students and their parents in an effort to safeguard their personal contact information. The Opt Out campaign was organized in response to a provision in the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act that mandated that all schools receiving federal aid provide military recruiters with the same access to students and their personal contact information as given to college admissions offices or prospective employers.¹³ The campaign was framed almost entirely in the language of privacy and parental rights, and neither the war in Iraq nor the pervasive influence of militarism were made a central focus of critical engagement or debate. For example, Leave My Child Alone!, a group which emerged to contest this provision in NCLB, framed the issue this way:

Did you know...that the notorious No Child Left Behind Act includes a sneaky section that requires high schools to turn over private information on students to military recruiters? ... Yikes. What do we do? Any way you look at it, this is a family privacy nightmare, another strong-arming of our local schools, and a creepy warm-up to a possible draft.¹⁴

The tenor of the Opt Out campaign—the outrage over the provision mandating the release of personal information as a violation of privacy—is somewhat at odds with the fact that the law does not make a hard and fast obligation out of information-sharing but preserves an element of personal choice. Students and parents have a choice, expressively codified in law, about whether their contact information is shared with military recruiters. At one and the same time, NCLB requires that schools release student information to recruiters and provides students and parents with the recourse, the legally codified right, to prevent schools from doing so. The section of NCLB that mandates release of information also specifically provides that “A secondary school student or the parent of the student may request that the student’s name, address, and telephone listing not be released without prior written parental consent” and

¹³ Not Your Soldier “No Child Left Behind,” accessed May 19, 2010, copy in author’s possession. See also Project YANO “Campaign to Challenge Militarism in Schools” http://www.projectyano.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=45&Itemid=78, last accessed January 8, 2013.

¹⁴ <http://www.leavemychildalone.org/index.html>, accessed September 20, 2010.

that schools "shall notify parents of the option to make a request and shall comply with any request."¹⁵ This was the opening in which the Opt Out campaign emerged.

The Opt Out campaign, like most counter-recruitment work, is waged largely at the local level. Groups work to educate students and their parents about their right to opt out, and in some schools, student groups have spearheaded efforts to get as many of their peers as possible to do so. Alongside these efforts, groups have lobbied school boards to revise their policies and streamline the process of opting out. In Oakland, California, for example, students and teachers were successful in convincing the school district to include an opt-out option directly on the emergency contact cards parents fill out at the start of each school year, as well as to offer students a form to opt out of a private recruiting and marketing database known as JAMRS.¹⁶

Older counter-recruitment organizations, which had focused their efforts on the presence of military recruiters in schools long before the passage of NCLB, understood the Opt Out campaign as one front among many. Their goal has been, not simply to secure family privacy, but to effectively demilitarize the schools, to turn schools into demilitarized zones.¹⁷ If the ultimate goal is to defeat militarism, the dominant strategy adopted by the counter-recruitment movement is to limit recruiter access to students, usually through effecting changes in school policies. While counter-recruitment activists have sought to restrict recruiter access to students through campaigns targeting JROTC programs and the presence of high-tech recruiting vans, obstacle courses, and rifle ranges on school campuses, the most common campaign, after Opt Out, has been one targeting the administration of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), a military jobs assessment test, in schools. The campaign against the ASVAB shares the same logic and framing as the Opt Out campaign, in part because the test is seen as a back-door way for recruiters to access student information, as student contact information is included with the test scores by default. In the materials that NNOMY distributes, for example, the issue with the ASVAB is presented as one of privacy and parental rights, not militarism. They object to the lack of choice and the lack of parental consent: "an important part of the equation...has to do with mandatory testing. 60,000 students in more than 1,000 high schools across the country were forced to take the ASVAB and had their information shipped to recruiters, many against their will and without parental knowledge." NNOMY then provides this advice to local activists who want school districts to change their policies around the administration of the test:

¹⁵ Not Your Soldier "No Child Left Behind," accessed May 19, 2010, copy in author's possession.

¹⁶ <http://www.baypeace.org/curriculum-organizing>, accessed January 16, 2013. JAMRS, which stands for Joint Advertising Market Research Studies, is a database that collects a wide range of information on recruitment-age youth.

¹⁷ In 2006, the War Resisters League published an organizing manual, the title of which encapsulates this approach: "DMZ: A Guide to Taking Your School Back from the Military."

You're simply arguing that the school should be abiding by federal laws that protect student privacy. ... *This is not about politics or imperialism or war. It's about privacy* and a constitutional clash between an overzealous federal agency and the rights of states and individuals. ... If you're truly committed to reversing the militarization of American youth, this is a great way to go. It's effective and it is quantifiable and we're winning battles across the country.¹⁸

For NNOMY, like the counter-recruitment movement more generally, the key issue to be addressed is militarism; their efforts are directed at demilitarizing the schools; and to wage a campaign against the ASVAB is seen as an "effective" and "quantifiable" way to address the militarization of youth. And yet, they counsel activists that the issue with the ASVAB is not "politics or imperialism or war," but privacy and parental rights. What might be a possible site for opening up a conversation about the role of the military in civil society, the national network of counter-recruitment activists counsels to keep as non-controversial as possible, at the expense of a moral and political debate about the central issue activists see themselves addressing: "the militarism that is a threat to democracy."

This might be an example of shrewd framing. If the movement is committed to "a long-term vision of incremental gains" (Harding and Kershner 2011, 102) and if persistence requires some evidence of efficacy, some "quantifiable" victories, then it may well be strategic to emphasize those talking points most likely to resonate with school officials. NNOMY wagers that privacy, and not a critique of war or militarism, will most likely achieve the desired result. As an immediate, practical matter, the approach has been effective: a number of schools or districts have agreed to make the test truly voluntary or to administer it on Saturdays. And the state of Maryland passed legislation that effectively requires students to *opt in* to having their test results shared with the military, as a matter of protecting student privacy (Castro 2010). One of the key organizers behind this effort was clear that a certain public image mattered in this campaign, saying "We never allowed anybody to suggest that we were anti-war people" (Harding and Kershner 2011, 94).

These policy victories are real and measurable, to be sure. They do serve to construct a wall, however much still much in progress, around schools that make it that much more difficult for recruiters to gain access to students. But a war of position is not simply about securing territory; instead, it is fundamentally about whose vision, whose conception of the world, will prevail. To argue in the name of privacy rights, and avoid any mention of war, secures little ground in a war of position against militarism. It alters little in the common sense.

Moreover these campaigns share a certain affinity with the logic of neoliberalism, and not simply in the anti-statism we see expressed in NNOMY's

¹⁸ NNOMY "ASVAB," emphasis added.

reference to an “overzealous federal agency” or in the more general fear that pervades these efforts. The affinity is also manifest in the very issues that counter-recruitment activists emphasize: choice and privacy. In suggesting that the No Child Left Behind Act represented a “creepy warm-up to a possible draft”¹⁹ and in using the language of “strong-arming,” Leave My Child Alone! suggests that the information-sharing provision in NCLB is an abrogation of individual freedom, a violation of choice, a moment of coercion. NNOMY suggests the same about the ASVAB in its description of students “forced” to take the test “against their will.” This argument finds supporters among libertarians and avowed neoliberals, because it resonates with core neoliberal precepts. It is a neoliberal framing, echoing what was once a central part of Friedman’s argument in favor of the AVF, the privileging of individual liberty over the obligations of citizenship. Here, in the context of these counter-recruitment campaigns, the choice is about whether to share contact information or not—and not much more.

In seeking resonance and broad appeal, this iteration of the counter-recruitment movement remains trapped within a neoliberal logic that elevates individual choice and privacy over the core moral issues that the war in Iraq raised. As Tannock (2005, 168, emphasis in original) put it, after two years of Iraqis facing devastation, torture, and death at the hands of the US military and subcontractors, “the US population, fed up with the actions of their nation’s political and military leaders, rises up and gets organized *to protect the privacy of their own children!*” While many counter-recruitment organizers may have been motivated by deeper moral considerations, by horror at what the US was doing in Iraq, and by questions of solidarity and conscience, these concerns were assiduously kept out of the public debate. This is in stark contrast with the approach taken, for example, by draft resisters in the Resistance²⁰ during the Vietnam War (Ferber and Lynd 1971) or Garrisonian abolitionists in the years before the Civil War (Olson 2007, 689) who made moral questions central to the debate, eschewed compromise on basic principles, and sought to “mobilize moderates by pressing them on their culpability,” forcing the latter to reflect on their own relation to the ongoing injustice of war or slavery and to choose a side.

¹⁹ It is not clear how the information-sharing provision within NCLB represents a step towards reinstating the draft, especially when we remember that all young men have been continuously required by law, since 1980, to register with the Selective Service upon turning 18 (<http://www.sss.gov/default.htm>). Creating a database of student information may enable recruiters to do their jobs more effectively, but were conscription to be reinstated, draftees would be culled from those registered with the Selective Service via a lottery system (<http://www.sss.gov/seq.htm>).

²⁰ The Resistance embraced a strategy of noncooperation, refusing to cooperate with the Selective Service by returning draft cards, relinquishing deferments, and refusing induction. They noted that the “American military system depends upon students, those opposed to war, and those with anti-Vietnam war politics wrangling for the respective deferments. Those opposed to war are dealt with quietly, individually and on the government’s terms.” (“We Refuse,” quoted in Ferber and Lynd 1971, 90). Rather than accept those terms, as the Opt Out campaign does, the Resistance embraced civil disobedience.

I would submit that this offers a more powerful model of a war of position against militarism than an approach that simply asks individuals to do what is best for themselves (opt out, don't enlist) but does not make them responsible for larger questions of social justice.

Confronting economic coercion

If the specter of coercion haunts the Opt Out campaign, despite the latter's execution of an expressly codified choice, it is more directly present in challenges to what counter-recruitment activists call the poverty draft. In the years immediately preceding the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, counter-recruitment activists were concerned with reaching the youth most targeted by the military: youth of color from poor and working class families. The Central Committee of Conscientious Objectors (CCCO), for example, made counter-recruitment a key part of its work. The organization had offices in Oakland and Philadelphia, and worked to reach out to the youth of color, in part by developing collaborations with political hip-hop artists and producing the magazines BLU and then AWOL that conveyed an anti-militarist message through interviews, poetry, art, and first person accounts of struggle both within the military and in other arenas of life. In San Diego, a town saturated with military institutions and personnel, the Committee Opposed to Militarism and the Draft (COMD) and Project YANO reached out to Latino youth in particular. They tried to tap into cultural notions of community, honor, and service and to show alternative ways those could be enacted outside of the military. They suggested alternative models of manhood as well, holding up Malcolm X, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Cesar Chavez as exemplars of strong men who spoke out against militarism.²¹

These organizations developed a critique of the poverty draft: they pointed out that divestment of schools and deindustrialization had left inner-city youth with few options and argued that this proved fertile ground for recruiters. As CCCO organizer Mario Hardy put it, recruiters could point to the problems of unemployment, drug abuse, high rates of incarceration, and violent crime in kids' neighborhoods and pose the following scenario: "you're either going to wind up dead or in jail, here's \$50,000, you sign right here and your future is as good as secure."²² There is very little choice involved in such a scenario; the decision to join the military is coerced, given economic circumstances and objective life chances. Hence, the notion of a poverty draft.

The poverty draft was the primary issue around which Not Your Soldier, a youth-led project affiliated with the War Resisters League, also organized. Not

²¹ Project YANO. "So You Want to Be a Man?" Available in English and Spanish at: http://www.projectyano.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=28&Itemid=53, last accessed January 8, 2013.

²² Network X. "Militarism in the Schools: Counter-Recruitment Conference," February 3, 2000. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=57Yra-RINK4>, last accessed January 8, 2013.

Your Soldier defined the poverty draft, where the “majority of military recruits come from below-median income neighborhoods,” as “the result of the unfair setup where opportunities are systematically eliminated in the communities that need them the most, while the military continues to get more and more funding.” The poverty draft does not work just through the systematic elimination of opportunities; it also relies on aggressive, predatory recruiting methods, and the lies that were discussed above:

Military recruiters are out in full force in the neighborhoods that are hurting the most, preying on the lack of opportunities. They want us to believe that the only option for us is to join up. They say we’ll be safer at war overseas than on our block. They’re promising college tuition, job training and adventure. ...

What recruiters don’t tell us is that 75% of blacks and 67% of Latinos report experiencing racial discrimination in the military. They skip over the fact that 1 out of 3 women in the military reported being raped. They never mention that the college money is hard to come by—only 16% of enlisted personnel who completed four years of military duty ever received money for schooling. They don’t say that the job skills they promise won’t transfer into the real world. Only 12% of male veterans and 6% of female veterans use skills learned in the military in their current jobs. And of course, they downplay the risk of being killed while on duty.

As is common across the movement, Not Your Soldier counters the lies and omissions of military recruiters here, but they also move beyond the moralistic condemnation that “recruiters lie” to a more systemic analysis:

We have decrepit schools, bad housing, limited job options and poor healthcare. Despite our serious needs, the government spends more money trying to convince us to join the military than on basic human needs like education.

The Pentagon dropped \$13,000 recruiting each person who enlisted. Compare that to the \$1,115 that is spent on education per student, and you’ve got a pretty clear picture of the government’s priorities.

Thus, in the discourse around the poverty draft, (some) counter-recruitment activists situate military recruitment in a context of structural inequalities and suggest that the issue is not one of misplaced priorities, but of a deliberate, systematic elimination of opportunities for some communities so as to ensure that the military continues to meet its manpower needs in the absence of a (*de jure*) draft.

By speaking of a poverty draft, they emphasize how neoliberal policies of divestment and state retrenchment funnel certain youth into the military, and they denaturalize the ostensible fairness and neutrality of the market. In doing so, they raise a challenge to neoliberalism and the structural inequalities it

exacerbates. At one point in time, Johnson's War on Poverty and Great Society visions readily acknowledged racial and class disparities, however imperfect and inadequate the efforts to address these problems might have been. Now, however, structural inequalities are rarely recognized as such. Sociological thinking has become harder to find in public debates, where individual initiative and personal responsibility are offered instead as answers to structural problems, in keeping with the logic of neoliberalism. In parallel, the neoliberal era has led to a narrowing rather than expansion of possibility, despite Martin Shaw's (1991, 184) expectation that the end of conscription would open horizons, enabling young men to imagine a future beyond an early death in war. Coinciding with the advent of the neoliberal era, the shift to the AVF has not meant that at all. If young men no longer need to contemplate an early death in war, many are nevertheless contemplating bleak job opportunities, long stints in prison, and/or an early death on the streets. For young working class women, and particularly women of color who are disproportionately represented (among women) in the military, the future looks little better. This is what counter-recruitment activists underscore when they invoke and critique the poverty draft.

The notion of a poverty draft offers a critique of the material moment of neoliberalism, the effects and logic of neoliberalism in practice, but does so partly within a discourse defined by neoliberalism itself. In mobilizing the language of a draft, activists thereby invoke its obverse: choice. If a poverty draft exists, and by definition contravenes choice, then it is an abrogation of individual liberty that must be decried. While other invocations of choice by the counter-recruitment movement reproduce (or at least do not challenge) neoliberal assumptions, I would suggest that the particular articulation of choice here can be thought of as a form of immanent critique, using neoliberalism's own sacred tenets against its applications and effects. The AVF, the neoliberal military, was premised on free market principles and offered as an alternative to the channeling that defined the Vietnam generation. And yet, counter-recruitment activists argue, individuals continue to be channeled by economic coercion and predatory recruiting—and so, choice, which is sacrosanct in neoliberalism, is not being preserved. At the same time, these activists push further, challenging the racial and class inequality on which the poverty draft is based.

Neoliberals are entirely comfortable with inequalities in outcomes, and American neoliberals, in particular, would be inclined to read racial and class inequalities as evidence of differential rates of (familial or individual) investment in human capital (see Foucault 2008). At the 2009 NNOMY conference, Nancy Cruz, a counter-recruitment organizer then in high school, offered a pointed and poignant challenge to this logic. Noting the differential access to information and resources across different educational tracks within her school, Cruz argued that students should teach one another, sharing their resources and what they know with one another. She was talking about the importance of this for counter-recruitment work (recounting how they had

managed to remove JROTC shooting ranges from San Diego schools), but also implied that it was a larger matter of racial and class justice. She continued:

You make things personal, because when you make things personal, it's like, 'oh they're challenging you.' So what I told people was that they think that you can't go to college. 'Oh, what, I can't go to college?' Like, right, you get that attitude, you get that fighting attitude out of people. 'They're putting this program into your school because you're not valued as people in other schools.' Right? So you start getting people to think more.

The notion of choice is invoked in Cruz's presentation—that students should have the choice as to which classes to take, or whether or not to go to college—but here it is explicitly linked to a critique of who and what is valued in society. Though Cruz does not reference the poverty draft by name, she is very clear that it exists: "We're in an economic crisis. This is the time where recruiters recruit the most. Why? Because we don't have options. I have talked to so many friends that have said that they're going into military because they can't find work, they can't afford school, and they don't have anything going for them."²³ The point of counter-recruitment work for Cruz is to create other options for youth, and while she suggests that this can be done in part by mobilizing familial networks and spreading knowledge through them, there is also an unmistakable sense that it will require, and be an exercise in, racial and class solidarity.

On its own, the critique of the poverty draft still falls short of really addressing militarism, as a set of beliefs valorizing war, but it is the most promising aspect of the counter-recruitment movement because it offers a systemic analysis and raises fundamental questions of justice. If the critique were developed out, and articulated with other struggles for racial justice and community self-determination, it could form part of a powerful challenge to the mutually reinforcing nexus of militarism and neoliberalism. CCCO made some of these linkages; we see these efforts expressed in its collaboration with hip-hop artists and in its newsletter *The Objector*.²⁴ But CCCO was largely defunct by 2009 (despite having existed continuously from 1948 onward); the Not Your Soldier project was short-lived; and there is no clear mention of the poverty draft in NNOMY's resource materials, despite the fact that as the national network of counter-recruitment groups, it was tasked with disseminating resource materials for the movement. The organizational backbone supporting these

²³ AFSCVideos. "2009 NNOMY Conference – Nancy Cruz"

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=14whj5KcACY&list=PL8DD41705E76C2CDF&index=4>, last accessed January 8, 2013.

²⁴ See, for example, the Summer 2003 edition entitled "Operation American Lockup" and which explored surveillance, immigration detention, and the policing of queer communities and communities of color.

challenges to the poverty draft, and by extension (or in the process) neoliberalism and structural inequality, has crumbled.

Nevertheless, these efforts could be revived.

Social movements remain one of the key actors in the contemporary world that can transform common sense into good sense. But to change how people conceive the world, what they value, and how they act, takes more than framing issues in a resonant way (e.g., appealing to individual opportunity) or achieving discrete policy changes. Each youth who chooses not to enlist and each school district that makes opting out easier does represent a victory that should not be minimized or dismissed. But we should not confuse these with the deeper changes in the very way that people apprehend the world that the war of position seeks to effect. The counter-recruitment movement is clear that it seeks to make war untenable—unthinkable—by eroding its cultural support. To truly root out militarism, however, will require that activists push beyond the inoffensive approach that we see widespread in much (though not all) counter-recruitment work and find the courage to have the hard conversations.

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About the author

Emily Brissette is a doctoral candidate in sociology at the University of California, Berkeley. Her research focuses on the broad political-cultural shifts that have occurred over the past half-century in the United States and the effects of these changes on contemporary social movements. An active participant in the Occupy movement, her writings on Occupy Oakland have appeared in *CounterPunch* and *Rethinking Marxism*. She can be contacted at erbrissette AT gmail.com.

Social movement or subculture? Alterglobalists in Central and Eastern Europe

Grzegorz Piotrowski

Abstract

Most of the research on the alterglobalist, also known as the global justice, movement has focused on Western Europe and North America, with occasional research on other parts of the world. There has been little research done on this movement in the postsocialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This paper attempts to fill this gap by exploring the key events of the movement as well as the genealogy of grassroots social activism in the region. It offers insight into a movement that developed in a region that, due to its history, has been rather hostile to leftist ideologies and groups. This paper examines the development of the alterglobalist movement in the region and traces its inspirations and path dependencies. It also poses questions about the nature of the movement and ways to analyse it – whether as a politicized social movement or a subculture and lifestyle choice. The close connections of Central and Eastern European grassroots social movements to subcultures and counterculture might suggest a new and fresh perspective for studying social movements.

Introduction

It seems that the best times of the alterglobalist¹ movement are over. At the peak of its popularity, it caught the attention of scholars, journalists and public opinion, and became a powerful mobilizing frame for many activists. Starting with the 'Battle for Seattle' that accompanied the ministerial round of negotiations of the World Trade Organization in November 1999, the alterglobalist movement has spread and received media attention all over the world. Central and Eastern Europe was not an exception, as street riots accompanied the International Monetary Fund and World Bank meeting in Prague in September 2000. However, when compared with its counterparts in the US or in Western Europe (which is what the activists usually compare themselves to), the movement in Central and Eastern Europe shows several characteristic features.

This paper aims at presenting the characteristic features of the alterglobalist movement in Central and Eastern Europe and suggests possible explanations for its distinctive features. The paper shows that historical legacies and the genealogy of social movements in the region - dating back to the mid-1980s –

¹ I will use the term alterglobalism because it is most commonly used by the activists in Central and Eastern Europe where terms such as Global Justice Movement for instance, have not caught on and the term anti-globalist was quickly abandoned at the beginning of the 21st century.

are the key factors shaping social movements as well as their reception today. Although it developed simultaneously with its counterparts in other parts of the world, the alterglobalist movement in Central and Eastern Europe is different. When compared to other regions, it has more in common with subcultures and counterculture than politics. In the CEE countries, social movements developed from youth subcultures and are still influenced by them. I will argue that this is strongly related to the genealogy of social movements in Central and Eastern Europe and the transition that these countries went through after 1989.

Most of the empirical data for this article were collected during fieldwork for my doctoral dissertation and other research projects that followed. The ethnographic fieldwork, based on in-depth interviews and participant observation, was conducted between 2007 and 2012 in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Around 40 key activists were interviewed (mostly in English and Polish; in one case in Hungary the interview was translated by a colleague of mine) and outcomes of the interviews were cross-referenced with publications coming from the movement as well as with observations during meetings and protest events. I relied on multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 1995) and on what Luis Fernandez (2008) calls ‘drive-by research’, in which the emphasis is on the meaning of the research for the researcher, the researched subjects, and other academics. In general, the aim is to understand the activists (in the Weberian sense of *Verstehen*) rather than simply describe them. I have spent several months in Prague and Budapest and frequented many activist events in Poland. I also closely followed the preparations to the Warsaw countersummit in 2004 and the Climate Change Conference in Poznań in 2008.

The vast majority of activists that I interviewed were in their late twenties or early thirties and already had a couple of years of activist experience: they took part in international protest events, went abroad in connection to their activism, edited journals, managed websites etc. People a few years older than them were already leaving the movement as they started families or got permanent jobs. Nearly all of the activists were students or had a university degree, mostly from social sciences or studies connected to environmental protection. Special attention was given to the practices of the activists on the organizational level. The activists that I interviewed defined themselves more through the ideologies and experiences they shared, rather than through membership in organizations. This may be because many of the coalitions were made ad hoc and for a particular protest event. Some of the activists were moving from one group to another, depending on which of the groups best met their ideological needs, and the majority of the groups did not have any kind of formal membership.

I interviewed people from the anti-radar campaign in the Czech Republic that belonged to several groups (such as the Humanist Movement and Socialistická Solidarita), people from Nesehnuti, squatters from Milada, antifascists, anarchists from the Czechoslovak Anarchist Federation (CSAF), people editing the A-Kontra magazine and women from the anarcho-feminist collective and anarchists that were not affiliated with any group but played important roles in preparations for the counter-summit in Prague in 2000 and the Global Street

Party in 1998. In Poland, I spoke to activists from the Anarchist Federation, Inicjatywa Pracownicza trade Union, Pracownicza Demokracja, the Young Socialists association, Active Society (Społeczeństwo Aktywne) and the Lepszy Świat association. In Hungary, I talked to people from the Zöld Fiatalok and Védegylet groups and to activists that were previously involved in the Centrum squatting group. I also interviewed people who avoided any group affiliation and later became involved in the LMP political party. The activists belonged to all kinds of groups: from loose structures (mostly the anarchists), through collectives, associations, foundations, NGOs to political parties. Coalitions were usually formed to deal with a specific campaign (such as the anti-radar / anti-missile shield campaigns) or protests (countersummits). Constant deliberation took place within coalitions, resulting in numerous splits and divisions and a very fluid composition of these coalitions.

I tried to find my respondents by consulting publications (mostly online), using my own contacts with Polish activists, and attending protest events and activist gatherings such as the European Social Forum (I went to Malmo and Istanbul). In the Czech Republic and Hungary, I also benefited from the help of two gatekeepers and relied on the snowballing technique, trying to maintain gender balance and sustain ideological diversity that would reflect the movements' composition.

The countries were chosen according to their similar paths of development after the regime change in 1989: peaceful transition to democracy, integration with NATO and the EU, and consequent building of parliamentary democracies. I am fully aware, however, that they are not homogeneous. Each of the countries has its characteristics when it comes to the 1989 transitions, the times that followed (such as emerging ethnic cleavages, different trajectories of electoral choices), and their socialist pasts. One of the turning points in Poland was the emergence of the Solidarność movement in 1980 and the introduction of martial law in 1981; Hungarian communists have promoted 'goulash communism'; and in Czechoslovakia after 1968, the times of 'normalization' resulted in rigid treatment of any sort of opposition. This results in different genealogies of social movements and a different composition of the alterglobalist movement in the region.

In this paper, I will try to characterize the alterglobalist movement and highlight the features that characterize it. I will present the history of the movement in Central and Eastern Europe by outlining the major protest events in the region that made the movement visible. Later I will highlight the features of the movement in Central and Eastern Europe and focus on transnational diffusion and local reception of the movement's ideas. In the next part of the paper, I will discuss the movement's connections to subcultures and counterculture and how these might affect our understanding and analysis of the alterglobalist wave of mobilizations. After this theoretical discussion I will try to show that some of the reasons for the shape of contemporary radical grassroots activism in CEE—including its genealogy and general hostility towards the left—lie in the past of the region. In the last section I will summarize and conclude my findings.

Alterglobalism in Central and Eastern Europe

In this section, I would like to address the emergence of the alterglobalist movement in Central and Eastern Europe by focusing on major protest events in which the alterglobalist coalitions were most visible. I will later point out the most characteristic features of the movement in this region and describe the role of diffusion of tactics and ideals in shaping the movement.

Jeffrey Juris and Geoffrey Pleyers wrote about the new class of social activists that they call alter-activists: “Despite their different backgrounds and political contexts, each of the young activists expressed a profound critique not only of neoliberal capitalism, but also of the hierarchical organising practices of the traditional left. A litany of common themes emerged: horizontal organisation, collaborative networking, grass-roots counterpower, alliance building, and creative direct action” (Juris and Pleyers 2009:3).

Activists in Central and Eastern Europe picked up many of these issues and debates in the mid-1990s. Because of the complicated history of the region and the general rejection of leftist groups and claims, these issues were taken up mostly by anarchist groups, who emphasised the aspects that were most attractive to them: horizontal modes of organization, anti-capitalism combined with anti-authoritarianism and hesitations towards mainstream politics. In this part of the paper, I will present the major protest events and campaigns of the movement and briefly sketch its characteristic features: low levels of (political) mobilization and a different composition when compared to other parts of the world.

Major protest events

Protest events are one of the few times when the alterglobalist movement, understood as a network of groups and individuals (della Porta and Diani 1999: 14-15), becomes visible to the public. Generally, the best way to describe a social movement is also through its most important protest events. In between the peaks of activities, in the so-called ‘submerged phase’ (Melucci 1989), movement actions are much less spectacular, much less oriented towards the public (and sometimes even exclusive). Even networking is much less intensive during that stage. Protest events are often the turning points for activists in terms of recruitment, mobilization and the choice of tactics.

The alterglobalist movement became known to publics throughout the world after the November 1999 riots (the ‘Battle for Seattle’), when thousands of protesters blocked the ministerial round of negotiations of the World Trade Organization on a Multilateral Agreement on Investments. However, another mobilization—the Global Street Party—had already taken place in 1998. With the biggest demonstration and riots taking place in London City (Notes From Nowhere 2003: 184-95) and catching the attention of mass media, many people missed a similar event that took place in Prague. The Global Street Party in Prague was the first anti-capitalist protest in the Czech Republic. It displayed

most of the characteristics of the future protests: horizontal organization, response to a global Call for Action, multiplicity of claims and groups participating in the event. In the organizing committee were groups supporting legalization of marijuana, anarchists, leftists, and antifascists. One of the organizers of this protest, with a long history of activism in anarchist-inspired groups and an organizer of many other events, told me:

I don't know if you saw the leaflets and the poster for the party... There were all sorts of issues and all sorts of problems there. There was marijuana [...], and there was tekkno², so there were many things. And it was exciting and we went there and the demonstration changed into this radical confrontation with the police, but it was a very exhausting day. It started in the afternoon in the square with the party and then we marched which was very exhausting. We marched for several kilometres and there were fights on the way.

The whole protest resembled a street carnival with dancing, music and a subversion of social order (such as taking over the streets), which are key characteristics of alterglobalist protests (Notes From Nowhere 2003: 94). The idea of street parties came from the Reclaim the Streets movement in the UK. Originally oriented against plans to build motorways, it later developed into a broader, capitalist-critical perspective (Notes From Nowhere 2003). The ideas came to the Czech Republic in two ways. One was that some of the activists went abroad (mostly to the UK), usually for university exchanges and scholarships (like the informant quoted), saw what was happening on British streets, and wanted to do the same in their home country. The other way coincides with the development of ICTs (Internet-based Communication Technologies). Some of the activists (including those who came back from abroad) wanted to be in touch with initiatives in other countries and signed up for mailing lists, listservs (now completely abandoned) and later social media.³ In that way they could be up-to-date with discussions and take inspiration from foreign examples about how to use new techniques and tactics. Mediated diffusion (Giugni 2002) seemed to be the most popular trajectory for ideas of the movement to travel to Central and Eastern Europe with some of the activists acting as brokers (especially the ones that went abroad in the late 1990s and early 2000s) who shared their contacts and information about tactics and possible information sources. These were usually the people with higher social capital (i.e. language skills).

² Tekkno is a sub-genre of techno music with harder beats. It was very popular in the Czech Republic in the mid-1990s. A music festival called Czech Tekk was not only a music event but also a political one. It was also one of the spaces where activists and potential participants would meet.

³ Surprisingly, for a long time social media were used mostly for private purposes and activist websites and services relied on independent hosting. Only recently one can observe a new trend of proliferating fanpages of activist groups on Facebook.

The peak of activities of the alterglobalist movement in Central and Eastern Europe was the meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in Prague in September 2000. It was an international protest with many people from abroad (not only from Central and Eastern Europe, but also from the US, for example) and some of the activists came months in advance to teach their Czech friends new tactics and strategies. The demonstrations that lasted for a few days turned into riots and – in the end – to a closure of the summit. For many activists it was a turning point in their lives. One activist from Budapest, shared this – rather typical – story:

In 2000 in Prague, huge demonstrations against the World Bank and the IMF took place, and this was the biggest thing in my activist life. That was very important to me because everything that I have previously read about the activities of the system in the books, was visible there during the demonstration. It was shocking for us, for our group from post-communist countries to see there how many more such leftist groups exist and operate in the West. [our group] did not want to be classified politically, we were neither conservatives nor the left, we did not belong to any option ideologically. And anarchism as an ideology worked for us [...]. In that our mode of operation was also anarchist, we haven't had a head or a leader of this group. It was more horizontal, and this was rare in those days.

Other events of an alterglobalist nature in the region included the counter-summit in Warsaw at the end of April 2004 that was organized to accompany the European Economic Forum, and the demonstration during the United Nations Climate Change conference in Poznań in December 2008 (called COP14). There were also protests during the biggest mobilization in the world: on February 15th 2003 millions of people went out to the streets to protest against the coming war in Iraq. Over time the activists in the region began to adapt the repertoires of action developed by the alterglobalist movement to their home turfs and local initiatives. The presence of activist groups at different meetings of the WTO, the IMF, and so forth, was nicknamed 'summit hopping' or 'protest tourism' because many people combined it with their holidays, and the protest was only one of the items on their agenda. Moreover, as Richard Day summed it up, "Participation in the summits is expensive and is beyond the range of marginalized groups" (Day 2009: 139). For activists from CEE the financial barrier was often impossible to overcome and the idea of going abroad for mass protests was abandoned (as they told me) soon after the Heiligendam counter-summit of 2007. Mass gatherings under alterglobalist slogans allowed the activists to meet, exchange ideas and finally get to know each other. One of the Polish activists (active in feminist, anarchist, artistic and many other initiatives over the years) told me, when we spoke about the importance of demonstrations in Prague for the whole movement:

This was the first big thing that the Polish alterglobalists organised. There were

anarchists, few reds, some collectives; they [...] even organized some coaches or something. This was the first such common trip; it also allowed people to get to know each other. Because if a movement is to get organized somehow, one must see that there are, let's say, 120 people that there are anarchists, leftists, whatever. It seems kind of obvious, but as it forms common ranks, it seems more real. So that I think was a very important moment. It was so because, of course, various groups already operated, but it was the first time to see that 'oh, there are so many of us!'

The slow decline of the alterglobalist movement has its roots in its organizational form. Most of the networks and collaborations take place for big protest events and campaigns and in between these peaks of activities there are almost no stable organizational structures. The only space through which they exchange ideas and recruit new people is the 'scene' - an "array of bars, pubs, squatted social centres" (Leach 2008). In Central and Eastern Europe, the scene is very much influenced by subcultures and therefore attracts a certain kind of people. And although there is an array of bars and pubs, squatted social centres are definitely missing from the picture: there are none in Hungary, few in the Czech Republic and less than a dozen in Poland. Many of the bars are also too commercialized for the activists' taste or simply too expensive. Alternative music is also not present at clubs to the same extent as it is in Western countries. Lack of stable organizational structures and dependence on inter-personal (instead of inter-organizational) networks - in particular in the case of international networks - is often perceived (together with the lack of a clear positive program) as the biggest challenge for the alterglobalist movement (Krzemiński 2006). For some of the activists, foreign roots of the movements and the tendency to use non-local patterns of protest and mobilization were also a problem. One activist with a long history of belonging to anarchist and feminist groups told me:

I have the impression that the movement in the region takes over the patterns of the movement from the West. For example, it includes Food Not Bombs and this is an idea imported from there, even squatting is also imported from abroad. And this is the weakness of the movement in that region, because it draws the traffic patterns from the West.

Whereas the lack of structures and a positive program is a general trend within the alterglobalist movement, the weak movement infrastructure – the scene – is a CEE phenomenon.

Characteristics of the alterglobalists in Central and Eastern Europe

One of the main characteristic features of the movement in Central and Eastern Europe is its small scale. When compared to mobilizations taking place in other

parts of the world, those in the region are visibly smaller (with the exception of the S26 protests in Prague). The WA29 protest against the European Economic Forum in Warsaw gathered around 10,000 people, The COP14 in Poznan in 2008 attracted no more than 1500 people for the final demonstration (in comparison to the next UN summit on climate change, the COP15, in Copenhagen one year later, when the final demonstration attracted about 30 000 people). Demonstrations on February 15th, 2003 against the war in Iraq were attended by no more than a few thousand people (in Warsaw and Prague, in Budapest there were less than a thousand on the Heroes' Square, in other major cities there were a few hundred participants). This social apathy is often the topic of conversations and discussions among the activists. For example when Polish Indignados organized a 'Day of Anger' in Warsaw, around 100 people came to the protest. At the same time in Poznan there was a concert of a hardcore group Apatia (pun not intended) known for their political involvement that attracted around 700 people from the 'scene'.⁴

As mentioned, compared to Western Europe, the alterglobalist movement in Central and Eastern Europe is much more dominated by anarchist groups than any other type of ideology. The horizontal structures are as important for these groups as being committed to their ideals. Hence politicians are perceived as enemies rather than potential partners, mainly because their actions are not seen as driven by any moral guidelines (as in the case of activists) but their own interests. In Czech Republic in 2008 activists were campaigning against plans to build a radar base for the US anti-missile shield project. One of the core activists of that campaign told me that it was only when some of them decided to go on a hunger strike - in order to get media and public attention – that the politicians of the oppositional party offered their support. The offer was refused for two reasons: the campaign would not benefit much from such an alliance and it was the opposition party that started the negotiations about the missile-shield project. He told me:

Just a minute ago, I received an SMS from the ex PM, Paroubek, of the social democratic party and he wants to come here tomorrow, so he'll just come [checking mobile and replying] I guess he wants to gain some capital on this, because he knows that 2/3rds of the Czech people are against this, and he's now in the opposition so he has to say what the people want. Or he doesn't have to but he wants to.

When in 2008 a coalition of activists was organizing protests against climate change that would accompany the COP14 meeting, internal conflicts emerged, initiated mostly by anarchists. They provoked public opinion by saying that

⁴ This situation sparked a heated discussion about the role and the position of alternative music and social movements in Poland which can be followed here:
http://cia.media.pl/apatia_zamiast_gniewu_czyli_powrot_do_dyskusji_polityka_a_subkultur
a [accessed 16.01.2012]

‘anything could happen’ and that one could not eliminate the possibility that some violent demonstrators may also arrive to take part in the protest. When their actions were met with negative responses by other organizers, they launched several statements accusing the other groups (the Greens, Young Socialists and Young Social-democrats) of being nothing more than groups of career-makers and suggested that they were organizing the demonstration only to gain political capital for themselves. This is also why in most of the demonstrations the ‘no logo’ rule is implemented: no party, group flags or banners are allowed. Only those that represent the whole coalition (the anti-war, anti-missile shield coalitions etc.) are permitted. In most of the cases, however, this rule is not respected, which results in arguments and internal divisions. This was the main line of conflict in the INPEG – Initiative Against Economic Globalization - coalition that organized the Prague 2000 protests. The arguments resulted in excluding some groups from the coalition and led to a major split in the coalition. As one of the members of the INPEG coalition told me:

Afterwards [after the counter-summit] we were completely tired and exhausted, and we split up and went to our homes. And then after – I don’t remember the exact dates – there was another INPEG meeting. And actually there was one huge conflict between anarchists and this socialist solidarity because there was an agreement within the INPEG that all the work we did and all propaganda was signed as the INPEG coalition

Transnational diffusion of ideas and their local reception

Transnational diffusion resulted in the spreading of alterglobalist ideals in the CEE region. In this part, I will try to analyse how the alterglobalist movement adopted protest and organizational tactics from its western counterparts and what were the results of this process.

Even if the wave of mobilizations under alterglobalist slogans is over, its impact on activists in Central and Eastern Europe is unquestioned. Although there are now almost no groups that would label themselves as alterglobalists, many of the tactics that activists use are still influenced by the previous alterglobalist protests. Creative ways of protesting were adopted unevenly throughout the region due to different protest cultures and opportunity structures. Some of the tactics were either forbidden or their legal consequences were so serious that activists did not want to use them. This was the case with squats and occupations, which are not perceived and used uniformly throughout the CEE countries. The alterglobalist movement has not developed homogeneously because although its protest repertoire was inspired by transnational ideas, it was translated and adapted to local contexts where some ideas fitted better than others. For instance large puppets – similar to those seen in Seattle and Genoa – are popular in the Czech Republic but are not seen in Poland or Hungary.

Although it was often other movements that had developed some of the tactics used by alterglobalists, it was the latter who diffused them. One such tactic was the use of barrels filled with concrete. They have a tube inserted into them where an activist could attach him/herself to a metal rod mounted inside. Such a human barricade could not be removed without destroying the barrel, which takes time. British radical environmentalists from Earth First used this tactic during blockades of highway construction sites. In the East, however, they proved less useful since the policing cultures of law enforcement agencies were different. In one case in Belarus the police simply decided to ram through such barricade resulting in broken (or even ripped off) arms among activists.⁵ In Central and Eastern Europe police actions were less drastic but the activists claim that they have difficult access to legal procedures such as filing complaints about police actions.

Many of these tactics survived the decline of the alterglobalist movement. One of them is the splitting of a demonstration into a few marches in the way it was done in Prague, which completely surprised the police. Furthermore, clustering people into affinity groups improved activists' security (as potential agents provocateurs were easier to spot and in case of arrest of some of the activists, others knew immediately who was missing). Some of the tactics were adopted by other kinds of movements such as the emerging 'autonomist nationalists' – right wing, anti-capitalist groups opposing neoliberalism and promoting ethnic exclusiveness and nationalism. These tactics could also be observed in the winter of 2012 when a wave of protests against the ACTA treaty (against production and selling of counterfeited goods and internet piracy) spread all over Europe. Many of the protests were organized in a similar fashion to the alterglobalist events but the coalitions behind them were even more diverse.

One of the main novelties of the alterglobalist movement – besides the tactics mentioned above – was its acephalous and horizontal way of organization. What Jeffrey Juris derives from works of Deleuze and Guattari and calls 'rhizomatic networks' (Juris 2008: 157) combined with the growing importance of new communication technologies, resulted in a completely different kind of a social movement. Lacking structures, hierarchies and leaders (to some extent, as informal leadership is an imminent part of every social group), the alterglobalist movement was much more flexible when it came to self-organization, and much more difficult to infiltrate by the police and political parties seeking alliances that were perceived as threats to the movement. It was also much more inclusive compared to previous social movements. In 1999 in Seattle, dozens of different groups joined the coalition organizing the protests. The same happened in 2000 in Prague. A few years later the coalition against the plans to build a US anti-missile shield base in the Czech Republic was composed of approximately 60 groups (for more see Navratil 2010). For David Graeber (2009: 11) such organization modes are at the core of the groups' ideologies; in

⁵ Quoted in a samizdat publication of memoirs of Grzegorz Kuśnierz who described the struggles during the campaign to save a forest on St. Anna mountain in Poland, downloaded from <http://www.anna-akcja.eko.org.pl/> [accessed 17.01.2012]

fact, they are their ideologies. This is because more often than in Western Europe and the Americas, in Central and Eastern Europe anarchists are the dominant group in coalitions and during protests (della Porta 2005).

A different situation may be observed in Hungary where green groups seem to dominate and some of the activists joined the leftist LMP (Politics can be Different) party that entered the parliament. In Hungary, LMP continued to promote the ideals of alterglobalism. At the same time, the anarchist group that was connected to this message disappeared. Usually the anarchist groups were only a small part of the alterglobalist movement, which was instead dominated by green NGOs that stood closer to a liberal ideology of civil society and its function than any anarchist or leftist ideals. Anarchists not only reject power structures of the state and society, but are also try to avoid them within their own groups. That is why deliberative practices and the consensus rule are the *sine qua non* requirement for most coalitions in the region.

At the meso level, the consensus rule is played out in long-lasting discussions and e-mail exchanges, which at times could be quite detrimental to the group's efficiency. Once I followed an exchange of more than 120 e-mails sent by around 20 people that wanted to go to another city for a demonstration. They were discussing means of transportation and time of departure. In other, more conventionally organized groups, this would be announced by one of the leaders and the problem would be solved. But the point is that everybody had the right to say something, could participate in the whole decision-making process and felt empowered and a part of the group. When compared to discussions taking place in real meetings, more women took part in the e-mail exchanges than spoke during meetings. Although nearly all of the groups that I came across supported feminist ideas and gender equality, a rather harsh and aggressive way of holding face-to-face discussions resulted in many women remaining silent. Similar practices can be found at the macro-level when one analyses the functioning of coalitions and looks at interactions between different groups. Endless debates, e-mail exchanges, statements issued or controversies over slogans or banners are very common.

Politicized subculture or a social movement?

The main challenge with comparative analysis of social movements is to find a way to explain the differences and similarities across cases. In this section, I propose a different perspective for analysing the alterglobalist movement in Central and Eastern Europe by referring to its genealogy. Many of the groups that were central to the alterglobalist coalitions and campaigns in the region had strong connections to and had evolved from subcultures. Here I would like to evaluate alterglobalism in the CEE region from a subcultural studies perspective.

One of the key issues for subcultures is the preservation of the purity of subcultural groups and their members, since any sign of diversion from the imagined model of the subculture member is seen as treason. Such practices

reinforce the groups and their members' sense of belonging, which might be surprising, considering how much individualism is stressed in their statements. Subcultures are more oriented towards their internal dynamics (Muggleton and Weinzierl 2003) and focus on building the groups' strength and unity. At the same time, groups that are more politically oriented are focused on the outcomes of their actions (Tilly 2004, Tilly and Tarrow 2006), on policy change and the like. Actions of the latter group concentrate on possible recipients of their claims and decision-makers and activists are more flexible in negotiating their positions. When one advocates a certain policy change (for example defends a local playground or some political dissidents in some country), the way in which one looks is far less important for potential allies. Also claims are more easily modified if demands are to be met. In the case of subcultures, there is an (idealized) image of the group and its participants. If one does not live up to it, they are excluded from (or not allowed into) a particular group (Marcus 1990). In other words, if one wants to become a punk but still feels more comfortable in suit and a tie, he or she will not be recognized as a punk by other punks and will not be allowed to enter their group.

The practices rooted in ideology influence activists' everyday lives in many various areas: diet (the majority of the activists I met were vegetarian or vegan), clothing style, avoidance of political participation (i.e. they refuse to vote in general elections), anti-consumerism, and use of public transportation or bicycles. When one academic working on the alterglobalist movement in Poland tried to arrange an interview with activists at McDonald's, the activists showed up only to ask him whether it was supposed to be a kind of social experiment or provocation and demanded that he would change the venue or else the interview would not take place. The researcher noted that he 'was surprised that the social resistance to the mainstream of today's (popular) culture is expressed in the most unexpected ways' (Pomieczński 2010: 31). This shows that being an activist influences not only one's political choices but also (or primarily) one's everyday life. One is always a full-time anarchist or a leftist ('alterglobalist' almost never came up as a way of self-identification, but the activists fully agreed to alterglobalist principles and took part in alterglobalist events). As one of the activists I interviewed in the Czech Republic said:

"[When one can define oneself as a 'true' activist] it also depends on your lifestyle and I don't think I live according to anarchist principles. It's connected to being active in everyday life, not only anti-capitalist but also anti-authoritarian and I work for an NGO and I support it through [my participation in] this NGO system... I'm a leader of this organization and that doesn't fit my concept of anarchism".

This is usually the case for radical social activists. Janusz Waluszko - an almost legendary Polish anarchist - wrote in his memoirs about the Movement for an

Alternative Society [Ruch Społeczeństwa Alternatywnego, RSA⁶] which he founded: “social activism is our way of living, not a social role after finishing of which one forgets about everything like an office worker coming back home with his salary” (Waluszko 2009: 31). For him, there is no distinction between the private sphere and political activism. For social activists their actions are a result of a calling. It stems from activists' moral obligations that manifest themselves in their actions. The differences between a subculture and politically motivated groups are presented in table 1:

Subculture	Political mobilization
Most of the actions directed TOWARDS the group	Actions focused on policy and/or political change
Restricted coalition forming on the grounds of groups' “purity”	Broad coalition forming with various actors
Stronger feeling of belonging to a group	Multiple belongings possible
Ideological orthodoxy, less likely to compromise	More likely to compromise / moderate the claims
Bigger effect on the lifestyle and everyday life practices	Stronger distinction between the public (political) and the private

Table 1: Comparison of the approaches and practices of subcultures and politically oriented social movements⁷

Based on the above, I suggest that the alterglobalist movement in the CEE region can be analysed in terms of sub-cultures. I recognise that they also have political interests, but claim that they are striving for political and social change in a subcultural manner. Greg Martin wrote: “Focusing on the relationship of social movements to the state and polity thus tend to ignore the hidden cultural dimension of social movements, which is significant because, among other things, it is the culture of movements – submerged in pre-existing networks of everyday life – that makes mobilization possible. In this way, the network of groups that constitutes a social movement serves as a platform for mobilization, since the movement network shares a culture and collective identity” (Martin 2013). The groups that are analysed in this paper put a lot of emphasis on prefigurative politics. Such zones can be observed during protests (Graeber 2009), in squatted social centres and other movement's spaces. This suggests that the movement's identity (or identities) is constructed in a different way compared to the classical theory of social movements. As Martin continues: “For

⁶ RSA was the first group in Poland after 1945 that called itself anarchist and it is believed to be the founding group for the modern anarchist movement in Poland.

⁷ In particular groups that belong to the third sector, political parties etc.

Melucci (1989, 1996), contemporary movements mount symbolic challenges to dominant homogenizing cultural codes by communicating to the rest of society the message of difference. They do that by living out alternative lifestyles. In this sense, the “medium is the message.” In order to communicate a clear and coherent message, movements must generate a collective identity” (Martin 2013).

When looking at the alterglobalist movement, especially in CEE, which is a rather hostile environment for grassroots social activism and leftist ideas in general, analyzing the movement’s identity building through the perspective of subcultural studies can yield interesting insights. Core activists seem to put pressure on the movement to maintain its ‘purity’, which is expressed in hesitation towards alliances and cooperation with other actors. The stress on prefigurative politics as well as close connections (mainly genealogical) to counterculture, suggest that the subcultural perspective is worth considering.

Close connections of alterglobalists to subcultures and counterculture go beyond the background of the activists; they are their paths of recruitment into social movement activism. Most of the time the activists come from punk rock and hardcore music scenes, which were the main channels of spreading new political ideas (mostly anarchism and radical environmentalism) among Central and Eastern European societies in the 1980s (Urbański 2009).

Historical legacies

Genealogies of social movements play an important role in their formation. In the CEE countries groups that formed alterglobalist coalitions were successors of the movements that developed in the mid-1980s, in particular the anarchists and the environmentalists. In the following section, I would like to argue that the history of this development has significant consequences today and that the development of the social and political environment in which the groups are active (which include the history of anti-communist struggles as well as the post-1989 transformation) plays an equally important role.

Grassroots social activism using confrontational repertoires of action developed in CEE in the mid-1980s in opposition to the communist authorities as well as the pro-democratic opposition (Piotrowski 2010). The past plays an important role in the functioning of today’s social movements in the CEE countries.

Despite more than two decades of functioning democracies, the legacies of the communist past are still strongly influencing social mobilizations and movements in Central and Eastern Europe. This gives the movement some distinctive features as compared to its Western counterparts. Social movements are often excluded from mainstream political discourse and debates for being not reasonable enough. This is reinforced by the legacy of the communist past, when pro-democratic struggles were taken seriously. In the late 1980s, the newly emerging social movements began to use carnival-like methods of protest and ways of mobilizing new supporters (Kenney 2002). They were the domain of youth and student movements. Revolution was to be achieved in a fun way,

with laughter. This image, however, did not fit the self-image of dissidents as intellectuals, people leading struggles for national independence and as defenders of the working class. The latter were very wary of grassroots initiatives that used carnival methods of protest, preferred not to take part in them and excluded members of these groups when it came to negotiations with the authorities. Social movements and young people participating in them were regarded as not serious enough for politics. Their demand for joy and carnival was perceived as a need 'to let off steam'. The founders of the Situationist-inspired Polish movement Orange Alternative [Pomarańczowa Alternatywa], for example, were thrown out from a group that organized a students' strike at the university of Wrocław because they were not 'serious enough'. According to such an imagery that is still present in Central and Eastern Europe, politics is a serious thing, for serious (often older) people, acting in serious ways.

Because of the rejection of socialist parties during the Autumn of Nations in 1989 (DuVall and Ackermann 2001), leftist political ideologies are associated with the former regime. Thus, 'cultural anticommunism' began to be the dominating frame. Anti-communism is still one of the major frames used not only by politicians but also football hooligans and other groups. It not only targets real communists, but also feminists, ecologists and members of other progressive groups that fall into the category of 'leftist ideologies'. When asked about the support for old left parties in the region, an activist from the Czech Republic told me:

Most of the people are still the same as they were in 1980. They just replaced the leaders and, you know, the party is the same. They have some new faces, for the last 5 years, just a few people, and they're basically based on the support of old people.

As the same activist said later in the interview:

Leftism has been considered non-democratic, authoritarian etc. Concepts like solidarity, equality or even social justice have been publicly denounced as being communist utopias and [...] competition, extreme elitism and free market are the basis of present ideology. Saying "I'm an anticapitalist" is translated in a very similar way to "I'm a terrorist", or "I'm an old-fashioned communist" etc. Capitalism is considered as the natural system of relations of production and parliamentary democracy as the best-ever political system with no alternative.

When analysing the situation of social movements in the CEE countries, one has to look at the genealogy of its political systems and social movements. In CEE, 1968 brought about a new wave of critical Marxism with humanist tendencies, which became the dominant trend among intellectuals. By the end of the 1970s, leftist ideals began to be replaced by liberalism, a trend that was accelerated in the mid-1980s when signs of weakness of the eastern bloc and Western support

for the dissidents became more visible. The “radical” groups that emerged in the 1980s can be seen as a critique of the earlier elites, reinforced by some kind of subcultural basis. Punk music served as one foundation for it; environmentalism (often connected to Buddhism and other Eastern philosophies) as another. A similar process took place in the West where New Social Movements (peace, environmental protection etc.) have moved away from Marxist thought and towards liberal models of civil society. Within the late Cold War context, the ideologies of human rights, civil society and liberalism (both political and economic) were strongly supported by the West in the CEE countries. In that setting, subcultural groups of the 1980s were a manifestation of an anti-hierarchical critique of both repressive socialist states and dissident elite discourses.

During the 1980s social movements were replaced by pro-democratic dissidents whose main agenda was to overthrow communism, leaving many other issues (such as compulsory military service) aside. Moreover, many of the activists from the 1980s went to new positions in state administrations or the newly established NGO sector, or they started their own businesses (Ekiert and Foa 2011). For alterglobalists this grant-based system was an attempt to de-radicalize political contention and the rebellious potential of society. More radical social movements were either isolated or lost members who went to work in NGOs and state administration. This transition created a generational gap that was not filled until the mid 1990s by activists who referred more to experiences of social movements from other parts of the world. When they were talking about the history of struggles (against capitalism or for a clean environment), they referred to examples from Western Europe or the US more often than to local ones. One informant – a sociologist, activist, and employee of an environmental NGO from Wrocław (Poland) – drew my attention to this fact:

This is interesting, [Piotr] Żuk did research on new social movements in Poland; and it was published in 2001; and he asked activists about the traditions to which they refer. The Western tradition was more important to them than the tradition of the 1980s in Poland, about which they knew very little.

They not only adopted new tactics and repertoires of contention, but also organized their actions around ideas that came from abroad. This was the case with the squatting movement that played an important role for the alterglobalist movement providing autonomous spaces for their actions.

According to some authors (Ost 2005), abandoning leftist positions by dissidents began earlier - in mid-1980s - when they turned towards more conservative and neoliberal positions, especially in Poland and Hungary. Forming a leftist group is therefore a problem. One of the leaders of the group Pracownicza Demokracja (Workers Democracy), a leftist group from Poland, told me the story how he wanted to establish a left-leaning group and how it failed:

It cannot work in Poland - running around with a red flag and talking about communism. Perhaps in Italy it has completely different connotations but in Poland it isn't associated with freedom but reminds people of a history of oppression.

This legacy has had a huge impact on the formation of the alterglobalist movement in Central and Eastern Europe. In Western Europe, left-leaning groups are the majority in the movement. Such is the case with the European Social Forum, for instance (della Porta 2005). In the CEE region, the movement has a different structure. The dominating activists within it are anarchists who tend to use more radical tactics and have different organizational ideas, and are much more anti-hierarchical compared to the traditional left. Even if they do not label themselves as anarchists, there might be 'anarchist strains' observed in the majority of alterglobalist groups in the region. They are also rather hesitant towards being called 'leftists', partially because of their involvement in the anti-communist opposition in the 1980s. In Poland one can observe stencils sprayed on walls by anarchists with the slogan 'Not left, nor right – freedom' ('Ani lewica, ani prawica – wolność'). Some of them told me that they are trying to break from the burden of the leftist past. The strong anti-communist sentiment within the alterglobalist movement is also reflected in the rejection of potential cooperation with leftist groups and/or parties. One of the Czech anarchists who was involved in the preparation of the 2000 protests in Prague, told me:

there were some stupid Turkish communists who looked like Ku Klux Klan, really [laughs]. They wore red flags. They made hoods out of them, [they had] huge red flags with hammers and sickles and it was a problem. The new left, it was coming out from the new left, the old left that is discredited in this country. It was a problem.

The alterglobalist movement had to look for another type of language and a way to rationalize their claims and positions – a way that would be beyond the left versus right distinction. However, failing to find a discourse that would be easily understandable by the public, the whole movement has not managed to mobilize on a massive scale and sustain itself. One of the spokespersons of the Czech anti-radar campaign told me that this could be seen in media coverage:

There is a big difference between the Czech media and the foreign media. The Czech media tends to be pro-radar so they tend to portray every opponent of the radar to be either extremist or communist, or some other kind of a crazy person.

Anarchism and radical environmentalism - the two most important currents on the social movement scene - were re-introduced in Eastern Europe through subcultures - mostly through punk rock music (Urbański 2009, Piotrowski

2010). It was a result of the dissident groups not meeting the demands of the young people, especially their demand to solve the problems of compulsory military service and environmental pollution. It coincided with a growing popularity of punk rock. Nowhere was the punk slogan 'No future' closer to reality than in Central and Eastern Europe (as noted by Ramet 1995). Similarly, the anti-fascist movement in Eastern Europe grew out mostly of the hardcore and punk rock music scene (Kubarczyk 2009, Koubek 2010).

Radical environmentalism (radical in a way that it includes direct action, such as occupations, blockades etc., up to physical confrontations with opponents) is also closely linked to subcultures and there are big overlaps between radical environmentalists and alterglobalists in CEE, particularly in Hungary.

Environmental groups seem to be particularly important in Hungary (where the Danube Circle was one of the first big grassroots mobilizations after 1956), but the Chernobyl catastrophe (and many other local disasters) sparked a number of protests throughout the entire region. These were not only protests against environmental destruction but also against information policies of the authorities that kept such information secret. By demanding access to information, these groups were turning out to be anti-systemic, deepening the divide between society and authorities.

The environmental protection movement shows a lot of common features with the alterglobalist movement as far as its development and diffusion of tactics is concerned. It emerged in Eastern Europe together with the growing grassroots social activism. The catastrophe in Chernobyl might be the breaking point in the development of this history. It was occasionally connected with Buddhist ideas, a growing popularity of vegetarianism and other lifestyle choices.

Conclusions

This paper described the distinctive features of the alterglobalist movement in Central and Eastern Europe, and tried to suggest some explanations for the shape that it has taken in this region. Even though the CEE countries are far from homogenous, they still share a few commonalities that have influenced the development of social movements. The movement emerged simultaneously with its counterparts in other regions and CEE was not at the periphery of events (in particular Prague in 2000). I claim that the movement in Central and Eastern Europe is different than its Western counterparts in the following respects.

Firstly, the movement is much smaller than in other parts of the world. In the region that according to some observers was one of the laboratories of neoliberalism (Klein 2007) and where economic transformation has left large parts of the population with the presumption that they had lost because of the transition, social discontent was not channelled through alterglobalist slogans. The region was also a field for rapidly emerging post-politics. Its anti-ideological discourse and emphasis on governance instead of politics might have weakened the highly ideologised slogans of the alterglobalist activists. In the region where

economic globalization and neoliberalism were seen at work, radical anti-capitalist slogans failed to become an effective frame to be used by the alterglobalist movement.

Secondly, the movement is composed of fewer currents than in other parts of the world, with anarchists and radical environmentalists being the strongest ones. This has the following consequences: the alterglobalist movement is more radical (in terms of repertoire of contention, tactics and rhetoric) and much more committed to its practices –in particular to deliberative democracy. For these activists, consensus decision-making is more than just a way to organize themselves. It is an important part of their ideology and as such it cannot be compromised, which limits the number of potential allies. The movement also seems to be exclusive and less prone to form alliances with political parties and other actors (NGOs, foundations, associations, trade unions) than in Western Europe or the Americas.

Thirdly, the movement is closer to subcultures and counterculture than in other parts of the world. It stems from the history and genealogy of social movements in the region, in particular the emergence of many grassroots groups in the mid 1980s that were not only opposed to the authorities, but also critical of the pro-democratic opposition. One of the main channels for disseminating their ideals included youth subcultures such as punk rock music. It is the milieu out of which today's social movements emerged. The subcultural origins of social activists go beyond their looks and musical tastes; they created a blueprint for the model grassroots activist. When comparing the practices of social activists from CEE with subcultures one can see that they share the feeling of orthodoxy when it comes to their self-image. Any 'impure' behaviour (like taking part in popular elections or, for some, eating meat) excludes the individual from the group and the movement. In my opinion, this is the reason why so many alterglobalists avoid cooperation and coalitions with political parties, even in situations where social movements could benefit from that. The generational gap also caused fewer structures supporting social movements to develop. This is particularly the case with the so-called scene, which is an in-between space where activists meet with supporters, potential newcomers and recipients of their claims (Leach 2008). It is the scene that preserves social movements between the peaks of its activities. This is where members of different groups can meet and exchange information or plan something together. In the CEE countries the movement's infrastructure is much less developed than in other parts of the world.

Finally, the last characteristic can be summarized in relation to the postsocialist heritage of the region, that is: deep distrust towards the state but also to any form of organization and self-positioning of activists as leftist. The left – despite more than two decades of fully functioning democracy – is still associated with the former regime and the communist past. This also makes it problematic to make leftist arguments, in particular those that attack and criticize the capitalist system.

Many of the activists that I spoke to referred to the concept of world-systems and applied Wallerstein's theory not only to economic and mainstream politics, but also to power relations concerning activists from abroad. Many of my interviewees were highly educated young people. They had often participated in academic exchange programs. This 'outsider (expat) perspective' allowed them to assess the cooperation with foreign groups and activists more critically, as in the case of an activist I encountered in Budapest. Born in Germany, with family ties to the US, and having been active for nearly a decade in Budapest and Prague in environmental and bicycle initiatives, he told me:

I noticed it, and it bothered me, if you have people from the West coming here. They have this automatic assumption that because they're doing whatever they've been doing for years, and because the East has just been released from communism, then anything that person from the West that comes here will say will be like 'wow' - grabbed like some hot food, in the sense that the idea comes from the morally superior side – from the West.

One of my informants, who was living and working in Budapest, and of Romanian descent, told me the following story:

Basically, they [activists from the West] were here to organize the Balkan PGA communication network or something; and I remember one guy, Michael, who took out his notebook and started: 'so, what are your problems here? This and that. So, you have problems with women issues. And with this and that' and hey, hey, I mean we were talking about these things earlier - about how things are different here and what is our approach, and there were five of us who organized their reception here and we didn't even think the same things about these questions. It was just like imposing this framework upon us. Maybe it was only because of the day, they were tired or something.

In her eyes, the problems stemmed from the fact that Western activists did not know the local conditions and their organizational structure was more hierarchical than the ways of organizing that she was familiar with:

It's basically because of the top-down structure. If you basically make this kind of framework, you could say that the biggest problem was with the word capitalism. You take it and you go to different places and you ask the question 'is capitalism a problem here?'

The top-down structures among activists reinforced the belief that the CEE region belongs to the periphery, which might discourage activists from further cooperation with their counterparts from abroad. Many of the activists decided to focus on local problems (even though they acknowledge their global origins)

on their own terms instead of framing them as a(n) (alter)global struggle. And finally, the unreflective construction of the alterglobalist movement's agenda around the word capitalism - which has a different meaning and different feelings attached to it in the post-socialist world - resulted in the failure of alterglobalist political mobilizations in Central and Eastern Europe.

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About the author:

Grzegorz Piotrowski is a Research Associate at Södertörns University in Sweden. He is currently involved in the research project 'Anarchists in Eastern and Western Europe – a Comparative Study', that focuses on a comparative analysis of anarchist movements in five different countries surrounding the Baltic Sea (Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Poland and Russia). Grzegorz is responsible for the Polish case. He completed his PhD at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. His thesis entitled 'Alterglobalism in Postsocialism. A Study of Central and Eastern European Activists' was supervised by Prof. Donatella della Porta. Grzegorz also holds a Master's degree from the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań (Poland). He can be contacted at grzegorz.piotrowski AT sh.se

Collective action frames and Facebook fan and group pages: the case of the Russian Snow Revolution 2011-2013

Yulia Lukashina

Abstract

The article reveals the shortcomings of the framing strategies of the Russian Snow Revolution movement. The author hopes that this scholarly endeavor can help activists of different movements to present and frame their ideas in a best way. Moreover, the study investigates whether Facebook provides a space for the framing processes and whether it helps sympathizers of the social movement to take part in the creation of shared meanings and collective action frames.

The author compares two collaborating Facebook communities, a fan page and a group page of the Russian protest movement. The findings are the following: it was proved that the main collective action frame is constituted by the joint efforts of ordinary users and online moderators. The frame has been given the name "The fear of getting back into the USSR". There are two specific framing strategies, which can be explained from the political context and from the specific features of this social medium. The first strategy –re-framing- refers to granting a new meaning to a situation by placing it in another context or explanatory model. The second strategy –discourse incorporation - is a process of an intentional use of a discourse, borrowed from another historical era, by a political actor for the purpose of persuasion. Both strategies secured the movement a longlasting attention of Facebook users, but seem to be (1) too much relying on the narratives from the past, and (2) using unclear definitions. That makes the movement reluctant to draw a picture of a desirable future. The final section provides a few simple guidelines for successful framing strategy.

Introduction

The paper offers a deep insight into the framing processes within a social movement. Two online communities, belonging to the Snow Revolution movement in Russia, were the object of the study and the source of the empirical data. The author employed mixed research design and a grounded theory. The frame theory was chosen as a starting point for the study and aims to answer the following questions: (a) are there any specific communication patterns within these online communities? (b) are there any deep structures behind their argumentation?

The author concentrates on the cognitive structures stimulating the spread of the movement, and on the cognitive constraints, averting its growth, and especially on the worldview, which inspires both activists and ordinary

adherents. This worldview is a key to understanding the internal drives of the movement, since this view is formed in alignment with and under the influence of the political environment, in which the movement was born.

The first section starts with a chronological description of what has been happening in Russia in 2011-2013. The author highlights the unstable character of the claims, the lack of any enduring agenda which the movement would try to bring to the public discussion, and argues that there must be some ideological concepts behind these changing claims. It is therefore suggested to use framing theory, and the idea of collective action frames in particular, in order to reveal these concepts. The second section deals with the literature about Facebook communities and political engagement, as well as describing the fan and the group pages of the object of study. The third section reviews frame theory and builds an analytical scheme, which is to be applied to the empirical data. The fourth section presents the results of the analysis. The data analysis was based on the socio-cognitive approach. In doing so, the author tries to understand the very motivation of the movement and afterwards finds the collective action frame "The fear of getting back into the USSR". The fifth section provides a possible explanation of the dominance of this frame in the discourse by addressing the elitists' approach. The origin of the frame "The fear of getting back into the USSR" lies in the long-lasting dominance of the political elites over the state institutions, which is no longer acceptable for society.

The Snow Revolution: main events and agendas

The movement that has inspired writing this paper is known as the "Snow Revolution" or the "Bolotnaya Movement" (in Russia) and refers to the civil engagement of thousands of Russians during 2011-2013, starting from the "election fraud" during the parliamentary elections in 2011. Because of the intensive use of the different communication channels, mainly online, the movement attracted a lot of public attention to many social and political problems in present-day Russia.

In December 2011 the sixth parliamentary elections were held in Russia. Even before the polls were opened, the public opinion was suspicious about the transparency of the elections. Many independent observers stayed at the polls during the elections to prevent any abuses of the voting procedures. Lots of crowd-sourcing online platforms were created for the information exchange between observers and for publishing their reports. That makes one think that suspicions about the transparency were quite strong. Afterwards, the observers made public lots of violations by sharing their reports and personal statements in the blogosphere and on Facebook. This online information wave was so strong that later on the same day the first street demonstration took place in Moscow. The city administration granted a permission to hold those events, but it seemed that the officials did worry about any possible escalation, since a few military troops were called to Moscow to insure public security.

In the very beginning, the movement declared the following demands: to force

the resignation of the Chairman of the Central Election Committee, to cancel the results of the elections and to schedule new ones. Additional claims were: more safety and freedom for independent observers, less violations etc. Participants of the street demonstrations were dissatisfied with the violations and a possible use of the "administrative resource" by the dominant political party – the United Russia. The administrative resource means that the members of the United Russia used their contacts among officials to manipulate the results. The officials, it was claimed, helped to change the data in the polls in favor of the United Russia. Many Internet users distributed the idea that the employees of commercial and state-owned organizations were forced to vote for United Russia by their supervisors and top-managers. It was also stated that the members of United Russia were seen giving bribes in exchange for votes.

A few days later the claims of the movement became less fact-related and more program-like. Demands to change the entire party system, including the legislation, and to reduce existing barriers for participation in the elections for small political parties followed. Some slogans were directed against the Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin. The street demonstrations arranged to support the movement, were named "For Fair Elections" in the online public sphere that time, and then the name was coined.

In March and April 2011 a few street demonstrations and rallies took place. In April the Parliament adopted and the President signed the amendments to the law on the party system in Russia, which liberated political struggle. Nevertheless, a big rally named "The March of Millions" was held in May 2011. The event ended up with a mess; many people were injured. It is still not clear who started the disorder, but a few activists were arrested, and now find themselves under the trial.

The movement also demanded to keep Prime Minister Putin from participation in the presidential elections, since it would be going to be his third presidential term. Putin did not abandon his political plans. His inauguration was followed by several protest actions. The movement stated that the comeback of Putin was planned even before the presidency of Dmitry A. Medvedev, and that Medvedev had occupied this position in order to prevent Putin from losing his control over the country. In the beginning of 2013 the movement was still active in both offline and online public spheres, but the street activities declined.

The political agendas of the movement have been rather unstable. The movement started with clear practical suggestions, with accusing concrete persons, and ended up with a relatively broad demand to conduct democratic reforms. The reluctant and inattentive reaction of the government partially explains this. Since the "smaller" claims were not paid any attention, the anger grew up and the claims evolved from situational ones into the moral judgments. Alongside with that, the movement actively picked up many other pressing issues, for example, the adoption ban law, or also known in Russia as an anti-orphans law. The law was passed after the death of a Russian child, adopted by an American family. The family was obviously guilty, but the case was too much generalized. The adoption of the law fueled many Russian citizens with anger. A

similar impulse was given when the music band Pussy Riot was sentenced to prison for singing a political song inside the Cathedral of the Christ the Savior in Moscow.

It is still unclear to what extent the movement represents the population of Russian. Street demonstrations and rallies have taken place from time to time all over Russia, but there was a big anti-movement, supporting particularly Putin. During 2011-2013 the Snow Revolution movement intensively used ad hoc developed online platforms for the crowd-sourcing, and popular blogs and social networks for spreading their argumentations. As a result, many people from the regions visited Moscow and took part in the street rallies, and the citizens of Moscow voluntarily went to other regions of Russia to support the rallies or to attend local elections in the role of independent observers. Nevertheless, the movement was named "Rebellion of the angry city dwellers" in the media and social networks, highlighting that they mainly represent the population of Moscow.

Facebook and politics

Literature review

Scholars from different fields have tried to approach Facebook. Within communication science, Facebook studies mainly fall into the uses and gratification theory, which examines individual motives for use. The study of Park et al. (2009) says that people use Facebook for entertainment, informing, socializing and self-seeking. There is also an attempt to classify social networks on the basis of their functionality. Kietzmann et al. (2011) developed an idea of building blocks, which are entailed by biggest international social networks – Facebook, LinkedIn, YouTube -, but in different proportions. The main building block of Facebook and its main function is mediation in establishing and sustaining social and professional relationships. Less important functions are instrumentality for maintaining an online presence, for maintaining an online identity, for conducting conversions with other users and for promoting a reputation. One can say that for a person actively using Facebook her profile must be an important part of the life experience. The question is, if the same is true for the Facebook-based groups and communities.

The relationship between an offline and an online political activity of Facebook users is still controversial for scholars. Some case studies provide evidence that Facebook is a simple extension of the offline world. The others give evidence that Facebook is a powerful and an independent communication tool.

A case study of Harlow (2011) about Guatemala gives a brilliant example of how careful one must be in drawing any conclusions about Facebook. In her paper Harlow (2011) examines a few Facebook communities that criticized the president of Guatemala. From the very emergence of the Facebook-based communities the discussions were influenced by racial and ethnic controversies, which have been disputed offline even before. At some point, the users switched explicitly to the racial and ethnic questions. Harlow states that she did not find

any new racial and ethnic discourses that could be different from those dominating the offline public sphere.

In another paper about Guatemala and the same social movement Harlow (2010) delivers a rather opposite finding. Although her other study showed little innovation in the web discourse, this study gave an example of one of the social movement organizations which emerged as a Facebook community, but then moved offline. This means that Facebook possesses its own mobilizing power.

The study of Chinese NGOs and their use of Facebook by Lo and Waters (2012) has ambiguous findings as well. The study shows that Facebook use does not say alone anything about communication strategies of an organization; further investigation is required.

The 2008 presidential campaign in the USA fuelled many research papers, among them one by Vitak, Zube, Smock, Carr, Ellison, and Lampe (2009), and one by Wolley, Limperos and Oliver (2010). A literature review provided by Vitak et al. (2009) proved that Facebook use promotes a slight increase in the voter turnout, since the online social networks serve as a resource of independent and reliable information about the candidates, thus, increasing the interest in politics and stimulating people for voting. A study of Vitak et al. showed that the main types of individual political activity on Facebook are adding comments to political posts and sharing links on political topics. The participants of the survey conducted by Vitak and his colleagues mainly used Facebook for receiving and spreading political information. The motives for online participation were a need for the involvement, and a need for learning. The participants of the survey were interested in looking into the experiences of other people. The study by Wolley et al. (2010) focuses on the way users discuss image of a candidate. In this study Facebook appears as a powerful tool of political campaigning.

Fernback (2012) in his study examines the resistance groups on Facebook who aimed to prevent an intervention in their private lives from the side of the Facebook owners and advertisers. Fernback highlights a specific discourse of the communities and the high level of their creativity efforts.

A strategic political use of Facebook was revealed not only in the case studies about online campaigning, but also in an interesting case study about an endeavor to change stereotypical thinking of young Americans and Palestinians in relation to each other (Alhabash 2009). Facebook provided participants of the study with the space for establishing new social ties. New social ties helped them to re-assess their stereotypes and attitudes to each other, although, not to the same extend for both nationalities. This study showed how one of the main Facebook functions – social relationships establishment assistance – can influence cognitive structures of the respondents.

The study of Langlois, Elmer, McKelvey and Devereaux (2009) not only argues that the Facebook-based political communities elaborate on many non-mainstream political topics, but also posits an innovative methodological question. Does the technical design of the online communities influence the

discourse that the users of these communities make use of?

The code, languages, and architectures, as well as the other elements that produce a human-understandable visual interface, impose specific constraints on the communication process while also allowing for new possibilities of expression, and in that way, they redefine what it means to communicate online. (Langlois et al. 2009: 420).

Paying a special attention to the different elements of a Facebook page leads us to the clarification of their role in the spread of specific issues, and to figuring out their contribution to the mobilization of a movement.

Facebook communities of the Russian Snow Revolution movement

Two collaborating Facebook pages were chosen for a closer examination. The group page and the fan page were founded in autumn 2011 and have been supporting the movement by publishing all important news and announcements.

Both groups have been serving as information hubs. The most posts include a link to other online resources, for instance, other social networks – YouTube, Twitter, Live Journal, - to the crowd-sourcing platforms, to the opposition and pro-governmental media. The fan page keeps people informed about forthcoming events, publishes calls for help, for example, when volunteers are wanted etc., provides information about important law drafts discussed by the Parliament, about main changes in the government, other crucial economic and political news. These topics are also typical for the group page. The difference between them is that the fan page has a “moderator”, who is mostly active in posting, but not present in discussions, and in the group page the users are active in both posting and commenting, and there is no “moderator”. The first page is a kind of a one-to-many communication, and the latter is a many-to-many communication oriented towards the opinion exchange.

The intensity of visiting the fan page is rather high. For instance, the fan page was given 33,000+ “likes” and some posts on the newsfeed collected up to 800 „likes“. The group page has 3,000+ followers. The intensity of users’ activity is also high. Although the messages on the newsfeed do not receive so much attention as those from the fan page, the frequency of posting here is much higher— up to 20 new messages per day (less than 10 messages for the fan page, if there is no ongoing street rally). It proves that both groups do play a role in the development of the Russian Snow Revolution movement and constitute a real online-based social movement organization (SMO).

Facebook provides a social movement scholar with an enormous amount of information. People gather here because they have common interests and needs. Adherents, sympathizers and leaders openly publish their plans, ideas and opinions. Posts and comments are analogous to the data that can be collected

from the focus groups. A regular monitoring of the newsfeeds is a kind of a participatory observation. One of the available functions is to sort posts on the basis of their origin, and separate posts published by the community owners from those created by the ordinary users, and to compare communication patterns, discourses and dominating frames.

This case study aimed to answer the question, whether this particular SMO "actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers" (Benford & Snow 2000: 613). For this purpose, a population of public messages in both groups was examined with the framing analysis methods. The underlying assumption was that if the SMO, particularly the online community, has attracted so many followers and sustained an enduring discussion, than one can expect a presence of a clear *collective action frame* in its messages.

Public discourse and collective action frames

I escape here from the detailed discussion of the frame theory, which has been already well elaborated by both social movement scholars and communication science students. I will only give a few remarks to bridge the history of the movement with my research strategy.

To frame means to structure a content of communication in such a way that a particular perspective dominates in the messages. Scheufele (2004) elaborates on the idea that any frame has slots – cells with defined functions. There is a rather stable set of slots, which a successful collective action frame must have to possess a high mobilizing power. Each slot has a specific function, for instance, a slot "causal agents". The slot indicates anyone or anything which makes a social group suffer. It can be an actor or an institution, or even a rather abstract phenomenon, like globalization, for example. Thus, the slot has a function of appointing a causal agent. The appointment can be different depending on the aim of an actor producing the frame, and is called "default value".

Since the members of the Facebook communities are the grassroots organizations, one should not expect that they publish professional press releases. Their messages are not products of a clear strategy. For this reason, the second assumption of the study was that the SMO did not have clear statements about their demands, but rather find themselves in the process of the articulation of the frame. I suppose that the default values in the slots of this collective action frame can be replaced with metaphors. That means that the data analysis would require some more sophisticated instruments, like discourse analysis.

A communicator does not randomly choose words and their sequences; these choices – linguistic choices - are influenced by the strategic goals and by the social and political environment. Any communication has its context and is a part of a specific public *discourse*, which is:

The totality of codified linguistic usages attached to a given type of social practice.

(Marks 2013).

In this paper, the data analysis utilizes the methods of Van Dijk's Socio-Cognitive Discourse Analysis (SCDA) and mind mapping to explicate main discursive structures from the empirical data.

SCDA, like any discourse analysis, employs the idea of the discourse as a language in use, as vocabulary and grammar, which is made use of in a given situation and help to understand the situation and its connection with the historical path of a given society. SCDA incorporates this common idea of the discourse with the idea of a frame. As Tenorio writes,

A large part of van Dijk's practical investigation deals with stereotypes, the reproduction of ethnic prejudice, and power abuse by elites and resistance by dominated groups. (Tenorio 2011: 190).

An SCDA highlights a process of bargaining over shared meanings between individuals and groups, as well as "coherence, lexical and topic selection, rhetorical figures, speech acts, propositional structures, implications, hesitation and turn-taking control" (Tenorio 2011: 191). The bargain about the shared meanings can be seen not only as a discursive process, but a framing process as well. Metaphors and rhetorical figures, stereotypes, which were inherited from the historical past, are used to highlight a particular perspective on an issue, to frame it in a way. Such an analysis requires grounded theory methods. After the coding is finished, the codes are classified into the categories; categories and rules constitute concepts, and eventually a theory can be formulated. Although grounded theory leaves a lot of free space for maneuvers, there are nevertheless a few predictable outcomes of the framing analysis to be expected. The literature from the social movement studies gives an idea of what types of collective action frame exist across movements, and which types of frames can facilitate the movement and which cannot.

The most popular frame is "an injustice frame" (Benford and Snow 2000: 615). If a message is written within this frame, then it is likely to have words, frames and modalities, which help to create a feeling of injustice. The injustice frame means that the ideas in the text highlight the situation of inequality, with some actors dominating or exploiting others.

As Gamson (1992) argues, any collective action frame that is successful in mobilizing people, must utilize not only the elements of the injustice frame, but also the elements of agency and of the identity frame. The agency frame must demonstrate that the followers of the movement are able to challenge the existing status-quo. The identity frame must demarcate the followers from other social groups and show them as a strongly coherent community.

Gamson sees the element "causal agents" as the key one in the injustice frame. Causal agents must not be "impersonal, abstract forces" (Gamson 1992: 32). The

more precisely these agents are described, the stronger is the mobilizing power of the frame. Besides, collective actors must show causal agents as intentionally acting. At the same time, the causal agents must not be isolated from the social structures, but be presented as rather a product of these structures. So, there must be a balance and a clear relationship between the political situation and a particular causal agent. The agent must not appear as a victim in the end. The best option is to define a causal agent as a social group, or a corporation, or an institution. For these reasons, the bargaining over the definition of the "causal agents" appears as a key framing process (Gamson 1992: 32).

Benford and Snow (2000) go a bit deeper. They look into the framing processes, and consider frames as products of the *strategic* creation of meaning. The investigation of the framing processes is another bridge between frame and discourse analysis. In this paper the author concentrates on the primary framing processes within a movement, which Benford and Snow call "discursive processes" (Benford and Snow 2000: 615). The very first process is frame articulation. A movement bargains over the events, issues and actors which are of a special meaning for it. On the stage of amplification the movement assigns dominant meanings to some events, issues and agents (Benford and Snow 2000: 623). That's briefly how the slots are chosen, highlighted and filled with specific default values.

Benford and Snow elaborate on compositions of slots, or what they call framing dimensions. There are three of them. Diagnostic framing is a victim positioning of a particular social group, a strategic production of meaning aiming to convince a wider audience in an existence of a social problem, and a process of labeling causal agents. Prognostic framing suggests a solution. The diagnostic frame presents the solution as rational, potentially successful and realistic for the implementation. The third dimension is a motivational one. It relates to collective identity, emotions, to the shared sense of "Us". A motivational frame legitimizes the movement and gives evidence that this particular movement or an SMO is the best candidate for solving the problem.

The components of collective action frames are subject to "conceptual stretching" (Sartori 1970), which is defined through the variable features. Variable features of a frame are the abilities of it to expand or to shrink in definitions, an ability to change a focus, and, thus, to change a problem or the way of labeling it.

Research design

Research questions

As previously highlighted, the Bolotnaya movement was reluctant to reach the goals that it had in the beginning, but has been existing for 2 years so far. After the first failures it did not disappear and was active in picking up new issues. There must be something in common in all these agendas, and something behind them that is a genuinely substantial concern of the middle class in Russia. A mixed research design was employed to reveal a true demand of the

movement. It was important not only to identify a collective action frame, which appeared to be a rather weak one, but also to investigate a historical discourse, a vocabulary of these collective action frames.

Based on the literature, the research questions are:

- (1) What kind of collective action frames are present on the Facebook pages of the Russian Snow Revolution movement?
- (2) What kind of discourse are these frames built upon?
- (3) Which historical circumstances made the movement use this particular discourses and collective action frames?

The first phase of the study employed a qualitative analysis to investigate discourses and frames. On the second phase the author continued to work with the literature to collect scholarly pieces which explain use of the particular discourse and frames from a historical perspective.

Data and methods of the qualitative content analysis

The data set consisted of the publicly available messages from both pages. It included a manifest of the SMO (published by the group page), status updates (or posts) from the newsfeeds of both pages, analyzed separately, and comments associated with the status updates. The communities have been being monitored on the regular since their creation till now, and the data for this article was gathered from March to November 2012.

A qualitative content analysis was conducted. Messages were put through several readings. An ad hoc code book, prepared in advance, was made use of. New codes were added after the open coding procedures were employed. Together old and new codes were put through axial coding, and then a final explanatory concept was developed.

The codes for collective action frames were developed on the basis of the two scholarly articles: one by Benford and Snow (2000) and one by Gerhards (1995).

Gerhards suggests 5 simple slots (Gerhards 1995: 227):

- issue and the interpretation of it as an urgent social problem;
- agents who caused the problem (causal agents);
- goals of a movement or of a particular SMO;
- chances of success;
- addressee of the claims;
- legitimization of the movement or of the SMO.

The logic of the frame analysis can be updated a bit to make the theory more coherent and to facilitate operationalization, as well as to highlight the interplay between Othering and building a collective identity. The following codes were

added to the ad hoc code book:

- "Us" – active followers of a social movement;
- "You" - prospective followers of a social movement;
- "they" - opponents of a movement.

The issue is being pushed back and forth between "Us", "You" and "They", and, thus, turned into a social problem. That's why these categories must be identified in the data.

Findings

Results of the study fall into the following categories:

- (1) a weak collective action frame;
- (2) a strong collective action frame;
- (3) reference to a historical experience which caused the use of the latter frame;
- (4) theoretical elaboration: negative and positive poles of collective narratives;
- (5) methodological elaboration: new techniques of the frame analysis;
- (6) practical advices: how to build a successful framing strategy.

Messages in the fan and in the group pages differ considerably. The fan pages provide mainly news broadcasting and reports about last street manifestation, initiatives taken by the informal leaders, or recent political events with a few comments on their meaning for the movement. The group page is likely a space for comprehensive discussions. Nevertheless, the framing strategies of both communities are rather weak. First of all, I describe the results of the analysis of the manifest that was published by the group page community, then give examples from the fan page that made use of the similar collective action frame. In the second part I describe a collective action frame which was found in the messages of the group page.

Table 1 summarizes the findings and visualizes their location in the empirical data.

a fan page		a group page	
data	findings	data	findings
The newsfeed: single posts	a weak frame	The "info" tab: the manifest of the SMO	a weak frame
		The newsfeed: single post	a strong frame

Table 1. Empirical data and findings

Weak framing strategies

The analysis of the manifest has revealed a weak collective action frame that does not provide any clear understanding of the problematic situation and suggests no solution. It makes use of the "negative" descriptions ("what we do not want"), instead of the positive descriptions ("what we do want"), and uses pronouns instead of giving real names. It is supposed that readers have an idea of what is behind these pronouns because they share similar historical experience. The presence of negative description led to the elaboration of the specific concept of a negative frame and methodological tools for investigating it (the template cards). Before delivering a detailed report of the analysis, some more remarks must be provided.

The vocabulary of the framing processes can be placed into the different level of abstraction (Gamson 1992: 385; Tarrow 1992: 177): values, strategy and tactics. "Strategy" and "tactics" are respectively long-term and short-term guidelines for action; "values" are abstract ideas, like "god" and "bad", or "friend" or "foe". The meaningful interactions between "goals and chances of success" and 'legitimization' are assured by more practice based sub-elements like:

- "strategy";
- "tactics";
- "solution" as a special case of a tactic;
- "efficiency" – an assessment of the certain strategies or tactical instruments;
- "danger" – a negative assessment of chances.

The interaction between the elements "You" and "legitimation" appears as an "obligation" in the framing strategy of the Bolotnaya SMO. It means that the group is trying to mobilize people by convincing them that their participation is a kind of duty.

Below is the full text with some examples of coding (English translation).

- We were on the Bolotnaya Square (*tactic*). We will be back again (*tactic*)!
- Friends (*motivational*)! We are not the party (*no-strategy, no-prognostic*), and we are not launching any revolution (*no-strategy, no-prognostic*). We just demand (*strategy, prognostic*) to give us back (*solution, prognostic*) what was stolen from us – our votes in the election polls (*issue, diagnostic*). For this very purpose we gathered at the Bolotnaya Square (*tactic, prognostic*). There have we seen that there are a lot of us (*efficiency, motivational*). That inspires us (*efficiency, motivational*), it is already a big victory (*efficiency, motivational*). But our task is not so far solved; our demands were not satisfied (*danger, motivational*). The more important is (*obligation, motivational*) to continue what has been begun.

For this purpose we created a group (*tactic, prognostic*). The group was created so that we do not lose each other. (*tactic, prognostic*)

On the page with the same name

- [link]

The news and announcements will be published.

Add your friends!

The collective action frame from this manifest violates the principles of an ideal frame, elaborated by Gerhards (1995). For instance:

1. The phrase “We just demand..” is not followed by any addressee of the demands. This is a very serious mistake. It challenges all other elements, such as strategy and motivation, since no political opponent was identified.
2. There is a good and rich description of the strategy, including the clarification of inappropriate methods (“party”, “revolution”), but a lack of “Us” and “Causal Agents”, so that the frame becomes even less trustworthy because of a frequent, but always dull and meaningless reference to “Us”.
3. There is no explanation like “Why are we better than the others in solving this problem?”, although the question seems logical after one sees a teaser “We are not ...”.
4. The “Us” appears in almost every sentence, but there is no clear reference to what “Us” actually means: which social group the adherents belong to, which strategic aims underlie their tactics.
5. There are no long-term targets: what kind of a future is an ideal one?

The reference to “no-strategy” and “no-solution” must call in memory a negative historical experience, the stereotypes that people still have or have learned from

the public discourse. This experience is a failed endeavor to create a party system in the beginning of the 1990s (after the decline of the USSR), followed by the disappointment in political parties as such, and the Great October Revolution and disappointment in the Bolsheviks' Russia. Thus, the authors of the manifest wanted to show that their methods would not lead to any recurrence of this experience. From the one side, it seems reasonable in the current communicative situation – an entire public suspicion about the authoritative tendencies, which creates a fear of getting back into the time of the Great Repressions of the 1937. From the other side, any mention of a bad historical experience instead of elaborations on a desirable future seems to be a big strategic mistake. The demarcating line between these communities, political parties and revolutionary groups do not contribute to the understanding of the methods, aims and identities of the movement. Political parties are the insiders of the political system and revolutionary groups are the outsiders. So, this is already a dichotomy, and there is no place for any third category in it, which is not a party and not a revolutionary group. Of course, in a real life we also have NGOs and a civil society as alternatives to the first two categories, but such an unclear label for the community cannot help one to decide whether he or she should also join it.

Political ideologies "at work" often employ negative and positive narratives (Schlipphak 2011). Negative and positive poles of an ideology or political program not only help getting trust and building a collective "Us". They are necessary to show the strengths of a political actor in comparison with his rivals. No political actor can avoid presenting a negative pole of his ideology, because none exists in a political vacuum, where there is no political competition. The question of negative and positive poles in a collective action frame has not been touched on by any scholar so far. It needs some conceptualization. As Goertz (2006) says, any concept in sociology must have both negative and positive poles. The positive pole describes what is expected to take place, and a negative one provides an idea of what is not expected or allowed to exist. Let us apply it to the collective action frames. In a message produced by a movement there can be negative and/or positive poles. The slots of a collective action frame can be filled with the objects or ideas, which are not expected to be present or did not exist in a fact. The positive pole is positive in the sense that something has happened, and negative one is negative in the sense that something has not happened, not going to happen, or is not desirable.

Table 2 illustrates the consequences of this elaboration for the empirical qualitative framing analysis. One can start by identifying the framing dimensions and then sorting them into poles, or, vice versa, by indicating two poles and then the framing dimensions.

core framing tasks					
diagnostic		prognostic		motivational	
poles		poles		poles	
positive	negative	positive	negative	positive	negative
What was stolen from us	-	We just demand to give us back	We are not a party	There are a lot of us	-
		We gathered at Bolotnaya Square	We are not launching a revolution	That inspires	
				A big victory	
				Our task is not solved	
				Our demands are not satisfied	
				The more important is it – to continue	

Table 2. Template cards

This case study has shown that the content related to the motivational dimension outweighs two other dimensions. Recalling a negative historical experience and phrases like “We are not” are supposed to create trust. The shared myths (“We were on the Bolotnaya square”) are good stimuli, and can connect people together, create a common identity, attach adherents to the community, but they highlight here even more that there is no idea about how the future must look like.

The verb “to continue” (“The more important is to continue”) could have built a bridge between the memory about the past, the understanding of the present and the future, but the latter one is just missed. “To continue” only intensifies the impression that the SMO is highly insecure about its own future.

Below are some examples of certain linguistic choices, and why they are fortunate or not.

We are not a party, and we are not launching a revolution ... We just demand ...
“Not – “not” versus “just”

After having read two negative statements one would expect to see more than two positive ones to understand who “We” are in the end.

We just demand to give us back what was stolen from us – our votes in the election polls.

“Give back” versus “steal” (in this case, the modalities in Russian and English do not exactly match. The passive voice in Russian still possesses a kind of agency).

The use of “give back” and “steal” looks like moral judgments, which is a must for any collective action frame.

For this very purpose we gathered at the Bolotnaya Square. There have we seen that there are a lot of us. That inspires us, it is already a big victory.

“Gathered” – “there are a lot of us” – “inspires” – “a big victory”

In his analysis of the anti-IMF protest frame Gerhards points the same phrase: “there are a lot of us” – as the example of a proper content for mobilizing slots in the frame (Gerhards 1995).

Nevertheless, in an injustice frame one would expect connotations of anger and not only of positive emotions. There must have been something between “stolen” and “inspires”: a problem as an injustice and a ground of the deprivation, something that causes negative emotions in “Us”, then a bridge to the solution, and from it to the motivation.

While it may seem obvious that the three core framing tasks – diagnostic, prognostic and motivational – must be congruent with each other, the empirical data have shown that the lack of congruency can take place. In the present example the core tasks do not contradict with each other, they were just written in the categories belonging to the different levels of abstraction. The diagnostic dimension says that the faked elections are problematic. The prognostic dimension offers a very abstract solution – “give [our voices] back”, and motivational one uses emotional component (“that inspires us”). Of course, for any person who finds himself in this situation, it is more or less clear that the solution is to cancel the results of the faked elections and to organize new ones. But this, would it have been present in the declaration, would also have had no connection with the emotional emphasis of the motivational dimension.

The manifest is not the only message that leaves an impression of uncertainty. The SMO publishes a lot of live reports about the street manifestation and rallies. Below there is a message telling about a meeting, which was to have taken place on the Red Square – the very heart of Moscow, which is of an inestimable historical meaning for Russians. The city authorities closed the Square, arguing that it was in an urgent need of repair.

[photo]

That's how “the repair” of the Red Square looks like now. Tell me, doesn't it enrage **you** that **they** lie and that **everybody** just does not care? **You** do not care? Come to the zero point. (*Bold is mine*).

There is one more post as an example of the weak framing strategy. The post was published soon after the invention of the first official symbol of the movement – a white ribbon, which everybody was supposed to wear.

If you don't want to attend the rallies – don't do it. If you don't want a ribbon – don't wear it. If you don't want to walk down the boulevards – don't do it, nobody forces you. But don't pick to pieces those, who come, wears, walks. 'cause it turns out to sound unconvincing. From under the escapist and disdainful reasoning appears the mug of Philistine: "Ah aren't they like all others? Don't they have anything to do?"

One can see that such an important element of a frame, as Othering, or a confrontation of the „Us“ and „They“, was presented only with pronouns, so that it is absolutely unclear which social groups belong to each category. Together with a few other posts, these pieces constitute a "Lie Frame". The Lie Frame is a highly abstract one; it blames a ruling elite in betraying citizens.

The administrators of the Facebook pages are trying to say that the most important evil is, first, that the authorities are not fair with the nation and, second, that the majority of the population is indifferent to this situation. From the administrators' point of view, these two facts must make people feel angry. And the anger is the legitimatizing reason to hold the rallies.

Thus, the weak framing strategy of the SMO can be characterized by the incongruent framing dimensions, the usage of the negative narrative, where the positive ones could be more appropriate and motivating, the shortage of clear labeling, or the usage of pronouns without introducing nouns.

Strong framing strategies

A qualitative content analysis showed two peculiarities in the stories published by the group page. The adherents of the movement are mainly concerned with the weakness of state institutions and the high personalization of the Russian politics. The idea which frames communication between the members of the group page can be given the name "The fear of getting back into the USSR". The community members do not reject the weak frame, which was manifested in the messages in the fan group page, and in the declaration of the SMO, but transform it and give it clear and precise meaning. They fill its slots by discussing different articles from anti- and pro-government media. The community members provide a *re-framing*: they retell a published story using historical metaphors and stereotypes, thus, giving the story a new meaning. Often they add a link to the same story, published in another media. The story in a post always has some core problems, or key persons, but different details are highlighted in the post and in the comments. The core problems or key persons find themselves in different contexts. In doing so, the users negotiate the meaning that should be granted to a story.

A communicative situation within which the discourses are produced refers to the collective resistance to the recent authoritative tendencies in Russia. One and the same person leads the country for a long time; it is logical to expect a growing fear of the power concentration. Since the democratization processes have not been finished so far, one can guess that the institutional make-up of the country is relatively weak. Thus, the context of communication is a strong power misbalance, a shortage of the transparency of the public institutions and the marginalization of the civil society. Those SMOs which in winter 2011 decided to change the situation met the problem of communicating their claims since they have been long ignored by official media and since communicating collective goals and strategies never appear to be a simple task. A movement has not only to communicate the components of a collective action frame, but also to change a proper vocabulary, use appropriate metaphors, catch phrases that are understandable for the target audience. Such a vocabulary must be connotative rather than denotative; must connect the previous experience of the nation with the current situation.

Unexpectedly, the Facebook community intensively makes use of the authoritative discourse of the Soviet propaganda, which every person in Russia learns through Soviet movies and Soviet literature. For instance, a user shares a link to an article in a pro-government online newspaper. Other users re-interpret the story by commenting on the post. The interpretation tells the story as it would have been presented in a Soviet movie, with the propagandist labels of that time. The discussants compare the current political situation in Russia with the past by sharing links to other online publications. Often the comparisons are sarcastic. The vocabulary of the Soviet propaganda is used to ridicule, for instance, government's initiatives. Since the Soviet Union has declined, any such reference means that a state-promoted project is going to fail.



Figure 1. A photo collage comparing Putin (right) and Stalin (left)

There are three more popular discourses in the messages. I would label them the managerial discourse, the "Imperial Russia" discourse and the the "Second World War" discourse. The last one is the extension of the Soviet discourse. It includes metaphors and expressions from the old Soviet movies about the Second World War, like "battle-front", "occupation" etc. The managerial discourse is a use of the managerial, financial and economic vocabulary in relation to politics, like, "optimization of education", where the word "optimization" means cost reduction and efficiency growth. The "Imperial Russia" discourse appears through the words and phrases which were typical in Russia before the Great October Revolution and which can now be found in the popular culture and classic literature. Two historical discourses play a role that cannot be replaced by any other discourse. They explain to the new generations, what is tolerated and what is not tolerated in politics. The managerial discourse grew up because of the symbiosis of the governmental and business elites (see the section "Political context").



Figure 2. A photo collage comparing Soviet elites (above) and ruling elites of the 1990s (below)

The discourse with the Soviet origin appears to be not just a simple vocabulary; it demonstrates the coherence of its metaphors, the presence of a durable imaginary construct behind it.

The last findings are the two types of discursive framing processes typical for this SMO. I would name these two linguistic phenomena discourse incorporation and a re-framing respectively. Re-framing was mentioned in a few political science papers (for instance, Dembrinska 2012; Killian 2012; Dyer 2010), but had another meaning. My definitions are the following.

Discourse incorporation is the process of an intentional usage of the discourse strategies, metaphors, catch phrases etc. which would more suit a political opponent, or are already used by them. *Re-framing* refers to granting a new meaning to a situation by placing it in another context and explanatory model.

As it was mentioned, both activists and ordinary followers of this SMO have problems with describing a desirable future, but strongly concentrated on discussing the Russian past, which scared them. The past is associated with the repressions and absence of political rights and personal freedom. But the centralized state is not the main threat in this collective action frame. In a few posts the users explicitly discuss the problem of the rejuvenation of the ruling elites. The question of the aging elite is elaborated, for instance, through

comparing Russia and China. In China, a user argues, the ruling elites are regularly replaced, despite not by means of the free elections. In Russia, on the contrary, the elites are not challenged by elections, but rather by processes that are not public. The inability to control these processes appears to be a main concern of the Snow Revolution movement. The SMO also mentions the Great October Revolution of 1917. A current leader of the country – the President of Russia Vladimir V. Putin – is compared with Nicolas II, the last Emperor of Russia, who was killed by the Bolsheviks. The SMO highlights that such ways of elite replacement cannot be tolerated.

There is also one more historical personality that is mentioned. The followers of the SMO make use of a newly invented word “Putler” to compare the political course of Putin with the leader of the Third Reich in Germany, responsible for genocide and mass murders. The metaphors, related to the Second World War discourse, are used in relation to a few legislative initiatives, which regulate a socio-demographic sphere, and intervene in the private sphere to some extent.

This overrepresentation of the negative connotations of the historical past shows that the followers see their past through the frame which can be called “The Degradation”. Therefore, any possible return to the past through irremovability of the elites seems to be a way to the degradation.

The followers of the Facebook-based SMO provided a reach narrative explaining their fears, but failed to present the way of a political development that they want to implement. Alongside with that, they demonstrate a weak agency, formulate their collective tasks neither explicitly nor by giving any positive historical example. They intensively demarcate themselves not only from the ruling elites, but from other social groups, the scope of which is unclear as well.

Eventually, two main hypotheses about social and political backgrounds, which can give a meaning to an unstable agenda of the current SMO and explain its collective action frames, can be brought to the discussion. The first hypothesis is that the personalization of the politics in Russia might influence the choice of the frame. This means in particular that few persons have a monopoly on the political decision-making process in Russia. The second hypothesis says that the state and social institutions appear weak and amorphous, dependent on the personalities. Together these two traits make up and sustain a strong hierarchical order of the Russian society, with the shortage of the social lifts – opportunities to make a political career based on the professional skills and not on the personal relationships with the ruling elite. This also explains a weak agency of the SMO.

The main ambiguity of the collective action frame is that the followers of the SMO address their claims to the ruling elites, who have caused the problematic situation. The shortage of their own agency appears once again in a repeated statement that the current elites will decline, since the elites of the Soviet Union declined once and the new elites have a lot in common with them or have strong relationships with them.

A strong attention of the followers (and of the whole movement, one can argue)

to the political elites in Russia and the distrust in the state institutions can get an explanation from recent Russian Studies. The next section provides a literature review.

Political context and its influence on framing processes

The fact that the USSR had thoroughly settled in the heads of people who were born even in the end or right after the end of the communist epoch, was highlighted, for instance, by Holak et al. (2007). From the USSR Russia has inherited three main socio-political constraints: a strongly hierarchical social order, a personalization of the state power, and, as the mixture of the previous two, a leading role of the powerful clientèles. The Bolotnaya SMO sees its task in challenging these constraints physically, but seems to have inherited them cognitively as well. Since the communist and Russian studies are rather specific and not widely known research fields, I have to talk about them in detail.

In Russia, as Huskey (2010) argues, the election system is not a way to obtain power, but a confirmation of the power that has long been possessed. And this is the bridge between the political context and the first agenda of the protest movement –election fraud. The fact that the elections are perceived as a fraud has strong historical roots in a modern Russian history. The political system in Russia functions upon the decisions of the ruling elites, and not because the stable institutional design. And it was the same in the USSR.

Puffer and McCarthy (2007) distinguish between three types of the ruling elites in Russia: economic, oligarchic and paramilitary ones. Puffer and McCarthy (2007), as well as Kryshtanovskaya and White (2005), argue that new Russian business elites started to form during a first decade after the USSR decline, when Boris N. Yeltsin had been the President of Russia for 8 years (2 periods). The origins of the new elites had, nevertheless, strong roots in the Soviet Union administration (Kryshtanovskaya White 2005: 297). People who occupied the most important administrative positions were widely known as “nomenklatura”. After the decline of the communist empire they moved to a business sector or continued their political careers. Among them was Yeltsin himself, who also created a strong political and economic clan, called the “Family” (Kryshtanovskaya White 2005: 294; Hashim 2005). This symbiotic fusion of the business elites and the state institutions constitutes Russian corporatism (Kryshtanovskaya White 2005: 296). Yeltsin’s Family appears in the messages as the reference to the Imperial Family, and the paramilitary elites are articulated as the reference to the Third Reich.

The youngest part of the elites is the paramilitary group “Siloviki”. Few key scholars mention it (Shlapentokh 2004; Kryshtanovskaya White 2005). Siloviki is a group of people who served in the army, the secret service and the police, and who afterwards went into business or politics and have been intensively using their contacts with old friends who stayed in the state administration.

Shevtsova (2012) highlights a huge degree of the personalization of Russian politics and the role of Putin as a key person in it. Putin, who has served in the

Russian secret service for many years, is perceived by the movement as a leader of the Siloviki clientéle. This led to the central position of Putin in the public discourse as a main referent of the negative connotations. In an attempt to express their anger, the netizens invented the word "Putler" and often mentioned state repressions in their discussions. De Vries and Shekshnia (2008) compare Putin with the head of a commercial company, who has to defend the interests of the stakeholders. This metaphor also reflects main results of the elitist studies about Russia.

One of the main leitmotifs of the Russian studies is that Russia is gradually going back to an authoritarian type of governance (Shlapentokh 2007). It results in a creation of hyperbolic state, permanently and increasingly intervening into the social and private spheres, by implementing censorship, for instance. This intervention has been being long "forgiven" by the citizens, as long as the state income from exporting oil and gas was high enough to keep the state functioning in the sense of providing population with common goods such as education, health care etc. The level of the state performance suffers from a higher corruption and underfinancing. Corruption, as Shlapentokh (2012) states, seems to be one of the main fundamentals of the authoritative Russia under Putin, the extension of his personal power, and a status-quo fully satisfying the ruling elites.

Watching the fights between elites, remembering the slogans of the early 1990s that promised to set up democracy in Russia, and not just create new political clans, disappointed with the public services and corruption, feared by the presence of a hidden government, the population of Russia lost trust in the ruling elites and addressed its anger to Putin as the top person. Indirectly, the faked political competition between Putin and the third President of Russia D. Medvedev (Shevtsova 2012) contributed to the strongest deprivation, in which the population ended up in the beginning of the 2010s. This deprivation is a simple understanding that citizens exert no influence upon the long-term political planning, since the decisions are made exclusively by the elites and not by the elected officials. This fact led again to the dominance of the Soviet discourse, comparisons with the Imperial Russia and the Third Reich.

Another problem is the question of succession. The first President of Russia, B. Yeltsin, stepped down in 1999, few months before the formal end of his presidency. The official reason was that he was too old to go on. He announced it in his speech on New Year Eve, which every President in Russia routinely holds, a few months before Putin first seriously appeared on the big political scene. In 2008 Putin calmed down the public opinion, and promised that he was not going to change the Constitution of Russia in order to get into his office for a third time. He nevertheless took part in the presidential race 4 years later, because such a pause did not violate the constitutional order. Putin has spent 4 years of Medvedev's Presidency as Prime Minister.

A comparison with Nicolas II shows that the violent rejuvenation scared the movement and its adherents. But the comparison with Hitler is even more terrifying, since the transfer of power in that case was not only anticipated by a

bloody war, but was followed with terror and genocide. Besides, the faked political competition between two prominent politicians convinced citizens to believe that the democratic reforms in Russia were driven by the elites and have now been stopped by them.

Thus, in the year 2011 Russia embodied a corporatist state, whose political course was formulated within a narrow cycle of political, business and paramilitary elites. Since the protest movement finds itself in such a context for many years, its followers do not see any other solution than to start dialogue with the elites. This intention was reflected in the Facebook discussions that were examined in this study. The followers of the movement do not think institutionally, so to speak. They confront the police, for instance, strongly criticizing it. From their point of view, there are some power nodes in the country, organized in a strong hierarchical order, by which all political decisions are made. Even while discussing new legislative initiatives, the followers mostly try to guess, which elite groups can be in favor of a new law. It shows that the followers are strongly convinced by the idea of the hidden power structures, which sometimes appears publicly. The weakness of state institutions is permanently highlighted, together with the strong and enduring character of the old state and social non-democratic institutions that existed in the Imperial Russia and in the Soviet Union, for instance, serfdom and a repression machine.

The frame "The fear of getting back into the USSR" is highly ambiguous in two more aspects. Many studies confirmed that the ability of a movement to fit a collective action frame into the wider cultural and historical memories (Benford Snow 2000) is beneficial. The Bolotnaya SMO has such an ability, indeed. But it was also proved that a frame works better when the diagnostic dimension is not just a stereotyped label, but a rather detailed narrative (Cress and Snow 2000). The Bolotnaya SMO uses historical metaphors even as a diagnostic framing. Since historical personalities and situations remained in the past, *and are not present anymore*, this harms the explanatory power of the frame.

The frame must resonate with a dominant political discourse as well (Diani 1996). Although memories of the USSR can't leave anyone indifferent and, thus, strongly resonate with cultural experiences (Benford Snow 2000), the Snow Revolution movement must overcome this elite-oriented paradigm and start thinking in terms of democracy and human rights.

Discussion

A good concluding remark would be that Facebook does give an opportunity for spontaneous political creativity, and enables grassroots organizations to bring up their agendas and concerns, and listen to the public opinion about them. Facebook provides a space for elaborating shared meanings, for communication between adherents and between adherents and activists. On Facebook, adherents can offer their perspective on the problem, go deep into the issue, share their knowledge, as well as learn from each other.

It is nonetheless necessary to be careful with generalizing the findings of a single

case study. The collective action frame is built upon the comparisons with the historical past, and may be unique for Russia and not so typical for Western culture, for instance. Besides, other grassroots organizations of the Snow Revolution movement have made use of the local Russian social network, analogous to Facebook, which is called V Kontakte ("stay in touch" in Russian). Facebook was chosen for this study since the author wanted to concentrate on the content analysis and historical routes of the movement, and avoid the analysis of the technical features of V Kontakte.

Practical implications

Despite a few shortcomings, the collective action frame of the Bolotnaya Facebook community has been persistently functioning. It could function even better, if the following remarks were taken into account.

1. In a collective action frame, all framing dimensions must be present and congruent.
2. Communicating a collective action frame must involve three levels: values, strategy and tactic.
3. Both short-term and long-term goals must be introduced.
4. An appropriate vocabulary must be elaborated.
5. Any historical examples can be used, but must be placed into the chain past-present-future.
6. The goals must be considered in their relationship with the (desirable) institutional design: political actors come and leave, institutions are durable entities.
7. The framing dimensions must work to attract new members, not to exclude them.

Any activist can use Facebook not only for information distribution, but also for exploring public opinion and as guidelines for writing their own public messages.

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About the author

Yulia Lukashina was born in Penza, Russia. She received a master's degree after graduating from the National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow, where she also worked as a junior researcher in the Laboratory for Business Communication Studies. She is a PhD student at the University of Technology in Dresden, and is affiliated with the Institute for Media and Communication. Her research interests are social media (Facebook), social network analysis, frame theory, right-wing extremism and Russia studies. She can be contacted at yulia.lukashina AT mailbox.tu-dresden.de (institutional address) or y.lukashina AT gmail.com (personal email).

Calculating success: teaching movement legacies

Françoise N. Hamlin

Abstract

The official memorializing of social movements, often shaped by governments and media, generally assigns clear-cut labels of success or failure given the circumstances and perceived results of the struggle. As scholars and activists, we work to bend, oftentimes rewrite, narratives toward more nuanced assessments that include the voices and opinions of the minority in appraisals of their efforts. Sanctioned narratives of one of the most famous social movements, the mass civil rights movement in the U.S., still persist with the theme of overwhelming success for both African Americans and the nation as a whole. Using the case study of Clarksdale, a small city in the Mississippi Delta, this article aims to accomplish two goals: to rethink the mass movement's legacies in concrete ways beyond rhetoric and legal doctrine, and in doing so demonstrate how we need to challenge the dominant narratives and teach more complex histories and legacies to students and activists that cannot be neatly categorized. This essay, through a historical lens, forces a reconsideration of present racial conditions in the United States when on the one hand, the killing of black youth continues unpunished, and some would argue encouraged by prejudicial laws, yet on the other, an African American man won two national presidential elections.

Introduction

In light of decades of "colorblind" rhetoric and the apparent resurgence of overt policies and politicians determined to restore America to long held dominant (racist) values, teaching the U.S. black freedom struggle on college campuses is fraught with tensions. Here I define black freedom movement or struggle as the long-term and continuing campaign for citizenship rights, equality, and anti-racism that began at the moment of enslavement. The mass civil rights movement is the period most often defined as post-World War II through the 1970s in many places, and while this truncated definition glosses over the many nuances and variances that make periodizing impossible, it gives loose temporal markers that define specific historical moments. We expose our students to the multiple examples of courage and high morals in the grassroots uprisings against Jim Crow, involving young people exactly their age who made decisions to dedicate (and sacrifice) their lives to causes greater than themselves. We list and discuss the many federal laws and court cases that chipped away at legal segregation and discrimination, and mourn the dead.

The dilemma by the end of the semester involves *how* to end. While we can quarrel about when the mass movement really ended, how do we attend to the legacies? Ending with the election of President Obama, a historic result and clearly a legacy of work done forty and fifty years earlier to register voters in the

South, this view perpetuates what I often call the "kumbayah" phenomenon. The country has come so far, look! A black president! On the other hand, ending with the engorged/engorging prison industrial complex leads down the path of abject declension and defeat. The reality lies somewhere in the middle and many social scientists have worked to quantify success more abstractly (Gamson 2003). This essay creates a space to begin the discussion about how to calculate success when thinking more concretely and less abstractly about the mass movement for black liberation.¹

Why is it important to question (and define) success? What happens to the collective memory of the mass movement when we think about the long-term changes? Calculating degrees of success is dependent on a movement's goal. For example, there are those who will argue that steps to address legal standards of equal citizenship denote racial advancement, thus the mass movement succeeded. Their opponents will counter that if the premise of the movement was to establish basic rights from which African Americans could work towards political power and economic opportunity, then success rests on shaky foundations. I argue that the myth of the mass movement, the genuflection to a golden age where brave and noble (black and white) men, women and children stood shoulder-to-shoulder against Jim Crow, uses the legal successes of the 1950s and 1960s in the Supreme Court and federal legislative policies as proof of an improved society.

As we teach our students and our children the lessons of the past, we need to teach them how to unpack the myth and rethink definitions and evaluations of success and failure, forcing them to dissolve this very dichotomy that prevents the understanding of nuance. Using local history as a lens allows for a deeper look at the implications of law, policy, and sentiments in people's real lives, while also highlighting how some of those people found and created opportunities for change. It also shows the limitations of and the constant battle to sustain success. As much as it is about race, class plays a key role in the analysis, and a local study using real peoples' experiences complicates the often-held homogeneous vision of black communities, both past and present. Furthermore, in this essay, I use a more doctrinal understanding of law, that is, the enactment of judicial rulings and legislation, and how the authorities have enforced and interpreted legal doctrine (Sarat 2004). In places I couple this with how grassroots activists have used the law for change and sought to create new doctrine. By the end, it is clear that the raced and classed dimensions of law continues to function as a form of social control, and activists' liberation work persists in attempts to dismantle oppressive structures and then struggle against the refashioned and renamed constructions of legal control.²

¹ The author would like to thank the two anonymous readers for their insightful comments and suggestions.

² This is a narrower definition than one that acknowledges and foregrounds rights and how rights mobilize groups in ways that fuel social movements. The larger definition requires another layer of analysis not possible in an article length essay.

The study

My case study focuses on Clarksdale, Mississippi, which is not a unique place. Eighty miles south of Memphis, Tennessee, in 1950, 16,539 people lived in Clarksdale, rising to 21,105 in 1960 (53.5% were counted as “non-white”). In the 2010 census, 17,962 people resided within the city limits: 19.46% (3,496) white, 78.97% (14,184) African American. The city’s population numbers remained steady, but people left the rural county and never returned. In 1950, 49,361 lived there, dropping to 46,212 in 1960 and 40,447 in 1970. By 2010, the number had plummeted to 26,151 (22.90% white and 75.53% black).³ Most of the Mississippi Delta reflects these declining numbers. Clarksdale’s claim to fame, however, is as the home of the Blues. Celebrated musical legends, from Muddy Waters and W.C. Handy to Sam Cooke and Ike Turner, came from or gathered to hone their talents in the juke joints, churches and homes. The famous landmark, the Crossroads (of highways 61 and 49) depicts where Robert Johnson purportedly bargained with the devil: his soul for musical mastery (Palmer 1981; Weeks 1982; Gioia 2008). The Blues, an expression of hard life, pain, and challenges, found fertile home in Clarksdale, and performances on stage occurred alongside the civil rights protest performances on the streets, courtrooms, and classrooms.

The mass movement began to form in Clarksdale after 1951 when two young black women accused a white man of rape. Such attacks on black women’s bodies were commonplace in the South, testimonies and histories have documented how white men abused them with impunity. This time, however, circumstances transpired to create a climate for change. A few black citizens made the decision to fight for justice on behalf of the young women. They complained until the police arrested Greenwood truck driver E. L. Roach and took him to trial. Although he walked free soon thereafter, not a shocking outcome for crimes of this kind, as scholars like Dorothy Roberts, Crystal Feimster, and Danielle McGuire point out, the experience set in motion events that created the infrastructure for movement activity in the black community for decades (Henry 2000; Hamlin 2012).

By 1953 the small group of citizens, led by World War II veteran and pharmacist, Aaron Henry, had chartered Clarksdale/Coahoma County’s branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). The rape case had convinced them that they needed more resources to amplify the impact of any future complaints. Many members of that NAACP branch

³ “General and Statistical Information” October 1965, Carnegie Library, Clarksdale; 1994 County and City Data Book, Population, Total and by Race for Clarksdale, Mississippi; Census 2000 analyzed by the Social Science Data Analysis Network (SSDAN) at <http://www.censusscope.org/us/s28/c27/chart_popl.html>; <http://www.censusscope.org/us/s28/c27/print_chart_race.html>; “Population of Counties by Decennial Census: 1900 to 1990” by Richard L. Forstall, U.S. Bureau of the Census: <<http://www.census.gov/population/cencounts/ms190090.txt>>. The Coahoma County numbers includes the population of Clarksdale in the calculation. 2010 census information from: <<http://censusviewer.com/county/MS/Coahoma> and <<http://censusviewer.com/city/MS/Clarksdale>> (accessed 10 March 2013).

would be a driving force in the mass civil rights movement in Mississippi. Vera Pigea became the branch secretary in 1955, also organizing the youth council and advising the youth councils throughout the state during an era where adults had taught their young how to stay alive by dampening rebellious youthful spirits. They did not need to look far for examples why; months before Pigea took on her NAACP role, she had been part of the network who tried to find and then protect witnesses following the murder of fourteen year old Emmett Till in neighboring Tallahatchie County for little more than an alleged whistle (Metress 2002; Till-Mobley 2004). Under Pigea's leadership, youth organized in their towns with the adult branches long before the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and other groups entered the state in the 1960s. In Clarksdale the NAACP branch remained strong and active, and Henry would become the Mississippi NAACP state conference president by the end of the 1950s and would enjoy a state-wide presence.

Clarksdale's particular mass movement had its fair share of the highs of successes and the valleys of defeats that characterize all struggles. Mass direct action statewide in Mississippi, that began soon after President John Kennedy's 1961 inauguration, slowly dismantled legal segregation in public spaces and illuminated police and judicial injustice at a national level. Clarksdale's movement leaders had a principal role in establishing COFO, the Council of Federated Organizations, a state-wide coalition of the major civil rights organizations created in 1961 to cloak the NAACP in the presence of Governor Ross Barnett (who would not meet the established organization). COFO would go on to coordinate most of the state's direct action and mass protest campaigns including Freedom Summer in 1964 (Dittmer 1995; Payne 1995; Hamlin 2012). In Clarksdale, a lawsuit and several swells of mass protest, from the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision in the mid-1950s through the 1960s, brought about the court-ordered desegregation of the public schools in 1970 (Bolton 2005; Keady 1988).⁴ One direct result of strong movement and organizing leadership enabled Coahoma County to become a rural test site for President Johnson's War on Poverty, with Coahoma Opportunities, Incorporated (COI) granted millions of federal dollars in the late sixties to increase the participation of the poor in their own uplift through a multi-program anti-poverty agency.⁵

⁴ The Council of Federated Organizations (COFO) coordinated the recruiting and training of black and white college students from around the country to come to Mississippi for Freedom Summer (1964), also called the Summer Project. During that time the student volunteers lived with local communities and sought to assist movement activities through projects like voter registration drives, community centers, Freedom Schools and literacy classes. Organizers used the rationale that national attention would focus on the plight of African Americans in the state only when young (mostly white) students were put in harm's way. Ten years earlier in 1954, the landmark Supreme Court case, *Brown v. Board of Education* (347 U.S. 483), declared segregation in public schools unconstitutional.

⁵ See "The Clarksdale Story," n.d. (but estimated at the end of September 1963), Aaron Henry Papers, Box 66, IVE Folder 1142, Tougaloo College Archives, Jackson, MS. Note that these papers are currently under re-processing at the Mississippi Department of Archives and History; *Rebecca E. Henry, et. al. v. Clarksdale Municipal Separate School District, et. al.* (DC 6428 and DC 6428-K); *Henry v. Clarksdale Municipal Separate School District* 409F. 2d. 682

Fast forward to the end of the century. In July 1999 Clarksdale was one of five stops on President Bill Clinton's New Markets tour of impoverished cities. During his five and a half hours in town he visited one of the few stores struggling to stay open on Issaquena Avenue, once the most vibrant street for black commerce in the county. Clinton listened intently to the testimonies of many black Clarksdallians unable to find work. During the years when the nation flourished, unemployment in Coahoma County ran at ten percent, six percent higher than the state average. The state had chosen Coahoma County to be an enterprise zone in 1984 as one of the poorest counties with the unemployment rate then around fourteen percent. State tax deductions used as bait, to attract new industry to take advantage of the stagnant labor force, had not worked. Clinton's visit brought national exposure to Clarksdale once more as he announced his New Markets Initiative that again tried to tempt business and industry to relocate to the Delta with tax breaks, incentives, and the promise of cheap labor. He committed \$15 million dollars in community development grants for the Mississippi Delta, part of a \$46.5 million funding package attached to his initiative, and hoped to improve the startling forty percent-below-the-poverty-line statistic.⁶

To read about the mass movement of African Americans for justice and equality between the traditional temporal boundaries, from *Brown* to the late 1960s, change and progress seemed to take shape in the Delta town as it did elsewhere, despite the battles. Most public spaces desegregated and African Americans seemed to hold some power in the local decision-making as federal demands for interracial participation in the Community Action Programs brought in much needed resources. Yet in 1999 a President comes to advertise what was, in effect, a bail out, investing in corporations and businesses (rather than the residents this time). Here we see the bi-polarity of movement memory versus reality, and the questions of success itself –the history empowers many, yet present day reality reflects deepening struggles. The mass civil rights movement, therefore, was a calculated success based on careful and well-timed political moves.

Economic justice for whom?

Coahoma County's complicated story has much to tell us about the meaning of improvement and its costs, particularly if success is grounded in beliefs of improved race relations symbolized by a level playing field in the economy, housing, education, services, and social interactions. Rigorous campaigns for economic justice never received the same attention as the social and political

(*Clarksdale I*), Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, New Orleans; Donald C. Mosley and D.C. Williams, Jr., "An Analysis and Evaluation of A Community Action Anti-Poverty Program in the Mississippi Delta," July 1967, RG 381, OEO Community Services Administration Office of Operations, Migrant Division, Box 50, Grant Files 1966-1971, National Archives.

⁶ "Clinton Visit Leaves City Optimistic," *Clarksdale Press Register*, 7 July 1999; *Commercial Appeal*, 24 May 1984; 28 September 1984; Chamber of Commerce, Vertical File, Carnegie Public Library, Clarksdale, MS.

battles so plentifully publicized. Recent scholarship is changing that bias (Orleck 2011; Carter 2007; Saunders 2011). Civil rights workers had recognized the dire need to correct the economic disparity in the Delta. Desegregating stores, restaurants and motels was important in principle, but most could not afford to spend money there. Desegregating schools became moot without sufficient nutrition and clothing for children. The black middle class in the Delta, people like Aaron Henry and Vera Pigea, comprised a tiny percentage of the population, and their position is relative to their region and segregated status. Forcing apart segregation exposed the underbelly of the American Dream, and Johnson's War on Poverty was as controversial as it was innovative and brilliant.

The War on Poverty had an active front in Clarksdale. Johnson's Office of Equal Opportunity (OEO), under Sargent Shriver, wanted Coahoma Opportunities Incorporated (COI) as their test-site for rural community action programs. In September 1965, COI received over \$300,000 in federal grants, with promises of more money and resources, but not before intense political struggle between civil rights activists who had applied for the Community Action Program (CAP) in the first place, and local segregationists who saw the funding train leave the station without them on board. This was after a summer of intense activity and competition over Project Head Start programs that served hundreds of preschoolers across the county. COI was one of the concrete successes of the local movement. The programs in Coahoma County created spaces for local black agency, interracial cooperation and tangible aid for the poor of all ages (Lemann 1991, 314; Williams 2004).⁷

COI was successful because it did what it promised. It provided training and employment for many beholden to the plantation system or white patronage. Whether as secretaries, cooks or teachers' aides, women in particular found a degree of autonomy from the local economy as federal employees in Washington signed their paychecks. Project Head Start, the cornerstone of the War on Poverty, continued to serve hundreds of young children in the county, not only enhancing their education, but providing nutritious meals and basic health care. Furthermore, COI directly connected the poor to federal programs, bypassing state and local agencies, empowering a larger population of African Americans than the direct action civil rights protests ever had.

⁷ Mosley and Williams, "An Analysis and Evaluation"; Bennie Gooden interviewed by Homer Hill, 15 March 1994 <<http://www.lib.usm.edu/~spcol/crda/oh/gooden.htm>>; Andrew Carr interviewed by Homer Hill, 14 March 1994 <<http://anna.lib.usm.edu/~spcol/crda/oh/ohcarrab.html>>; Andrew Carr interviewed by author, 22 September 2010, Clarksdale, Mississippi; "'Anti-Poverty' Goals Outlined In City Today," *Clarksdale Press Register*, 18 May, 1965; "OEO Official Gives Details of Aid Plan," *Clarksdale Press Register*, 4 June, 1964; "'Head Start' Projects To Begin Here Monday," *Clarksdale Press Register*, 18 June, 1965; Clarksdale Board of Trustees Minutes, Book X, 13 May, 1965, 28 June, 1965, 415-6, 435; William Drayton and Eric Gold, "Structure for Action and Communities: An Analysis of Community Action Agencies," sometimes called the "Drayton Report" (1965), RG381 Community Services Administration, OEO, Community Action Program Office: Records of the Director, Subject Files, 1965-1969, Box 27, 1966, National Archives.

In the county, subtle shifts in race relations embodied the most valuable contribution of COI. Coalition-building and focused determinism, mirrored at the federal level (at least in the Johnson administration), won out against the forces that had traditionally succeeded with ease. Activist Vernon Keys announced, "It was a peaceful revolution" as economic independence coaxed begrudging respect. Federal funds created hundreds of jobs free from local economic control, encouraging self-sufficiency, jobs with titles, real salaries and benefits. Black patrons were courteously addressed, a stunning change for a population (regardless of class) continuously and contemptuously addressed by first names (and worse) by white men, women and children alike. Now, as white businesses sought a piece of the federal pie, they had to conform to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting discrimination. In addition, businesses wanted to attract the increase in black consumers with a little more cash in their pockets.⁸

Many found a self-confidence to step out in new ways. While black Clarksdalians struggled for basic civil rights, in the more dangerous years of the mass movement, internal class divisions did not visibly polarize the community. However, once courts established and secured judicial orders and federal accountability for those rights, the local black community shifted its focus. Teachers in particular, those who chose not to participate in mass movement activities in order to preserve their livelihoods, now stepped forward to claim leadership positions in newly created federally funded programs and organizations. Their ascension created a more robust black middle class, one more secure than mere years before.

With all the positives that COI brought to the region, many queries about the long-term effects of community action plagued the War on Poverty legacy as a whole. Were revolutionary and activist voices silenced through their cooption into the poverty programs? Many critics of the War on Poverty like social scientist Michael Katz (1989) questioned the federal motivation to fight poverty, seeing it as a device to cement black loyalty to the Democratic party when mounting black protests in the South and in the urban North by the mid to late 1960s threatened to shake that foundation. Were the poverty programs, like Head Start, merely pacifiers? Critical scholarship about Project Head Start has mirrored Katz's assertions. No solid evidence existed that Head Start pulled families out of poverty, but that it was much easier to care for "innocent" children (rendering the program non-political) than tackle the roots of poverty directly, roots embedded in national social and economic foundations.

Yet despite more social relations between the races, black and white societies continued in parallel. Andrew Carr was one of the architects of COI who worked with Aaron Henry and other black leaders to make sure that the agency's board was interracial – a vital component for grant eligibility. In an interview with the wealthy white planter from Coahoma County, who had served in World War II and had a social consciousness that many of his rank did not, Carr considered

⁸ Vernon Keys interviewed by Homer Hill, March 19, 1994.
<<http://digilib.usm.edu/cdm/ref/collection/coh/id/4233>>. Accessed 12 July 2012.

himself a conservative even though his association with local black leaders led to his ostracization from the greater white community in Clarksdale. He adamantly insisted, however, that he did not socialize with African Americans stating that he did not have to, only two were members of the country club and his social and religious circles remained all white.⁹ Indeed, outside of the workplace, racial groups largely have largely maintained *de facto* segregation in churches and social spheres, a phenomenon more or less reflected nationwide.

Furthermore, federal funds to the War on Poverty dwindled dramatically after Johnson's presidency. COI had to cut back many of its programs created during the height of its development in the late sixties, and then deal with the reality of extensive fundraising, a skill and expertise not sought within the initial staffing structure of the organization. Maintaining the programming without solely federal funds required grant-writing skills and creativity, and most of the CAPS were ill-equipped in this regard.¹⁰ We should not blame the leaders for lack of foresight. Intense political agitation had secured COI in 1965 in the face of intense opposition and community leaders faced constant challenges that made it difficult to prioritize passing on the tools to successfully procure grants in order to sustain COI, and the programs offered by OEO long-term. As COI continued to face political opposition mirrored at the federal level when President Nixon dismantled OEO, and later when President Reagan shifted the funding structure to block grants, personnel became more professionalized, bowing to pressure that pulled the agency further and further from the grassroots and activists, and more towards federal bureaucrats (Lemann 1991, 164; Trattner 1999, 370; Clark 2002, 166).¹¹

COI and multi-program anti-poverty organizations like it had responded to the shift in the workforce from agricultural industries into other sectors. Many of their adult education classes sought to reeducate a mostly agrarian population. Yet employment did not materialize, even for those with advanced skills. As agriculture became less profitable in the Delta in the last decades of the century, landowners and businessmen developed lucrative money-making opportunities that perpetuated systems akin to the plantations. Consider three: casinos, tourism and prisons.

⁹ Andrew Carr interviewed by author, Clarksdale, MS, 22 September 2010.

¹⁰ Mayo Wilson interviewed by author, 9 November 2004, Clarksdale, MS; Troy Catchings interviewed by Homer Hill, 15 March 1994
<<http://digilib.usm.edu/cdm/ref/collection/coh/id/718>> (accessed 12 February 2013).

¹¹ OEO General Correspondence, 1967-69, RG381, Community Service Administration, OEO, Executive Secretariat, Box 13; "History of OEO During the Nixon Administration, 1973" by Kenneth Munden, RG 381, Records of the Community Service Administration, OEO, Records of the Office of Planning Research and Evaluation, Box 107; "Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 9:9:196-211 (March 5, 1973) also in Box 107, all in National Archives.

The "New Jim Crow" expanded

The casinos and tourist industry in the Delta, touted as an economic boost, maintains what the late scholar Clyde Woods (1998) described as the reality of the plantation legacy, with African Americans working for low wages in white-owned businesses. The tourist industry flourishing in the Delta echoes the white slumming that black Harlem attracted in the 1920s where white patrons frequented clubs and dance halls to consume black culture, while those who performed profited little from the business (for a recent study see Kelley 2010). Clarksdale's Delta Blues Museum resides in the former Illinois-Central passenger terminal that three black teenagers tried to desegregate in the early sixties (Pigee 1975, 48).¹² National and international visitors marvel at the rich Blues legacy in the area, but after the brief sojourn, many turn around on Highway 61 to return north to Memphis or the casinos. A cultural tourism based on "ethnic supremacy" presents a carefully packaged Delta history. The Shack-Up Inn, on the Hopson Plantation just outside Clarksdale, offers tourists the opportunity to experience sharecroppers' shacks – with amenities, of course. Earlier tourism centred on monuments to white supremacy – antebellum homes, reenactments, battlefields, plantations, and antebellum collectibles. Today's tourist trails follow Blues history and now civil rights tours based in Memphis or Jackson are fashionable. Such forays into local "folk" areas are planned and coordinated, and Hollywood actor Morgan Freeman's upscale blues establishment, "Ground Zero," housed in the former cotton weighing station next to the defunct train tracks and terminal, allows tourists to hear the blues with their Delta farm-raised catfish. Local African American experience remains censored and curtailed, and their employment in this industry restricted mainly to service.

Economic incentives attracted the gaming industry as casinos docked on the banks of the Mississippi River and in the Gulf Coast to cash in on regional markets. Tunica County, just north of Coahoma and a stone's throw south of Memphis, hosts a bevy of casinos that competes with Atlantic City and Las Vegas in size and attraction (Baruffalo 2000, 16). Isle of Capri (formerly Lady Luck) Casino stands alone at the foot of the Helena-Arkansas Bridge in rural Coahoma County, the closest river crossing to Clarksdale, twenty miles north, and two miles from Helena. The county vote for the casino was contentious. In the summer of 1993, unofficial results counted 4,501 votes in favor, 3,121 opposed (fifty-nine to forty-one percent) with a forty-five percent voter turnout. Six hundred jobs, tax breaks for the county, and a cut of the revenue convinced

¹² "Negro Youths Charged Here," *Clarksdale Press Register*, 24 August 1961, 1; Jack Young to Robert Carter, 13 September 1961, NAACP Microfilm, Part 22, Reel 6, Group V, Series B; Gloster Current to Henry Moon, NAACP Public Relations Director, memorandum, 24 August 1961, III E9, NAACP Papers, LOC; Aaron Henry to Gloster Current, 28 August 1961, III C75, NAACP Papers, LOC; *Mary Jane Pigee, et al, v. State of Mississippi*, brief for appellants on appeal from the County Court of Coahoma County, September 1961; Tom Scarbrough report, 5 September 1961, Sovereignty Commission Papers, Mississippi Department of Archives and History; Monthly report from Julie Wright, SE Regional Field Youth Secretary, 6 September 1961, Reports 61-2, III E55, NAACP Papers, LOC.

voters. In the end, the *Clarksdale Press Register* reported, "The pocketbook proved mightier than the pulpit" in the orchestrated battle between morality and economics (Baruffalo 2000; Nash & Taggart 2006).¹³

The casinos in the Delta are a mixed blessing. While they provided much-needed jobs to local Mississippians, the local revenue generated by their presence did not necessarily improve conditions in the surrounding counties. Wealthy landowners increased their profits by leasing or selling land to these industries and the attendant array of hotels and retail outlets, while local politicians controlled the influx of local money. New school buildings now exist to educate the relocated families and ease the overcrowding of the former structures. Yet new jobs for African Americans pool at the bottom of the pay grades and black people rarely hold managerial posts. A 2001 U.S. Civil Rights Commission report noted that the Mississippi gaming commission was not required to maintain data on salaries by race and gender, but found that whites constituted 72.9% of the casino officials and managers whereas 71.2% of the laborers were black. Only 0.8% of the gross revenues actually went to cities and counties. More often than not, African Americans are consumers, frequenting the bargain buffets and gambling precious resources at the penny slot machines, with very few other leisure outlets available elsewhere in the region.

The other burgeoning industries in the Delta are the prisons, filling rapidly with young black men and women who become permanently politically and economically shackled. The construction of private prisons has proliferated as corporations approach regions with more land, a cheaper workforce, and a poor local economy eager for any injection of funds. In 1995, a huge construction program ensued to house the 6,500 prisoners registered in Parchman, the state penitentiary – a triple jump in incarceration figures, from between 1,800 and 2,500 inmates, in the first seventy years of the century. The incarceration rate of black men nationally has increased over five hundred percent in the two decades since the eighties to where more African American males were held in prisons than are enrolled in higher education institutions (Oshinsky 1996; Shaw 2000; Williams 2003).¹⁴ In the hard-fought 2003 gubernatorial elections, the majority of Mississippians who voted did not agree with Democratic Governor Ronnie Musgrove's opposition to privatizing the prisons, and Republican Haley Barbour won with a pledge for "Safer Communities." He opened the door for more private prisons, extending the use of private and regional jails to relieve pressure on Parchman, but maintaining the eighty-five percent law (that all convicts serve eighty-five percent of their sentences before going up for parole)

¹³ "Coahoma County Casino Still A Best Bet For Wins," *Starkville Daily News*, July 16, 1995; *Clarion-Ledger*, August 25, 1993. In June 1993, the unemployment rate was 12.8%, double the state average; *Clarksdale Press Register*, August 25, 1993.

¹⁴ <<http://www.naacp.org/pages/criminal-justice-fact-sheet>>; Grassroots Leadership Press Release, Monday May 20, 2002 at <http://www.grassrootsleadership.org/press_rels/Final_MS_Edu_Incarc.html>. The report is online <http://www.grassrootsleadership.org/downloads/Miss_3.pdf>.

keeping all available beds full. Barbour made provisions to loosen the law in 2008 with little effect.¹⁵

The private prison growth has occurred primarily in poor counties with the promise of local revitalization, but like the gaming industry, precious little of the money trickles into the local coffers. As Jim Crow lined the pockets of planters and industrialists in need of cheap controlled labor, prison industries provide new avenues for revenue profiting the same population. As legal scholar Michelle Alexander (2012) succinctly articulated, the prison industry has reconceived Jim Crow, as the effects of poverty have become criminalized and black bodies are quite literally controlled and fettered. Sentencing disproportionately punishes the petty thief or drug pusher with harsher sentences than well-heeled white-collar thieves embezzling millions from pension funds or the wealthy kingpins controlling the drug trade. The organizing group Grassroots Leadership questioned the connection between private prison companies and campaign financing, noting that the figures have linked millions of dollars to political campaigns promoting the construction of private prisons. The number of incarcerated black women has also dramatically increased in the past years. In 1996, 807 inmates were housed at the state's only women's prison, Central Mississippi Correctional Facility in Rankin County in the Delta. In 2001, the number was 1,455 in a facility built in 1987 to hold only one thousand. With these numbers, the state's response has been to build another jail or convert a facility for male inmates to house the women (Williams 2002; Marable 2000). This struggle is ongoing and current activism includes reinstating voting rights for felons as well as fighting against the racialization of crime, racial profiling on the streets, excessively long sentences and the lack of inmate rehabilitation, and reforming the entire prison economy (USCRC Report 95; Alexander 2012).

Reassessing voting rights and education

Disfranchisement occurred elsewhere as well. White local and state leaders found loopholes to circumvent the 1965 Voting Rights Act, but sometimes the courts helped them gain some lost ground. On February 18, 1971, Justice Orma Smith (U.S. District Court Judge) ordered the adoption of a redistricting plan to bring counties in line with federal law. As a result, he ordered re-registration. This meant that all the work undertaken in the sixties to register people had to be redone. Twenty counties, including Coahoma, purged their voting registers after the 1970 census. From 1965-1970 black registered voters numbering anywhere from 28,000 to 280,000 had to be re-registered for the 1971 elections. In an effort to recoup their losses, student volunteers again came to Clarksdale in April to help the re-registration campaign, just as they had come in the early

¹⁵ For more details about Mississippi's prisons see <<http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/courts-corrections/mississippi-correction-reform.html>> and <<http://www.desototimes.com/articles/2012/05/23/opinion/editorials/doc4fbd3253c1b3b659782775.txt>> (accessed 12 July 2012).

sixties in campaigns that included the 1963 Freedom Vote and the 1964 Freedom Summer. State and local gerrymandering and redistricting attempts, such as changing electoral procedures from single to at-large voting systems, purposefully hindered black participation and electoral victory further by diluting black majorities (Foster 1983; Dittmer 1995; Payne 1995; Hamlin 2012).¹⁶

In 1975, 22,202 made up the voting age population in Coahoma County. Whites consisted of forty-three percent at 9,626 and fifty-seven percent were blacks or 12,576. In 1971 in a total of 17,030, forty-four percent were white and fifty-six percent were black. Additionally, behind-the-scenes harassment and improper procedures took place to hinder black participation. In 1983, over 200,000 eligible voters did not register in Mississippi, in part because of the voter registration laws requiring registration at the county courthouse and in the municipality to vote in city elections. Abused by misinformation or no information given before election-day, voter registration has declined due to pure frustration. The U.S. Justice Department's investigation was nothing more than window-dressing. They did not notify community organizations that registrars were in the Delta. In fact several authors cite the Justice Department's unwillingness to enforce the Voting Rights Act as a major problem. Once a friend, the department became a foe, a legacy from Ronald Reagan's administration (Nixon 1999).

Despite these persistent voting problems, the numbers of black elected officials rose steeply from the late 1960s with federal intervention and judicial rulings in the state. There are many social critics who maintain, like Clyde Woods, that this rise is "severely overstated." Very little fundamental change for African Americans has occurred as a result of more black elected officials. They occupied predominantly local or county, not statewide, positions, and were elected primarily from black constituencies. Nevertheless, black people fought for the right and exercised their newfound electoral muscle immediately and to great effect. Clyde Woods noted that Robert Clarke was elected in 1967 to the House of Representatives, the first black since Reconstruction. He was joined twelve years later by Clarksdale's Aaron Henry. Henry Espy became the first African American mayor of Clarksdale in 1989, and has become the longest serving mayor, announcing his intentions in 2012 not to run for re-election (Woods 1998, 215; Salamon 1973, 624-625; Rodgers 1981, 67; Bennett 1979, 196; Lane 2012).

As civil rights legislation passed and judicial rulings supported change, civil rights organizations lost their creative momentum and their *raison d'être*. The Council of Federated Organizations crumbled after the interracial Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party attempt to unseat the regular all-white Democrat

¹⁶ At-large voting systems requires the election of candidates to represent the whole membership of the body (like a city, or county, county, state, or nation) as opposed to just a single electoral district. *Clarksdale Press Register*, March 9, 1971; Mississippi State Democratic Committee, memorandum, April 18, 1971, Minor Papers, Box 1, "Black Mississippians."

delegation in Atlantic City in 1964. Splintered by difference of opinions within the ranks, and differing philosophies exacerbated by competition for membership and donations, the four groups that gathered under the COFO umbrella went their separate ways. Once the summer of 1964 ended, top officials in the NAACP head office guarded their position and had little to do with the other three organizations: the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Congress of Racial Equality and SNCC.¹⁷ Martin Luther King Jr., working on campaigns in Alabama and Georgia and then in Chicago, came to Mississippi less, and subsequently SCLC lost some footing there. He journeyed to the Delta in 1968 on his last trip, to initiate the Poor People's Campaign to go to Washington, D.C., but Clarksdale reporter Curtis Wilkie (2001) noted that he was not as well received as before. Wilkie poignantly wrote, "Like a debilitating virus, the rivalry among civil rights groups sapped energy from the movement just at the time their followers were finally reaching the gates of city halls and courthouses across the South" (173).

Like economics and politics, education was and is a major battleground in the black freedom struggle, and assessing success in this field is also mixed. President Johnson once proclaimed that "education is the only valid passport from poverty" (Patterson 2001, 138). After a six year legal battle that began in 1964, the schools in Clarksdale desegregated through a District Court order in the spring of 1970 (*Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education*). That year the promise of *Brown* (decided a generation earlier) reached its peak and could only be enforced through the courts. The results were unsatisfactory to most students, parents and teachers, black and white. Federal law and court orders that desegregated schools did little to alter many white Mississippians' racial attitudes. For example, in 1956 Senator John Stennis (D-MS) bemoaned integration forced by outsiders. Evoking Civil War rhetoric, "carpet baggers and do-gooders" caused the deterioration of race relations, he fumed in a Washington, D.C. radio interview.¹⁸ "I have never heard any responsible leaders of the colored or white race in the South say that the ultimate goal of their social relations or their race relations was to have integration educationally, socially or otherwise," he continued.¹⁹ By the late 1970s, Robert Patterson, architect of the Citizens' Councils in 1954 in Indianola, Mississippi, mirrored little change in

¹⁷ Gloster Current to Roy Wilkins and Bishop Stephen G. Spottswood and the Members of the Board, memorandum, 29 December 1964, NAACP microfilm, Part 22, Reel 11, Group V, Series B, Box 14 and Current to Wilkins, memorandum, 9 November 1964, III A200, COFO, NAACP Papers, LOC.

¹⁸ "Stennis Says Integration Efforts In Dixie Doomed," *Clarksdale Press Register*, March 27, 1956.

¹⁹ Stennis did not exaggerate. Retired teacher Joyce Kendricks, raised in Durant, Mississippi, reinforced how imbedded segregation and race relations were in the fifties. She remembered, "there was no animosity... we went to the movie, they sat in the balcony and we sat downstairs, that's the way it was.... I never heard a cross word said between blacks and whites, I never heard an ugly word uttered about either one in my presence and it was like I said, I guess we were just ignorant... they seemed to be comfortable with it and we were comfortable with it" (Kendricks interviewed by author, February 13, 1999, Oxford, MS).

white sentiments, "That's not social integration, that's *forced* integration under the might of the federal government... To be subjected to integration is one thing, but to submit to it is something else entirely. We are being subjected to integration; we are not submitting to it." He reinforced his claim, "you'll find that the white people do not frequent places where there are a whole lot of Negroes through choice. And I think gradually... things will resegregate themselves." (Raines 1977, 300).²⁰

The newly desegregated schools kept the white principals, and the former black school principals became assistant principals. Most black teachers were demoted. Interactions within classrooms and schools caused problems, conflicts, and more court dates.²¹ These patterns existed throughout the nation. In Clarksdale, white children transferred to the new Lee Academy, creating a private white institution beyond the court's reach. Across the South, these segregated academies have drained resources from the public system. Public schools, therefore, suffered from the lack of investment in facilities, teachers and students, both financially and emotionally. It also re-segregated public education (Bolton 2005).

Robert Patterson's predictions proved correct, in part because of sustained conservative campaigns and policymaking that chipped away at desegregation legislation. Integration in schools lasted barely a generation. In the mid- to late-eighties, the courts permitted a partial return to the neighborhood school plan so vehemently fought against twenty years earlier. All parties agreed on the change, with some conditions. Scholar Gary Orfield, who ran a Harvard study on school desegregation noted, "Expanding segregation is a mark of a polarizing society without effective policies for building multiracial institutions." (Orfield 1997; Keady 1988, 108). Orfield maintained that since 1974, a mere four years after court-ordered desegregation in Clarksdale and in many Delta school districts, almost all policy changes were negative, while numbers of nonwhite school age children dramatically increased (Orfield 1997, 6; Hawkins 2000).²²

²⁰ The Citizens' Councils were created as a direct response to the *Brown* ruling that spring. With a membership led by prominent white locals (from police chiefs, judges, mayors, bankers and the like), this group used economic "persuasion" to thwart civil rights activities in their area.

²¹ Court record of *Jonathan Harris, et al versus The Board of Trustees of the Clarksdale Municipal Separate School District et al.* (DC-73-29-K) in Donell Harrell Papers (in author's possession); Clarksdale Board of Trustees Minutes (CBTM), Book XVI, 1 March 1973 (special meeting); Hearing before Judge Keady, U.S. District Court, *Henry* case, Monday 25 September 1972, 31; CBTM, Book XV, 3 August 1972, 370. Also see *Rebecca E. Henry, et. al. v. Clarksdale Municipal Separate School District, et. al.* (DC 6428-K) 10 November 1975, 9; CBTM, Book XV, 22 June 1972, 349; "A Report on the Black History Week Episode, Clarksdale High School Officials and Black Student Confrontation, February and March 1973," 27 March 1973 by Aaron Henry in his capacity as Mississippi State Conference President, Aaron Henry Papers, Box 67, IVE folder 1157, Tougaloo College Archives; Sara Cannon interviewed by author, 9 March 1999, Clarksdale, MS.

²² Ronald Reagan's administration actively worked against progressive school desegregation. The Justice Department reversed policy on many pending cases. In *Board of Education Oklahoma City v. Dowell* (198 U.S. 237 [1991]), the Supreme Court ruled that school districts

Interviews in Clarksdale's black neighborhoods reveal strong opinions that the decimation of black schools also injured the sense of community. For many who experienced segregated black institutions, or for those who have studied the period, the victory of desegregation remains bittersweet. No longer did the village raise the child in the same way as before (to coopt the sage African proverb). Many of the teachers interviewed in Clarksdale, who had worked in the segregated system, longed for the old days of discipline and community pride. With integration, most historic black institutions could not survive. Vera Harrell, who taught in the school system, preferred working in the segregated system, "I now wish we had stayed over there.... I think integration did more harm to the black children... When we first went over to the Clarksdale High School, the white children embraced, kissed everything, smoked, they drank beer... and they all had cars. You let a black child go out and drink... By the time they got home they were sober because they knew what their parents were going to do to them." She continued distastefully, "When they went over there and saw what the white children were doing and got just like [them]. They wanted cars knowing that their parents couldn't afford a car... I didn't know about dope when I went to Tougaloo [College], I found out about dope when I went to Clarksdale High School." Brenda Luckett attended the city's desegregated schools in the 1970s. A teacher herself in the 1990s, she noted that the prevailing attitude remained that white was better because, "[the black students] are not taught anything about black history, they're not taught anything about white people, they don't deal with white people."²³

The costs of climbing the ladder

A growing middle class of African Americans, a conventional marker of success, nevertheless displaced older, traditional social statuses within the black community, leaving people who felt ousted by newly empowered teachers and educated professionals. The transformation of the leadership devalued those who lacked the formal education but had been at the forefront to secure the very same initiatives that created the new opportunities. The personal costs for the older leaders, those on the frontlines of the mass movement in the fifties and early sixties, are often overlooked in the gilded memory of the movement. In

could return to segregated neighborhood schools, and that white flight was voluntary by private individuals and was not the school boards' doing. *Freeman v Pitts* (1992) in DeKalb County near Atlanta, reinforced that decision (see Patterson, 2001, 196-198; Orfield, 1997, 7). President Clinton did little to stop resegregation trends. Clyde Woods noted that in September 1990, the Fifth Circuit court of Appeals found that Mississippi's higher education policy was race-neutral which began an attack on historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) in the state and the resegregation of predominantly white institutions (Woods, 1998, 229). The Supreme Court continues to deal with cases around diversity and education, having just ruled in *Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin* <http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/11-345_I5gm.pdf> (accessed 24 July 2013).

²³ Vera Harrell interviewed by the author, 23 August, 1999, Clarksdale, Mississippi; Brenda Luckett interviewed by the author, March 8, 1999, Clarksdale, Mississippi.

Clarksdale, the activist work of Vera Pigea best illustrates the friction that “success” wrought on leadership generations. Her exquisite passion buoyed her in the darkest years from the early fifties when very few risked everything to lead movement activity. Economically independent from the plantation system as a beauty shop owner, and utilizing her place and business to quietly communicate to, shelter, and teach young people in the NAACP Youth Councils and adults in citizenship classes, Pigea’s light shone bright in the state. At the core of Clarksdale’s mass movement, serving as secretary of the NAACP branch, Pigea had risked life and limb for the cause, withstanding physical attacks on her body and home. For years she kept the hole, from the bullet that had punctured her home, unfixed as a reminder of her sacrifice and why she continued her work.

As more civil rights organizations, particularly through COFO, pried open spaces in the closed society, they also dislodged Pigea’s authority and status, creating new places and ways to protest louder and with more national impact. Pigea complained bitterly about how the earlier struggles were easily forgotten as paychecks fattened, and African Americans began to eagerly climb the rungs of the economic ladder. As a long-time veteran, over fifteen years on the frontlines by the time COI altered the landscape, she watched formally educated newcomers elbow their way into leadership positions. The poverty programs, particularly COI, provided jobs, respectability and opportunity for a whole cadre of people who had not participated in the movement previously. Pigea did not mince her words, labeling them “Johnny-Come-Latelys,” where title and rank now made a difference. Black and whites worked together, but salaries were set on a sliding scale rendering her on the lower rungs, despite her years of experience and community influence. Vera Pigea wrote and self-published her two-part autobiography, *Struggle of Struggles*, in order to re-insert herself into the local history that had erased her, even by 1975.

Her story of rejection and erasure are more complicated than a bruised ego and hurt feelings. The poverty programs assisted in establishing a strong educated black middle class in the Delta, one more aligned to white mainstream norms. Yet this newfound prosperity widened stratifications in the black community. The new class structure in black America elevated (but did not remove) the glass ceiling, and so the ladder to the top lengthened allowing the black elite to climb. There is a disruption of community and the sense of linked fate that once bound black people together. The conditions that perpetuated the need for the bond transformed. No longer does the rhetoric of group uplift direct the path for many middle-class African Americans. With individual opportunity came individual advancement, tenets of American ideology and philosophy. No longer linked solely by the fate of their blackness, those able to improve their lives and those of their families did so with flourish and without delay. With fewer obvious legal restrictions, and more legislation in place encouraging African Americans to strive for social mobility, the fact that some can and do achieve *are* signs of success. The American Dream became theirs as they entered the American economic and political realm as more equal citizens. On the other hand, of course, this must be judged against new oppressive legal measures that

fill the prisons, stunt personal freedoms on the street (by expanding police control on black bodies), and give financial institutions more freedom to discriminate without citing race, thus maintaining a false colorblind innocence. The list goes on. A changing community needs to adapt their tools for more to climb the ladder.

Conclusions

How can we make sense of all the complexities involved in even thinking about success given the many pitfalls and setbacks since the mass movement? One of these larger conversations revolves around the nature and extent of change. The late writer and activist Audre Lorde theorized, "For the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house. They may allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring about genuine change" (Lorde 1984, 112). Embedded in her words is the historical understanding that only alternative forms of protest can transform the status quo in the long-term, rather than the aspiration to utilize only mainstream methods. Here I have focused on activists who were radical for their time and place, even revolutionary in some circles, but not militant or proponents of black nationalist rhetoric as articulated more audibly in the late 1960s. Including those who would completely shun the "master's house" in the first place adds yet another layer of complexity to discussions about success. The narrower parameters, however, capture a debate that dominates black activism across the long trajectory of the black freedom struggle and continually comes to the fore in Clarksdale during the latter half of the twentieth century, and particularly now in the re-evaluation of racial politics against this recent past.

For the local people in Clarksdale, much was at stake. They needed access to the "master's house" – whether the institutions of democratic government, like the House of Representatives; the seat of local landowning as in the "big house" of plantation owners; or simply that common civic sphere of small town life – to claim the rights and privileges of full citizenship. Yet once they attained it, once-outsiders (due to racial segregation), now insiders (whether elected officials or federal/state employees), lost much of their revolutionary edge as their class status elevated, and either could not resist mainstream pressure to bolster the status quo, or were stymied for their efforts. Those elevated became part of the structures of domination, and used, in theorist bell hooks' words, "power in ways that reinforce rather than challenge or change" (hooks 1989, 36). The black freedom activists, broadly defined and within the parameters of the mass movement era, have both utilized the master's tools to exact change from the system, through the legal and legislative processes, *and* rejected the tools in favor of civil disobedience through marches, boycotts and other public acts of resistance. In order for the continuing black freedom struggle to be effective, it needs to evolve – to rethink its strategies, its constituency and its goals. Times have changed, but so must the tools with which the continuing battle is fought.

The search for these tools has become even more urgent. There is a full tilt assault on civil rights that applies pressure from the voting booths to the Supreme Court. The 2012 national election that re-elected President Obama shone spotlights on the extent to which certain groups attempted to thwart democratic demonstrations of citizenship at the polls. With increased media coverage, enabled by wireless devices and cameras, such interventions backfired in many cases, yet state legislatures continue to push through restrictive voter identification requirements under the guise of preventing voter fraud. In 2013 the Supreme Court, currently occupied by more conservative justices, gutted most of the protections provided by the 1965 Voting Rights Act, continuing the steady undermining of that law since its inception.²⁴ The new problems activists face as they retool include finding innovative ways to dismantle legalized oppression. If doctrinal law, a great source of conflict and oppression, had yielded only partial successes (success for those higher on the economic ladder), what are the alternatives? Knowing the past enables us to see where we have come, where we are, and where we need to go. Clarksdale's story, like many other communities, has not finished by any means, just as the black freedom struggle continues.

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²⁴ <www.brennancenter.org> (accessed 6 April 2013);
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About the author

Françoise N. Hamlin is the Hans Rothfels Assistant Professor of History and Africana Studies at Brown University. Born and raised in London, England, an exchange year in Clarksdale, Mississippi changed her path from a projected career in law to a scholar activist, teacher and historian. Her research interests include the multiple American histories and cultures, memory, race, activism, and gender. Her intellectual work includes activities off the published page. For instance, she is actively involved in programs educating schoolteachers about how to teach history with more nuance and creativity using different sources and narratives. At her institution she has developed a project that takes students to Mississippi for Spring Break to enable active learning at the nexus of theory, history, lived experience, and activism.

She is the author of *Crossroads at Clarksdale: The Black Freedom Struggle in the Mississippi Delta after World War II* (University of North Carolina Press, 2012), that reveals the complexities of the black freedom struggle through a local study in the heart of Mississippi. This book won the Berkshire Conference of Women Historians Book Prize and the Lillian Smith Book Award. *Thunder At The Gate: An Anthology of African American Writing on War and Citizenship* is a co-edited book in its final stages. Hamlin's new research focuses on young people, trauma, and activism. She can be contacted at francoise_hamlinATbrown.edu.

Between success and failure: dwelling with social movements in the hiatus¹

Max Haiven and Alex Khasnabish

Abstract

This article explores the ways social movement “successes” and “failures” are conceived of and measured, particularly in relation to research that strives to act in solidarity with such movements. Reviewing some of the best examples of politically-engaged research, we contend that even these assume normative categories of “success” and “failure” with respect to both movement and research outcomes. Drawing on our work in the Radical Imagination Project, a politically-engaged social movement research project in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, we argue that social movements typically dwell not at the poles of the success/failure binary but in the “hiatus” between “not-success” and “not-failure.” We contend that a more dynamic mapping of social movement success and failure produces a richer and more robust understanding of social movements, the significance of their activity, and social change. This reconceptualization and remapping of success and failure also has important implications for the way researchers seeking to work in solidarity with social movements can productively reimagine their own measures of success and failure.

Reimagining success and failure

In 2010, we won a grant to experiment with “convoking” the radical imagination. We wanted to contribute to efforts to reimagine the relationships between social movement researchers and the social movements they study. We chose to do this research in the unromantic and marginal city of Halifax, Nova Scotia, an intentional departure from the cosmopolitan contexts which tend to dominate social movement studies. With a population of just under 400,000, sprawling out across a huge geographic area on Canada’s east coast, we were interested in working with movements experiencing stagnation, frustration, and failure, rather than those enjoying momentum, exhilaration, and success. We wanted to imagine a form of solidarity research aimed not just at supporting or working for particular social movement campaigns or organizations, but at intervening in the difficult, slow space between and amidst movement participants and groups as they attempted to contend with global and local issues.

¹ See the video appendix at <https://vimeo.com/77785507>

Three years later, after dozens of interviews, several public events and dialogue sessions, and a goodly amount of participant observation, we found ourselves reflecting on the successes and failures of the project (not least because our funders, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, required us to do so to justify the money they gave us). While we have published the particulars of our research method elsewhere (Khasnabish and Haiven 2012) and will be sharing some of the results of our research in a forthcoming book (Khasnabish and Haiven forthcoming), the present essay is a critical reflection on how we measure and imagine “success” and “failure” in social movement research, especially research that strives to work in solidarity with the social movements in question.

We begin by narrating the development of academic social movement studies, from its functionalist origins to recent forms of co-research or solidarity research. But we suggest that even some of the best examples of this work take for granted the categories of “success” and “failure” both in terms of what makes for “successful” movements and what makes for “successful” research. In the second half of the paper, we draw on thinkers like Judith Halberstam, Fredric Jameson, and Donna Haraway to argue that a more substantial understanding of social movements, and of social movement research, can come from a more dynamic mapping of success and failure. Drawing on our ethnographic research, we argue that social movements typically dwell in the “hiatus” between “not-success” and “not-failure,” and that researchers seeking to work in solidarity with social movements can fruitfully reimagine their own criteria of success and failure through this model.

Objects of contention: the lives of social movement studies

The history of scholarly attempts to make sense of social movements can be characterized as fundamentally fraught. Prior to the 1960s, collective behavior theory was the dominant academic perspective on social movement activity which was operationalized as collective contentious action mobilized outside the halls of power and its formal political channels. In a decidedly functionalist tenor, it frequently cast social movements as little more than mob behaviour, an “escape valve” for the supposedly unarticulated and misdirected frustrations of the lower classes that had no real bearing upon politics as such but which, as a form of collective catharsis for the unwashed masses, served to maintain the equilibrium of the system as a whole (see Staggenborg 2012, 13–14). This cast social movements as reactionary rather than creative and dynamic and emphasized structure over agency.

The dramatic upsurge in social movement activity in the 1960s cast serious doubt on the assumptions animating the functionalist paradigm, particularly because many of these movements – feminist, queer, civil rights, anti-war, anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, student, black and red power – defied the mob caricature through

their intentionality, radicality, and organization in addition to the eloquent and powerful critiques and alternatives they advanced to the status quo and the vested interests at work within it (see Edelman 2001; Katsiaficas 1987). Rather than demanding a “seat at the table” with powerholders or seeking piecemeal changes to existing structures of power and privilege, many of the movements which coalesced in the 1960s both in North America and globally took aim at the systems they saw as responsible for perpetuating inequality, exploitation, and violence as well as contesting the very way in which social life was constituted and organized.

Our own use of the term “radical” belongs to this legacy, extending well beyond the New Left, of movements and approaches that understand the problems confronting them as irresolvable within the structure of the current political system and so seek systemic change rather than piecemeal reform (see Day 2005; Holloway 2002). In the face of the seeming inability of collective behavior theory to make sense of the rise of the New Left in the ‘60s, political process and resource mobilization models were advanced particularly by North American sociologists and political scientists as a route to conceptualizing social movements as genuinely political actors rather than as aberrant psychological phenomena (Staggenborg 2012, 18). Around the same time, in Europe social movement scholars were elaborating what would become known as new social movement theory (see Melucci 1985; Touraine 2002). While these new schools of social movement analysis emerging on both sides of the Atlantic represented strong breaks with the preceding functionalist perspective, they also followed divergent trajectories as to how they conceptualized social movements and their activity (see Tarrow 1988).

From the political process/resource mobilization perspective, movements were viewed as collective political actors making claims against the dominant order whose success depended largely upon their capacity to mobilize material (organizational infrastructure, funding, etc.) and immaterial (leadership, member commitment, social capital, etc.) resources as well as the nature of the political system itself (the presence or absence of institutional allies or challengers, the relative openness of the system, the system’s perceived legitimacy). While the political process/resource mobilization represented a significant advancement over collective behaviour theories in terms of its robust analysis and its willingness to take movements seriously, the paradigm still fundamentally reconciled social movements – however radical or militant – as merely one political contender amongst others seeking to leverage influence and affect change within the established socio-political and economic order and largely in the terms set by it. At the same time, across the Atlantic, European scholars were elaborating a school of social movement inquiry that would become known as new social movement theory (NSM) which advanced a perspective that focused on macrosocial struggles, seeing movements originating in the 1960s and after as engaged in post- or immaterial struggles revolving around issues relating to the nature and constitution of social

life itself in the context of late or “postindustrial” capitalism (see Melucci 1985; Touraine 2002).

According to NSM theory, while “old” social movements – like organized labour – fought for material benefits, “new” social movements – like the anti-nuclear and peace movements – concerned themselves with the deep logic of the social order, contesting not only the material consequences of a system governed by inequality but the very spirit animating it. While the NSM paradigm contributed significantly to scholarly understandings of social movements in ways that exceeded the functionalism of collective behaviour and the materiality and liberalist rationality of political process/resource mobilization it was by no means free of its own blindspots. In focusing so prominently on distinguishing “new” from “old” social movements the NSM paradigm posited a radical break in forms of collective contentious action that obscured important continuities. In emphasizing “immaterial” struggles over the social logics of “post-industrial” capitalist society, the NSM perspective also tended to ignore the structural nature of violence, oppression, and exploitation and valorized struggles that tended to belong to more privileged social actors and classes.

None of this is to suggest that dominant social movement studies paradigms have not yielded valuable insights into understanding the dynamics of social change and contentious action outside of formal political channels. In many cases, such work has even served to legitimate social movement activity in the eyes of the mainstream as genuinely political and not merely aberrant or pathological. Sometimes this research is driven by the values of solidarity, and can occasionally see researchers work with or for movements. Some of the lacunae present in earlier paradigms have also been corrected for with a more recent focus by social movement scholars on issues including emotion and biography (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001; Jasper 1999), consciousness (Mansbridge and Morris 2001), issue framing (Benford and Snow 1992; Olesen 2005), networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998), and globalization and transnationalism (Bandy and Smith 2005; Della Porta, Kriesi, and Rucht 2009).

Nevertheless, the multi-disciplinary field of social movement studies has tended, since its inception, to approach social movements as “objects” of study in a manner not dissimilar to the classificatory and taxonomic systems elaborated by biologists engaged in the identification of different species. In many cases, the analysis and its significance remains structural and functionalist even if the substance of the analysis has moved away from such restrictions. In this sense, the form of analysis and its representation betrays the epistemological and ontological assumptions of the practices of knowledge production at work (see Lal 2002). When the “objects” under consideration are far more radical in their deviation from these norms the stakes and consequences of such disciplined interpretations increase considerably. It is one thing, for instance, to make sense out of mobilizations and campaigns occurring under the banner of “Make Poverty History” – a campaign tied strongly

to the UN Millennium Development Goals and linked to organized labour, faith groups, and the NGO development sector. It is quite another to try and use the same analytical schema to explore radical anti-capitalist organizing on a transnational scale as it unfolded under the auspices of networks like People's Global Action at the height of the alter-globalization movement, which were decentralized, based on the principle of local autonomy, and characterized by an anarchistic commensurability of means and ends.

All too often, in good faith attempts to shed light on the complexities of socio-political change driven by extra-institutional actors, social movement scholars have disciplined and domesticated social movements by rendering them in terms sensible with respect not only to the scholarly traditions of their field but to the assumed socio-political backdrop against which such action was positioned. This often had the effect of naturalizing dominant socio-political and economic structures, institutions, actors, and practices – to say nothing of the ideologies animating them. As Marina Sitrin argues, a focus on “contentious politics,” so common amongst North American social movement scholars, renders all movements “in a contentious relationship to the state, or another form or institution with formal ‘power over,’ whether demanding reforms from or desiring another state or institution” (2012, 13). Because they could not be rationally positioned against such a backdrop, lost from view in such a perspective are the radical challenges issued by some movements to the status quo as well as the imaginations, hopes, and desires inspiring them.

Movements, stories, and militant ethnography

In his work on the importance of story to the life of revolutionary movements and moments, social movement scholar Eric Selbin argues that it is through the collective telling and retelling of stories that the possibility of resistance, rebellion, and revolution persists. This reality, Selbin contends, necessitates “a systematic return of stories to social science methodology,” a move that acknowledges and is capable of engaging “the myth and memory of revolution and of the power of mimesis for the mobilization and sustenance of revolutionary activity” (2010, 3–4). Selbin's contention is not simply that stories matter but that, when considered comprehensively, their telling and retelling constitutes “a story structure, a repository of stories which undergirds and shapes our daily lives” (2010, 45). He goes further: “We (re)compose stories and (re)configure them in an effort to (re)connect with each other and to build community.... Truth, direct or otherwise, is less important than the extent to which stories represent people's perceptions or capture what they feel. They form a collection of who we were and where we came from, where and who we are now, and guide us to where we are going and who we wish to be” (2010, 46).

Selbin focuses on four key types of revolutionary story in his work, but his articulation of the importance of story to social change struggles has much broader implications as well. Indeed, the territory of stories and story-telling that Selbin navigates in his work is a vital space of the radical imagination at work. The collective articulation and circulation of revolutionary stories constitutes a key mechanism by which social movement participants bring the radical imagination into being and affirm the enduring possibility of radical social change. While social movement scholars have sought, primarily via theories of "diffusion" (see Tarrow 2005), to chart the way ideas, tactics, and strategies circulate through movements and the activists who constitute them, such examinations, while undoubtedly valuable, primarily consider the mechanisms facilitating such circulation with some attention paid to the role of context in this dynamic. Why these ideas and repertoires of struggle matter – what they signify and how they work to construct collective visions of political possibility that animate struggle – is accorded much less significance. The application of framing theory to explain how movements engage in meaning-work and symbolic contestation has similarly yielded results that are analytically sophisticated without probing very much beyond the mechanisms (human rights discourses, digital media, the Internet, etc.) facilitating such struggles (see Olesen 2005).

A much more embodied, robust, and engaged perspective on social movements – particularly the newest ones emerging out of and in the wake of the alter-globalization movement – has been advanced by a constellation of explicitly politicized social science researchers. Recent work by David Graeber (2009; 2007), Jeffrey Juris (2008), Alex Khasnabish (2008), Marianne Maeckelbergh (2009), Marina Sitrin (2012), and Lesley Wood (2012), for example, exhibits a strong tendency not only to engage with movements on the ground and from an avowedly politicized stance but to take movements seriously as engines of social change and incubators of social possibility. Many of these works, though by no means all of them, are ethnographic in their form and methodology, an important departure from the dominant core of social movement studies that has tended to work from much more structural, institutional, and organizational perspectives.

In adopting this orientation and taking the perspectives of movement participants seriously, this newer body of engaged scholarship takes up Selbin's exhortation to return stories and story-telling – understood broadly as the collective, social act of communicating collective understandings of what has been, what is, and what might yet be – to its methodological core. Without simplistically elevating ethnographic methods, it is worth ruminating upon what ethnographically-grounded approaches to social movement research can provide in contrast to conventional social movements studies perspectives. In order to do so it is necessary to unpack "ethnography." Ethnography needs to be understood not only as a genre of scholarly writing characterized by "thick description" or even as a set of research methods grounded in participant observation and immersion in "the

field" but as a perspective committed to understanding and taking seriously people's lived realities. Ethnographic methods including participant observation, long term fieldwork, and in-depth interviews are founded on the conviction that the world is not comprised simply of objects to be analyzed but is acted and imagined into being by active subjects, including (importantly) researchers themselves.

Because of its groundedness and its willingness to take matters of subjectivity seriously, ethnography is a research posture particularly well-suited to exploring dynamic phenomena such as social movements as well as their less tangible dimensions. Ethnography is also a perspective and methodology that lends itself well to engaged research that is committed to taking part in rather than merely observing social change struggles. Anarchist and anthropologist David Graeber has gone so far as to suggest that ethnography could be a model for the "would-be non-vanguardist revolutionary intellectual" because it offers the possibility "of teasing out the tacit logic or principles underlying certain forms of radical practice, and then, not only offering the analysis back to those communities, but using them to formulate new visions" (2007, 310). Jeffrey Juris has articulated a similar vision of "militant" ethnographic practice which refuses the valorization of "objective distance" and the tendency within the academy to treat social life as an object to decode (2008, 20). Juris contends that in order "[t]o grasp the concrete logic generating specific practices, one has to become an active participant" and within the context of social movements this means participating in and contributing to the work of these movements themselves (2008, 20). Indeed, in bringing together a variety of ethnographers with direct experience with various manifestations of the Occupy movement, Juris and Maple Razsa note provocatively that "activist anthropologists" might be considered the "organic intellectuals" of Occupy given the roles played by many within the movement, roles that were coextensive with rather than outside of their research commitments (Juris and Razsa 2012).

Again, without unduly valorizing ethnography or anthropology, the interventions made by engaged ethnographers in the study of social movements, particularly in their more radical manifestations, point importantly toward what methodological choices can illuminate and what they can obscure. At issue is not simply the subjective versus the objective but how we understand the nature of social change struggles and the scholarly "vocation" itself. We have considered these questions at length elsewhere (Khasnabish and Haiven 2012) and it is not our intention to rehash them here, but it is useful to briefly consider them in light of how they intersect with the how we understand movement successes and failures as well as how this bears upon the work we have done in the Halifax Radical Imagination Project. Central to this question of how we study movements are the questions of how we understand them as entities – how we perceive them – and how we gauge their socio-political and cultural effects – their "successes" and "failures."

If, for example, we look at social movements through the lens of hegemonic mainstream social movement studies, we see movements as organizations whose

principal objective is policy change which they seek to achieve through pressure leveraged against dominant political institutions and actors. Success is measured through a movement's ability to achieve this and to sustain itself. Of course, what disappears from view through this lens are the multiple effects produced by movements that are non-institutional and non-instrumental in nature. For example, absent from this conceptualization and analysis are the effects produced by movements which have contested racism, misogyny, capitalism, and war whose struggles successfully challenged the relations and ideologies sustaining these structural forms of violence at the level of everyday social reality. Of critical importance to this attentive perspective is an understanding of social movements not as "things" but as products of the collective labour and imagination of those who actually constitute them. Attending to movements as effects of the relations that constitute them leads the critical analytical eye away from their most ossified, obvious remnants like policy change or electoral impacts, and instead foregrounds struggle as a product of collective encounters between activists, organizers, allies, opponents, and the broader public.

David Featherstone's (2012) work on solidarity as a transformative political relationship rather than a "thing" to be achieved or not demonstrates the utility of this approach. Tracing histories and geographies of left internationalism, Featherstone excavates the labour of building solidarity between different actors engaged in a multitude of different struggles, a process that is never devoid of conflict, power, or inequality but which, when successful, has the ability to reshape the field of politic possibility as well as to transform the subjectivity of those engaged. A critical focus on the relationality at the heart of radical movements has also been a focus of ethnographically-grounded engaged social movement scholarship (see Graeber 2009; Juris 2008; Khasnabish 2008; Maeckelbergh 2009; Sitrin 2012). Instead of focusing on instrumental outcomes of movements and reading success and failure through a lens focusing on institutional impact, these works insist on the significance of understanding and engaging movements as living spaces of encounter, possibility, contestation, and conflict. As Sitrin contends in her work on horizontalism and autonomy in the newest social movements in Argentina, "participants speak of the success of the movements, and of a success that is not measurable by traditional social science, but rather one that is measured by the formation and continuation of new social relationships, new subjectivities, and a new-found dignity" (2012, 14). Such movements do not merely serve as vehicles for the dissemination of "action repertoires," they are laboratories for experimenting with ways of imagining and living otherwise (see McKay 2005).

Convoking the radical imagination

Yet there is also something absent from even these attempts to take movements seriously and it relates centrally to the question of what social movement

scholarship is good for. In all of the above examples, whether considering mainstream social movement scholarship or its politically engaged variations, scholarly attempts to engage social movements occurs in the context of fully-formed movements. There is, of course, undoubtedly value in this and such scholarship has yielded a wealth of information about contentious and radical politics outside of the halls of elite power. At the same time, as we have explored elsewhere (Khasnabish and Haiven 2012), such work can be characterized as functioning within scholarly strategies of invocation and avocation.

In the case of invocation, scholars have used their academic work and privilege to retroactively legitimate social movements as politics conducted by other means. In the case of avocation, scholars have sought to disavow their academic privilege and to lend their research skills to movements by disappearing into them. If conventional movement studies might be considered an example of a strategy of invocation, methodologies like participant action research could be considered a manifestation of a strategy of avocation. Indeed, over the last twenty years at least there has been a proliferation of politically engaged strategies that could be grouped under the label of avocation, including: action research, engaged research, advocacy research, participatory action research, collaborative ethnography, and militant anthropology (Burdick 1995; Hale 2008; Lamphere 2004; Lassiter 2005; Low and Merry 2010; Mullins 2011; Sanford and Angel-Ajani 2006; Scheper-Hughes 1995). This trajectory is preceded by and emerges out of decades of politically committed feminist research (see Cancian 1992; Federici 2003; Harding 2005; Mies 1986; Mohanty 2003; Naples 2003). It is also informed by efforts to challenge the continuing hegemony of universalist objectivism within the enduringly white, male, and Eurocentric academy (see Lal 2002; Vargas 2006; Wallerstein et al. 1996; Zuberi and Bonilla-Silva 2008). Our own experiment with a research-based method of convocation also owes a great debt to these alternative paths.

Our point here is not to valorize or debase any particular methodological orientation but to point out that research methods, much like the tactics of those engaged in social change struggles, are always most effectively when deliberately situated in relation to the context in which they will be deployed. That being so, avocation and its various strategies can only work in spaces where fairly robust movements or struggles are present, where researchers have a self-consciously constituted collective into which to submerge themselves. But what is the utility of social movement scholarship in a context where movements are dormant, demobilized, nascent or fragmented? In much of the global North, such a characterization could have been accurately applied to the terrain of radical politics in the latter part of the first decade of the new millennium. In part, this dissipation of radical movement can be attributed to 9/11 and the pretext it provided to drastically augment the repressive apparatuses of the state, restrict civil liberties, and demonize and incarcerate a wide variety of social justice activists in the defense

of corporate interests and under the banner of the "War on Terror." At the same time, before 9/11 many activists involved in the alter-globalization movement were already discussing the limitations of summit-centred convergence activism and looking for ways beyond it (Day 2005). While many of the activists and organizers involved in the alter-globalization movement would become involved in the anti-war movement that coalesced in the lead-up to the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, despite mobilizing historically unprecedented numbers, this movement, too, faded in the face of its inability to impede the march to imperialist war (Graeber 2011; Mezzadra and Roggero 2010).

These dynamics also characterized the situation in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, the context in which our Radical Imagination Project was situated. Compounding them was a particularly rancorous split between more moderate and more militant activists in the city which fractured relations of cooperation and solidarity that had been built through the work of activists and organizers over the previous years. In the midst of this historical low point for social movement activity, strategies focusing on simply observing, commenting on, or even going to work within the fabric of social change struggles no longer appeared, to us, as viable or effective routes for engaged research. Instead, through the Radical Imagination Project, we have sought to mobilize the (unjustly) privileged, relatively autonomous space of the academy and academically-based research to facilitate with activists and nascent movements what they had not created for themselves: an intentional and non-sectarian space and process capable of summoning into being the radical imagination that is the spark of radical social movements (see Haiven and Khasnabish 2010). Rather than focusing on analyzing movements as if they were insects pinned within a shadowbox, the Radical Imagination Project has sought to participate in "convoking" the radical imagination in collaboration with activists in Halifax – to provide the opportunities, resources, time, and space necessary to collectively bring into being the prefigurative capacity to envision and work toward building more just social worlds (Khasnabish and Haiven 2012). From this perspective, issues of movement "success" and "failure" along with other empirical "outcomes" of movement analysis so common to social movement scholarship fade from view, replaced by a focus on relationality, encounter, and dialogue.

Over the course of two years, we spoke with emerging and elder activists, those who were considered central movement participants and those on the margins. Our research partners worked in a variety of organizations on a range of issues and included employees of environmentalist NGOs, street punks, anti-racist organizers, book publishers, student activists, feminist militants, Marxist party members, radical academics, and anti-poverty advocates. Halifax is a city where most people in the radical milieu know one another, and where many activists participate in multiple organizations. We began with purposefully vague definitions of "radical" and "activist," and sought out our research partners through a combination of participant observation, word of mouth, and advertising in local activist-oriented

media. Very few activists we approached declined to participate, though many expressed skepticism regarding what the project could contribute or achieve. We conducted open-ended interviews with each participant, asking them to narrate their own journey to radicalism and activism, to express their key frustrations and greatest inspirations in organizing, to reflect on what it would mean to win, and to share with us their hopes and fears for the future. Based on key themes and tensions that emerged in the interview stage, we facilitated three dialogue sessions where we invited selected participants to articulate their position on their session's theme publically, and an audience of other participants responded and discussed. In the final stage of the project, in response to requests from our research participants, we curated an occasional speakers' series aimed at bringing fresh and stimulating ideas into the Halifax radical milieu.

As the primary research phase wound down, we were forced to question the criteria by which we and our movement partners should assess the project's successes and failures. If we are to take the lessons of recent innovations in solidarity research seriously, we cannot imagine that research success is merely a matter of collecting reliable data, nor simply helping movements themselves "succeed" in any simplistic way. If we are to imagine radical movements as fraught and conflicted force fields of possibility, animated by stories, relationships, visions, and often contradictory practices and driven by dreams of the future that reject success *within* the present sociopolitical order, how then must we imagine their successes?

One option might be to consider the mere existence of such radical movements a success in and of itself: the mere fact that they overcome the ideological and material structures of power and are able to imagine and fight for a different reality is significant enough. But this answer will satisfy neither movement participants, nor researchers. And then what would be the point of research? Another option might be to ask movements themselves what success might mean. But our experience (and we asked, specifically, "what would it mean to win?") is that movement participants typically have a vague answer to this question, and their answers are rarely immediately aligned. We believe there is a critical utility in holding the question of success open, and dwelling with the further (sometimes uncomfortable and perhaps unanswerable) questions it evokes.

The queer art of failure

Judith (Jack) Halberstam's *Queer Art of Failure* (2011) offers us a useful place to begin reimagining social movement and social movement research "success." Halberstam asks us to consider: if "success" is defined within an oppressive, exploitative and unequal society, can "failure" be a liberatory practice? What are the "arts" of failure that help undo the normative codes of success, especially in an age of rampant neoliberalism where personal advantage-seeking is held to be the key to success, for both individuals and for society at large (thanks to the "invisible

hand of the market")? For Halberstam, these questions are framed most cogently around questions of queer politics: if "success" in gender performativity means being able to match one's performance of self to the given gender norms assumed to be associated with one's genitalia, is the queer "art" of bending, challenging, or simply "failing" to obey these norms not key to resisting the status quo?

Halberstam is also interested in social movements, although through the lens of popular culture, noting the ways that many popular children's films (contrary to pessimistic readings that see them as purely hegemonic) actually narrate the failure of the sort of possessive individualism that is seen typically seen as "successful" neoliberal behaviour. These films often depict the victories of those who we might consider "failures," to the extent these failures band together and challenge the overarching regime of success.

What might social movements and scholars of social movements learn from this approach? As we have seen in the first section, social movement studies has, to a large extent, fixated on the question of movement success, even when that success has been understood less as quantifiable material and political gains and more as the fortitude and intensity of networks, or as transformations of subjectivity.

Likewise, successful social movement scholarship has typically been marked by the observation and interpretation of movement successes, or the successful identification of the causes of social movement failures. To embrace Halberstam's "queer art" of failure would be to look to failures as potential sites of rupture and possibility.




Figure 1

Here another tool from critical theory can be equally useful. For Frederic Jameson (1976, 1981) and Donna Haraway (1992), the "Greimas Square" (named after the French semiotician) offers a profound heuristic tool for taking apart binary thinking and pluralizing the horizons of thought. While the rich and complicated semiotic theory behind the square is beyond the scope of this paper, the basic idea

is that tension between two (ostensibly) contrary concepts (in this case "success" and "failure") can be productively opened up by, in a sense, "squaring" the equation, adding into the mix their "contradictories" ("not-success" and "not-failure"). The four terms can form a square, the sides of which offer up new possibilities for interpretation.

What is key is that "success" is not the same as "not-failure," and "failure" is not the same as "not-success." The "lines" in the square represent fruitful and provocative opportunities for reconsideration. This is because, in Jameson's interpretation, the initial binary (success and failure) is "ideological." That is, it is an always partial, fractured way of understanding reality. The binary is forged within and tainted by the society of which it is a part. For instance, most critics will be familiar with the critique of the "binary gender system": the binary of "male" and "female" exists as an element of a patriarchal gender system that allows certain traits, features and behaviours to be feminized (and devalued) and certain ones to be masculinized (and valorized) (see Butler 1990). The binary gender system grows out of a patriarchal society, and, in turn, it shapes our thinking, performances of self, and interpersonal actions in ways that see (most of) us reproduce a patriarchal society. To return to Halberstam, our binary of "success" and "failure" is one defined by a normative social order, built by and reinforcing heteronormativity, patriarchy, class exploitation, white supremacy, and other modes of oppression. Within the limited "success/failure" binary, the absence of equal marriage rights for gays and lesbians is seen as a "failure," and the gaining of these rights is seen as "success." But it is queer success within a heteronormative framework, which might lead us to question whether "success" is all that "successful."

For Jameson (1976, 1981), in his Marxian approach to the Greimas square, the final reconciliation of the initial binary (some sort of possibility to transcend the ideas of "success" and "failure") is utopian: it exists just over the horizon of our thinking, possible only in (an impossible) world to come where we have conclusively overcome all the sorts of oppression and exploitation that frame (and benefit) from our ways of thinking (see Haiven 2011). Until then, it is the job of radical critique to deconstruct and open up supposed binaries and pluralize the sorts of options available for thinking and acting beyond the pre-given epistemic order. As such, each "line" in the above square represents a key ideological tension, and in the rest of this section we think through each in turn, first for social movements, then for solidarity researchers.

Social movements and the hiatus between (not-) success and (not-) failure




Figure 2

What is key is that on each axis of the square, a synthesis can emerge. For instance, on the original “top” axis (2a), we might say that the synthesis of “success” and “failure” is that utopian moment when we no longer live by the sorts of binary expectations that are characteristic of systems of power (“rich”=success, “poor”=failure), which we might call “collective potential.” That is, it would be a world of freedom where individuals and groups were able to constitute and reconstitute themselves without the restriction of prior expectations. This is the sort of utopian moment of which social movements dream (Haiven 2011). The key critical power of this methodology is that it refocuses us on what the more substantive goal might be beyond particular ideas of success. In our square, we might be tempted to imagine that the left-hand synthesis is the most desirable, but the Jamesonian square (for by now it has gone well beyond Greimas’s intentions) forces us to see that whatever emerges in this left-hand space (2d) is really only a limited possibility within (not yet beyond) the society that has created the initial opposition in the first place. That is, while it might be important, whatever fills that space will fall short of the more substantive and radical possibility at the “top” of the square (2a; in this case, utopia).

So on the left side of the square (2d), if we think of what social movement “success” and “not-failure” might mean, we might think of practical and material victories: success by a movement’s own standards, or what we might call “gains.” While not insignificant, what the square forces us to imagine is that a movement’s own standards of “success” may not, in and of themselves, be all that animates that movement. Hence the recognition that even when movements “win,” they rarely pack up and go home, nor are the battles they fought necessarily finished. For instance, the 2012 Quebec student movement succeeded in their stated objectives of turning back the planned increase in tuition fees but a proposal for tuition increases, albeit more modest ones, was reintroduced by the incoming provincial government in winter 2013. So is this movement success or failure? As this example illustrates, the dichotomy is facile and occludes other more enduring, less spectacular outcomes. Student resistance to tuition increases continues and Quebec continues to enjoy the lowest university tuition rates in all of Canada but, perhaps more importantly, the spirit of that movement lives on, both in campaigns for free tuition, groups that are confronting neoliberalism in other sectors of society, and in the affinity groups and friendships that formed during the strike and whose consequences are yet to be seen (Thorburn 2012).

Likewise, then, the square forces us to reimagine “failure” as well. On the right-hand axis of our square (2b) we have the synthesis of “failure” and “not-success.” Not only are we thinking about a tactical or a strategic collapse and a failure of movements to reach their stated objectives and make their desired impact (the contrary to their concept of “success”), there is also a more profound socio-psychological dimension, an absence of success. In the context of the movement actors we spoke to, we heard a lot about what our participants called “burn out.” This meant not only pessimism about the possibilities for real change (success) but a weariness and cynicism that was wounding to the soul itself. Many participants reported “being” burnt out (and having withdrawn from activism), or having burnt out and recovered, or worrying about burning out in the future. Causes of burnout were numerous. Often it resulted from activists getting so caught up in the quest to succeed that they worked themselves too hard, often coming to resent or becoming alienated from other movement participants who were not perceived to be pulling their weight. Others noted that for those with more advanced anti-oppression approaches, or who came from marginalized groups, the toll of dealing with ignorance and privilege was extremely taxing. Others confessed that the further they delved into movement participation, the less they had in common with non-activists and that many relationships with non-movement friends and family members atrophied, leaving them lonely, especially in times of movement crisis and failure.

Based on these testimonies, our own experiences as activists and organizers, and a significant and growing body of activist reflection on self- and community-care and burnout (Carlsson 2010; Loewe 2012; Padamsee 2011; Plyler 2006), we think that

activist “burnout” is a key category that deserves much more exploration and consideration. Many elder or more experienced activists we spoke to revealed biographies that included periods of burnout, often followed by transitions into other movements or causes, sometimes radically different than those they had engaged previously. Often this included a shift from “activist” work (the organization of direct action, political lobbying, and public education) towards “organizing” and forms of self- and other-oriented care (including formal and informal social work, teaching, community mobilizing, or working for NGOs). A few participants wryly and wistfully confided that, after burning out, they thought themselves done with radical politics for good, at least in any organized sense.

Burnout is key in part because it is so universal among radical activists. But it is also key because it is something radical social movement researchers can help with. Movements, we learned, often have difficulty offering the institutions, practices, and spaces to help individuals avoid or return from burnout. Social movement researchers interested in working with movements might be able to create these missing elements of social movement culture (what we identify as “solidarity” work, below). For instance, many of our research participants admitted that the semi-formal opportunity to privately talk through their issues with researchers gave them new perspectives and helped them work through metaphorical wounds, a sort of radical therapy (see Berardi 2009). We also offered opportunities for movements (not just single movements, but multiple overlapping activist circles) to meet and talk about broad issues and ideas, which also allowed some of the issues that lead to burnout (judgmental atmospheres, oppressive behaviour, unequal labour) to be addressed – though certainly not solved!

Along the bottom axis of our square (2c) is the synthesis of “not-success” and “not-failure,” which we have identified as “culture.” This is, to the best of our understanding, the near constant state of social movements. Because the horizon of social movement potential exceeds the limited and stated forms of “success,” often articulated as the concrete goals of struggle or specific campaign objectives, the work of movements is never done. This dwelling between “not-failure” and “not-success” represents the key psychosocial landscape of social movement actors, and it is the ability to keep hope, solidarity, and purpose alive, for both groups and individuals, that is the heart of social movement energies. We might call the horizon of social justice at the “top” of the square (2a) the terrain of “transcendence,” the necessary wish for a different society that animates radicalism. The antithetical “bottom” (2c) is the terrain of “immanence,” the everyday, existential shared landscape of perseverance. It is between these two that what we have elsewhere (Haiven and Khasnabish 2010) theorized that the “radical imagination” exists: it is not only the ability to dream of different worlds, it is the ability to live between those worlds and this one, between “not-success” and “not-failure.”

Our research partners in Halifax developed many ways of doing this. Most reported that relationships were key. Many talked about needing to keep spheres and areas of life separate from their activism, or have other groups of friends and hobbies. Many of our participants' abilities to dwell between not-success and not-failure were cast in reference to history, to the way that movements in the past appeared to be "going nowhere" until, all of a sudden, there was a breakthrough. Interestingly, perhaps the most pervasive technique for dwelling in this space was cynicism, a wry knowingness, often articulated as a sardonic fatalism. Often with reference to the worsening global ecological situation and the consolidation of corporate and state power, almost all our participants performed a sort of cagy and sardonic tone towards their seemingly Sisyphean labours, which perhaps helped insulate them from the heartsick reality whose naked presence might lead to demobilizing fury or despair.

We have called this axis (2c) "culture" because it helps reveal the importance of stories, images, practices, beliefs, relationships, ideas, and institutions that allow movements to persist (see Selbin 2010). It is this sense of culture, understood as a material and symbolic practice of meaning-making rather than merely as a thing one possesses, which allows us to see that movements do not exist in isolation. Almost everywhere, multiple movements enjoy overlapping "membership" (whether formal or informal) and are cross-cut by a social commons constituted by relationships and individuals, sometimes colleagues, sometimes neighbours, sometimes lovers, sometimes rivals. Radical social movements, then, are both the products and the producers of culture at the crossroads of not-success and not-failure, an ecology of persistence.

Our argument here is that the space between not-success and not-failure is a vital one for researchers to study, not only because it (rather than definitive success or failures) is the real substance of social movements, but because it is in this hiatus - a beautiful word, which stems from the Latin word for "opening" - that solidarity-researchers might be able to find their place in relation to the social movements they study. What if, rather than "helping movements succeed," we conceived of our role as helping develop strategies for dwelling in not-success and not-failure?

Returning now to the left-hand side of the square, we can see how limited the simple contrast of social movement success and failure can be, which can only hope to measure these terms either by movements' own stated yardsticks or by rubrics imposed by the researcher from the outside. Movements do not "succeed" or "fail," they exist in the interstice, in the hiatus. They are borne of and driven by (often unstated, unarticulated) common dreams of a world beyond the binary of "success" and "failure" and they live in the everyday space of "non-success" and "non-failure." From this perspective, often successes are worse than failures: when an electoral victory leads to demobilization, for instance, leaving participants scattered and lost. And by the same token, failures can be better than successes. In both New York City and Halifax, the eviction of Occupy demonstrators was a failure in the

sense that the forces of the state rendered impossible the stated objective of the movement: to occupy public space. But out of that "failure," in both contexts, have emerged a plethora of new activist networks and groups working on a wide variety of issues, animated by the utopian horizon beyond success and failure and actuated by activist techniques for dwelling between not-success and not-failure. This is to say nothing of the spectacle of their evictions by police, which illuminated a political reality for countless witnesses.² This is not to say successes are not important, or that sometimes successes are not just successes and failures just failures. Successes often lead to greater levels of mobilization as people feel the momentum of victory and often failures lead to burnout, if not prison terms or worse. Rather, it is to say that when we pluralize our understanding of this binary, we gain a more profound insight into radical social movements.

Solidarity research: dwelling in the hiatus

We can use the same framework to reinterpret the study of radical social movements. Let us begin by contrasting what are typically considered research "successes" and "failures." For mainstream academics, the measure of success is the ability to collect and interpret reliable data. More cynically, it is the ability to "get published." Failure is ideally conceived of as a methodological mistake, a failure to accurately or reliably collect data. In practice, failure means collecting boring data: data that either does not illuminate anything particularly "new."

We are less interested in this traditional research and are more interested in research that attempts to find solidarity with movements. For those of us committed to this path, success and failure is more difficult to plot. For some, success still means cultivating reliable data, often at the behest of movements themselves, or in order to illuminate and legitimate movements through the prestige of the academy (Khasnabish and Haiven 2012). For others, success is to be measured by how well movements are served by the research, often by a standard the movements themselves determine. But in either case, as with the movements in the square above (figure 2), the researcher exists between, on the one hand, an impossible utopian relationship with the movement, one of perfect reciprocity and immediacy (figure 3, 3a), and, on the other, a reality of not-succeeding and not-failing (3c). Let us once again go through our syntheses.

² For running reflections on the exciting afterlives of Occupy Wall Street, see the publication *Tidal*, produced by the Occupy Theory working group. <http://occupytheory.org/>.




Figure 3

On the left-hand side we have the synthesis of solidarity research success and not-failure (3d). This means that, according to whatever criteria was imagined (whether the cultivation of reliable data or service to the movement in question), the researcher has succeeded and avoided failure, in the sense that many of the pitfalls that accompany social movement research have been evaded: the exploitation or disruption of the researcher or research, the often corrosive effect of power and privilege differentials, the use of researcher information by law enforcement agents, or the alienation of the research from the movements, or from academe. This outcome is, of course, desirable for all sorts of noble reasons. The Jamesonian Square method does not ask us to abandon the “left hand” of the equation (3d), only to recognize that there is more to the picture.

Thus, on the right-hand side we can understand the antithesis of “results” and the synthesis of “failure” and “not-success” as exploitation (3b). Beyond simply not collecting good or reliable data, this side of the researcher-social movement relationship can open onto forms of exploitation such as those mentioned above. Here exploitation might include the exploitation of the movement by the researcher, in the sense that the research serves the latter’s career at the expense of the former. Or, vice versa, social movements may “exploit” a willing researcher, either demanding all their time or placing limits on their autonomy which restricts what we have elsewhere called “the odd (almost perverse) freedom” and the

"critical element of 'play'" that is in many ways unique to university-based researchers in an age where neoliberalism has dramatically confiscated almost all other forms of critical intellectual autonomy. Exploitation here refers to a failure of responsibility in the radical, poetic sense of the term: a failure for one party to be "responsible" or "responsive" to the other, to be "accountable," in the sense of being able to "give an account of oneself," to "settle accounts" (Butler 2005, 9-21). In other words, the synthesis of "failure" and "not-success" (3b) is the perpetuation of power imbalances that undermine the research relationship. The synthesis of "failure" and "not-success" here speaks to the betrayal of the utopian vision (3a) which is at the heart of solidarity research.

And what of that quadrant? Just as social movements dream of something beyond their immediate goals, so too do solidarity researchers, we believe, dream of a utopian horizon. Like all horizons, this one recedes as we approach, and its contours are always hazy and incomplete. But like our earlier square, this utopian horizon is one where the original antinomy is reconciled, where research success and failure are no longer an opposition. This would be a world where the line between researcher and movement would no longer be tenable. That would be a world where "research" is folded back into the fabric of daily life, and where the unequal and unfair division of labour (where some are "researchers" and others are "researched") disappears. Experiments in co-research have strived for this horizon and have often approached it in admirable ways (see Shukaitis, Graeber, and Biddle 2007). But the true utopian horizon cannot be reached because, in a way, it would be a moment where research itself would be unnecessary. Just as radical social movements' utopian horizon is one that has no use for them, our researcher's horizon renders the dreamer anachronistic. Solidarity researchers do the work they do because they think it is an important way of confronting injustice, beyond the "normative" constellations of "success" and "failure." In so doing, they dream a world beyond the sorts of injustice they believe research can help eliminate.

More practically, radical solidarity-researchers develop methods and strategies that are always, even when pragmatic, grounded in the utopian belief that if the power imbalances of the researcher-researched relationship cannot be overcome (in this society), they can be worked through. And it is this "working through" that we identify with the bottom quadrant of our square (3c), which we have identified as "solidarity." This is the state of "not-success" and "not-failure" familiar to us from the social movement square, and likewise it is the space of active waiting, of anticipatory pragmatics, of the pregnant hiatus. Researchers dwelling in this place navigate the ongoing difficulties, pitfalls, and irreconcilable conundrums of working with social movements with an eye on the north star (the top of the square). As with social movements, this dwelling between success and failure is a practice of radical patience. And in that, it is fundamentally at odds with the neoliberal university obsessed with "results," research "deliverables," and quantifiable baubles of knowledge (see EduFactory 2009).

Beyond failurism

Recently, political theorists including Jody Dean (2012) have taken aim at what they characterize broadly as the Left's obsession with failure as a melancholic attachment, one that sees social movements narcissistically devour themselves by fixating on small, largely insignificant gains rather than demanding and building to win meaningful social change. These theorists, frustrated by the "soft" liberal anarchistic tendencies in radical movements (notably, Occupy Wall Street) call for a rejection of failurism and a return to what Dean calls "The Communist Horizon." While Dean is not exactly calling for a return to the rigid party organization and ideology of the 20th century, she believes that Left social movements need to return to broad visions of a different society and eschew the sorts of liberal individualism and shortsightedness that produce activist subcultures rather than thriving, powerful movements against capitalism and other systems of exploitation and oppression.

Our vision of a research politics of not-success and not-failure is not unsympathetic to this objective. In claiming that social movements dwell in the hiatus, we are not necessarily celebrating that fact, although we do not believe movements will ever achieve some transcendent status of pure success. Indeed, transcendence seems jarringly antithetical to the immanence of the social and the lived, the terrain of real politics. In fact, we believe that movements that are too triumphalist about their own narrative are extremely dangerous. We are also concerned that authors like Dean, in their impatience with Leftist narcissism, might inadvertently invite their readers to fold in the important anti-oppression work movements often do (including seemingly endless soul-searching over themes of privilege, exclusion, and inaccessibility along the axes of class, race, gender, education, citizenship status, and cis/trans politics, among others) into a critique of liberal individualism and movement pathology.

Yet if we were to imagine a move towards a research-solidarity based on the framework illustrated above, it would not mean a glorification of failure. Such a move would, in fact, allow researchers to reimagine their own role vis-à-vis the movements they work with and the impasses, limits, frustrations, and contradictions they inevitably face. In our research project, for instance, many of our partners reported that the interviews and dialogue sessions were a rare occasion for them to articulate and share - in an open-ended, reflexive, and non-sectarian space - broader visions of what they were fighting for, and to be forced to link those visions to their current forms of activism. These solidaristic research interventions became a means to open up the productive tensions between success and failure. As Dean notes, the Left's obsession with failure emerges in part from the way social movement cultures get caught up in the often mundane and unending nature of struggle. The methodological approach we are dreaming of here is one that sees the researcher help create a movement space for broader reflection and strategizing that, outside of more formal party structures, rarely exists. In this

way, our proposal to imagine and work with movements as they dwell in the hiatus between not-success and not-failure is not a celebration of failurism. It may, in fact, help make movement beyond failurism possible.

In Halifax, our primary research phase concluded in the spring of 2011 on a distinctly pessimistic note. The radical activists with whom we spoke conveyed feelings of depression and hopelessness. Crisis seemed ubiquitous, the radicalized mass movements necessary to confront and overcome them conspicuous in their absence, at least in the global North. Our three group dialogue sessions, while fruitful, were frustrating for nearly all involved, frequently raising vital issues of direct concern to radical movements and their participants seemingly without doing anything substantial with or about them. Seasoned organizers winced at the political immaturity of neophytes, recalling their own early embarrassments and missteps. Emerging activists were perplexed, frustrated, and alienated by the level of perceived sectarianism and infighting in the milieu. The specters of movement and personal histories haunted these encounters, even though many participants had no direct experience with or knowledge of them. Our project occurred at a moment of suspension, of "in-betweenness" for radical social movements in Halifax with several movement organizations and groups recently becoming dormant or dramatically imploding. Meanwhile, on the global stage, the age of austerity had been ushered in, driven by an unapologetic, frenzied neoliberal militarism that exacerbated and deepened nearly all the social, political, and economic problems radical activists had been working against. These were dark times indeed.

But then, seemingly from nowhere, the Arab Spring emerged, followed urgently by the Occupy movement. Both of these resonated deeply with our research participants and Occupy Nova Scotia coalesced around an almost entirely new cast of radicalized activists and organizers. In Canada, the subsequent "Maple Spring" student movement in Quebec and the ongoing Idle No More indigenous movement further contributed to a resurgence of movement optimism. For us, this was an important lesson in success and failure. While we could never claim a correlation between the work of the movements we studied and these momentous events (with perhaps the exception of Occupy Nova Scotia, which did include and benefit from a few seasoned activists), we are convinced that these struggles all, in various ways, "resonate" with one another (see Khasnabish 2008): they connect on the level of shared aspirations, personal relationships, movement myths and legends, organizing strategies, and common horizons.

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About the authors

Max Haiven is an assistant professor in the Division of Art History and Critical Studies at the Nova Scotia College of Art and Design. His work has appeared in journals including *Social Text*, *Cultural Studies*, *Cultural Critique* and *Mediations*. He is the author of a forthcoming book on finance capitalism and the imagination and is co-authoring (with Alex Khasnabish) a forthcoming book on the radical imagination (Zed Books). He can be contacted at mhaiven@nscad.ca

Alex Khasnabish is an associate professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Mount Saint Vincent University. He is the author of *Zapatismo Beyond Borders: New Imaginations of Political Possibility*, *Zapatistas: Rebellion from the Grassroots to the Global*, and co-author (with Max Haiven) of a forthcoming book on the radical imagination (Zed Books). He can be contacted at alex.khasnabish@msvu.ca

Book reviews: Interface volume 5 (2)

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Books reviewed this issue:

Sheila Rowbotham, Lynne Segal and Hilary Wainwright. 2013. *Beyond the fragments: feminism and the making of socialism* (3rd edition). London: Merlin. (324 pp; £14.95)
Reviewed by Laurence Cox

Shigematsu, Setsu. 2012. *Scream from the Shadows: The Women's Liberation Movement in Japan*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (272 pp.)
Reviewed by Julia Schuster

Chris Crass. 2013. *Towards Collective Liberation: Anti-Racist Organizing, Feminist Praxis and Movement Building Strategy*. PM Press. (295 pages)
Reviewed by Lesley Wood

Wood, Lesley. 2012. *Direct Action, Deliberation and Diffusion: Collective Action after the WTO protests in Seattle*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. (paper; £55.00.)
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Hill, Symon. 2013. *Digital Revolutions: Activism in the Internet Age*. Oxford: New Internationalist Publications Ltd. (147 pp. plus Index, £9.99/US \$16.95)
Reviewed by Deborah Eade

R. D. Smith. 2012. *Higher hopes: A black man's guide to college*. BFI Technology: Rochester. (292 pp; \$9.41)
Reviewed by Mandisi Majavu

Sheila Rowbotham, Lynne Segal and Hilary Wainwright. 2013. *Beyond the fragments: feminism and the making of socialism* (3rd edition). London: Merlin. (324 pp; £14.95)

Reviewed by **Laurence Cox**

Introduction

Beyond the fragments is one of those books that many activists cite as playing a role in their own biographies. I came across it in the mid-1990s, as a young organiser developing conversations and networks between different social movements in Ireland, in the overlap between European Green parties' vanishing self-understanding as movement alliances and the first inklings of the Zapatista-inspired networking processes that would shortly lead to the "movement of movements". We take our ideas and inspiration where we can find them, but read them critically, for what they can offer our own struggles and our own problems.

One of the liberating aspects of *Beyond the fragments* was that it embodied this kind of politics of knowledge. Rather than presenting a closed, seamless analysis with an agreed set of propositions which readers were implicitly encouraged to sign up to – the book as party conference motion – readers found themselves involved in a conversation between three activists who had come from different left organisations, with a range of related but not identical experiences in women's, trade union and community organising. The open space created by this approach allowed readers to relate to the book as a conversation between their peers which they could join in.

This fitted with the picture presented by the book itself: rejecting the top-down political practice of Social Democracy, Trotskyism and orthodox Communism, it re-situated the authors, and activists in such parties, as participants in a wider conversation among a broader *movement*. That conversation was never liberal in form; it was always geared to practice and informed by a close discussion of specific experiences, but open to the possibility of making alliances between struggles without passing everything through the filter of organisational leaderships.

The book also embodied these experiences in its history: first published in 1979 by the Newcastle Socialist Centre and the Islington Community Press, two such examples of local, non-sectarian alliances between activists, it was taken up by Merlin Press, translated into several languages and fed into the development of what became known as socialist feminism, in the brief period before neoliberalism's assault on socialism and its very selective alliance with elements of the feminist agenda reduced the space for that position to one of academic theory¹. Now, after the experiences of the "movement of movements" and the

¹ In slightly different ways, parallel projects such as eco-socialism or anti-capitalist strategies within the GLBTQ movement were to be squeezed out of the space of political possibility, at least within western Europe.

new anti-austerity struggles, the book has been republished with substantial reflective essays by the three authors – each in the meantime widely respected as engaged thinkers by people from many different political spaces – looking back on the 1979 text, reflecting on its political context and the onslaught that was to come, and discussing the relevance of the questions raised by the book for today's movements.

What remains?

In her new piece, Sheila Rowbotham observes that

it has to be recognised that the women's liberation movement of the 1970s was part of a broader radicalisation. We had lived through a stormy decade of conflicts in workplaces and communities. In Ireland people were engaged in armed struggle. We had marched on massive trade union demonstrations, supported picket lines and learned from men and women on strike and in occupations. Then there were burgeoning movements against racism, around gay liberation. While our main focus in the decade before 1979 had been the women's movement this did not mean we had been enclosed within it. (pp. 13-14)

In some ways, as all three authors note, we are returning to this kind of situation of movements and struggles overlapping with and informing each other – much to the discomfiture of NGO and trade union leaderships, celebrity activists and academic empire-builders whose local power is built on keeping "their" issue and "their" audience separate from others. To say this, though, is easier than to think through what it means; and much of *Beyond the fragments* then and now is about the three-way relationship between women's struggles, working-class campaigns and political organisations large and small.

Reflecting on this question, Hilary Wainwright writes that

a more useful metaphor is to understand [political organisations] as part of a constellation – or, more mundanely perhaps, 'network' – of activities, sharing common values, involving all kinds of patterns of mutual influence, each autonomous but interrelated in different ways. Several further implications and questions follow. It becomes obvious that different ways of organising and different forms of democracy suit different purposes...

Moreover, people sharing the values of this multiplicity of organisation and eager to be part of a process of social transformation will have different possibilities and inclinations to participate. A useful concept to capture a necessarily flexible approach to participation is 'an ecology of participation'. (p. 56)

Again, and relevant to *Interface* as well as her own example of *Red Pepper*,

Rather than thinking in terms of unification versus fragmentation, I would emphasise a recognition of the necessity of diverse sources of power, and the need therefore to devise organisational forms for different purposes and contexts... This in turn points to the importance, as one piece in the organisational jigsaw puzzle, of a purposeful infrastructure to strengthen these flows of communication, cohesion and common political direction, with all the mutual learning that this involves. We all have to be activists and reflective observers at the same time. (61)

As she has explored in more detail elsewhere, Wainwright outlines the politics of knowledge involved in movement struggles, explorations of the possibility of a socialised economy and the possibility of "reclaiming the state" from below, as well as the vexed question of political parties in the process of transformation. She discusses the disappointments of previous attempts at movement parties such as *die Grünen* and *Rifondazione comunista* (p. 50) while arguing that political parties and an engagement with state power are nevertheless necessary, making particular reference to *Syriza* in Greece.

Part of the difficulty – and this is not to dismiss the strength of what she is saying – is that because of the centrality of the state to what we could call "common sense" popular politics (ideas shaped by nostalgia for the welfare state, national-developmentalism or state socialism) and the accumulation not only of power and financial resources but also of cultural prestige in the parliamentary arena and associated media, academic and NGO spheres, *effective* political parties tend to massively distort movement action.

Much like military strategies, they tend to wind up meaning that popular struggles put most, if not all, of their eggs in the state-centric basket, with the risks not only of generalising the cost of defeat in this arena but of the familiar ambiguous victory in which supposedly progressive parties wind up implementing neoliberal politics with the backing of movement forces who have invested too heavily in the party game to admit their mistake. "Good sense", perhaps, would suggest a greater detachment from the fascination of the state and its Meaning – but of the many extraordinary experiments in Latin America over the past decade, few have managed to escape this logic entirely².

² Conversely, the evident need of many left intellectuals to have a Good Party to point to in Latin America is extraordinary, and has led to the reproduction of many mistakes for which there is no excuse. Its broader rhetorical context is the jump from an abstract question as to whether A Party or engagement with The State is necessary, to commitment to a particular body which is supposed to fill this role – independent of any serious assessment as to whether the broader movement situation makes this remotely realistic or whether the organisation in question is capable of living up to its billing. A bit more attention to popular movements, and a bit less neediness in the search for the Modern Prince (Charming), would be a valuable step towards the hard-headed realism about power which such intellectuals regularly claim for themselves. The absence of such projection in *Beyond the fragments* is part of its political maturity.

One reason for this fascination, perhaps, has been the way in which neoliberalism has narrowed our imagination for what is possible and leads us to seek Meaning in a space which will not get us laughed at. Rowbotham again:

In the 1960s and '70s, inspired by movements against imperialism, people of colour, women and gays imagined a politics of 'liberation' which went beyond rights, or access to resources. 'Liberation' suggested a transformation not simply of the circumstances of daily life but of being and relating. Instead of an individualism of selfishness and greed, there was to be self-definition and expression, instead of competition, association, trust and co-operation. This is the future I still envisage and want to help bring about. But I have to take a deeper breath before admitting to it. (p.25)

This sense of historical change and the contrast between what could then be taken for granted and what has, now, to be painfully rebuilt is powerful in Lynne Segal's new essay:

When I turn back to that paradoxical moment, 1979... I know I am returning to another world. It is strange to revisit those times, when we were able to take so much for granted about commitments to direct democracy, equality and the need to develop and share the skills and imagination of everyone... The bottom line was the prefigurative politics that expressed our belief in mutual aid and the sharing of talent and resources (p. 93)

Segal's contribution is deeply reflective, situating her libertarian left commitments in the late 1960s counter culture and their enrichment through the challenges she faced as a single mother in 1970s London, noting both the gains made by feminism in the decades which followed and the cost of growing class divisions to women and ethnic minorities in particular. Making the links between 1979 and Occupy, she is at once supportive, enthused and aware of complexities and difficulties to come:

Drawing especially upon the impact of feminism, the problem as we saw it back then was how to facilitate more dialogue and co-operation between the different organized left groups and diverse activist movements to build coalitions solid enough to confront the triumph of the right under Margaret Thatcher. In so many ways we seem back in that moment again, except that the obstacles we face have grown formidably. (p. 66)

Returning *beyond the fragments*

If ever a movement embodied William Morris's comments about the ambiguity of popular struggle, it was surely second-wave feminism:

"I pondered all these things, and how [people] fight and lose the battle, and the thing that they fought for comes about in spite of their defeat, and when it comes turns out not to be what they meant, and other [people] have to fight for what they meant under another name..."

What liberal feminist, in 1960, could have predicted that so many legal barriers to gender equality could fall, that so many educational changes could be brought about, and that economic inequality would remain so marked, while patriarchal forms of popular culture would experience such a revival? What radical feminist in the same period could have imagined the bulk of their movement turned into service provision in state-supported work on rape and domestic violence, with so many battles won around contraception, divorce and (albeit still contested) abortion – and that rape culture could be so aggressive and so public at the same time, while women's control over their own bodies in childbirth would remain such a marginal issue? What Marxist feminist could have conceived that women's role in paid labour could undergo such a transformation and yet the cultural power of marriage and family remain so strong?

In all these cases, the genre which seeks to identify first causes, locate strategic issues and propose theoretical analyses dates quickly, and for a simple reason: it relies on the exclusion of the richer complexities of present-day struggle, and substitutes individual analysis for collective practice. Similar gestures had long been dominant in statist left politics, and the original essays challenge these from many directions, rejecting not only social democratic technocracy and the de facto conservatism of British Communism but equally the self-proclaimed wisdom of Trotskyist leaderships – above all, the *practice* of domination by small male elites, the silencing of dissent, the instrumental approach to movements and the dismissal of popular experience. Then as now, the book's openness, conversational tone and refusal of the seamless analysis inviting either submission or departure are very welcome:

every form of subordination suppresses vital understandings which can only be fully achieved and communicated through the liberation of the oppressed group itself. No 'vanguard' organization can truly anticipate these understandings...

If a revolutionary movement is to be truly able to encourage, develop and guide the self-activity and the organized power of the oppressed then it must be able to learn from and contribute to these understandings... To a very large extent socialist politics should derive and at times, has derived, its main content from these understandings. (Wainwright in 1979; p. 113)

Unlike many classics from its time which remain on reading lists, the original *Beyond the fragments* does not focus on structural analysis, hypothesised genealogies of patriarchy or polemics directed at other feminists. Instead it presents us with the question of how we can learn from each other's struggles: how feminists, community activists, radical trade unionists and others had

learned to organise; how this contrasted with the logics of social democracy and Leninism; and how a conversation between these experiences of popular self-organisation might look.

This practical emphasis, of course, takes it away from the format preferred by the university, today far and away the single largest institutions socialising people into explicitly feminist identities; however, it takes it into the heart of actual organising. Segal's 1979 essay closes, appropriately, with a statement of problems for movement practice:

First, the relationship between feminism and personal politics, and left groups and the general political situation. Secondly, the relation between local organizing and national organizing, and how this relates to the conflict between libertarians and feminists and the traditional left in the current situation. Thirdly, how we move on to a perspective for building socialism which can incorporate both feminist politics and the new ideas and ways of organizing which have emerged over the last ten years. (p. 279)

That some of these might now seem like dead issues at first glance of course reflects the extent to which we have become institutionalised or – to put it more harshly – succumbed to the neo-liberal logic of fragmentation in which we find quick, dismissive answers to the big questions and invest ever more heavily in our own special areas of interest and our own “niche markets”.

The original essays in *Beyond the fragments*, written at the end of a decade of women's, gay / lesbian, migrant and working-class struggles and campaigns over issues such as nuclear power and the Vietnam war, show the extent to which these different movements were then intertwined, learning from one another, exploring similar issues and registering similar ambiguities and contradictions – an experience which found shape in formations such as socialist feminism, eco-socialism, black feminism, and other attempts to rethink and reformulate the hard-won knowledge of popular struggles in ways that brought together something at least of a shared analysis of causation and structure as well as some parallel directions in struggle, organisation and goals.

Those moments were broken apart, not only by neoliberalism but also by empire-building strategies on the part of organisational leaderships, movement intellectuals trying to create space in the academy and celebrity authors converting movement into commodity. We have spent much of the last fifteen years or so trying to piece the fragments together one more time: more cautiously perhaps, aware of the long history of mutual distrust and origin myths which sanctify our specific identities (including, it should be said, socialist ones) as against others.

As we have done so, we have found ourselves reclaiming, recycling and reusing much of that earlier movement knowledge in our own contexts, talking through forms of structural and historical analysis which do not privilege a single struggle, exploring alliance- and network-based strategies for change and

discussing forms of social organisation which would not rest on exploitation and oppression in any dimension, and trying to go further:

You need changes now in how people can experience relationships in which we can both express our power and struggle against domination in all its forms. A socialist movement must help us find a way to meet person to person – an inward as well as an external equality. It must be a place where we can really learn from one another without deference or resentment...

This means a conscious legitimisation within the theory and practice of socialism of all those aspects of our experience which are so easily denied because they go against the grain of how we learn to feel and think in capitalism. All those feelings of love and creativity, imagination and wisdom which are negated, jostled and bruised within the relationships which dominate in capitalism are nonetheless there, our gifts to the new life. (Rowbotham in 1979; p. 232/9

This is there, too, in both sets of essays in this book: the authors share, in different ways, the experiences, choices, mistakes and learning which underlie and give rise to particular formulations, strategies and problems – and in so doing enable the reader, too, to position themselves as another such activist, struggling with the problems they encounter and trying at the same time to go beyond them.

In the wake of the “movement of movements”, the alliance-building experiences of Latin America and the broad popular participation in anti-austerity movements in Europe, the new *Beyond the fragments* offers precious resources, calm voices grounded in experience and the long perspective of present-day activists reflecting on past struggles. It will be a valuable contribution to “the movement” – which will be feminist, and anti-capitalist, and many other things too, if it is to change the world.

About the review author

Laurence Cox has been involved in movement networking for two decades in several different organisational forms. He co-edits *Interface* and collaborated on vol. 3 no 2, “Feminism, women’s movements and women in movement”. He co-directs an MA programme bringing activists from different movements together, and has recently co-edited *Marxism and social movements* and *Understanding European movements*. He can be contacted at laurence.cox@ATnuim.ie

Shigematsu, Setsu. 2012. *Scream from the Shadows: The Women's Liberation Movement in Japan*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (272 pp.)

Reviewed by **Julia Schuster**

Setsu Shigematsu's multi-sided background in Feminist and Gender Studies as well as in Asian/Japanese and Asian American Studies is duly reflected in her book *Scream from the Shadows*. In this work, Shigematsu offers a transdisciplinary analysis of *ūman ribu* (phonetical for "women lib"), a radical Japanese woman's liberation movement that emerged in the 1970s. Using a wide range of methods, she explores the movement's history, ideology and political situatedness. The result is an impressive account of a women's movement and its complexities.

The author draws on an astounding wealth of information. In preparation of this book, Shigematsu analysed a large body of literature published by members of *ūman ribu*, the New Left, the media (both mainstream and alternative) and academia. Over a period of ten years, she conducted intensive fieldwork that included interviews and discussions with more than twenty *ūman ribu* activists and intellectuals. She also participated in several events of the movement and maintained correspondence with core activists over an extended amount of time. Shigematsu's personal engagement with the material is one of the book's strengths but the author acknowledges that her analyses lack distance from the subject. Seemingly to counteract this alleged flaw, she adopts an unnecessarily dry language. However, this 'lack', in fact, enriches her book because it draws the reader in the midst of *ūman ribu*'s internal and external conflicts.

Scream from the Shadows addresses a broad range of readers. For those already familiar with *ūman ribu*, the book provides information that other sources—such as the documentary *30 Years of Sisterhood* (Yamagami and Seyama 2004)—do not offer. Shigematsu's work is rich with anecdotes about, and reflections on the personalities of prominent *ūman ribu* members and their ideologies. Thus, it allows nuanced insights into the complex motivations of this movement and its members. For readers without prior knowledge about Japan's women's liberation, the book embeds its analyses in a historical account of Japan's political environment after World War II. It situates the development of *ūman ribu* within the context of the U.S. Occupation, uprising student protests of the 1960s and the influence of the United Red Army (URA). The author takes much care to explain these historical links and repeatedly clarifies their reflections in *ūman ribu*'s ideology. Occasionally, these explanations become repetitive for those who read the book cover to cover but they are helpful for more selective readers.

Using the *ūman ribu* movement as a case study, the book sets out to address broader questions regarding the ability of feminism to theorise the engagement of women in violence against other women, children and men. Shigematsu positions her research within academic debates about the relationship between

the empowerment of women and female violence. She identifies manifestations of this relationship, for example, among female heads of states and leaders in the military who become responsible for the planning and execution of violence. The book argues that feminist theories so far have failed to adequately explain women's contradicting roles as both victims and perpetrators of violence. In *Scream from the Shadows*, Shigematsu attempts to unpack this complex matter by exploring the ethics of violence proposed by *ūman ribu* that locate violence in the female body and the feminine subject. She asks which lessons contemporary feminist theory—across its broad spectrum from liberal to postcolonial—can learn from the experiences of this movement in order to fill gaps in conceptualizing and understanding violence by women.

The book is divided into three sections. Part one addresses genealogies and political origins of *ūman ribu*. Shigematsu explains in these first two chapters how a number of women, frustrated with patriarchal power structures of New Left student activism and disappointed by the acceptance of conservative family values in traditional women's organizations, formed initial activist groups in 1970. The second part of the book offers an explanation of *ūman ribu*'s complex ideology and introduces the iconic member Tanaka Mitsu. The third part is devoted to an in-depth analysis of *ūman ribu*'s relation to violence. However, the core ideas found in this section are also woven through the narrative of the entire book. In an epilogue, Shigematsu elaborates on the 'lessons from the legacy' of this radical movement.

Shigematsu's work provides much insight to how *ūman ribu* was different to most other women's liberation movements at the time. It was not an identity-politics based movement that aimed to enhance the lives of all women. It despised many of the traditional approaches of other women's organizations that promoted the notion of being a 'good wife and wise mother'. It also had no interest in expanding as a movement or creating a centralized nationwide network. Individual groups of *ūman ribu* operated in a self-determined way and there was no official leader to unite the movement. However, Tanaka Mitsu caused much conflict within this setting. As the unofficial leader of a movement that rejected leadership, she was a torn personality. She enjoyed guiding other women but detested their dependence on her. At the same time, many activists admired Tanaka but strongly disliked her dominance.

Ūman ribu used the terminology of *onna* as a starting point for its social critique. *Onna* is a term for 'woman' that holds negatively sexualized connotations. Most *ūman ribu* activists identified with this term, interpreting its meaning to encompass both women's roles as victims of, and accomplices to domination. The liberation of sex, eros and *onna* were crucial for *ūman ribu*'s anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist politics. The women criticised the presence of the state in the lives of individuals and the effect of this presence on women's bodies and sexuality. For instance, *ūman ribu* strongly opposed any state regulation of abortion and other issues of reproductive health. Thus, unlike many other fractions of women's liberation, *ūman ribu* did not fight for abortion rights because such a law implied yet another interference of

authorities with women's bodies. Similarly, it was not a goal of the movement to achieve equality between women and men on an individual level. Instead, its fight against sex-discrimination was aimed at state authorities and ideologies that structured social relations and tied women's lives to children and homes.

As the central theme of the book, Shigematsu puts much emphasis on explaining *ūman ribu*'s take on violence. The movement heavily opposed male-centred forms of student activism in the New Left, where violence was idealised to such an extent that male members of different groups fought and killed each other only to prove their political commitment. But *ūman ribu* women did not condemn all perpetrators of violence. For instance, they were supportive of women imprisoned for killing their own children and who consequently faced much social stigmatization. While *ūman ribu* did not promote the killing of children, it acknowledged the social pressures that led those women to do so. For *ūman ribu*, the killing of children by their own mothers reflected the embodied violation of motherhood and the potential of violence within mothers and *onna*.

After 1972, when the two leaders of the URA ordered to torture and/or execute 12 of its own members—including an eight months pregnant woman—many *ūman ribu* members voiced support for Nagata Hiroko, the female URA leader. While the media depicted Nagata as an inhuman evil witch, it described the male head of the URA, Mori Tsuneo, as a political leader whose plans went astray. *Ūman ribu* women interpreted this difference as a manifestation of sex-discrimination through the authorities. Moreover, they understood the URA tragedy as a result of the much despised masculinism within the New Left, which pushed Nagata to adopt such horrific violence in order to succeed in her leadership role as one woman among many men.

Shigematsu answers her initial questions regarding feminist explanations of violence by women with a discussion that situates *ūman ribu*'s ideologies in a broader context. She highlights that increasing empowerment of women created female leadership on various levels. However, the book further argues that institutionalized sexism and gender discrimination remain to shape women's political agency. Accordingly, women in leadership roles—whether they are as radical as Tanaka Mitsu and Nagata Hiroko or whether they work within state authorities as Germany's Angela Merkel and South Korean's Park Geun-hye do—continue to be judged by male standards of leadership. These standards often include an assertive attitude towards the use of violence. At the same time, powerful women need to display a stereotypical feminine sensitivity unless they accept being portrayed as cold-hearted and 'unwomanly'. *Scream from the Shadows* relates the discussion of this dilemma to *ūman ribu* because of its support for violent women. These activists accepted violence as a reaction to injustice and as a female attribute that is inherent to *onna*. The movement viewed violence as a necessary evil for the assertion of female leadership and the reclamation of women's agency in a patriarchal world.

Almost casually, Shigematsu ties further discussions of intersectionality issues, individualism and feminist communities into her account of this movement.

Thus, she presents a book that is—for many reasons—highly relevant for understanding contemporary women's movements and serves as an inspiring reminder for feminists across the globe to learn from history.

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About the review author

Julia Schuster is a PhD candidate at the sociology department of the University of Auckland in New Zealand. Her research focus is on women's movements and feminist activism. Contact via email: jsch136 AT aucklanduni.ac.nz.

Chris Crass. 2013. *Towards Collective Liberation: Anti-Racist Organizing, Feminist Praxis and Movement Building Strategy*. PM Press. (295 pages)

Reviewed by **Lesley Wood**

In her piece, "Love as the Practice of Freedom", U.S.-based writer bell hooks (1994, 244) argues, "until we are all able to accept the interlocking, interdependent nature of systems of domination and recognize specific ways each system is maintained, we will continue to act in ways that undermine our individual quest for freedom and collective liberation struggle." In Chris Crass's new book, he works to show how our movements can understand and counter such internalized and systemic oppressive systems and can move toward these goals of freedom and collective liberation.

The book isn't a roadmap. Indeed, it is a set of stories and essays of attempts, disasters, and victories of twenty years of organizing in the U.S. within projects including Food not Bombs, the global justice movement, feminist collectives, anti-racist, and queer campaigns. It argues that to organize more effective, revolutionary movements, those of us who are most privileged by the system in terms of our race, class, gender, sexuality or ability need to listen better, to be more humble, and will need to prove ourselves worthy of the trust of organizers from more marginalized communities. But unlike some discussions of the ways that privilege and power operate in movements, Crass' book doesn't keep the argument at the level of ethics, but instead grounds it in a reading of history that says that the most transformative, sustainable movements are those that are grounded in the experience of marginalized communities. Crass argues that without keeping this analysis of power and praxis central to our work, organizers that are white, male, cis, straight and able-bodied will be likely to re-enact hierarchical and oppressive relationships, taking us further from the goal of building the relationships necessary for a more democratic, socialist society.

This book is divided into distinct sections, each with a number of pieces ordered roughly chronologically. It begins with a broad agenda -- building an anarchist left. The theme of the second section is anti-racist feminist practice, which includes widely read pieces like "Against Patriarchy: Tools for Men to Help Further Feminist Revolution." This is followed up with a section called; "Because good ideas are not enough: Lessons for vision-based, strategic, liberation organizing praxis," with pieces on leadership and the U.S. civil rights movement. The fourth section is described as "collective wisdom" and it brings together lessons from five different and diverse anti-racist organizing projects through interviews and essays.

While a few of the pieces in the collection were previously distributed on the Colors of Resistance listserv and website, and through a collection of essays put out by *Kersplebedeb* distribution, bringing them together and framing them so cogently gives them additional power. It is Crass' book, but he is at pains to emphasize that both the book and the organizing behind it are part of an

ongoing collective effort to make more strategic, transformative movements. The first pages of the book are jam packed with a who's who of endorsements by some of today's most skilled organizers in the U.S., and the book itself contains many voices, including a forward by Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, author of *Red Dirt Woman* and *The Great Sioux Nation: Oral History of the Sioux-United States Treaty of 1868*; an introduction by Chris Dixon, author of a forthcoming book on anarchist organizers, and the interviews with five different anti-racist organizing projects.

Personally, this is a book I've waited a long time for. Crass is a white U.S. anarchist who became politically active in the 1990s via suburban punk rock. The book articulates the evolution of an anarchist politics that some of us came to in the 1990s and 2000s, out of a recognition that hierarchy couldn't be reduced to race, class, gender and sexuality. It is a politics that took into account the idea that the personal was political, and the feeling that large, ritualized protests were not creating a more just and fulfilling world. While such anarchist work is widespread in a wide range of contemporary organizing, including immigrant rights, Occupy, police brutality, and student movements -- it is more visible in workshops than in publications. Crass puts this 'small a' anarchist approach into historical context.

This is not just a book for anarchists, and indeed many anarchists won't see themselves within it. But it is a book for those interested in the challenges and gifts of grassroots organizing, whether they see themselves as communists, anarchists, revolutionary sovereigntists, feminists, queer activists -- or some combination of the above. Indeed, he's been certified by some of the most powerful grassroots organizers in the U.S. today.

This book is meant for those engaged in, wanting to be engaged in, or burned out from being engaged in, deep, transformative social justice work. It should be read and discussed by organizers interested in building multi-racial, anti-capitalist, feminist movements. It is written from the perspective of white organizers in a U.S. context, and will be particularly relatable for audiences sharing that space and identity. However, it offers accessible, strategic thinking about the intersection of different forms of inequality and the dynamics of alliance building that should offer insight to those in other contexts and positions.

Rich with stories that will make you laugh and groan, it is full of solid, earnest, loving advice that will push you to think more strategically and patiently about the work that social justice requires. Unlike some discussions of organizing, Crass doesn't suggest that this work will be easy. He recounts the stories of awkward meetings, angry confrontations and bad strategy. He clearly shows us why challenging power inequalities within our organizing can be far more emotionally draining than occupying a government office or marching on Washington. Nonetheless, Crass concludes with a hopeful essay entitled, "We can do this." He doesn't want our movements to get stuck, to get depressed and for our activists to eat each other, and the next generation of organizers, alive. He tackles the tendency for organizers, activists and radical academics to spend

much of our time critiquing our movements and our politics. Crass rightly points out that while critique is a crucial part of rethinking and rebuilding existing practices, the trap of right/wrong, solid/fucked up can trap us, steal our energy, and stop us from thinking creatively and strategically for the long haul. Instead he suggests that in order to be strategic, and to keep our momentum up, we need to combine critical reflexivity with a focus on the opportunities and assets we have, and work to build a just world. *Towards Collective Liberation* is the sort of book you want to hand to your comrades and friends, read passages from, and head into the streets. With a book like this, it feels like yes indeed, we can do this.

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About the review author

Lesley Wood is an organizer and scholar in Toronto, Canada.

Wood, Lesley. 2012. *Direct Action, Deliberation and Diffusion: Collective Action after the WTO protests in Seattle*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. (paper; £55.00.)

Reviewed by **Neil Sutherland**

In *Direct Action, Deliberation and Diffusion: Collective Action after the WTO protests in Seattle*, Lesley Wood seeks to examine the micro-level interactions that influenced the diffusion of the cluster of tactics associated with the 1999 World Trade Organisation (WTO) protests in Seattle, drawing on ethnographic research spanning over several years (primarily between 1999-2002). To draw out these ideas, Wood conducts a comparative analysis, studying the strategies of six case organisations - three in New York City, three in Toronto - all of which had a history of disruptive protest and cited the Seattle demonstrations as having a "big influence on their activities" (p.3). In short, what was found was that while the New York organisations continued to experiment and utilise innovative tactics drawn from the Seattle Protests a year after the event, similar organisations in Toronto had largely abandoned them. This fundamental difference is traced back to the deliberative periods surrounding the potential adoption of Seattle tactics and strategies, and Wood sets out to inspect the factors that led to innovations being either implemented or discarded.

To situate this discussion, Wood begins by describing the background and history of the 1999 WTO protests based in Seattle, noting that activists involved in the demonstrations "push[ed] past the classic repertoire of marches and rallies and began to engage in Direct Action" (p.1). Some time is spent delineating the specific innovative direct action tactics that were utilised during the demonstrations, specifically: black blocs, the use of giant puppets, lockbox blockades, and jail solidarity techniques. Although none of these tactics and strategies can be considered as entirely 'new' in themselves, each was nevertheless "reinvigorated as a result of its association with activist successes in Seattle" (p.34), and taken together can be considered as a cluster of 'Seattle tactics.' Following this broad introduction, Wood then goes on to examine the deliberation and diffusion processes within each of the case organisations through eight short chapters. For the purpose of this review, the foci of these chapters can be split into two broad categories – (a) macro, external factors, and (b) micro, internal factors that influenced the relative quality of deliberation, and the success or failure of diffusion.

Concerning macro issues, Wood turns to the political, societal, cultural and economic factors in New York and Toronto, providing an overview of the environment in which the case organisations operated. Whilst a cursory glance would suggest that the situations were similar, in fact, there were fundamental differences in the relational context of both cities which were critical in influencing diffusion of Seattle tactics. For example, although the case organisations in Toronto had more experience in fighting neo-liberalism pre-Seattle, this meant that they had developed more entrenched and routinised

repertoires, and were less likely to consider and incorporate *new* tactics through deliberative periods. Furthermore, Toronto's political landscape was dominated by relatively few centralised and risk-adverse 'opinion leaders,' who deemed Seattle tactics as inappropriate for use – stifling the opportunity for collective deliberation amongst other organisations. In contrast, deliberation about alternative strategies was more free-flowing in New York, between fragmented but interconnected groups. These organisations were smaller, poorer and more willing to take tactical risks than their counterparts in Toronto, and were therefore increasingly receptive to innovations - often locally experimenting with Seattle tactics. Later chapters also examine the impact of police repression and the 9/11 attacks on deliberation opportunities, demonstrating how the organisations in each city reacted to such developments, leading to further experimentation with, or abandonment of, locally new innovations.

The remaining chapters are dedicated to investigating the micro level, internal factors that underpinned successful and failed diffusion. Wood explains this by citing several core discussions -- identification with Seattle protestors; summit hopping; property destruction -- to illustrate how specific interactions and conversations shaped the potential for deliberation about, and diffusion of, Seattle tactics. Several findings emerge from this. For example, it is suggested that in Toronto, activists and organisations did not generally identify with protestors in the 1999 WTO protests (who were predominantly white, middle-class students), whereas those in New York did. As noted: "unless potential adopters [...] identify with the users of that tactic, they are unlikely to experiment with that tactic" (p.122), and participants explained their rejection or acceptance through constructed stories about their own collective identity (articulating who 'we' are, as well as who 'they' are).

Furthermore, Wood notes that another reason for the Toronto-based organisations rejecting Seattle tactics was that conversations often became quickly polarised, thus limiting spaces for deliberation. When discussing summit hopping, for example, activists in Toronto distanced themselves from Seattle protestors (and by proxy, their tactics) on the grounds that they were privileging global concerns at the expense of local organising. On the contrary, "a bridge was built" (p.91) by the organisations in New York, who articulated the connectedness of global and local arguments, welcoming new strategies and even joining summit protests themselves. Through a number of short examples across the text, Wood deepens these arguments and demonstrates the fundamental differences between the Toronto and New York organisations, thus addressing the primary research question, that is, why New York activists continued to experiment with Seattle tactics when activists in Toronto had largely abandoned them. However, in the chapter centred on property destruction, Wood draws a parallel between the organisations in the two cities, as, in *both* cases, confrontational black bloc tactics were not incorporated. Because of anxieties around illegality, arrests and police repression, neither Toronto or New York based organisations were willing to deliberate about the use of these tactics, and "without such discussions, Seattle-style property destruction [didn't] become part of the local repertoire in either city" (p.112).

This is a crucial point that highlights the underlying message of the book, that is, without open, egalitarian, diverse and reflexive deliberation, diffusion is unlikely, or even "impossible" (p. 3).

One of the primary contributions of this text is undoubtedly Wood's unique 'insider' status. Before the study began, Wood was actively involved in the organisations under study, having grown up in Toronto and lived in New York. Early on it is noted that this positioning might give way to a better sense of the internal dynamics of the organisations, as well as developing research that is centred around specific questions and concerns of movement activists themselves, making the results "more useful [...] and more interesting" (p.21). Indeed, this form of activist-centric ethnography offers deep insights into the theory behind the inner workings of social movement organisations which may otherwise be off-radar. Whilst there has been much written on diffusion theory, deliberation and direct action in the past, this work often fails to actually engage with activists directly. However, whilst Wood's commitment and dedication to social movement organising is unquestionable, the overall writing style didn't reflect this as effectively as possible. Much of the empirical data on offer throughout the book is in the form of short interview extracts, email correspondence, and official data (such as minutes and manifestos); little time is dedicated to offering thick and rich descriptions of Woods' time with each organisation. As a result, the text feels somewhat more detached than other recent activist ethnographies (Juris, 2008; Maeckelbergh, 2009; Graeber, 2009; Lagalis, 2010). This may have been an instrumental choice, as, given that the book is relatively short, it may have been difficult to include more in-depth examples and vignettes without losing the theoretical insights. However, where more textured narratives emerge, it considerably adds to the overall impact - giving a sense of what it was really like to be participating in, organising with and contributing to such movements at a specific point in time.

Stylistic issues aside, overall, *Direct Action, Deliberation, and Diffusion* offers a valuable and important analysis. A considerable amount has been written on the tactics of the 1999 WTO protests in Seattle, from activists and academics alike, but Wood supplements this by taking a more critical approach and examining how these strategies have diffused through deliberation processes. Rather than accepting the notion that Seattle tactics are unquestioningly incorporated into post-1999 social movements' repertoires, Woods' musings on unsuccessful deliberation (and the consequent abandonment of innovations) may indeed provide movement activists with relevant insights into the importance of (often unevaluated) internal processes. Furthermore, whilst this book takes Seattle tactics as the primary focus, in fact, these kinds of arguments and analyses may prove fruitful in the future. As noted in the final conclusions, it will be interesting to see how similar processes and discussions around tactics/deliberation unfold in light of the Occupy movement, and this text may provide a valuable building block for subsequent analysis.

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About the review author

Neil Sutherland is a researcher from Bristol, currently based at the University of the West of England. In his research he seeks to reconceptualise leadership as a collective and relational socially constructed process, and as something that can exist in the absence of individual leaders. He is especially interested in exploring democratic organisational and decision-making practices, and the ways in which they facilitate distributed and non-hierarchical forms of organisation.

Mattoni, Alice. 2012. Media Practices and Protest Politics – How Precarious Workers Mobilise, Ashgate (214pp; 49.50 Sterling)

Reviewed by **Mark Bergfeld**

For more than forty years now, Italian social movements have inspired those seeking to change the world. From the *sciopero bianco* (work-to-rule strike) in the Northern car factories to the social centres amidst urban ecosystems, Italian workers and youths have always developed new repertoires of contention. Home to the formerly largest communist party in Western Europe, the PCI, Italy also brought forth groups such as *Lotta Continua*, the *Tute Bianche* and *Ya Basta!*. While the former was synonymous with the *operaismo* movement in the 1970s, the latter two remain emblematic of a new anti-capitalism in the 21st century. To the dismay of many, it appears that the comedian-turned-politician Beppe Grillo and his Five Star Movement overshadow the legacies of Antonio Gramsci and Toni Negri today.

Alice Mattoni's book *Media Practices and Protest Politics - How Precarious Workers Mobilise* shines a different light on the Italian anomaly. Her study of precarious workers and their media practices is an invaluable resource for academics and social movement participants alike. It facilitates a deeper understanding of how activists embed themselves in a varied media environment. She argues that activists use different media and technological objects in the course of the same campaign. "The result [is] that media texts carried their contents from one site of the media environment to another" (p. 18). This unique theoretical approach promotes a re-assessment and re-thinking of protest politics, contemporary activism, and new communication technologies. In light of the recent tendency to over-emphasise activists' use of social media such as Facebook and Twitter (Castells 2012, Mason 2011, Gerbaudo 2012), this study is a breath of fresh air in a techno-utopian desert.

Mattoni's starting point is the notion of 'precarity' in Italy. Throughout the 1990s working conditions deteriorated in Italy. In effect, neoliberalism undermined workers' labour rights and excluded them from certain functions of the welfare state. While those (re-)entering the labour market bore the brunt, it also renegotiated the position of those workers in fixed and long-term contracts. Mattoni describes how the issue of precarity reached a tipping point when a government minister labelled precarious workers "the worst of Italy" in front of rolling television cameras. The main trade union confederation, the CGIL, only exacerbated this narrative by regarding precarious workers as a threat.

Mattoni tells a wonderfully crafted story of how precarious workers constituted themselves as a political actor within the mainstream and institutional politics. They manipulated and subverted the renowned Milan Fashion Show, called Euro Mayday parades against precarity, throughout Italy, linked up with university students and faculty in the occupation of La Sapienza University, and coordinated a strike of call centre workers. In doing so, they rendered themselves visible "as political subjects instead of mere victims, [...] producing

an alternative system of meanings about the labour realm independently of trade union confederations" (p. 156). This further required the transformation of activism and protest culture.

Mattoni describes this process by broadening Charles Tilly's concept of "repertoire of contention" to "repertoire of communication." This involves an interplay between "direct actions [...] oriented towards the symbolic and expressive side of protest" (p. 50) and activists' "perspective on the media as tools in front of different audiences" (p. 156). As innovative as this may seem it delineates and confines the role of activists to communicators in a techno-political space. Unfortunately, it does not endow them with the strategic and tactical capacity to change the balance of forces in society. Furthermore, one cannot reduce a social movements' achievements to whether or not they have attained a stable position in the symbolic realm. This downplays political facts and successes which do exist. Her sharp focus on changes at the level of signification and representation blurs real political manifestations.

At its peak, namely, there were 22 Euro Mayday parades in different cities across Europe. Today we still find precarious workers' organisations from the *Precarious Workers Brigade* in London to the *Precários Inflexíveis* in Lisbon. While there is no longer any mass movement of precarious workers, it has become common currency to campaign around the issue of precarity. Just recently Gregor Gysi of the German Left Party, *die Linke*, incessantly addressed the issue of precarity during a televised election debate. In large parts, this can be attributed to the groups and mobilisations analysed in this book.

All in all, her study bears important lessons about the technological mediation of activism today. Mattoni points out how precarious workers and activists are both media consumers and producers. They read daily and left-wing newspapers, watch television, and co-produce media by writing leaflets, blogging, or making videos. Inasmuch as activists do not only want to be consumers of media, they do not only want to consume a pre-digested or pre-mediated form of activism. Activists have three roles in relation to the media: they are news producers, news audience, and news sources (p.66). This renders the citizen journalist or media activist obsolete. Mattoni writes, "the expression 'media-activism' had lost its original meaning in media-saturated societies, due to the diffusion of portable digital devices" (p. 100). Being an activist means deeply embedding oneself in a given media environment -- *and an attempt to change it*. In other words, activism vis-a-vis *media knowledge practices* and *relational media practices* is a *a-teleological* process of shaping and being shaped by technological objects and the media environment at large (p. 20).

Her argument is convincing. Yet, existing capitalist social relations imply the hegemony and hierarchy of certain mainstream news outlets or a particular medium over others inside the media environment. Especially in Italy where Silvio Berlusconi owns much of the television media this cannot be denied. Consequently, other media is created in its image. Thus, social movement groups adapt to both mainstream and left-wing media as well as "the characteristics of the media environment as a whole" (p. 114 - 117). While that is

not necessarily counter-productive to a movement's goals, it does raise the question of slowly-creeping adaptation and compromise that many movements have fallen prey to in the past.

What does Mattoni though mean by *adaption*? Precarious workers use contentious performances such as theatre and parades to mediate a greater visibility in the mainstream press. The mainstream's requirement of a ready 'media story' is accommodated. This raises the question whether protest groups reproduce existing capitalist social relations or perhaps even render some forms of protest acceptable while others are unacceptable.

Mattoni's focus on *relational media practices* as "manipulation, recombination and appropriation" (p. 20) can assist one in answering these questions. Serpica Naro, the fake Japanese fashion designer, invented by a group of precarious workers in the fashion and textile industry serves as an example of such practice. Precarious workers successfully organised an official catwalk event at the Milan Fashion Show under her name. At the same time, they held demonstrations outside the Fashion Show accusing Serpica Naro of employing precarious labour. The troika of manipulation, recombination and appropriation would not be complete if precarious workers had not used the show itself to raise the issue of precarity in the fashion industry. This "repertoire of communication" was far more successful than if they had limited themselves to traditional demonstrations outside of the show.

Through such stories, interviews, and examples, Mattoni is able to reveal how activists employ a self-reflexive strategy in which they adapt themselves to their audience. They consciously choose different mediums, technologies and tools of communication to achieve the greatest possible degree of visibility. Hereby, she draws on Dieter Rucht's Quadruple - a model which outlines different relational media strategies: *abstention, attack, adaptation, alternatives* (Rucht, 2004). These four types of media strategies show that activists do not only adapt to their media environment but learn how to contest and delineate themselves by attack. In addition, they create media institutions which serve as counter-hegemonic alternatives. Mattoni's emphases on 'visibility' and 'audience' run into similar problems as her focus on representation and signification. To think about different audiences means one also needs to think about which audiences or elements are 'active' and which are 'passive.' Activism and organising are not an act of substitution but a means to activate more people in the process of contention. While from a media practice approach the notion of an audience suffices, an emancipatory and radical democratic politics which these precarious workers ascribe to requires a re-thinking of how an audience becomes active participants.

Mattoni's book has many strengths. Her ability to disclose the meaning behind activists' media strategies is her greatest by far. Instead of developing theorems and categorisations of social movement practice she lets activists' lay theories frame both the discussion on the issue of precarity as well as their media strategy. In doing that, precarious workers become active political subjects capable of subverting and refusing dominant narratives on precarity. Instead of

establishing an ideological framework *a priori* her method allows her to see beyond the latest technological or ideological trend and produce knowledge that can stand the test of time. This will allow others to apply her tools to and within the varied social movements to come. We can look forward in anticipation to her next work. It is certain that Mattoni will challenge us to re-assess and re-think social movements, political communication and contemporary activism.

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About the review author

Mark Bergfeld is a socialist activist and writer. He was a leading participant in the UK student movement in 2010. He has written for the New Statesman, Jacobin and a number of other magazines. His work is regularly translated into German, Norwegian and Spanish. He is currently a research student at Queen Mary's University of London. His writings can be found at mdbergfeld.com. He tweets at @mdbergfeld. Mdbergfeld AT gmail.com

Gerbaudo, Paulo. 2012. *Tweets and the Streets: Social Media and Contemporary Activism*. London: PlutoPress. (194 pp)

Reviewed by **Maite Tapia**

What has been the impact of social media on the recent popular movements in Egypt, Spain, and the US? In occupying Tahrir Square, Madrid's Puerta del Sol, and Zuccotti Park in lower Manhattan, how did the "tweeps" (Twitter users) and Facebook users transform themselves from virtual coordinators into street-level occupiers, or how were they able to generate place-based mobilization and massive sit-ins? To what extent are those movements actually "leaderless" and "spontaneous"? These are the main questions Paolo Gerbaudo addresses in his compelling book *Tweets and the Streets*.

By providing an alternative explanation, or a more nuanced view, of how social media matters in these new social movements, Gerbaudo goes against the determinism of the so-called techno-optimists like Clay Shirky (2008) or Paul Mason (2012), as well as that of the so-called techno-pessimists like Evgeny Morozov (2011) and Malcolm Gladwell (2010). Whereas the optimists celebrate the social media as new tools facilitating collective action, the pessimists denounce these new technologies for bringing complacency and providing the illusion of activity to replace actual participation in revolutionary action. Gerbaudo claims the importance of social media is in their role as "choreography of assembly," which he defines as "a process of symbolic construction of public space" (12). The choreographers are the influential Facebook admins and tweeps that set the stage for street-level mobilization or gathering of the masses.

Gerbaudo highlights two critical elements. The first is the marshaling of emotions, or the way tech-savvy key actors use "emotional conduits" to influence the participants, creating a common identity and thereby enhancing the likelihood of mass mobilization. The second is the "soft leadership" positions, created through the use of social media, assumed by the choreographers who, because of their influential position, are able to guide and mobilize others into collective action. These movements are thus neither leaderless nor spontaneous, as they have sometimes been portrayed; bureaucratic, centralized, or hierarchical structures are not excluded, contrary to Castells' notion of networks (2009) or Hardt and Negri's multitude claims (2005), but have actually been constructed through the use of these new media.

Based on ethnographic research, about 80 in-depth interviews with activists, his own observations of the protest camps, and an analysis of tweets and Facebook messages, Gerbaudo takes us through the initiation and maintenance of the Egyptian uprising, the Spanish *Indignados*, and the Occupy Wall Street movement, paying particular attention to the cultural use of social media as a means for collective action. His chapter on the Egyptian revolution focuses specifically on the *Shabab-al-Facebook* (Facebook youth) during the 18 days of uprising against the then president, Hosni Mubarak. When the Egyptian police

beat the blogger Khaled Said to death in June 2010, a popular anti-regime Khaled Said Facebook page was created by Wael Ghonim, an Egyptian living in Dubai. Through Facebook statuses, Ghonim engaged his readers in conversation, responding to user comments and triggering a "process of emotional identification" as many previously unpoliticized middle-class Egyptian youth would now identify with a common hero, Khaled Said, and against one common enemy, the Egyptian police. Social media were used extensively in anticipation of the big demonstration planned for the 25th of January, 2011. To actually transform virtual bloggers into street-level protesters, and to involve the Egyptian working-class, however, a massive amount of street and face-to-face work was needed. And thus, while social media and "choreographers" like Wael Ghonim were critical in evoking an emotional response, that alone was not sufficient to explain the sustained occupation of Tahrir Square.

The chapter on the mobilization of the Spanish *Indignados* illustrates the prominence of the internet-based group *Democracia Real Ya* or DRY in setting the stage for the mass demonstration on May 15, 2011, also known as 15-M. Created online by two previously unconnected recent graduates, Fabio Gandara and Pablo Gallego, DRY resulted in an online platform against the government's austerity measures. By avoiding extreme leftist politics or ideologies in its manifesto, the organization was able to find support from many more people than did other, often more extreme, political campaigns and organizations. Leading up to May 15, DRY admins would engage in online discussions with other users, evoking strong emotions in anticipation of the protest. In addition, however, much work had to be done offline, such as hanging posters, passing out leaflets, and connecting the different groups on the ground. Especially once people had gathered in Puerta del Sol, the main means of communication became face-to-face rather than virtual. Gandara and Gallego took a back seat, while groups like Okupa, a more radical squatters movement, took over. In this way, while social media were crucial in initiating the movement, street-level groups became critical in sustaining the encampment.

Gerbaudo's final case study is of the role of social media during the Occupy Wall Street movement. While social media weren't very successful in initiating the movement, their role became more prominent during the encampment phase. During the summer of 2011, the initial call to occupy Wall Street on September 17, 2011, was put forth by two key people working for the Canadian countercultural magazine *Adbusters*: the 69-year old Kalle Lasn, the founder and main editor based in Vancouver, and the 29-year old Micah White, a senior editor based in California. Lasn and White reached out to radical groups on the ground in New York City, which started to meet and to organize a first General Assembly as early as August 2nd. The launch of the movement, however, lacked broad public support compared to those in Egypt and Spain. According to Gerbaudo, the groups created a rather elitist communication model built around Twitter rather than Facebook, and failed to develop an engaging emotional conversation with a broader audience. Over the course of the encampment, however, Twitter became an important tool of coordination and communication

among the protesters. Furthermore, as opposed to the more countercultural messages from *Adbusters*, the slogan "We are the 99%" went viral, facilitating for many an emotional and popular self-identification. With this chapter, Gerbaudo has shown that social media in itself will not translate into mobilization; to enact any form of collective action, organizers are needed on the ground and emotional connections must be made.

Before concluding, Gerbaudo highlights the importance of the "soft leadership" that was present in all three cases, even though there have been strong denials by the participants of the existence of any leadership or even "organization." As a consequence, however, the illusion of spontaneity as well as horizontalism obscures any accountability or responsibility on the part of those leaders. For example, once Hosni Mubarak stepped down, Ghonim tweeted "Mission accomplished. Thanks to all the brave young Egyptians. #Jan25," and people left the square. As we now know, the military council that immediately took over wasn't very different from Mubarak's political regime.

Gerbaudo is an excellent writer, engaging the reader with fine-grained, convincing case studies as well as a strong theoretical component. His case studies clearly show how the role of social media can be regarded as "setting the scene" or providing an "emotional choreography" that is likely to trigger the mobilization of their many users. While social media were highly successful in the case of the Egyptian uprising and the Spanish *Indignados* movement, Gerbaudo also shows how they can fail, giving the reader a clear understanding of the conditions under which social media can or can't get people onto the streets. Throughout the text, Gerbaudo emphasizes how social media do not eliminate the need for street-level communication, but have to be complemented by face-to-face interactions.

Finally, I want to raise some questions. First, it wasn't always clear whether and how those contemporary movements diffused from one country to another and the role social media played in the processes of diffusion. Was there a need for an emotional narrative as well to encourage participation across countries? Could a shift of scale be possible, promoting an international movement, through the use of Facebook and Twitter? Second, in the Occupy Wall Street case, I would have liked further details on the links between the anti-globalization movement and this popular movement. Many activists in Zucotti park had a background with the anti-globalization movement. How was OWS able to become more diverse and, again, how did Twitter or Facebook enhance this process? Third, what happened to those movements after their protest camps were dismantled? Have social media been able to sustain the movement during the times of non-protest? Can social media function not only as a catalyzer for collective action, but also as a virtual "abeyance" structure (Taylor 1989)? Finally, a chapter comparing the role of "old" and new social media across movements - their similarities, differences, advantages, and disadvantages - would give the reader a more grounded, historical perspective.

Despite these minor remarks, this book is definitely a must-read for people interested in popular social movements, the role of social media, the debates on

organizational horizontalism, and forms of leadership. For academics and activists alike trying to understand how a “revolution” can emerge and the difficulties in sustaining it, this engagingly written book provides important contributions to the field of social movements and social media, challenges commonly accepted theories of well-known socio-political thinkers, and provides critical insights and learning tools which – who knows? – might come in handy for the next revolution.

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About the review author

Maite Tapia has completed her PhD at the Industrial and Labor Relations School, Cornell University and joined the faculty at the School of Human Resources and Labor Relations at Michigan State University. Her main interests revolve around trade unions, community-based organizations and worker centers in the US and Europe. Currently she is focusing on member commitment, organizational structure, and mobilization. Her work also analyzes the diffusion and adaptation of core organizing elements from the US to the UK and Germany and how these processes are moderated by institutional, socio-economic context. She can be contacted at tapiam@msu.edu

Hill, Symon. 2013. *Digital Revolutions: Activism in the Internet Age*. Oxford: New Internationalist Publications Ltd. (147 pp. plus Index, £9.99/US \$16.95). ISBN: 798-1-78026-076-1 (pb).

Reviewed by **Deborah Eade**

I began reading this book in the first half of June 2013 as three still-unfolding events, each linked to Internet-based activism and online activity, made global news. The first was the sit-in in Istanbul's Taksim Square by environmental activists, in protest against the nearby Gazim Park being razed to make way for a shopping mall. News of the protest attracted many hundreds of people with various grievances against the Ergodan government. The riot police used water cannons and tear gas to dispel the peaceful demonstration. Their brutality was captured on video. The 'woman in the red dress', who was sprayed at close range with pepper gas – aimed directly at her (unveiled) head – as she walked home from the university, became what Norman Stone (2013), professor of International Relations at Bilkent University in Ankara, called 'an immediate if reluctant icon'. Rather than cover the protests, mainstream Turkish TV broadcast a documentary about penguins, of all things – widely satirised via social media as a bizarre example of the government crackdown on citizens' right to information on national issues. Meanwhile, in the name of 'austerity', the government of neighbouring Greece closed down public broadcasting and the national orchestras. Thousands of journalists and musicians were fired with no prior warning. What a sad irony for a country that gave birth to the concept of 'democracy' – but also, let's not forget, of oligarchy and kleptocracy. At the time of writing, the laid-off journalists are occupying the buildings and live-streaming programmes, for no pay (Keep Talking Greece 2013).

The second was the wave of demonstrations in Brazil, initially portrayed as a vociferous but containable protest against a 10% increase in the cost of metro and bus fares. Some regional governments swiftly revoked the price hikes. But as millions of poor and middle-class Brazilians took to the streets in one city after another, the protests focused on the spiralling expense of hosting sports extravaganzas at the expense of investing in public services, and stamping out police brutality and endemic corruption. Impressive government anti-poverty efforts notwithstanding, economic growth has by-passed millions of Brazilians. But email was commonplace in Brazil years before it was widely used in Europe, so it is no surprise that the polling firm Datafolha found that 81% of respondents first heard about the protests via Facebook (Reuters 2013). The use of social media both heightened international attention to the issues – and, once again, showcased heavy-handed policing. A video explaining the multiple contradictions, 'No I am not going to the World Cup', was posted on YouTube on 17 June 2013, just before the demonstrations. Four days later it had attracted *2.5 million* views. (You can add to these at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZApBgNQgKPU/>.)

The third was the first of many revelations by Edward Snowden about domestic as well as international espionage conducted by the US National Security Agency (NSA). Whether explicitly or tacitly, since 9/11 most Western governments have justified greater public surveillance as a price worth paying to thwart terrorism. 'Activists,' as Symon Hill points out, 'are used to the idea that the police and other government agencies may be reading their emails' (p. 122). Given that this surveillance has also included active infiltration by private companies as well as security forces, he comments that 'it would be naive not to recognize that hacking is also likely to be a common practice' (p. 124). Few non-activists had reason to imagine, however, that their every online activity was potentially captured in a vast NSA database with no special warrant needed to obtain it. AOL, Apple, Facebook, Google (which owns YouTube), Microsoft, Yahoo and company fell over themselves to deny that they provide users' data to the NSA. British politicians boasted that UK surveillance was squeaky clean, only for Snowden to show that its intelligence agencies set up fake Internet cafés and intercepted phone calls to spy on delegates at the G20 meetings the UK was hosting – and that they routinely shared data with the NSA. In the face of this, assurances that 'if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear' cannot allay public disquiet about, much less justify, comprehensive state-sponsored intrusion into the private lives of law-abiding citizens. It is one thing to lock down your Facebook settings and to assume that email is about as private as PA system. But it is all too easy to imagine how someone might pick up a 'suspicious' profile because they used a credit card to buy olive oil from Palestine or, indeed, reviewed a book with 'revolutions' and 'activism' in the title.

Symon Hill has extensive activist experience on issues ranging from disability rights and economic justice to campaigns against the arms trade and militarism. This 'on the ground' engagement provides an invaluable backdrop against which to analyse the various roles that the Internet in general and social media in particular have played in contributing to social movements. Hill dispels several urban myths. First, facile allusions to 'Twitter revolutions' (p. 16) tend to overrate the importance of technology and to ignore deeper understandings of the reasons for mass political unrest. 'When Tunisian dictator Ben Ali fell from power, there was excited talk about a revolution brought about by the internet. Some found it a convenient explanation – much easier than analyzing economic causes or addressing the complicity of Western governments in oppressive regimes' (p. 17).

He also underlines that although social media can give an outlet to simmering public discontent, and a means by which people can organise and publicise their concerns, they are only one component of political activism. 'The internet has not been the cause of this wave of activism' (p. 136), and web-based campaigns such as the Avaaz and 38 Degrees networks can be successful only 'if used as part of wider struggles' (p. 117). While perhaps not every reader would be entirely comfortable with the Tunisian activist who claimed he 'protested on the streets with "a rock in one hand, a cellphone in the other"' (p. 61), Hill is right to point out that 'economics are overlooked surprisingly often when discussions

start about the Internet's role in activism. However much we discuss technology, let's not do so in a way that leads us to forget the slums in Egypt, the soup kitchens in Greece or the newly present food banks in Britain' (p. 26).

A third general point is that online campaigns need to exploit their symbiotic link with conventional media. Ironically, this becomes most important when the state media either ignore protests – in favour of penguins, let's say – or portray the demonstrators as delinquents and hooligans. The first video clips of the Tunisian uprising were seldom posted or 'liked' on Facebook for fear of reprisals, but were shown on Al Jazeera – which enabled Tunisians (and an international public) to view them. Other examples abound in the book, illustrating the importance of making strategic use of mainstream media while being aware that most are for-profit ventures – as the saying goes, 'if you sup with the devil use a long spoon'. Indeed, Hill draws attention to the 'paradox of cyberactivism', which 'usually involves reliance on major corporations', such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, that 'can end up facilitating discussion about campaigns aimed against them' (p. 125).

Hill draws on a broad range of examples of Internet activism, albeit with a slight bias towards UK-based reference points, such as Boycott Workfare, Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT), UK Uncut, and 38 Degrees – although, to be fair, he also gives serious attention to the so-called 'Arab Spring', the Spanish *Indignados* and Russia's Pussy Riot. Equally, his point is that often an event starts in one place, and then snowballs, taking on unique characteristics in each context. For instance, Slutwalks began as a response to a police officer, who said, speaking on personal safety at Toronto's York University, that women should avoid victimisation by not 'dressing like sluts' (cited on p. 47). Over the following year, there were Slutwalks in more than 250 cities worldwide, in each case organised by local women (p. 48). In some cases, women asserted the right to wear 'provocative' clothing, while in others the focus was on everyone's right to dress as they so please – veiled and skimpily clad women sharing a common platform. Similarly, the Occupy movement began as Occupy Wall Street, in protest against the role of the banking and financial sector in bringing about the global economic crisis – although I was pleased that Hill alluded to the time-honoured Latin American tradition of organisations of landless and peasant farmers staging occupations to 'reclaim' idle land. So widespread had the Occupy movement become that items banned from the 2012 London Olympics site included '"demonstration articles or items", accompanied by a picture of a tent' (p. 84)!

The author does not pretend that web-based activism is all democratic sweetness and light, however. While activists may aim to practise non-hierarchical organisational forms, prior experience of doing so tends to be thin on the ground. Women and ethnic or sexual minorities, people with disabilities, or those who are not fluent in English, for example, often denounce discriminatory or patronising attitudes in activist groups that are broadly perceived as democratic. Another problem is that of sustainability, unless there is 'an economic element to resistance' (p. 141). The flipside is that movements

risk being ephemeral or institutionalised; Hill refers to 'the number of religious groups that began as exciting alternatives to the mainstream only to turn into cautious, respectable institutions' (p. 139). I would make the same point about Northern NGOs that in opting to channel government funds end up trading their cutting-edge potential for a knife too blunt to cut butter. More positively, broad-based activism means that people bring a range of educational and social experiences and opinions, leading to discussions on political ideology, organised religion, ethnicity, LGBTQ issues, or what strategy to adopt in the face of violent repression.

In a chapter that is particularly chilling in the context of the outsourcing of government surveillance to private companies, Symon Hill describes the practice of 'astroturfing' – 'fake versions of grassroots activism' that seek to give the impression of a groundswell of opinion on a given issue, often by 'establishing complex multiple identities online, with email, Twitter and Facebook accounts that all match up' (p. 128). Some activist groups have used the same tactic, setting up corporate websites that seem to be authentic, but are in fact intended to expose the company in some way. Gramsci would have recognised this struggle for hegemony.

Symon Hill is well aware that activism is by definition a moving target as groups wax and wane, campaigning methods evolve and those on opposing sides of the battle for ideas try to outwit each other. Technological advances tend to accelerate this evolution. Critics say that people can get the warm glow of being engaged with national or global issues without ever venturing outside. What counts is getting beyond 'cliktivism' (p. 116), which seems increasingly like a virtual form of 'rent-a-crowd' fuelled by perpetual outrage. As he says, 'We need to engage on several fronts at once, with different tactics in different contexts. The Internet is one battlezone among many' (p. 143).

My only real gripe about the book concerns the bibliography. Each chapter has its own references, many of which are to interviews, newspaper articles or websites. For no obvious reason, the bibliography includes only a tiny proportion of the print or online articles. Entries are organised alphabetically but ignore the convention of inverting the authors' family name and given name. It is not clear what this reader-unfriendly quirkiness was intended to achieve.

But this editorial quibble in no way distracts from Symon Hill's timely, informative and thoughtful account of a significant aspect of contemporary political activism.

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About the review author

Deborah Eade worked in Mexico and Central America for 10 years and has published widely on development and humanitarian issues. She was Editor of the journal *Development in Practice* from 1991 to 2010. She has been based in the Geneva area since 1994.

R. D. Smith. 2012. *Higher hopes: A black man's guide to college*. BFI Technology: Rochester. (292 pp; \$9.41)

Reviewed by **Mandisi Majavu**

Henry Gates (1997) once wrote that "every black man...has had his own gauntlet to run. Each has been asked to assume the position." In responding to this challenge, black men have had to think seriously about the kind of masculinity they choose to embody as part of their humanity in this world. The possibilities to choose from range from Nelson Mandela to Malcolm X and to today's multi-million sports stars such as Michael Jordan.

Mainstream society generally embraces black men who turn to sports to express their masculinity. Traditionally, white societies dealt harshly with black men who sought to attain their competency and masculinity by seeking liberation from the chains of imperialism and white supremacy (hooks 2004). "This black man potential rebel, revolutionary, leader of the people could not be allowed to thrive" (hooks 2004). Mainstream societies still view this particular type of black masculinity as being the personification of the threat to white manhood, as well as white male authority and dominance (Wallace 1990). Hence, white males who oppose this type of black masculinity are cast as chivalrous and heroic.

Interestingly, mainstream writing about black masculinity, even by black authors, tells us that all black men need to do to be materially successful is to become better patriarchs (hooks 2004). Meaning, the best that black men can do is to achieve an 'honorary' membership within hegemonic white masculinity by accumulating great wealth (Collins 2004). Further, it is not enough to achieve great wealth or to amass educational credentials, to be accepted by white society black men have to appear to uphold white social values.

R.D. Smith's (2012) book, entitled *Higher Hopes: A black man's guide to college*, gives advice to young black men attending college on how to achieve an 'honorary' membership within hegemonic white masculinity. Smith (2012) identifies his book as a "college-prep book," specifically addressed to black men. Although activists will not find this book useful, what I find interesting about it is what it leaves unsaid. Smith's book is an apolitical treatise on how black men can make themselves useful to societal hierarchies. For instance, Smith advises university black students to choose a "marketable major." In his own words, he writes that "I don't want to ruffle feathers but the job market has often sent clear signals that in hard times it wants people with marketable skills" (Smith 2012: 23).

Smith (2012: 20) further cautions black men to participate in college activities that help them achieve academic success at best "or not detract from academic success at worst." This is not one of those books that explore black radical pedagogy. It certainly is not one of those books that activists searching for alternatives to patriarchal manhood will find useful.

The search for alternatives to patriarchal manhood however is an issue that many black activists are still grappling with. Historically, although movements like the Black Consciousness and the Black Panthers forged a revolutionary black masculinity, the kind of masculinity these movements created was still very much rooted in the values of mainstream patriarchal masculinity. The image of these movements, for instance, revolved around toughness and courage.

In her book, *Black Macho*, Michele Wallace (1990) writes that black male chauvinism contributed to the shortsightedness and failure of the Black Power Movement in the U.S. Similarly, a reading of the South African Black Consciousness Movement literature "reveals an explicit largely uninterrogated masculinist bias" (Gqola 2004). Mamphela Ramphele, a former Black Consciousness activist, confirms this observation. According to Ramphele, the Black Consciousness movement was patriarchal (Gqola 2004).

The anarchist tradition does not have much insight to offer on how to develop a liberatory masculinity either. Writing about Spanish anarchists, Kaplan (1971) writes that the traditional relationship between men and women was carried over into revolutionary Spain. "In the unions and collectives dominated by the CNT, women continued to perform the same work -- homemaking, baking, and washing -- that they had performed before the revolution" (Kaplan 1971).

Ackelsberg (1985) agrees with Kaplan's analysis. She points out that the subordination of women "was at best a peripheral concern" within the Spanish anarcho-syndicalist movement's agenda. According to Ackelsberg (1985), most anarchists simply refused to recognise the specificity of women's subordination, "and few men were willing to give up the power over women they had enjoyed for so long." She explains that although many anarchist men might have been committed, in principle, to a sexually egalitarian movement, "for too many of them commitments ended at the door of the home or at the entrance to the union hall" (Ackelsberg 1985). Similarly, although the Yippies overcame a number of oppressive mainstream habits, women within the movement were still largely supposed to serve men (Albert, 1974). "For now there had to be colorful clothes and liberated smiles and free sex along with an adoring deference for the still male god. Women were allowed only in a lower echelon of participation as 'our women'" (Albert 1974). According to Albert (1974), sexism in Yippiedom was one of its chief weaknesses.

It is worth noting however that a revolutionary black masculinity not only has to overcome mainstream patriarchal values, but also the "weight of a psychohistory that represents black males as castrated, ineffectual, irresponsible, and not real men" (hooks 2004). That is one of the challenges facing black activists today.

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About the review author

Mandisi Majavu is the Book Reviews Editor of Interface. He is a PhD candidate in the Sociology Department, University of Auckland. He is co-author, with Michael Albert, of the book *Fanfare for the future: Occupy theory, Vol 1*. He can be contacted at majavums AT gmail.com